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P R E F A C E .
The results of the stuRy of the legal and 
constitutional problems involved in the evolution of Indian 
Independence are submitted in the following pages. The 
Indian Constitutional problems were of a threefold nature:
(1) The attainment of freedom;
(2) The Hindu-Muslim question, and
(3) The problem of the Indian States.
The long and chequered history of Indian
Constitutional development has been in fact the history 
of the emergence of these problems and of the constitutional 
experiments made in order to solve them.
The British contact with India and the introduction 
of the British type of education and administrative 
institutions, indeed, offer an interesting field of 
investigation. I have made an attempt to taJce full advantage 
of this to bring out their implications. The study of the 
implications of these problems has thus developed into a 
consistent theme, which explains on the one side, the forces 
leading to the partition of India and its consequential 
issues and on the other, the factors that have determined 
the nature of the relations of India and Pakistan with the 
Commonwealth. This theme is also suggestive of the solution 
of the present problems. But no attempt has been made to 
set forth any concrete proposals of this kind here; because 
it was, in the first place, outside the scope of this thesis 
and in the second place was likely to outshadow the 
significance of the theme developed in these pages.
The conclusions reached are not in any way claimed 
to be conclusive and final. The attempt is confined to set 
forth a logically consistent theme which if improved in the
light of criticisms and suggestions may provide a clue 
to the undetstanding of both the external and internal 
political problems concerning India and Pakistan. In this 
sense, it is hoped, this work may serve the purpose of an 
introduction to the study of the laws of the Constitutions' 
of India and Pakistan. This was needed because the present 
Constitutions of these countries are or would be to a large 
extent the product of the experience gained in the past 
and the aspirations of the future. No true understanding 
of the present laws of the Constitutions is possible without 
a comprehensive background. I would, therefore, gratefully 
welcome criticisms and suggestions to improve the work to 
attain this object in view.
The list of the books, articles, reports etc. 
consulted in the preparation of this thesis is given 
separately and it is hardly necessary for me to mention 
how much I owe to them. The literature being vol'uminous 
and mostly controversial, I have made every attempt to 
consult all shades of opinion. I have utilized all the
C t o a 't (nMc
material that was possibly(in India, Pakistan and in this 
country. I have found occasions when it was not possible 
for me to agree with some of the writers and have given tiÿs 
reasons for my disagreement.
I do not claim any profound knowledge of the 
Constitutional laws of the Dominions but I have endeavoured 
to secure enough information to enable me to understand the 
issues connected with the Commonwealth of Nations. The 
problems of India and Pakistan have been predominant in ray 
mind and comparison has been made in the hope that this 
would lead to a better understanding of the similar problems 
in respect of these countries.
The Commonwealth now has become an international 
institution and as such I feel that the study of this living
tu
institution was needed to be made from the standpoints of 
India and Pakistan. I do not know of any book or any 
comprehensive article written by a national of either of 
these countries which satisfies the demand to bring home the 
true value and significance of this institution, i.e. of 
the Commonwealth, to the people of India and Pakistan.
This was equally important from the point of view of other 
Dominions. I feel this may be of some help to enable them 
to appreciate the Eastern point of view in the Affairs of 
the Commonwealth. I have, therefore, restated first^  all 
the objections advanced on this institution and have then 
trieef. to discuss them franlcly. This in its limited scope 
will serve the purpose of removing some doubts which I think 
exist owing to the lack of understanding of the subtle nature 
of this institution.
The study of the British contact with the Moghul 
Empire in India on the one hand and the transfer of powers 
to India and Pakistan within the Commonwealth on the other, 
has incidentally resulted in a comparative study of the 
conventions and customs of these Empires which have been shared 
by both Indians (including the Pakistanis) and the British 
people. This provide^ a sound ground for the claim that India 
and Pakistan (this seems to be equally true of Ceylon) can 
certainly continue to be equal and loyal members of the 
Commonwealth without any formal bindings. There are certain 
points of conflict which if removed would certainly place the 
Commonwealth on a broader and firmer basis.
The thesis consists of ten Chapters, each dealing
with a topic of its o\im; therefore it has not been possible 
to maintain the consistency of size. Some of the Chapters 
can be conveniently divided into two but this, it is presumed,
is not necessary for the purposes of the thesis.
iV
I confess my limitations to deal with such a vast 
subject but I have undertaken this in the confidence of my 
sincerity towards the subject.
It is indeed impossible for me to express my 
gratitude for the kind encouragement I have received from 
Mr, George Philip, M.A., LL.B., Lecturer in Constitutional 
Law at Glasgow University, during the course of my work.
I also thank the Librarians and the Staff of the 
Libraries of the University, Glasgow, and of the India House 
in particular, and the following institutions of India, 
Pakistan and Great Britain in general:-
(1
(2
(3
(4
(5
(6
(7
(8
(9
The British Museum
The Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London 
Lincoln's Inn
The National Library, Edinburgh
The Mitchell Library, Glas gov/
The Royal Faculty of Procurators' Library, 
Glasgow
The State Library, Hyderabad Dn., India
The Osmania University Library,
Hyderabad Dn., India
The Pakistan Constituent Assembly Library.
I also owe my gratitude to the Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations, to the Embassies of the 
Netherlands, of Indonesia, Paidstan House, and to the 
United Nations Association, London, for the help extended 
to me.
R. KEMAL
The University,
Glasgow.
August, 1951.
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SANCTIONS BEHIND BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY 
IN INDIA,
I.
Burke in M s  analytical speeches before the House of Lords
as judges in impeachment of Warren Hastings traced the sources of
the East India Gompany's authority, and found them tv/of old. He
said, "The East India Company itself acts under two very dissimilar
sorts of powers, derived from two sources very remote from each
other* The first source of its power is under Charters which the
crown of Great Britain was authorised by Act of Parliament to grant.
The other is from several Charters derived from the Emperor of the
Moguls, the person in whose dominions they were chiefly conservant.
Particularly that Great,Charter by which, in the year I766, they
acquired the high stewardship of the Kingdoms of Bengal, Bahar and 
(1 )
Orissa." This view is not peculiar to Burke only. It is
also shared by Hastings. "Though the substance of it [Moghul
sovereignty] no longer exists and the Company itself derives its
Constitutional dominions from its ostensible bountyl'(^ ) Ilbert,
in his book The Government of India, also contributes to the same
view. "The authority of the Company", he writes "v/as originally
derived, partly from the British Crovm and Parliament and partly
(3)from the great Moghuls, and other Indian rulers."
To form a comprehensive view.of the foregoing statements it 
is necessary to trace and analyse some historical events that lead 
to this conclusion, while confining the enquiry to those events 
only T/hich tlirow light on. the constitutional and legal aspects.
When the efforts on the part of Queen Elizabeth to establish 
peace with Spain failed, the Queen sanctioned a Charter to the 
Company of London Merchants on 31st December I600 for the monopoly
(1) Burke, The_speec^. Vol. I, p,20.
(2) Forrest, Papers: proceeding (11 May, 1787).
(3) Ilbert, ThejGoyei^^ p.l.
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of trade with the East Indies, The lead in this field had already 
been taken by Protestant Holland, though this part of the world was 
assigned to the Portuguese by the Pope, and that right had passed on 
to Spain as a result of the union of the Spanish and Portuguese 
Crowns. The Charter is copied in full in Pure has* Pilgrims. The 
two important clauses of this charter are given below in parts,
"That they and eyerie one of them henceforth bee, and shall bee one 
bodie corporate and politique, in deed, and in name of,the 
G-overnours and Gompanie of Merchants of London, trading into the 
East Indies, one bodie corporate and politique., in deed and in name,
really and fully for Us and our Heirs and Successors.  being
selected and nominated to the Committees of the said Gompanie as 
afore said, before they be admitted to the execution of the said
offices shall take a corporate oath...... . •
.........  To malce, ordain and constitute such or so many
reasonable laws, constitutions, orders and ordains, as to them or 
greater part of them being then and there present shall seem 
necessary, and convenient for the good government of the same 
Gompanie, and of all factors, masters, marines, other officers
employed or to be employed in any of their voyages  may lawfully
inforce, ordain, limit, and provide such pains punishments penalties
by imprisonment of body or by fines.......
 .....  Without the impediment of Us, our Heirs or Successors
or any of the officers, or ministers of us......  by reasonable and
not contrary or repugnant to the laws, statutes or customs of this 
realme." '* ^
It is plain from the clauses cited above that all that 
authority of governance and legislation vms placed at the disposal 
of the Company v/hich was necessary for the purpose of maintaining 
discipline on the high seas and regulating the monopoly of trade.
The political and corporate aspects of the Company were taken into 
consideration when a legal personality was given to it. It might 
not necessarily have contemplated any acquisition of dominion .
(1) PurGhas’ Pilgrims. Vol. I,
SEE the summary given in the Calendars of
the^ .3tate^  Paperst Colonial; East Indies 1513-1616, p,115.
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in any foreign country, but there were potential qualities given to 
the company which in case of need were capable of developing into a 
state. This conclusion is not merely based upon the words "body 
corporate and politique", but on the fact that the company was given 
powers to formulate laws, enforce discipline and punish offences, 
and it proves that the distance of the places which were to be 
visited, made it imperative to give the company state-like rights 
of governance besides those that were necessary for commercial 
purposes. The later history of the company is a record which 
establishes this statement beyond dispute. It is true that the 
Company vfas not granted in every detail all that was needed for its 
subsequent career in this Charter, but it was constituted in such 
a way that the subsequent powers conferred on it fit in the frame 
so well that the course of its natural growth from its infancy to 
statehood is clear. Such potentialities of the Eoyal grant, it 
seems, were peculiar to the genius of the time when expansion had 
become the order of the day, and had caused the broadening of the 
horizons of vision which intuitively took the unfolded future into 
consideration. In this case, no wonder, if the framers of the 
Charter had some faint idea of the necessities of the enterprisers 
in the New World. Except for the question of the establishment 
of dominion there seems to be no difference between this Charter 
and those granted for the New World.
It was due to these potential qualities in the company’s 
structure that its servants soon after establishing factories dreamt 
of the extension of British power in India. There are instances 
to show that they had followed the lead of their predecessors in 
sharing in the local politics. Archbold observes that this was 
no accident that the Company's organisation developed suddenly after 
the middle of the Eighteenth Century but its dreams of territorial 
greatness can be traced further back from the Battle of Plassey, 
in the correspondence which has been preserved between the Company 
and its servants in India,.^  ^ Participation in local politics
(1) Archbold, An Outline of the Constitutional History
of India, pp.28- 29.
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on the part of the servants of the Company will be observed in these 
pages even further back than Plassey.
The monopoly of trade with India was based on the Royal
prerogative; this prerogative was put to judicial examination at a
later date under different circumstances, and under the influence
( 1 )of divergent ideals, but was upheld by,the judicial authority.'
The company was made subject to the laws, conventions, 
constitution and also Statutes of the realm. The Company was not 
independent of the officers and the Ministers. Thus its status 
in England was that of a corporation. But as the Company was 
formulated for commercial purposes and its field of operation was 
beyond the kingdom it was assigned some political powers too. This 
made it distinct from, and superior to, other local corporations.
Before the Company's contact with India is described, the 
subsequent Charters, Letters Patent, and Acts of Parliament may be 
cited. The whole course of the history of the Company's relation 
with the King and parliament is marked by two factors. The King 
and Parliament gave to the Company what was needed for its gradual 
growth and the process of acquiring strength in India. But as soon 
as it was felt that the Company had gained all that was expected of 
it without passing on the Implied accusations for its actions in 
India to the King and Parliament, they started to extend their 
control on the Company's government in India. “ Thus it was claimed 
that India was ruled in the name of the Grown when the Company had 
established a ^  facto authority there without regard to the rules 
of the constitution that were implied in the grants they received 
from the Moghuls and the Indian rulers or to the contractual 
obligations assumed by them.
Very soon after the first Charter it was realised that the 
power to enforce martial law was inevitable. The Cempany was 
better defined by the Charter of James I in I60I. The Royal grant 
of 1615 vested the power to issue commissions in the Company.
With the establishment of factories in India the power to punish
(1) Bast India Company v. Bandys (I683),
®E_é*gO Keith, Ooiistltuti^naLiyjie P-12-
offences on land was extended. The rivalries between the old and 
new companies and the ultimate union of both are a commonplace of 
history. The Company had to pass through the upheavals of the 
Revolution but still had not lost vigour for its future career.
When the leadership passed on to Sir Josiah Child the Company was 
authorised to maintain forces to defend its factories in India.
Sir Josiah, it seems, had inherited some ambitions of acquiring 
territory in India which made him prepared to measure swords with 
the Emperor Aurangzeb. This instance on the one hand proves that 
Archbold was not wrong in his observations. On the other hand the 
Company was implicitly given powers of maintaining forces for such 
occasions.
The chapter of the British contact with India opens with 
reference to the mission of William Hawkins which was followed by 
that of Sir Thomas Roe.. Neither of them was able to formulate 
commercial treaties with the Moghul Emperor. Instead they were 
granted the privilege of trade with certain immunities. The idea 
of a treaty even on the footing of the subordinate kings 
was not favoured at the Imperial court*
The failure of these two attempts made the Company approach 
the local chiefs. They were able to obtain facilities for trade 
from the local authorities at Surat, But the first acquisition of 
territory was made through the grant of "Wandiwash"'^  chief J who also 
gave the permission to build a castle, a fortress and to mint 
money, '
The grant was subject to the supremacy of the local chiefs. 
This is borne out from the fact that the permission to coin, which 
was considered to be an important attribute of sovereignty, was 
delegated to the Company subject to the superinscription of 
supremacy. Tenverer describes the English money of Fort George, 
Madras, as "A piece of the same size, (reference is to the gold 
coin of the Muslim kingdom of G-olconda) bearing on the obverse a 
nude figure of Vishnu with rays emanating from his person".
(1) Love, Vestige^j^ Vd. I, p. 17.
(2) Tenverer, Voyage. Vol. II, p.l6.
When the southern principality was conquered by the G-olconda 
kings, the company secured a new grant according to the usage of the 
kingdom from the G-olconda kings. This grant also was subject to 
supremacy. The Emperor Aurangaeb after his conquest of the 
G-olconda kingdom renewed this grant by his Imperial "Firman", but 
in every case the conditions changed in accordance with the strength 
of the grantor.
The case of Bombay was different from that of Madras. Bombay 
island, which came to the British Grown by a marriage treaty in 
1661, was transferred to the Company "to be held of the Grown, as 
of the manor of Bast Greenwich in fief and soccage" for the annual 
rent of £10.  ^  ^ This territory thus ceded to the Company according 
to an international treaty gave a new source of strength to the 
Company's status in India. This was the first time in the history 
of the Company that a territory came into its possession on vfhich 
the exercise of full sovereign rights was possible. The 
prerogative of the Grown to govern a ceded colony and also to confer 
on the Company full sovereign rights was in accordance with the laws 
of the realm,
It is not that the Company could exercise full sovereign rights 
on this island which had its sanction in an international agreement 
of the West, but its origin also can be traced in the same sort of 
international agreements in the East. The records of the 
Portuguese relations with the Indian Princes and also with the 
Great Moghuls are a fertile source for a systematic study of how 
the international relations were conducted in the Bast. But what 
has a direct bearing on the subject under treatment is the statement 
that the island of Bombay was ceded by the Sultan of Gujrat to the
Portuguese in 1534. This is the source of an international agree­
ment in the East concerning the island of Bombay.
The Company's sovereignty in Bombay was extended to all the 
inhabitants of the island Europeans and Indians. It is true that 
Indians were given civil jurisdiction^ -^ '' but on criminal charges it
(1) Keith, op. cit. p. 9.
(2) Colvin's Case (I6O8),
(3) Money's Digest, Vol. I. Perozebhais' Case. p.349.
Perry, J. In Perozebhai's case does not accept this 
contention, but Keith and other historians establish 
it beyond dispute.
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seems they were tried at the Company's court. There is reference to
( 1 )one instance of Ramakomte^  ^being sentenced for life for treason 
after a regular trial.
The fact that in Bombay, for some time after its cession,
(2)Portuguese law was continued does not prejudice British sovereignty. 
Even this was recognised by the rules and practice of the Indian 
kingdoms. The Moghuls maintained the laws and customs of the county 
after their conquest.
Reverting to the other possessions of the Company, e. g, Bengal 
was at first a mere field of trade, there were no territorial 
possessions. The Company's legal status entered into a new phase 
with the purchase of the "Zemindary" rights for three villages.
This purchase only effected the transfer of the rights of "Zemindary", 
This was subject to Indian allegiance. The only advantage gained 
from the purchase of "Zemlndary" was that the Company assumed civil 
jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the villages. This power was 
Inferior as compared to that of Bombay because the criminal 
jurisdiction was vested with the "Foujdar" above whom was a "Nazira". 
Legally speaking zemindar's status was that of a faujdar's sub­
ordinate. This is supported by the fact that the Company could 
not as late as the time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1757
with the Hawab obtain the right of minting coins at Calcutta and by
(3)the jurisdiction of the law courts there.
The status of the "Zemindarship" did not remain unchanged, 
though theoretically subordinate to "Faujdar" it practically , 
assumed and exercised extensive powers. When deterioration and 
corruption developed in the local administration, the Company took 
advantage of it and enlarged its own jurisdiction. Further it 
evaded the formal assent from the "Faujdar" and "Nazim" that was
necessary for capital punishment. But the Company was very cautious;
in putting Musulmans to death, fearing that the Nawab would !
interfere and assert his a u t h o r i t y . I n  theory all sentences of !
(1) Perry, J, (Ibid).
(2) Campbell v. Hall, (1774).
(3} Oambridge_gj:8^ Vol. V. p.590.
(4) Ibid.
death should have been submitted to the "Faujdar" at Hugli and the 
"Nazim" at Muvfshidabad before being enforced. As the Company 
extended Its jurisdiction the importance of this theory gradually 
vanished. " J f f
The position of Calcutta as compared with Madras was inferior 
as minting rights were not given in Bengal.
The Company had appointed different heads for the various 
factories. There was no centralisation of Company's administration 
in India. But their rivals, the French, compared withJthis 
point of view were superior. They had already taleen interest in 
Indian politics and wielded influence at the local "durbars".
This induced the Company's servants to demand a change in the policy 
of the Company, The Board of Directors also were alive to the 
situation. Thus centralization of the Indian administration of 
the Company was the result.
The War of the Austrian Succession spread from Europe to India 
and new problems emerged. The port of Madras was conquered by the 
French. The legal interest in this event is that the French 
unfurled the banner of the Nawab along with their own. This was to ' 
testify that the conquest was subject to the Nawab's supremacy.
By this time Indian politics also had undergone a great change.' 
After the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb there was a set back. The 
provinces had become the strongholds of the Viceroys of the Empire, 
who in their domain were the de facto sovereigns, but recognised 
and respected the supremacy of the Moghuls. But this recognition 
was not derogatory to their sovereign and independent status. None 
of them could dare overthrow it. There were new powers like the 
Mahrattas in Central India and Hyder All in the south. They, 
though powerful, had no Imperial sanction or connection with the 
Imperial House. There is evidence to prove that Hyder All was 
prepared to accept allegiance to the Emperor as well as to promise 
tribute if recognised as the "Nawab" of Carnatic. Among these 
Indian powers involved in the struggle for supremacy were the French, 
ànd the British, the Dutch eventually withdrawing out of the picture. 
These changes in politics and the emergence of new political powers 
in India naturally affected the rules and laws of the Moghul Empire,
■9.
In the first place the powers to negotiate and conclude treaties ^ 
were assumed without reference to the Emperor. The authority to 
confer titles and grants was exercised by the Subahdar without 
confirmation by the Emperor. The succession no longer remained at 
the pleasure of the Emperor for his servants, but had become 
hereditary. There was one thing in common; whenever there was a 
change these Subahdars having established their ^  facto authority 
obtained Imperial "Firmans" to legalise their position. For this 
they had to pay large sums as presents. None the less their 
exercise of sovereign powers did not always depend on the Imperial 
firman.
The Emperor gradually became a puppet in the hands of the 
Ministers, lost his own discretion and authority, and acted on their 
advice.
The Oompany though not in an exalted position, like the other 
Viceroys nevertheless was not without some legal sanction behind 
it. They were, the recognised "zamindars" of the Empire, and 
their military strength made them capable of concluding treaties 
with the local chiefs. It was under these circumstances that 
their settlements were brought under one control, of vdiich Calcutta 
became the seat, and Clive v/as put at its head.
By this time the Company was given and had secured powers to 
conclude treaties with foreign governments.
The servants of the Company fully equipped with, and competent 
for both tasks, from the legal as v/ell as the military point of 
view and working under one coherent policy, conducted by one man, 
brought the "Nawab" of Carnatic and also the "Nawab" of Bengal 
gradually under their control. The details of the process of 
this achievement are the domain of history. This superiority 
gained on the fields of battle and in. the courts through intrigues 
was legalised by treaties, to enter into which "Nawabs" were 
competent by the usage of the declining period of the Moghul Empire. 
The Battle of Plassey and the subsequent treaty are generally taken 
to mark the opening of a new era. Now the Company in both these 
provinces - the Carnatic and Bengal - had become the ^  facto ruler 
though still theoretically the "Nawabs" held the authority.
10 .
The Company was allovmd, according to these treaties, to fortify 
their factories as they thought proper. As far as Bengal was 
concerned they were given the privilege of coinage also. The 
Company changed "Nawabs" according to its wishes, and in 1763 
reserved the right of appointing the chief minister of the "Nawabs" 
of Bengal. Throughout the process of making and unmaking the 
local kings, the Company never took cognisance of, the Imperial 
sovereignty. Neither was any reference made to the Emperor in 
connection with the treaties. -^ {7
The Company after the Imperial grant of the "Dewani" of Bengal 
in return for which it agreed to pay to the Emperor six lakhs of 
rupees a year besides giving him the possession of Allahabad and 
the bordering district, assumed the status of a Dewan vfhich was 
superior to that of a Zamindar. This grant of Dewani Hastings
( 1 )has described as "a presumptuous gift of what was not his to give"; -
Again it was said that "His grant gave them nothing which they
could not very well have taken for themselves, had they been so 
(2)minded". Had this been true, Clive would never have attempted
to secure this grant from the Prince who was a fugitive. As a 
matter of fact Clive, was quite aware of the fact that the grant, 
though, from a fugitive prince, was not devoid of the influence 
which his connection with the Imperial blood and the right of 
heir apparentship to the throne inherited.
The Inconsistency of Hastings’ impression about the Emperor of 
Delhi was the outcome of two contradictory factors influencing his 
mind; the ambition of establishing British sovereignty and the 
inconvenience felt due to the customs and rules of the Moghul 
Empire. Two specimens of his inconsistency are given below.
"The sword which gave us the dominion of Bengal must be the
instrument of its preservation and if  it shall ever cease to
be ours the next proprietor will derive his right and possession
(3)
from the same natural character". ' ^
(i)&(2) Forrest, Op. cit. (4 October, 1773)*
SBE Qiambrldge.,m M o£Z_<a..IMia- OP- P-597.
(3) Forrest. Op. alt. ( 12 October, 1772).
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"The King Shah Alam", writes Hastings, but with a different
tone, "can scarcely be of propriety mentioned among the powers of
India. Yet his name and family subsist with all the latent rights
(i )inherent in them". If this was true it was no wonder that
Olive secured the grant of "Dewani" from the fugitive prince, being 
fully conscious of its legal significance,
Hastings was bent upon repudiating the Emperor's sovereignty 
in every possible way. This was not a novel idea of his OT/n.
Olive in his turn had set afloat a scheme for connecting the 
Company's government in. India directly with the Grown, but found the 
Board of Directors and the Government of England unprepared for 
such a scheme, Hastings in the background of his successes did 
not care to determine his policy towards the Emperor in relation to 
his predecessors' experience. He v/rote to the Company, "You 
establish your own power or you must hold it dependent on a superior 
which I deem to be impossible",Hastings further suggests in 
his letter to Lord North, "Whatever form it may be necessary to 
give to the British Dominion in India, nothing can so effectively 
contribute to perpetuate its duration as to bind the power and 
states vfith whom the government may be united in ties of direct
(3)dependence and communication with the Orov/n".
This suggestion was not favoured by the Company. The 
Government also was unprepared. The difficulties vfere twofold.
None of them were in a position to the extent of the risk involved 
in such an ambitious scheme, and legally there was nothing clear- 
cut to go ahead with it. This period was marked by the uncertainty 
of the legal position, of the Company in India and the Crown's 
relation to it. The fact that the Regulating Act of 1773 and the 
Acts of 1784 and 1793 leave the question of British sovereignty in 
India undefined, is in itself a proof of this uncertainty. These 
Acts do not extend sovereignty over Indians.
Besides there was strife between the Ministry and the Directors
(1) Forrest. Cp. cit.
(2) Gleig. Meraoirs, Vol. I, p. 508.
(3) Ibid.
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of the Company. The Company Viras fearful that any direct connection 
of its Indian affairs would increase the control of the Ministry 
which they resented. There was the legal position as well. What­
ever was possessed was the result of the grant or confirmation of 
the Emperors. Any direct assignment of Indian affairs to the 
Grov/n would have amounted to subordination to the Moghul Emperor,
Uncertainty about the legal status' of the Company in India was 
made tense by the mission sent to India under Commodore Lindsay 
with plenipotentiary powers, A. letter of King George III was 
addressed to the Moghul Emperor. No cognisance of the Company 
was taken in this mission. Even the Company was not informed of 
it.
The treaties of international status too do not explicitly 
admit British sovereignty in India. The Treaties of Paris and that 
of Versailles leave the question untouched.
The Government was successful in exercising control over Indian 
affairs to some extent, through the Committee appointed under the 
Act of 1784* For such an act of intervention by Parliament there 
were tv/o bases. The Company originally was subject not only to 
the prerogative of the Crown but also to the statutes of Parliament. 
The origin of the prerogative of the monopoly to the Company was 
confirmed by subsequent Acts of Parliament. The legal opinion 
about the Company’s possessions in India in relation to British 
sovereignty was delivered as early as 1757, on the Company’s 
memorial, praying for the grant of all booty and conquests made in 
India, "In respect to such places," say;. . the Law Officers, "as 
have been or shall be acquired by treaty or grant from the Moghul 
or any of the Indian Princes or Governments, your Majesty’s 
Letters Patent are not necessary, the property of the soil vesting 
in the company by the Indian grants subject only to Your Majesty’s 
rights of sovereignty over the settlements, and over the inhabitants 
as English subjects, who carry with them your Majesty’s laws where 
ever they form colonies.... in respect to such places as have lately 
been acquired or shall hereafter be acquired by conquest, the 
property as well as the Dominion vests in your Majesty by virtue 
of your Icnown prerogative, and consequently the Company can only
13 .
, 4 -.fr  I . - .  M (  ^ )derive a right to them by your Majesty's grant...
This legal observation is based on the theory of. the prerogative 
as applied to the colonies. The point in question is of India, 
the grants as seen in the foregoing details were subject to Indian 
suzerainty whereas the position of colonies was different. English­
men in colonies occupied a sparsely inhabited land which inherited 
no obligations,. In India there were obligations. Whatever was 
given to the Company were either the property rights or the rights 
of collection of revenue or governance, subject to the supremacy 
of the grantors. Now the question is how could the territories 
given with the clear undertaking of subordination possibly accept 
British sovereignty at the same time. If it is taken for granted 
that the act of the Company in accepting such grants inherited 
British sovereignty, the only logical conclusion that could be 
reached is that British sovereignty was under that of Indian, as 
the original was not British but Indian, The legal position, 
therefore, was this. The Company acquired rights under 
obligations of subordination,. The fact that the original Sovereign 
of the Company did not object to such a contract signifies that this 
Sovereign undertook, of course implied, to make the Oompany fulfil 
those obligations. The exercise of sovereignty by the British 
was confined to this extent or was towards safeguarding the rights 
of the shareholders who happened to be British.
It seems that, finding it difficult, the British Government in 
I878 asserted their sovereign rights and sought recognition from 
the French, Reference was made to Article Eleven of the Treaty 
of P a r i s a n d  Article Thirteen of the Treaty of Versailles.
It is worthy of note in this connection that this assertion was 
only made in respect of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, of vfhich the 
Company held the Dewani rights, leaving aside Madras which was of 
common interest, and hence bone of contention. The French did not
(1) Public Record Office, G.0. 77-19, As quoted by
S m b r i d ^ ^ i ^ r y ,  Vol. IV, p. 593.
(2) & (3) SEIS for details, Cambridge History. Op. cit.
pp.595-6. See Chapter on States,
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consent to this. This attempt towards securing recognition of 
sovereignty of an international character indicates that the cloud 
of uncertainty was disappearing from the skies of the political 
minds. Though still without any legal certainty, the British 
statesman seems to have based it on the ^  facto authority held by 
the -Company in India.
There was the alternative possibility of negativing Moghul 
supremacy in order to establish that of the British. The 
sovereignty of the Moghuls though a shadow had not lost its strength. 
It was not so because the Emperors were strong enough to defend 
their authority, but from the fact that there were other Indian 
rulers who held this phantom in very high esteem. There were 
constant attempts by the rising powers to take control of the 
Imperial palace in order to establish authority in the Emperor’s 
name* This was not only so in the case of the Muslim rulers; 
even, the Mahrattas were prompt to accept the post of"Vakil-ul- 
.Mutlaq" 5 but would not dare to overthrow it. Any attempt on the 
part of the British to replace this sovereignty with their own 
would possibly^  have served the purpose of uniting all the Indian. 
Princes against them. There were the French who were ever prompt to 
seize the opportunity to join any alliance planned against the 
British. The French were not oblivious of the possibility of 
extending their support to the Emperor, The whole course of the 
policy of Dupliex and Bussy was based upon the legitimate authority 
of the "Subahdars". The French who had learned well to utilise 
the theory of the legitimate authority of the "Subahdars" would 
never have missed any scheme for taking the advantage of Imperial 
authority. At a later date a letter of the French Officer from 
Deccan contemplated such a scheme, "Owing to the undisputed
sovereign of the Moghul Empire", says the letter, "....  the English
Oompany by its ignominious treatment of the Great Moghul, has 
forfeited its right as "dewan" and treasurer of the Empire....,, 
thus the Emperor of Delhi has a real and indisputable right to 
transmit, to whom so ever he may please to select, the sovereignty
of his dominion as well as the arrears to him from the English".)
('!) Wellesley, Dispatches. IV, p. 652.
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This letter belongs to a later period but its climax is not without 
some foundation in its earlier period.
Hastings had to modify his attitude towards the Emperor seeing 
that neither the Kings like the Nizam were prepared to assume the 
style of kingship independent of the Emperor, nor could he secure the 
support of the Directors and the Government. He, therefore, launched 
upon a modified scheme of annihilating the Imperial sovereignty.
Meanwhile he had talien full advantage of the uncertainty prevailing 
among his countrymen about their legal possession and at the same 
time of the desire to extend their authority in India, The measures 
Hastings took to repudiate the Emperor were■successful in establishing 
the Company’s de facto authority.
Hastings stopped payment to the Emperor, which was due according
to the Treaty of Allahabad. When such payment was demanded he
refused it, alleging as an excuse the famine conditions of the
province, "I must plainly declare," he writes to the Emperor "that
until the safety and welfare of these provinces admit of it, I
cannot consent that a single rupee be sent out of them which it is
( 1 )my power to retain". '  ^ This was not the fact, but just an 
excuse. He writes to Purling, "I think I may promise that no 
more payments will be made while he (the Emperor) is in the iiands 
of the Marahattas, nor if I can'prevent it, ever more. "
Hastings could not repudiate the legality of the demand of the 
Emperor though much in its favour as is apparent from the last phrase 
of the quotation of his letter to Purling* The reason was the 
uncertainty of the Company’s legal position in India. The tone of 
the letter written in his capacity of Governor-General who held the 
seal bearing "The Governor-General, the servant of the Emperor", 
reveals the significance given to the connections with the Emperor,
\
A twist was given to the policy of the Company towards the
(1) Forrest. Correspondence.
Hastings to Shah Alam - 13 September, 1773.
(2) Moncktone Jones, Hastings to purling. 22 March, 1772.
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Emperor to gain the object in a different way, "The Authority of
the Emperor," writes Hastings, "should be in a considerable degree
(1)
restored and means given him to support it". Hastings had
already condemned this policy in the case of the Mahrattas when they
took control of the Imperial palace, ' "What consequences this new
assumed policy of the Mahrattas may produce I cannot foresee; but
think it more likely to embarrass Scindia himself by the burden of
a ruined country, and an exhausted revenue, than to add to his own
(2)powers  in no respect can it prove harmful to our interests".
It is evident that Hastings had learnt a good deal which made him 
change his policy and found himself almost marching on the lines he 
had condemned. But he took a very cautious step by appointing 
Major James Brown^^^ as his agent at the Imperial court of Delhi.
The purpose of this appointment was, in Easting’s words, "To collect 
materials for a more complete and authentic knowledge, not only of 
the Emperor, but also of the independent chiefs and states whose
(h)
territories bordered on his".p^^
Hastings had launched upon a policy of achieving his purpose ■ 
through the modified scheme, hence the carelessness @.s to the legal 
implications of the appointment. The Oompany by this appointment 
of an agent at the Imperial court had extended legal recognition 
of the authority that the Emperor held. This inconvenience was 
felt by Metcalfe even when he instead of an agent had assumed the 
status of a Resident. But to Hastings there was no legal
implication of this; it was merely a means for the collection of 
information.
This was neither the revival of the Moghul Empire as claimed 
by Hastings, nor its, destruction. It was the suspense of the 
contradictory forces.
The most drastic action taken towards establishing the Company’s 
de facto supremacy was due to the resentment against the objection 
raised by Scindia in the Emperor’s name on the installation of
(1) Public Record Office. T.hS- 8 as quoted in the Cambridge
History of India. Vol. V, p.600. -------
(2) Forrest. Papers, Vol. II, p.59.
(3) 1782. P
(4) India Offices Home Miscellaneous. Vol. No. 336. Thomson. Op.cit
(5) Edward Thompson. Making of the Indian Princes, ^
p.280.
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Nasirul Mulk as the Nawab of Bengal. This is important because this
was the formal rejection by the Oompany of the Imperial authority of
the confirmation of subordinate Nawabs; otherwise previously to this
the Nawab of Gujrat was extended recognition by the Oompany without
regard to the Emperor. What brought nearer the fulfilment of the
object was the Mahratta defeat.
The Mahratta war of 1803 is significant because the Emperor's
territories came under the control of the Oompany. The Agent at
the Imperial court changed his style and became the Resident, The
city of Delhi and the bordering districts which were the Imperial
domain were administered by this Resident. The administration was
inspired and instructed by the Government of Calcutta, though carried
out in the name of the Emperor.
Lord Moira's arrival in India coincides with the formal
assertion of the British Government of British sovereignty in India by
the Act of Parliament in 1813, This act, contrary to the preceding
Acts, stated that, "without prejudice to the undoubted sovereignty of
( 1 )the Grown of the United Kingdom, etc. in and over the same". To
some authors this assertion of sovereignty seems to be sudden and also
to involve the question as to the exact time at which that( 2 )
sovereignty came into being.
Undoubtedly there was no formal assertion of this nature either 
in the Acts of the Parliament or in the treaties of an international 
character, but the fact that the legal sovereign of India was in the
in VUt ûicvc»
hands of the Company was probably a sufficient groundy for such, a
proclamation. As regards the sovereignty of the Grovm and 
Parliament over the Company, that was, of course, based on the 
prerogative as to which the legal officers had expressed their opinion
as early as 1757. The assertion of the Parliamentary sovereignty
chronologically spealiing was based on the Charter and the Parliament­
ary confirmation which found expression in 1784 in the form of a 
check.of the Ministry over Indian affairs. "Practically the 
Government^of India passed out of the hands of the Company in I784," 
remarked the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the debates on the Bill
(1) The Act of 1813.
(2]^ Cambridge History, Dp. cit. p.595.
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connecting the Government of India with the Grown* "And from that
date a series of governors appointed under the influence of the
(1)executive government at home succeeded".
This assertion found recognition in two international agreements, 
viz. The Treaty of Paris in 1814 and the Convention with the Nether­
lands in the same year. However it needs clarification as to the 
nature of sovereignty that was proclaimed and the areas that were 
referred to. As regards the first point it is quite obvious that 
any claim of sovereignty with the Government of the Company did not 
go beyond the rights of supervision for which arrangements were made 
through the Committee appointed in 1784. As regards the second 
point the reference was rather vague, and hence must necessarily 
be implied to intend the exclusion of the territories of the Emperor 
taken over after the Mahratta only for the purposes of administration. 
The arrangements made for such administrablonhave been recognised by 
the Judicial Oonomittee^as amounting to a Treaty between two 
independent sovereigns. Thus it can be construed that the 
sovereignty of the Company was never claimed to include the 
territories of the Emperor,
Moira took charge of his office under circumstances which had 
made him. definite in his attitude towards the Company's legal status 
in India, at least from the British point of view. He carried 
the policy of annihilation .of the Imperial supremacy still further.
His seal, no longer bore "The Governor-General the servant of the 
Emperor". It is followed by a chain of attempts to stop the appoint­
ment of "Nazars" on. behalf of the governor to the Emperor. Amherst 
in 1827s says Keith, met the Emperor without the customary ceremonies. 
The request of Hastings to meet the Emperor on an equal footing was 
rejected by the Emperor, but the circumstances of Amherst's meeting 
seems to have been different. Keith describes the reasons for it as 
follows, "Metpalfe on succeeding the former Resident persuaded him 
that the paramount power must be prepared to insist on respect for its 
decisions, and the Fort (Bharatpur) was at last stormed. Doubtless !
(-1) Hansard, parliamentary debate. Vol. C]0:,VIII, p, 1334.
(2) Salig Ram’s case, infra.
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it was this incident among others which induced Alibar II to accord
(1 )
the Governor-General a meeting on the footing of equality".
Contrary to this and the details given by Thompson which prove that
(2)ceremonies were, observed, which he represents as a trick' * to impose 
ceremonials on Amherst which in Indianeyes was the admission of the 
Emperor’s suzerainty.
As regards the subsequent policy of the Company towards the 
Emperor, the following paragraph of Thompson is characteristic of 
the clear description of the practice and the motives influencing 
it, "Yet even Metcalfe looking back on this incident (Amherst’s 
meeting with the Emperor) from Lord William Bentinck’s time 
tolerantly allov/ed it not amiss because the superiority of the king 
(Emperor) is acknowledged and the motive of the acknowledgement 
cannot be mistaken, even while he (Metcalfe) regretted to see that 
the king is assuming more than he did and that Bentinck had given 
way, though ever so l i t t l e " . H e  further quotes Metcalfe as 
"We have on the whole behaved generously towards the King (Emperor) 
from the first; and I never found him unreasonable or assuming....
I should think it our best policy in future to let him sink into 
insignificance, instead of upholding our dignity as we have done. 
Metcalfe further recommended a moderate and cautious use of the 
supreme goverimient’s (,de facto authority of British) right as the
" (5)
fountain of honour until opinion grew used to it. '
These quotations prove that a conscious attempt was made to
wipe out the Emperor’s importance, but as the British were alive to
the ghost of reverence that existed in the immense shadows of
public opinion and active and malignant to the British, it was
recommended that the Emperor be allowed to sink into insignificance.
The terminology of address to the Emperor was modified so as to
(6)
recognise superiority, not vassalage or allegiance;
The Emperor's resentment to these attempts and especially to
Keith. Op. cit. p.120*,
2 ) T homp s on-Me t c alfe. ^
3) Thompson. Making of the Princes, p.280,
'4) Ibid.
Ibid.
(6) Keith. Op, eit. p. 120.
20.
the arrangement that the gifts of the Indian Princes to the Emperor
had to pass through the Resident v/as very strong. In I83I the
Emperor addressed the Directors, avoiding the Governor-General,
threatening that he vmnld refer the matter to the King of England if no
satisfactory arrangements were made in this connection. The Emperor
did not stop there. He sent Ram Mohan Ray as his representative
to London,. The Company then could not deny that it acknowledged
H  )its title as held from the Moghul Emperor.' '
The question of not coining in the then Emperor*s name, was
brought up for discussion because, since I806 after Shah Alam’s
death; the Company seems to have entertained a confused notion that
it safeguarded its status of independence by using the dead Monarch’s
(2)authority on the coins instead of that of his successor.
No purpose could be served, because there was no longer 
uncertainty on the part of the British Government, and in spite of 
the fact that Parliament had assumed supervisory responsibility 
through the Act of 1813 and thus applied a direct supervision. Ram 
Mohan Hay’s mission and his emphasis on the legal position could not 
succeed.
In 1833 this legal basis was repudiated by coining the Indian 
Rupee bearing the British King's image and superinscription.
From these facts, it may safely be deduced that the East India 
Company gradually assumed all the attributes of a sovereign and 
independent power and this was as much sovereign and independent as 
any other Indian prince besides the Emperor, The sovereignty thus 
assumed was confined to the territories held under the grant of the 
Emperor or to the territories that were annexed in accordance Y/ith 
the treaties with other Indian princes. The territories belonging 
to the Emperor and administered by the Company in his name were 
definitely excluded from the territories of the Company, The 
Company, as it will be observed in subsequent pages, entered into 
contract v/ith the Emperor after the defeat of the Mahrattas, as an 
independent state. The sovereignty claimed by the British 
Parliament v/as entirely of a supervisory character because India
(1) Thompson, The Making of the Indian Princes, p.281.
(2) Thompson - Metcalfe, p.137.
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0)
was neither a colony of which occupation by British subjects would 
have implied the extension of British sovereignty, nor was it a 
conquest to make India entirely dependent on the Prerogative of the 
Sovereign .of Great Britain. The sovereign rights assumed by the 
Oompany were based on the treaties, whatever their form might have 
been. The contractual basis of the connection of the British Grown 
with India made it necessary to keep India's personality and 
identity intact, and therefore there was no annexation effected,
n
The foregoing historical facts throw light on the gradual
development of the sovereign status of the East India Company, but
in order to form a comprehensive view of its legal status vis-a-vis
Indian Emperor, it is necessary to study the legal aspect of the
office of Vakil-ul-Mutlaq of the Indian Empire, which the Oompany
assumed after the defeat of Mahrattas, The office of Vakil-ul™
Mutlaq before the Mahrattas was held by the Nizam. When Mahrattas
assumed, this office they tried to exercise the executive sovereign
rights of the Emperor and even protested against the East India
Company's recognition of the Nawab of Bengal. Hastings rejected
this protest, but was uneasy to find the Mahrattas in possession of
this influential office. In view of this he made changes in the
policy of the Company towards the Emperor and set upon the scheme of
re-placing the Mahrattas In this office by the Company. When the
Mahrattas were defeated, Wellesley wrote to the Court of Directors
(1) „
of the Company; "Your Honourable Committee is aware that the
late Madhujl Scindia after having rescued the unfortunate 
representative of the House of Timur from the sanguinary violence of 
Ghulam Qadir obtained from His Majesty the office of Vakil-il- 
Mutlaq, or Executive Prime Minister, for his Highness the Peshwa, 
and was himself appointed to execute the functions of that office 
under the title of deputy, and that Daulat Rao Scindia succeeded to 
the office of deputy Vakil-ul-Mutlaq, and to the consequent control 
which his predecessor had established over the person and family of
(1) Wellesley* s Dispatches, Vol. IV, p. 542.
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the unhappy Monarch of Delhi. By successful intrigue Monsieur Per on
obtained the office of the Commandant of the fortress of Delhi,
which is the residence of the Royal family, and thus secured the
possession of the. person and of the nominal authority of the
Emperor", It was with this background that the Governor-General in
Council suggested : "Among the most important political benefits
of that arrangement, the reputation. which the British name would
acquire by affording an honourable and tranquil asylum to the fallen
dignity of the king..... and by securing the means of comfort to
his  family".
Referring to the arrangement made for the administration of
the territories as a result of the assumption of this office, the
Privy Council remarked that "the final determination of the Governor-
General in Council upon this subject was communicated to the Resident
at Delhi by the letter from the secretary to the Government,,..
the arrangement was as much an act of state as if it had been
carried into effect by a formal treaty signed by the British 
( 1 )Government". In this case the status of the ex-king of Delhi
wns discussed and was held that he was a sovereign. The status of
the ex-king was that of a king. He "was treated and recognised
by the British Government as a King and not merely as a jagiredar
holding an ordinary grant from the British Government. He was the
grandson of Shah Alum, and neither he nor his ancestors had ever
been deposed by his own subject or by the British Government or by
(2)any other power". Discussing the status of the ex-king of
Delhi, it was stated that the sovereignty of the Company’s courts 
in the territories outside the areas set apart for the Emperor 
could be distinguished from those that were administered in the name 
of the Emperor, In other words India was divided into three 
distinct legal entities. (l) The territory round Delhi which, 
after the defeat of Mahrattas, was taken under the administration 
of East India Company in their capacity of Vakil-ul-Mutlaq of the 
Indian Empire. The sovereignty still lay with the Emperor,
(1) Salig Ram v. Secretary of State for India,
I. A. 1872- 73. p. 119.
(2) Ibid. p.127.
23,
(2) The territory in the possession of the East India Oompany 
consisting of the areas transferred under the grant of Diwani and 
other areas annexed as a result of conquest, or in accordance with 
some treaty with Indian rulers. (3) The territories of the Indian 
rulers who had assumed power in the capacity of the Governors of 
the Empire or had established their power as a result of some local 
revolution. The Subahdar of the Indian Empire, in view of the 
declining power of the Moghul Emperors, had established their 
independence though.still as the governors. In the Roman Empire 
the states under its suzerainty aclaiov/ledged the Emperor,”but they 
were formally empowered to enter into foreign relations of great 
importance on their own account and in their own names, and the 
Emperor and the Imperial Diet were quite unable to enforce the 
formal limitation of their foreign relations?^^^ As the states 
of the Roman Empire were treated, disregarding the constitutional 
theory^as full members of the European international society, the 
Indian rulers, including the East India Oompany, had established 
their independence and treated one another "as internationally 
sovereign and made alliance war and peace."
In the light of these observations it may be stated that the
arrangements made for the administration of the Emperor’s
territories and the assumption of the office of Vakil-ulr-Mutlaq by
the Company was in its capacity as a sovereign body. The Company
had in fact a dual capacity; it Y/as a commercial corporation as
well as a sovereign body. This dual personality was more or less
distinct ever since the time it Y/as granted authority to form
treaties with foreign powers and maintained armed forces. This
dual personality has been recognised in a large number of cases and
it has been held that the Company was subject to British Municipal
Courts only in the matters and proceedings undertaken by it as a
( 2 )commercial corporation.'  ^ But it was not subject to them in its
(3)sovereign capacity. The Company claimed and exercised
(1) V/estlake; Papers, pp. 197-8.
(2) Perozebhai‘s case, supra.
(3) East India Company v. Syed Ali. Moore's Indian
Ap.. Ca. 535• ' • The Nabob of the Carnatic v. The
East India .Company. (As quoted in Salig Ram’s Case).
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territorial jurisdiction. "The law established in a number of cases
was that the man who entered the service of the Bast India Company
necessarily lost his domicile and acquired one in India on the ground
that the Company was in a great degree a separate and independent
( 1 )government foreign to the government of England". Therefore the
arrangement of the administration of the Emperor’s territories can 
be compared with similar arrangements with Turkey for the adminis­
tration of Bosnia by Austria, and that of Cyprus by Great Britain.
It was not only the administration of the territories that was 
settled with the Emperor but was also the assumption of the office of 
Vakil-ul-Mutlaq. One was the trust of the administration of the 
territories and the other that of the executive functions of the 
Empire. Now coming to the meaning and juristic conception of the 
term Vakil-ul-Mutlaq, it may be remembered that in the above quoted 
passage of Wellesley it has been translated as the office of "executive 
prime-minister". Another writer states that "this title (Vakil-ul-
Mutlaq) was translated in the diplomatic language of the west as 
paramount"; or, again referring to the Company’s assumption of this 
office he observes: "all three areas were controlled by the East
India Oompany as Vakil-ul-Mutlaq or lieutenant plenipotentiary of
(2 )the Moghul Emperor". '
’Valiil-ul-Mutlaq’ is a Muslim juristic term written both in a
Persian form as Vakil-e-Mutlaq, and in Arabic as Vakil-ul-Mutlag,.
"Vakil" in Arabic means an agent, therefore the term Valialah
(3)(Vikalah) means the office of a substitute, an agency, attorney­
ship*. If examined from the juristic point of view it signifies a 
mandate or authorisation on the basis of a contract, by which one 
contracting party commissions the other to perform service for him. 
According to jurists, the authorisation may be definite or general, 
the first kind of Proxy is called Vakil-e-Mu’aiyan, or limited or
(3)
fixed mandatory. The latter Vakil-e-Mutlaq or mandatory paramountcy.
a) Cheshire: Private International Law. p.168.Buckler: The Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,
1924. (The Political Theory of the Mutiny), See 
for further discussion. The Transactions, I927.
(3) Both The Encyclopaedia of Islam and The Dictionary of
Islam spell it with'"W", but I find "V" phonetically 
more appropriate.
(4) & (5) See The Encyclopaedia of Islam*'^®f'. Hamilton’s
Hidaya.
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This term was in common use in the Moghul Empire, The terms
used in Moghul times denoting institutions and offices are
characteristic of their two sources, i.e. Islamic and Moghal, There
were terms like Dfwan, Vizier, Bukshi, etc. each indicating its
source as either Arabic, Persian, or Turkish. The term "vakil" was
more or less used in its original sense. The following quotations
from Tabaqat-e- Akbari will reveal that the term used in different
connections retained its original sense. Referring to Hemun the
author of Tabaqat-e-Akbari writes first, "Adali now sent Himmi, the
( 1 )Bakhal, who was his Vizier, with a large army." Then just at
this juncture, "letters arrived from Tardi Beg Khan and other nobles
who were in Delhi, stating that Hemun, the Vakil of Muhammed Khan AdâLi
(2)
had approached Delhi * This use of different words by the
same author about the same person appears to give two names for the 
same office, Vizarat or Ministership. But strictly speaking there 
was a'difference, maintained in these two offices. Again about 
Pir Mohammed he writes, "The Pir was the general manager or Vakil-ul- 
Mutlaq of the Khan-e-Khanan, and all business passed through his 
hands. He was the person to whom the nobles and officers had to 
make their applications and of the many, high and low, who attended
(3)at his door, he hardly admitted anyone". This quotation reveals
the nature ahd the authority that was connected with it. Even the 
governors were given vakils who had the whole control of the affairs 
of the province. Referring to Prince 8hah Murad's appointment to 
Gujerat as governor, the author of Tabaqate-Akbari mentions the 
appointment of Muhammed Sadiq Khan as his Vakil. And again the 
government of Malwa was placed under Mirza Ghah Rukh and Shahbaz
Khan Kambu was appointed to be the Valiil and general manager of the
(4)
affairs of Malwa under 8hah Ruldi. These references further
prove that the office was distinguished from Vizarat. It was 
higher than that of Vizier. It constituted custodianship and was
(1) & (2) Ain-e-Akbari. Vol. I, translated by H.
Blochmann. p.258.
Sir H. Elliot: History of India, Vol. V, 
translation.
(3) Ibid. p. 258.
(4) Ibia. pp.460-1|.67.
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entrusted with almost all the powers that were inherent in the office 
to which it was appointed. The term "vakil" was used to convey the 
sense of "envoy" too, but, strictly speaking, it was more than an 
envoy, rather an ambassador or plenipotentiary, A characteristic 
passage conveying this sense of plenipotentiary powers is written by 
the author of Tabaqate-Akbari \Yhen he referred to Ali Khan, the 
ruler of Kashmir, sending his plenipotentiary to the Emperor Akbar 
"along with the two envoys he sent his own Vakil Muhammed Kasim to 
carry his tribute and productions of Kashmir as his presents to the
(i)
Emperor".
It is strange to note that 8arkar does not take cognisance of
such an important office in the Moghul administration,. He only
refers to the office of Diwan or Vizier as the Prime Minister,
"Vizier" or "Prime Minister" seems to have been an honorific title
without necessarily implying the change of any particular branch of
administration* He was no doubt always the head,of the revenue
department, but it was in his capacity as Diwan, All div/ans were
(2)
not viziers. " This omission is highly regrettable in. an authority
like Sarkar, in view of the abundance of literature about the
distinguishable features of Vikalat and Vizarat, Abul Pazl
enumerates names under two heads - Valiils and Viziers, the first
meaning "prime minister" and the second meaning "ministers of
finance". In the list of Vakils first of all comes the name of 
( 3 )Bairum Khan. When Bairuia Khan was Ataleeq, he was much more 
powerful and hence Buckler mentions him as Vakil-ul-Mutlaq - 
mandatory paramount "the company was in precisely the same position 
as Bairum Khan. In 1556 Bairum Khan was the paramount power 
resting on Persian support, three centuries later the East India
Company was the paramount power resting on British support (^1')
The office of Vakil-ul-Mutlaq in the Moghul Empire, before it passed 
on to the Mahrattas, was conferred on Hizara-ul-Mulk, but -he did not 
stick to it. The author of the Mahratta history. Duff, refers to
( 1 ) Ibid.
(2) Sarkar: Moghul Administration, p. 15.
(3) Buckler: Political Theory of Mutiny. Op.cit.
p.162, year 1924.
(4) Ain-e-Akbari. Translation by Blochmann, p.527.
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the renewal of this office to the Mahrattas vfhen the Emperor 
ascended the throne, Vfith great pomp and show(^ ) Hastings too refers 
to this office of ■\rahil-u3_-Mutlaq. in his correspondence with the 
Directors of the Company.
Ylt
It is evident that the delegation of the executive sovereignty 
was in accordance with Muslim jurisprudence and it formed a high 
office in the Moghul Empire. The. Company assuming this office 
acquired a trust in accordance with the constitutional theory of 
the Moghul Empire. But the question arises whether the assumption 
of this status by the Company was in its own account or passed on 
to the British government. Westlake commenting on the legal 
position of the Company states that "an incorporated company is the 
creature of the state to the lavf or the government of which it owes 
its corporate existence and powers, and if it is incorporated for an 
object which brings it into relations v/ith foreign states, the state 
which has created it cannot escape responsibility for the acts of 
its creature...'. The relations into which it has in fact entered 
without being restrained by its parent state, are those of parent 
state of which the company is as much an organ as the department of
(2)
its government", Btuyt referring to Huber’s remarks in the
Palma’s case contributes to this opinion that acts "of the Bast
India Company (Dutch) in view of occupying or colonising the regions
at issue in the present affairs must in international law be
U  (3)
entirely assumulated to acts of Netherlands state Itself".
The logical conclusion that one can draw in. the light of these 
statements is that the obligations and rights ac.quired by the Bast 
India Company passed on to the British G-overnment. As the 
obligations were of subordinate character, they implied subordination 
of the British Government and the crown to the Indian Emperor.
But this is doubtful. The British Government did not seem to have
(1) Duff. History of Mahrattas. pp,
(2) Westlake, Op. cit. pp.195-6,
(3) Stuyt. The General Principles of Lav/, p. 8.
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accepted the implications of the grant of Diwani or the assumption
of the office of Valcil-ul-Mutlaq, It is true that the formal
declaration was made in I813 but it also lacked precision both in
terras of area and the meaning of sovereignty. Moreover the company
was treated as established in above lines as a sovereign state
foreign to the British Government. In view of this difficulty the
theory of trust propounded by Burke seems to be more sound and
logical. Burke speaking of the acceptance of the Diwani by the
Company and acquiescence of Parliament remarked, "When Great Britain
virtually assented to that grant of office and afterwards took
advantage of it, Great Britain guaranteed the performance of its
duties". lie, further illustrating the obligation of the British
G-overnment and Parliament towards the people of the country observed,
"Great Britain thus entered a virtual act of union with that country
by which we bound ourselves as securities to preserve the people in
all the rights, laws and liberties which their natunal sovereign v/as
bound to support if he had been in a condition to support. By
the disposition of events two duties flowing from two different
sources are now united in one. The people of India therefore
come not in the name of the Commons of Great Britain, but in their
own right, to the•bar of this house, before the supreme justice of
this kingdom from whence originally all the powers under which they
(i )
had suffered were derived".
It follov/B from the theory propounded by Burke that the 
responsibility of the British Government was only because it had 
undertaken to guarantee the due performance of the obligations 
accepted by the East India Company, but it did not imply that the 
Acts of the Company were those of the British Government. The 
responsibility of the British Government could be invoked only 
when the Company failed in the performance of its duties. Probably 
it was on this ground that the Emperor of India threatened the 
Directors of the Company that he would refer the matter to the 
British sovereign. It was in this theory of trust that the right 
of the people’s sovereignty was recognised,
(1) Burke. Speeches, Vol. I, p.21.
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The Mutiny brought matters to a head. The British Government’s
responsibility was in fact invoked by the ciroumstances. The
( 1 ')Emperor was held guilty of felony by the Gourt^  ^ appointed for his 
trial and deported to Rangoon,. The charges^^) brought against him 
were based on the claim that he was a pensioner and servant of the 
British Government and therefore within the jurisdiction of the 
trying court. The Indian opinion on the Mutiny is that it was an 
attempt at overthrowing the illegal government of the Company,
The British opinion on this matter is divided. Some writers are in 
full agreement with the Indian opinion. Buckler in his paper the 
Political Theory of the Mutiny establishes that the Miitiny was not 
that of the Indian sepoys against the Company’s government, but 
that of the Company which, as a disloyal vassal of the Moghul
(3)Emperor, had usurped his powers, culminating in an act of treason, 
Others hold that the Moghul Emperor had become a pensioner of the 
Company surrendering his sovereign rights when he accepted the 
Company’s protection after the defeat of Mahrattas. This view
is not tenable in law. The privy Go'uncil in, Balig Ram’s case 
(supra) accepted the last Emperor’s status of a sovereign.. The 
view held by the Privy Council is undoubtedly sound on a legal basis 
and. is supported by the foregoing historical facts. Therefore, the 
annexation of territories belonging to the Emperor by the Company 
should be treated as analogous to that of Cyprus. Cyprus was 
annexed by the British Government whereas the territories of the 
Moghul Emperor were annexed by the Company, which can^be treated as 
an act of British Government. The Gompa.ny was an independent 
sovereign state and .the annexation affected by it was the act of 
state. The military help given by the British Government to
suppress the mutineers was in the nature of an alliance. It is
true that this sounds paradoxical in view of the sovereignty claimed
( j ) See Parliamentary ReportsÏ Proceedings on 'the
trial Muhammed Bahadur Shah. 1858,
(2) Ibid. p. 8.
(3) Buckler; Transactions. op, cit.
(1|.) See Proceedings
30.
by Parliament in the Act of 1813, but it is logical on the ground
that the British Government treated the Company as a sovereign body
and did not accept the implications of the subordinate obligations
acquired by the Company in India. The annexation of the Emperor’s
territories which had a separate legal entity was in itself
succession of state, and this has been accepted by the Privy Council
in Balig Ram’s case.
The British Government extended military help in view of
political expediency, but the Parliamentary enquiry after the Mutiny
held the Company guilty of mal-administration and injustice. The
British Parliament was bound as securities (in Burke’s words) to
preserve the people in all the rights, laws and liberties which
their natural original sovereign was bound to support if he had been
in a condition to do so. The disappearance of the Moghul Emperor
was a sound ground to replace him by the British Crown. The Act
of 1838 strictly speaking did not bring about any fundamental change
in the form of Indian government except that the Board of Directors
and the Parliamentary Gnnamittee were replaced by the Secretary of
State for India in Council. The Secretary of State for India in
Council was a substitute for the Board of Directors of the Company
and he was made a Member of the Cabinet in order to, replace the
arrangements for Parliamentary supervision through a separate
Committee. It may, therefore, be concluded that Parliament thus
arranged for eliminating the Company and taking the administration
under its direct supervision. But this cannot be interpreted as
an annexation of India, because India’s legal identity continued
and what was provided was supervision.. The Interpretation Act
excludes India from the list of Colonies. Cyprus and Ceylon were
annexed, ns Colonies, but India was not a colony and the recognition
of its international personality was made when she joined internation-
al organisation^ The title of the sovereign, the Emperor of India,
also signifies its identity and establishes the fact that India was
an Empire in itself and the head of State was the Emperor of India,
Had India been annexed, as a colony or in any other form, it would
have been necessary to provide some changes in law to enable her to 
join the international organisation, but no such fundamental change
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was brought about.
The connection of the Grown with Indian administration appears 
to be analogous with that of the trust territories known as mandated 
areas. The theory of Pic and Stoyanousky declaring that 
sovereignty lies in the people of the mandated territories though 
in suspense may be contested^^ in the case of mandated territories, 
but it is sound in case of India, The fact that reference to the 
inherent right of the people to receive back the sovereignty was 
made evident ever since it came into British hands is well established. 
Even the often quoted passage of Hastings supports this statement,
"A time not very remote wi3J. arrive when England will on sound 
principles of policy wish to relinquish the domination which,she 
has gradually and unintentionally assumed over this country and
(2)
which she cannot at present recede," Still more distinct is
the categorical statement of Thomas Munro and Henry Lawrence,
Thomas Munro in 182h wrote, shall in some future age have
abandoned most of their superstltitlons and prejudices and become 
sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for them­
selves and to conduct and preserve it. Whenever such a time shall 
arrive it will probably be best for both that the British control 
over India will be gradually with dra wn. Equ all y  unequivocal 
was the utterance by Henry Lawrence made in iSi+Lj., "IVe cannot expect 
to hold India for ever." Macaulay also predicted Indian 
independence. The theory of trust was predominant in the minds 
of members of Parliament when discussing the Bill of Indian 
Government, 1858. There were speakers like Bright, to whom the 
people’s right was the basis for administration, "I accept the 
possession as a fact, there we are : we do not know how to leave
it and therefore let us see if we know how to govern it. The 
people whom you have subdued, who have a right and strong claim on.
you - claims that you cannot forget - .... our children at no
(1) Oppenheim; op. cit, pp.197-200,
(2) Private Journals of Hastings, Part II, p,326.
(3) 8ee. Coupland; Restatement on India, in which
he reproduces similar quotations.
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distant generation (will have to) pay the penalty which we have 
purchased by negating our duty to the population of India."
In view of these statements one can safely state that the 
circumstances under which the responsibility of the British Govern­
ment towards Indian affairs was invoked. -li was obligatory on its 
part to fulfil that responsibility by reverting the sovereignty to 
the people of India which was assumed by the British Government as 
a trust. It is undoubtedly true that the political motives in 
prolonging the rule have played their part in the Indian affairs, 
but none can deny the fact that the identity of India in 
international law was continued unimpaired. This has helped India 
in its ultimate achievement of independence.
U) UviDom ^  ) W
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THE INDIAN STATES AED BRITISH SDPBEMA.GY.
The East India Company started Its political career 
as toll collector then acquired the position of a *de facto* 
authority due to which it entered into treaties with other 
Indian rulers. The assumption of the office of Diwani and 
that of Vakil-ul-Mutlaq provided the *de jure* force for these 
treaties. Throughout this period the East India Company's 
relations with other Indian powers were treated as foreign. 
Westlake asserts that - "(The Company) became an Indian power 
enjoying the same practical independence as the other rulers 
who had risen on the ruins of the Moghuls. It treated those 
rulers as internationally sovereign and made alliance, war 
and peace with them just as England and France acted with 
regard to the Elector of Bradenburg or of B a v a r i a . I t  
therefore may be argued that the relations between the Indian 
States and the Company were governed by international law 
though not necessarily by the law of Christian Nations or 
the law of Nations as it was understood then. The fact that 
the Company itself treated these relations as foreign is 
evident both from the form of treaties and correspondence on 
the one hand and from the maintenance of a foreign department 
on the other. Hastings, writing about the nature of relations 
with the Nawab of Bengal, speaks of them as foreign; "The 
alliance with the Nawab Sirajud Doulah, the Vizier of the 
Empire is the only foreign connection in which this Government 
can be with propriety said to be e n g a g e d . A l m o s t  all the 
treaties of this period testify to the spirit of reciprocal 
friendship and mutual alliance on an equal footing. There is 
recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the
(1) Westlake: Papers, p.198.
(2) Forrest: op,cit. Vol.I, p.8 (Hastings' letter to
the Board of Directors, 25th October, 1774)
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contracting parties. "In almost every case negotiation was 
on the basis of equality between the contracting parties.
To quote another authority - "During the 18th Century treaties 
with the States were made on a basis of equality, hence the 
relationship has a quasi-intemational c h a r a c t e r . T h e y  
were quasi-international if the facts of history are judged 
by the standards that existed before the lapse of paramountcy. 
To have a true view it is necessary to see these facts in the 
perspective Of the then existing law and custom. Lee Warner 
too accepts the character of the relationship with the Indian 
States as international.
The Treaty of 1803 with Scindia was notable for 
two reasons; firstly they had accepted the Supremacy of the 
Company; and secondly they renounced all claims upon the 
Emperor's Authority on the strength of the office of 
Vakil-ul-Mutlaq. It was from this time onwards that the 
Company realised the need for a change in their policy towards 
the States. The change, of course, could not be brought 
about immediately, but when sovereignty was proclaimed in 
Great Britain in 1813 and recognition sought from the two 
European powers, the Compàny fouhd.itself on firmer ground 
to effect this change. The year 1813, therefore, marks the 
dividing line between the theories of relationship that 
subsisted earlier and those that followed and came to be 
known as "Paramountcy."
Much has been written about the nature and theory 
of British Paramountcy in India; but no one has been able 
to trace its origin and elucidate its juristic and constitu­
tional meaning. Almost all writers without exception have 
tried to propound theories relying on the facts and practices
(1) Barton; The Princes of India, p.247.
(2) Chalmers and Phillips: Constitutional Law, p.422.
of British policy with the Indian States. Difficulties 
are multiplied through the fact that paramountcy was not 
a legal term of British constitutional law. It is an 
Anglo-French feudal t e r m . I t  was never used in British 
Constitutional law in the sense in which it defih#d®the 
nature of the British supremacy in India in relation to the 
States. The authors fail to trace its origin only because 
none attached any importance to the relations that subsisted 
between the East India Company and the Moghul Emperor. 
Paramountcy, as established already, has its origin in the 
office of Vakil-ul-Mutlaq that the Company assumed after 
the Mahrattas. The juristic conception underlying this 
office has already been explained and it has been established 
that the Company with the assumption of this office acquired 
the right to exercise supremacy On behalf of the Moghul 
Emperor. All the kings who held the titles of Vizier and 
Subedar virtually passed on into the control and supremacy 
of the Company. But unfortunately the Company had already 
initiated a wrong step to put an end to the importance of 
this office when that was enjoyed by the Mahrattas. Now 
it had to reverse what was done with the approval. Further 
the Company was sensitive about references to the name of 
the declining power of the Moghul Emperor in the conduct 
of their affairs. The Company was not in a position to do 
away with it but was not at all in favour of using the 
Imperial name. At the same tiitfe they could not afford to 
neglect the benefits accruing from such an influential 
office. Therefore as was characteristic of the practical 
English legal mind, they retained the authority, and assumed 
it in practice while dropping its source. When the Moghul 
King was deposed and the Government passed on to the Grown
(1) Oxford Dictionary.
the Institution of paramount power entered a new phase.
Though the office of paramount power or Vakil-ul- 
Mutlaq was virtually assumed only after the defeat of the 
Mahrattas by Wellesley, the Company had already launched 
on a policy in this direction. By the appointment of the 
resident at the Imperial Court of Delhi a practical means 
of attaining this object was established. It is in this 
correspondence that the Imperial consent to the nature of 
future relationship with the Company can be noted. Shah Alara 
in his letter to the Governor-General says; "We now esteem 
you as the offspring of this Royal House and therefore have
in this honour.......... honour you with the title of our
noble and fortunate son.........  The first proof of
affectionate attachment will be displayed in your exertions 
for the restoration of our Imperial affairs and in the arrange­
ment and improvement of the Royal F i n a n c e s . F r o m  the 
last sentence of this letter it is evident that the King had 
expressed his consent to hand over the management of the 
Empire to the British Company, if it accepted the conditions 
laid down. It was this consent of the Emperor which in 
Mujibudawlah's letter too was referred to. "Now that the 
Ëiabat (deputy) of the Vizarat appertains to me, I am in fact 
the Naib here on your part and on the part of the Nawab
Vizier........" But it was neither possible nor advisable
for the Company to take any rash action in this direction 
while the Mahrattas were in the picture. Hastings therefore 
took a very cautious step in appointing a Resident at the 
Imperial Court to #Lom he gives these instructions - "Your 
first care must be, to collect the material of a more complete 
and authentic toowledge. You must study the character, 
connection, influence' and power of the several competitors
(1) Forrest’s papers: letter of Shah Alam received
by Governor-General on 10th September 1783, p.1024.
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for the possession of the King's favour or the exercise
of his authority........." Is it not clear that Hastings
was very cautiously planning to wipe out the competitors 
for the possession of the King's favour, or in a better 
worded phrase, for the exercise of his authority. The 
exercise of authority was vested in an office known as 
Vakil-ul-Mutlaq or paramount power, but there could be no 
two persons holding the same office. It was already granted 
to Peshwa. - The Company had to defeat the Mahrattas before 
attaining this office ; this was achieved by Wellesley.
What was planned by Hastings was achieved by Wellesley only 
a few years later.
A word is needed to explain the legal implication 
of this change. The quotations cited in the foregoing 
paragraphs are characteristic in one sense. They have been 
selected with two ends in view. First to prove that there 
was an office which was not only known to the academic jurists 
but was also used in the practical politics of the Moghul 
times. Secondly, to show that they use the term as it was 
understood by the writers themselves. If all the quotations 
be put together, and the different words used to convey the 
meanings of the term Vakil-ul-Mutlaq be studied in their 
context, it will clearly appear that the office was more 
than that of a Vizier or Minister. The equivalent of Prime 
Minister was Vakil, but Vakil-ul-Mutlaq was much higher in 
dignity and more powerful in authority. It had all the 
virtues and attributes delegated to the holder of the office 
which were naturally vested in the delegator himself. It 
also implied that once the delegator handed over the authority, 
he receded into the background. It was a general delegation 
of authority, hence no reference to, or consent of, the 
delegator was necessary for the performance of the executive 
work of the Empire.
3%
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The question arises whether the States were 
all at onoe brought into the orbit of the. relationship 
of paramountcy with the assumption of the office of Vafcil-ul- 
Mutlaq and also whether there was no other relationship 
existing between the Company and other States? The answer 
to this question can be found in crystallising the cloud 
that impends on the historical facts and the Undercurrent 
of policy of the Company towards the Mahrattas, the Nizam 
and the Sultan of Mysore. The study of the original sources 
of the history of Hastings* times will prove beyond dispute, 
that the Company had virtually established its supremacy 
in two regions - Bengal and Oudh and the Cannatic. The 
Nawabs of these provinces were completely under the influence 
of the Company. The only powers who could be a match tOR 
the strength of the Company were the Mahrattas, the Nizam, 
and the Sultan of Mysore. Among them, it was only the 
Sultan of Mysore who had close relations with the French 
and therefore was the more dangerous to the ever growing 
strength of the Company. The Mahrattas were the rivals for 
the possession of the Imperial authority. The Nizam was 
the only Muslim Subedar with historical connections with 
the Moghul Empire and therefore exalted in the eyes of the 
people. The Company therefore was planning for a situation 
which would involve these three powers in a destructive 
conflict. It first destroyed the Sultan of Mysore as in him 
was the greatest danger to the interest of the Company. The 
Company was cautious enough to secure the support of both 
the Mahrattas and the Nizam, not Only under the pressure of 
strategic considerations but also to ensure that they might 
not join the other party and thereby outweigh the strength 
of the Company. It was not easy for the Nizam to accept
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the supremacy of the Mahrattas as the Vakil-ul-Mutiaq of 
the Empire. The Nawab of Bhopal did not accept the Mahrattas’ 
supremacy in spite of the fact that his dominion had been 
extremely reduced. It was more unlikely on the part of the 
Nizam, who was much stronger than the Nawab of Bhopal, to 
accept it without a trial of strength with the Mahrattas. 
United action was taken by the Mahrattas to impose this 
supremacy and the battle of Kara was its result. liPhat is 
interesting to note in this context is the fact that the 
East India Company in spite of the treaty of alliance with 
the Nizam did not go to his rescue. But when the Nizam in 
his disappointment turned to the French the Company realised 
the danger and re-established relations with the Nizam.
This time, however, the Nizam was neither the victorious 
ally of the Company against the Sultan of Mysore, nor the 
Nizam of intact prestige. The alliance was hot for mutual 
assistance but actual protection on the part of the Company. 
The only power left was that of the Mahrattas and they too 
were ultimately brought under the Company's supremacy.
If these historical facts are studied with the 
treaties between the Company and the Indian States in the 
latter half of the 18th Century and even in the earlier part 
of the 19th Century, military supremacy and protection could 
be read as a clause of the treaty of alliance. There are 
certain treaties which contain clauses requiring the States 
to promise not to employ or have any diplomatic relations 
with foreign powers. The treaties signifying protection and 
acceptance of British influence are those entered into with 
Cooch Bihar 1773, Cochin 1791, Oudh 1798, Mysore 1799, 
and Hyderabad in 18Q0- The Company having established its 
military strength among the Indian powers invented another 
device for extending it to other States. This was the device
H-0
of subsidiary Alliance. It was not a new thing in the 
military history of the Company, It was used both in Bengal 
and the Carnatic. Through the Alliance the Company entered 
into a contract for providing military help to the State 
which promised to bear the expenses of the number of troops 
it required for the purpose. This added to the strength and 
prestige of the military forces of the Company and on the 
other hand made the States in subsidiary alliance more and 
more dependent on the Company. It must not for a moment 
be thought that the Company having established its military 
supremacy as a military paramount power had brought all the 
Indian States into subordinate legal relations. To support 
this view a phrase may be quoted. "The government of the 
Carnatic, the appointment of commands, the regulation of 
forces, the collection of revenue, correspondence with 
foreign chiefs and States, the negotiation and even the 
execution of foreign treaties are strictly the rights of 
the Nawab and must, of course, descend to his heirs, unless 
a provision shall be made for such oases as may admit or 
require the intervention of the authority of the Company.
This is the view about the Nawab of the Carnatic held by the 
most responsible officer the Governor-General of the Company, 
but in spite of this the Company recognised his sovereignty, 
hence it felt the need to base any future intervention not 
on any natural rights but purely on a treaty which provided 
a contractual right. This relationship was considered long 
after by the Privy Council in the Nabob of Arcot versus the 
East India Company^and the conclusions reached by this 
judicial body recognise that the treaties contracted between 
the Company and the Nawab were those of two Sovereigns.
(1) Forrest : Papers Vol.II,op.cit.p.445.
(2) I.A.C. (1893).
Whatever rights were ceded to the Company were based on 
treaties; that is why Hastings emphasised the need to acquire 
the rights of intervention through a treaty even in a State 
where the Company had already obtained enormous influence; 
and Hastings elsewhere refers to the Nawab as a mere pageant 
and cipher. The basis of this relationship being a legal 
contract can only be dealt with under international law.
Almost all the Indian States which were in 
constitutional relations with the Emperor had gradually 
acquired all the "de facto" attributes of sovereignty. They 
were in treaty relations both with the British and the French. 
"Before 1858 it is evident that the Indian States in their 
relations with eacb. other were not bound by the policy of 
the East India# Company. They were at war with each other 
when both had peaceful relations with the East India Company 
and viee v e r s a . T h e  constitutional relationship they 
had with the Emperor was never Considered in their foreign 
relations. There were other states where no such relationship 
existed. The States were capable of declaring war and 
formulating peace independently of either the Company or 
the Moghul Emperor. The question arises as to whether there 
was any international law so to say applicable. It is true 
there was no law of nations as it is understood today; 
but, as has already been established, neither the Indian 
nor the Muslim rulers were unaware of the legal principles 
governing . nations. An English law is the law of
England and French law that of France, so international law 
was that of a certain part of the world which comprises, if it 
was”j. not exclusively composed of Europe, all nations outside 
Europe, but of European blood and Japan. More interesting 
and appropriate is his^^^ remark that "Outside that part
(1) J. Eestlake. The Native States, p.401.
Law Quarterly, Vol. 26, 1910.
(2) Westlake; op.cit. p.315.
of the world which I have indicated there are facts of the
same nature as some of those which international law deals
with; for example, governments and their dependents, as
in dealing with these facts there are the same principles
of national justice to vihich international law ought to
conform and is supposed to conform.........  The Indian system
is free to have its own nomenclature.......(1) It can be
fairly deduced from the observations of this authority on
International law that despite the fact that the Company
had become the strongest power in India, and had in some
oases extended its protection to some of the States, the
States had not lost their international personality as it was
understood in those times. It is wrong to apply the criterion
of modem law to the facts of history, especially since the
present international law owes its origin to the laws of
the Christian nations. The States were not within its sphere
but they had their sovereign existence in India. Even
Persia and China were admitted to the sphere of present
international law in 1899 and 1907 respectivej^y. Again,
even if the States are judged according to the principles
of modern international law they do hot fall too short of
this definition. This classification is here made to maintain
the distinction between the nature of the relationship that
the Company established with the Indian States as a de facto
and that of the de jure paramount power in the position of
Vakil-ul-Mutlaq. The de facto relations were, as has been
observed, entirely based on the principles of International
law and those which formed the basis of relationship between
the paramount power (Vakil-ul-Mutlaq) and the States were
constitutional. The Company had become paramount and thus
succeeded the Peshwa but not the Emperor of Delhi.
(1) Ibidem,
(2) Keith, op,cit.p.
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The Company was in a position to exercise Imperial authority 
in the name of the Emperor but not in its own name. It was 
the delegation of power and therefore the position of the 
Company was that of a trustee. The Imperial authority was 
in trust in the hands of the Company. But it did not amount 
to a complete transfer of the natural succession. In view 
of this constitutional position it could interfere in the 
States, in constitutional relationship with the Empire as 
once Scindia,making the Company's constitutional subordination 
to the Emperor, a basis had tried to intervene in the Company's 
affairs on the recognition of the Nawab. It may also be 
pointed out here that the Company in the first place was 
an independent Sovereign and in the second place had also 
assumed the office of trust. In other words the Company 
acted as an independent Sovereign in its own affairs and 
as an Executive Prime Minister vis-a-vis the Emperor.
The Indian States which had acquired the attributes 
of independence even from the point of view of the Moghul 
Constitutional law were not the feudatories of the empire. 
Mahrattas and Sikhs had acquired their titles without any 
grant.' The rulers strictly speaking held provinces of the 
Empire as governors who in view of the fact that the emperors 
had grown so weak as to act on the whims and fancies of the 
ministers having control over them, had acquired a hereditary 
character of succession and de facto sovereignty. It was 
this constitutional origin of these states that made them so 
eager to gain Firmans for the renewal of the appointment of 
the office at every new succession. The grant of Jagir 
(fief) and the appointment of governorship were two separate 
things. It could have been combined in one person but this 
did not change the distinct legal identities. But the 
Company's servants with the background of feudal system
at home and the meagre knowledge of the nature of the 
constitutlonal principles of India, very effectively 
pursued a policy of replacing British authority as that of 
a lord-paramount. They failed to maintain any discrimination 
between the office of paramount power and the overlordship 
of lord paramount. The fact that the Company was the strongest 
power and enjoyed the privilege of controlling the execution 
of the Imperial authority resulted in a policy which could 
have been better suited to a natural succession than to a 
trustee. The Company was conscious of the declining prestige 
of the Emperor on the one hand and the extension of its 
political Influence on the Indian States on the other hand 
and therefore assumed all the dignities that were usual with 
the Emperor. This fact tan be seen throughout the history 
of the Company's policy towards the State from 1813 to the 
time of the AMutiny. Even the Board of Directors which always 
insisted on the policy of non-intervention seems to have 
changed and approves annexation of territories of the Indian 
rulers in the absence of any natural successor. They justify 
it by relying on the constitution and customs of India as 
if they had succeeded the Moghuls in reality. It is to this 
period that the policy of intervention, annexation, insistence 
on prior permission for adoption, etc., owes its origin.
III.
The main change which came was that the Company 
shifted its policy in relation to the States from the field 
panel of international law to that of constitutional law 
and the Imperial codes. The servants of the Company carried 
this change Out vigorously. Foreign relations had already 
been taken under control according to the treaties with
most of the States and had become a common feature of the 
relations. Some of the States were made to promise not 
only acceptance of protection but also of obedience and 
subordination. The term military subordination in the 
treaties was changed to general subordination. Sanads 
were issued to emphasise both the absence of original 
granters Moghul or Mahratta and confirmation of the Company 
States like Mysore and Kashmir were carvéd . out as the 
Company's grants to the rulers. In these States not only 
subordination, obedience and protection were guaranteed, 
but also the grantor reserved the rights of jurisdiction 
of law if need arose. Enunciation of any new law on the 
part of the State was made subject to the previous sanction 
of the Company. The basis of the relation of the Company 
with States undoubtedly had an air of feudalism. An attempt 
was made to place the Sanad States in this category, though 
they had their original title, by the renewal of Sanads.
Another important feature of the policy.prosecuted 
by the Company, in relation to the States, from 1813 to 1857, 
was that the Company virtually attempted to wipe out the 
different legal em.d historical relations that it had established 
with different categories of States. Common principles of 
policy were made the rule. Big or small, sovereign or 
subordinate, States with original titles or those of its 
own creation, were one and the same for it. The fact that the 
British Company had a sovereign to look back to, encouraged 
this policy, which is considered as one of the main reasons 
for the upheaval of 1857.
On the part of the Indian rulers, reliance was on 
the Treaties, maintaining at the same time differences in 
their dignity according to the size and historical background 
of the State. One thing was common to all of them. All
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without exception had delegated the conduct of their foreign 
relations but were very reluctant to acquiesce in, and 
resentful against annexation or intervention. They accepted 
the supremacy of the Company which came through treaties, but 
rejected the supremacy which emanated from the source of the 
office of paramountcy (Vakil-ul-Mutlaq). This clash of 
views continued till the upheaval of 1857 in which the very 
existence of the government of the Company was in danger.
What is important in the chain of this upheaval is that the 
States with the disappearance of the Moghul Emperor took 
steps which amounted to their legal independence. The name 
of the Emperor was replaced by that of the local ruler on the 
coin and in Qutba.But not all of them rejected the supremacy 
that was established through treaties. On the other hand 
some of them gave substantial help to the Company which was 
in keeping with the spirit of the treaties. It is to this 
period that the Nizam's de jure declaration of independence 
belongs.
A question arises as to whether the States which 
declared their legal independence only in revolutionary 
circumstances when the British Government was engaged in 
putting down the Mutiny could justifiably be treated as 
independent and sovereign States. In the first place, as 
has been established, the States under the Moghul supremacy 
had assumed all virtual and de facto attributes of sovereignty. 
Their recognition of Moghul supremacy according to Eastern 
standards was not an infringement of their sovereignty.
An analogy may be found in Eastern history in more than 
one case. The Abbasid Caliphs had their supremacy recognised 
by all the sovereigns of the time, who were both in fact and 
in law independent; even the Muslim Kings of India accepted 
Khilat and title from the Abbasid Caliph which implied
recognition of Abbasid aupreraacy. Those interested may 
refer to Altutmishfeenthusiasm and efforts to obtain such 
Khilat and Title. Even in Indian history the Mahratta rulèrs 
accepted the supremacy of the Peshwas. In the second place, 
the States recognised Moghul supremacy but they did not 
accept the succession of the East India Company in place 
of that of the Moghuls, and that is why they declared their 
independence. Had there been no declaration of independence 
that would have at least implicitly amounted to its acceptance,
IV.
Ho sooner were the troubles of the Mutiny over, 
than it was decided by the British Government to establish 
direct rule of the Crown in India, and then followed the 
Queen's declaration. In this declaration there is no reference 
at least explicit, to the paramountcy rights, which recognised 
intervention, on the other hand intervention was denounced 
and a solemn promise to respect the treaties that had been 
contracted with the States by the Company was made. This 
omission of paramountcy and acceptance of Treaties explicitly 
recognised the claims of the States and thus put an end to 
the controversy to which among other causes the Mutiny was 
attributed. Such a declaration in the absence of any ruler 
at Delhi in whom the States could see a rival to the Crown, 
shows that this was not because the British Government was 
apprehensive of any such danger but had realized that neither 
the Company nor the Oroivn itself could be a natural successor 
to the Imperial office and thereby utilise all its attributes. 
Contrary to this athe British rightly and wiwely too, implied 
succession to the de facto supremacy of the Company established
through the treaties, by accepting them and also referring 
to the general peace of India at large. This change of 
attitude can be seen in the use of suzerainty in the Royal 
Title Act which was not enacted to make any changes in 
the laws of the governance of India but was intended to fill 
up the vacuum that was created by the mere acceptance of 
treaties without any explanation or interpretation. The 
acceptance of the treaties on the one side implied the 
recognition of the principles of international law as a basis 
of their relationship, and on the other hand the reference 
to the general peace and order of the whole of India needed 
further clarification. The Interpreting Act^^^ for the 
first time used "suzerainty" of the British Grown over the 
native Princes. This provided the statutory definition of 
the nature of the relations with the Indian States. As regards 
the second aspect of the application of international principles 
it was only defined as late as 1891, through a circular of 
the Government of India which stated, "The .principles of 
international law have no bearing upon the relations between the 
Government of India as representing the Queen Empress on the 
one hand and the native States under the suzerainty of Her 
Majesty on the o t h e r . T h i s  circular was issued in view 
of the fact that the Government of India realized that the 
policy of non-intervention announced by the declaration and 
on other subsequent occasions could not be adhered to literally. 
This declaration gave birth to the controversy that existed 
between the States on the one side and the British Government 
on the other. The nationalist writers taking the third point 
of view thus making the controversy move in a triahgle.
Before jthis controversy is assessed and examined one fact must
(1) 1876.
(2) 1889.
(3) Government of India: Gazette, 21st August 1891.
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be made clear, the fact that the British Government used 
"suzerainty" instead of "paramountcy" giving it legal status, 
needs some explanation of the meaning of this term.
The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines "suzerainty"
as "a term of feudal law, is now used to describe a person
or States in a position of superiority to others. The term
was rare in feudal times in E n g l a n d . " F o r  the first time
"suzerainty" was used in the Interpreting Act to define the
authority of the British sovereign over native Princes.
There is no concensus of legal opinion on the meaning of
"suzerainty" and that was the main reason why it was ultimately
dropped from the convention of 1881 between the South African
Republic and the British Government.^^^ In spite of this
difference in legal opinion on its meaning, the term was used
in defining the relations of the Grown to the Indian States, 
not
"Paramountcy" was/employed in the legal and important official 
documents. This change was more conspicuous in the fact that 
the word "paramountcy" used in the Indian Independence Bill 
was dropped and "suzerainty" was used instead.
With this background to the meaning of the term 
and history of its use it seems appropriate to enquire why 
"suzerainty" was employed to replace "paramountcy" and the 
sense it conveyed in this context. As far as its original 
feudal sense is concerned it cannot be strictly applied to 
India as a whole, even the States which were the East India 
Company's creation joined the ranks of the other Princes taking 
advantage of the common policy that the Indian Government 
followed towards the States. There was another marked 
difference, feudal suzerainty implies allegiance both of 
the subordinate and his subjects to the suzerain or his 
overlord. This was not the case even of those States which
(1) Encyclopaedia Britannica: Article - Suzerainty.
(2) Ibidem.
were the East India Company’s creation, Sidgwick describes 
three characteristics that could be noticed in the evolution 
of feudal suzerainty: "First, intenser and closer relationship 
or lordship and service. Second, the relation of the individual 
to his land. Third, the exercise of government function over 
free men."^^^ NO one except Tupper tries to define the 
relationship in the terms of the feudal system, who does so 
in spite of the fact that no such evolutionary facts are to 
be noticed. The question of suzerainty was raised in the 
case against the Gaekwar of Baroda. It was explicitly laid 
down that, " ’suzerainty’ is a term applied to certain inter­
national relations between two sovereign states whereby one, 
whilst retaining a more or less limited sovereignty, acknowledges 
the supremacy of others. Such a relation may be in the nature 
of a fief or conventional i.e. by some treaty of peace or 
alliance in contrast with the fief; which is a sovereignty 
granted by a lord paramount, over some defined territory 
accompanied by an express grant of j u r i s d i c t i o n . " I t  was 
further stated that "His Highness by International law is 
not capable of being made a co-respondent in a suit for 
dissolution of marriage in the High Court in England."
"Suzerainty" according to another authority is a
term of feudal law as is the case of vassalage "and
scarcely appropriate to modern state relations. Nevertheless 
they have survived, although with a somewhat altered meaning.
In its most appropriate sense it would appear to denote a 
St at e which, although once' a part of a paramount state, has 
as a result of agreement or disruption, established itself 
as a separate political community, although without achieving 
independence in its external affairs relations." As compared
(1) Sidgwick: Development of European polity, p.202.
(2) and (5) Statham v. Statham etc., A.G. 1912, p.95.
(4) International Gases, p.45.
with the above cited definition, the Indian States were 
at no time part of the paramount state, hence do not come 
in the purview of this definition.
The suzerainty that was used to define the relations 
with the Indian Princes was conventional relying on treaties 
and allowances in contrast with the fief. Even those states 
which owed an express grant of territories and jurisdiction 
over it subsequently were brought into line with other States.
The other form Of the extension of supremacy
known to international law is known as a protectorate.
The main difference being that, a "protectorate" flows from
or is a reduction of the sovereignty of the protected state.
Suzerainty is conceived as derived from and a reduction of
the sovereignty of a dominant s t a t e . T h e  only title to
it, being the superior strength of the protector state.
It has been admitted that the protected states of India in
this sense in the majority of cases have their own titles.
There is no grant of territory or jurisdiction originating
from the British Grown. There are writers like Sen who
classify the Indian States according to their titles. He
says, "Vassal states, comprise all those States which derive
their titles from grants......... Such are the Sanad States
of Bundel Khand and some of the Simla Hill S t a t e s . T h e y
do not, of course, exhaust the list of the States in this
class. Even the Sanad States, as a matter of fact, had
their own title. According to Leslie Scott, the Sanad is
nothing more than an evidence or record. "The word 'Sanad'
(in older documents often spelt 'Sunnad' as it is pronounced) 
been
is, as we have/informed, in common use in India, not only 
of diplomatic instruments of grant, but in ordinary commercial
(1) Encyclopaedia Britannica: op.cit.
(2) S. Sen; Indian States, p.18.
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documents, and receipts for money, and means merely evidence 
or record." As far as the meaning of the word "Sanad" 
is concerned we have nothing to disagree with, hut its use 
in documents of grant explicitly conveys the sense of 
subordination. It is a commonplace of Indian History that 
as a result of conquest Sanads were issued hy the Conquerors 
to confirm the titles of the conquered sovereigns and states.
A record of such Sanads issued hy Aurangazeh after the 
conquest of the Qutuh Shah* s Kingdom could he seen hoth in 
the State Archives at Hyderabad - known as Daftar-e-Diwani 
and Mai - and in family Archives of the several people as 
well. ïhe Sanad States though they had their original titles, 
gained recognition for these titles through Sanads from the 
Crown. A Sanad is an evidence of agreement, hut the only 
difference being that the agreement is completed hy its 
acceptance. The Acceptor is not a signatory and this form 
therefore has been used for those who are inferior in status.
The other form similar to a Sanad is an agreement.
"Agreement" should not he understood, as far as Indian States 
are concerned, in the sense of its international usage.
Its history demands certain qualifications to this. In order 
to form a correct view of the meaning of this word Hastings* 
following paragraph may he read. *’No. - is a Persian copy 
of a Cowlnama or agreement on engagement which I obtained 
from the Vlzlex confirming to Raja Chief Singh and his posterity, 
the stipulations formerly made on behalf of his father,
Balwart Singh, the Vizier desired that the stipulations made 
in favour of the Rajah might he executed in this mode rather 
than hy an article in the treaty, and it was equqlly satisfactory 
to the R a j a h . **(2)
(1) "Report of the Indian State Committee, 1928-29.
cmd.3302 - Counsel’s advice, p.66.
(2) Selected State Papers: Vol. I, p.26.
Further referring to the grant of Kara or Oorah
to the Mahrattas hy the Emperor he says ”........ given a
Sanad for Corah or Kurrah to the Mahrattas." This 
suffices to show the original memiing of these two words.
The meaning they originally conveyed establishes the fact 
that these forms were used in order to show that the person 
in whom they originate is the natural fountain of the authority 
they confer.
V.
The States classified according to the form of
the relation, that is treaties, engagements and Sanads, can,
of course, he distinguished from one another, in stature.
But now we have to see whether this principle of distinction
and differentiation could he maintained as regards their
legal status. There is one common thing retained hy the
States and recognised hy the judicial bodies of Britain,
this is the suzerainty common to all from the small State
of Kathiwar to the largest States like Hyderabad. In
(2)
Hemohand de Ghand v. Azam Sakarlal Chotaralal established 
that the jurisdiction exercised in connection with Kathiawar 
was political and not judicial in its character. Kathiawar 
as a whole was not within the King’s Dominions. There had 
been no assertion of territorial sovereignty. The legal 
entities of these territories has thus been distinguished 
from those included in the King’s Dominions.
The princes were to a greater or less extent 
sovereign within their own dominions and the legal aspect 
of international law has to he applied in their -relations with
(1) Ibidem, p.30.
(2) Hemohand Dechand v.'Azam Sakarlal Chotamlal,
I.A.C, (1906) pp.1-29.
the British Government. The sovereignty held hy the States 
was common and as far as this is concerned all States were 
governed hy this rule and were the same in the eyes of the 
law. Sovereignty rested with the States except to the extent 
to which it has been delegated to the Crown, "To the extent 
of such transfer the sovereignty of the State becomes vested 
in the Crown, whilst all sovereign rights, privileges and 
dignities not so transferred remained vested in the ruler 
of the State. The phrase ’residuary jurisdiction’ is sometimes 
used in official language. In our opinion it is the state 
and not the Crown which has all residuary jurisdiction."
There are two points referred to-in this theory propounded 
hy the legal councils of the Princes in their support.
First, that the sovereignty is divisible, secondly the 
transfer of certain rights of sovereignty transferred to the 
Crown hy the State, leaves them with the rest of the sum total 
of the sovereign rights which they call residuary jurisdiction. 
As far as divisibility of sovereignty is concerned, there 
seems to he a consensus even among the writers of the opposite 
group. Sovereignty is divisible within the State hut not 
without. State sovereignty within the State can undoubtedly 
he divided between its different organs, this rule was rather 
carelessly applied to the fact that the States had transferred 
certain sovereign rights to the Crown, as has been maintained by 
some, eminent writers.This transfer does not amount to the 
division of sovereignty. It is the delegation of sovereignty. 
Thus it can he plainly stated like this - sovereignty within 
the State is divisible hut without it is only delegatable. 
"Division” has the sense that the States with their divided 
sovereignty do not have separate entity, for this purpose 
they are one, merely parts of one. It can he further explained
(l) State Committee Legal Opinion, p. 61.
on the analogy of the internationally recognised sovereign 
States in relation to U.N.O. The fact that the members of 
this international body agree to abide by the clauses of the 
Charter implies limitation of sovereign rights to the extent 
that they are transferred. As soon as any member state 
breaks away from this body such rights revert to it.
The states are foreign territories for the British 
Government. Hot only the Slates but the territories of 
Berar also are foreign. Berar was a territory of which the 
administration was handed over according to the Treaty. It too 
remained a foreign territory for all purposes. The Indian 
States are foreign for the purposes of the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act of 1890. The sovereignty of States like Tanjore and 
Faridkote has been judicially r e c o g n i s e d , T h e  criterion 
of separate entity depends on three factors as has been laid 
down in the judgment of the Madras High Court by Sir D ’Arcy 
Reilly:
(1) The people of thé territory must owe allegiance
to the ruler;
(2) The Laws enforced in the State must be the
ruler’s laws, either made or recognised 
by him;
(3) Those laws must be enforced by his courts
deriving their authority from him and 
not subject to the judicial control of 
any outside authority. (2)
The States are in possession of sovereignty which 
fulfils all these three conditions. It may be asked what 
about the States in which magistrates were appointed by 
British authority. This question was decided in the Kathiwar 
case and it was maintained that the fact that the British 
officers were in charge of the judicial administration does 
not bring the territory and such administration subject to
(1) Secretary of State versus Kamachi Bai, 7 M.I.A.(Tanjore) 
Guru Dayal Singh versus Rajah of Faridkote 1894*23 A.C.
(2) Kotha Venkata Rama Ready versus Bhopal Mao (Gadwa)
53 M. 968.
Dthe Municipal Courts of Britain because though such adminis­
tration was made by British officers the authority behind 
it was that of the rulers.
There are certain objections raised in this 
connection, first and foremost is that the Indian States 
have been made subject to the laws made by the British 
Parliament, In defence of this view Lee Warner quotes 
37 George Ilb Chapter 142 Section 28 which imposed a 
restriction in respect of;lending money to Indian Princes 
without the consent of the Court of Directors or Governor- 
General in Council. The relevant clause runs like this -
"...... be it therefore enacted no British subject by
himself or by any other person directly or indirectly employed 
by him lend any money or other valuable things to any native 
prince in India by whatever name or description such native
princes shall be called ” This is legislation entirely
meant and confined to British subjects, the mere reference 
to Indian states in no sense of law extends the authority 
of British law to the State’s territory or the persons of 
their sovereigns, therefore to read the extension of juris­
diction of this Act on the Indian Princes is not at all 
tenable in law. Every sovereign state is empowered to regulate 
the conduct of their subjects. It may be in relation to 
another individual, or class, within the State or another 
Sovereign State or any class in that State.
Another objection raised is that for all international 
purposes, at any rate, the whole empire, including the protected 
State united to it must be regarded as one nation represented 
by the British.Government. The treaty of extradition with 
Germany of 1872 was signed to the effect that the British 
Government took the responsibility for this obligation for 
the whole of the Empire, and therefore the Indian States were
"bound to 0 0 -operate in rendering the Treaty effective in 
their dominions too. As has "been said hy Westlake: "If 
the hands of the British law cannot directly reach the 
fugitive offender outside its own jurisdiction, the State 
which har"bours the fugitive must produce him on British soil 
where he can he dealt with according to law. " There are 
two answers to this defence: first, the States hy delegating 
their sovereign rights regarding foreign affairs have implicitly 
accepted the o"bligation of co-operating with the British 
Government in this sphere.
In the same way the declaration of war and 
conclusion of peace in the war of 1914-1918 as well as that 
of the last war was made on behalf of the States along with 
India not because the States had no sovereign rights of their 
own, but because their sovereign righls of making war and 
peace were delegated to the British Government which had 
taken the responsibility for conducting their foreign relations 
as a whole. In the second place, as far as the handing over 
of a fugitive was concerned, this was regulated according 
to an agreement between the Government of India and the 
States. An Extradition agreement to this effect was mutual 
in its operation and the fugitive defined as that of the 
Indian government included fugitives coming within the 
definition of the treaty above cited. In the eyes of the 
Courts of the States any such fugitive was the fugitive 
of the Indian government. All necessary procedure had to 
be adopted in order to secure the person*: of the fugitive.
A common practice in Hyderabad State was that the British 
Indian Courts used to utilize the political agency of the 
Resident who in his turn used to send the ease to the
(1) Westlake: op. cit. p. 272,
political secretary of the State. It was necessary to 
establish a prima facie case on which the High Court used 
to give an order for handing over the fugitive. It is 
plain from these facts that the extradition arrangement was 
not ; derogatory to the sovereignty of the States.
The last but not the least objection is based 
on the fact that the rulers of the Indian States were bound 
to loyalty to the Crown and that their rulers have beeny 
and could be punished by fine, by the deprivation of salutes, 
and in extreme cases by deposition. The rulers are legally 
liable for an offence to a penalty imposed by a.political 
s u p e r i o r . T h e  Maharaja of Gawalior was reprimanded for 
his military JheifihienQÿ, and the history of British relations 
with the State was "one of constant military interference 
and chastisement of the Durbar troops, the strength of which 
was considered dangerous.
The Indian States Committee has particularly 
chosen two cases, namely those of Baroda and Manipur.'*^
In the Baroda case a Commission was appointed to go into 
the complaints brought against the ruler’s administration and 
to suggest reforms. In 1891 violent dispute occurred in 
Manipur State which led to the abdication of the Maharaja, 
especially because Mr. Quinton and his colleagues were 
beheaded under the orders of the Senapati or General (the
brother of the Maharaja), and the Prime Minister of the
, /'A'i these
State.'- In almost all/cases the procedure adopted was
political. There was no normal judicial procedure or trial
adopted. "When a ruler Was deposed for his complicity in the
death of his Uncle and was interned outside his State, he
appealed to the Privy Council against the findings of the
(1) Tuppers (Sir Charles Lewis): Our Indian
Protectorate, p. 5.
(2) Lee Warner: op.cit. p. 24.
(3) Baroda Case 1873-75 Manipur 1891-92.
(4) State Committee, pp.16 & 17.
Commission* It was held that the conviction of the ruler 
was by a Commission appointed by the Government, "in its
political and sovereign character...... and was not in any
sense a C o u r t , f r o m  which any appeal could be heard. In 
other words the action taken by the British Government in 
these cases was an Act of State. An Act is so defined only 
when it is taken against a sovereign. The fact that the 
British Government took action against the rulers did not 
establish the extension of British jurisdiction over the 
State but on the other hand its political and sovereign 
character, proves that the States were treated as sovereign.
VI.
Now the term "suzerainty" as it was used in 
relation to the States both by the British Government and 
the judicial bodies, was used not in its original sense of 
feudatory relations but in its modern sense, showing its 
usage in international law. "Suzerainty" therefore expresses 
in this connection international guardianship. It does not 
imply the extension of sovereignty. "Sovereignty" is used 
in the sense of territorial sovereignty or of the word 
Dominium> in Roman law, even to the extent of the rights 
coming in the sphere of foreign affairs. The term "division 
of sovereignty" implies Dominium. The States delegating to 
foreign powers do not pass on Dominium on these rights, on 
the other hand they place them in trust with the British 
government. This fact can be further explained on the analogy 
of the sovereign rights over railway area and cantonments 
that the At ate placed with the British Government. The
(1) Mahadev Singh (Panna) versus Secretary of State,
I.A, . 1904. p. 239.
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The jurisdiGtlon exercised hy the British Government in such 
areas displayed all sovereign attributes except Dominium.
The Privy Council in Mohammed Yusufuddin versus Queen Empress 
held that the jurisdiction over the railways in the territory 
of the Nizam was exercisable to the extent and limits of 
the Deed."
Suzerainty therefore can be conceived as derived from, and 
a delegsbion of, the sovereignty not of a dominant state but 
of a state under suzerainty. This at least is the case in 
British suzerainty in relation to the Indian States. The 
source is the State and not the British Govemment. Thus 
there remains no difference between a protectorate as defined 
in international law and a Protected Indian State under 
British suzerainty as explained in the above paragraphs.
Protectorate in international law, may be called 
a kind of international guardianship, but "it is characteristic 
of a protectorate, in contradiction to suzerainty, that the 
protected state always has, and retains for some purposes, 
a position of its own within the family of Nations, and that 
it is always for some purposes in International Person and a 
subject of international law."^^^ Keith maintains a distinction 
between protectorates and protected States: "The essential 
characteristic of the protectorate is that the Crown assumes 
and exercises full sovereign authority, though without annexing 
the territory* In the case of the protected State the sovereign 
authority belongs to the sovereign of the State, and not in 
any sense to the British Crown, and the role of the latter 
is derived from treaty arrangements with the States which do 
not confer any sovereignty over them, but give powers and 
duties in respect of either or both internal and external 
affairs, or the latter almost e x c l u s i v e l y . I t  is not
(1) Mohammed Yusufuddin vs.Queen Empress 2C.A.>p,239> 1904*
(2) Oppenheim. op*cit. p. 169.
(3) Keith: The Governments of the Brit ish Empire (1935)
p.508.
desired here to go into the intricacies of the term and its 
proper use but it is evident from' the foregoing facts that 
sovereignty belonged to the rulers.
The inability to unearth the legal principles under 
the political actions of a democratic Imperial government 
have led many eminent scholars both of India and Great Britain 
to fallacious conclusions and the controversial character of 
the problem has supplied fertile ground for propounding 
theories, which try to treat the controversial problems with 
the theoretical background. The theories propounded by the 
State C ommittee also signify the theory of personal relation­
ship. The legal aptitude of Prof. Holdsworth could neither 
stand feudatory theories of Tupper nor the defence of 
A.P. Nicholson and Leslie Scott in favour of the Princes.
He was equally unsympathetic to Chudgar’s book which could 
well be treated as a production inspired by a hatred of the 
Princes. Two important characteristics of the theories he 
put forward in the State report and supported and explained 
in his article are notable. In the first instance he raised 
the law of the relationship of the Indian States with the 
British Government, from the sphere of Constitutional law, 
but does not carry it any further than a special kind of 
constitutional law, thereby adjusting it to contain certain 
elements derived from international law. In the second 
instance he treats paramountcy as a part of the prerogative 
of the Crown but at the same time distinguishes it from the 
other parts of the prerogative as he treats paramountcy 
as a source of this distinct prerogative and not vice versa.
For his definition of constitutional law he relies 
on Dicey’s criterion, "constitutional law is the body of 
law which includes all rules which directly or indirectly 
affect the distribution or exercise of the sovereign power
6.2-
in the State. Hence it includes (among other things) all 
rules which define the members of the sovereign power, all 
rules which regulate the relations of such members to each 
other, or which determine the mode in which the sovereign 
power or the members thereof exercise their authority." 
Professor Holdsworth relying on this definition concludes,
"the rules which govern the relationship between the paramount 
power and the States are covered by this definition. And I 
think that the part of constitutional law of British Empire 
into which this relationship falls is that part which is
concerned with the prerogative of the Crown........  but it
is very distinct part; and, in order to differentiate the 
distinctive features it is necessary to distinguish it from 
other parts of the prerogative."^^^ This definition of 
constitutional law’is applicable if the whole Empire of which 
India and the Indian States formed a part, could be treated 
as one state. But this was not true,if the Indian States 
formed a part of the State then there could not have been any 
act of State in relation to them. The fact that the States 
have been treated as sovereign states by the judicial bodies 
of Great Britain by denying appeal to the Acts of the British 
Government in their relations, and also by extending immunities 
to their heads, established it beyond dispute that they were 
sovereign in the eyes of the judicial bodies of Great Britain. 
They were not therefore parts of the State. To say that they 
are within the British Empire is quite different from saying 
that they are part of the state, i.e. Great Britain. They 
were not even subject to the appeal to the Privy Council as 
was the case with the Dominions. The constitutional law of 
Great Britain has a peculiar character of its own, besides
(1) A.V. Dicey: Law of the Constitution, 9th Edition, p.23'
(2) Holdsworth: The Indian States and India. Law
Quarterly Review, Volume 46, 1930, p.424.
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the law of the Constitution of Great Britain, there are 
constitutional conventions relating to the Dominions hoth in 
their relations with the United Kingdom and with one another.
These Constitutional principles and doctrines also form part 
of this subject, but even these principles do not cover the 
relationship of the British Government with the Indian States.
The relationship with the Indian States seemed to fall within 
this sphere for two reasons. In the first place, the 
notification of the Indian Government that the principles of 
International Law will have no bearing upon these relations 
signified a change of policy. The criticism levelled against 
this notification by Professor Westlake was, "the only criticism 
to be made on that notification is, that it would have been 
more accurate to speak ih it of international law simply than 
of the principles of international law." It is a commonplace 
of the conventions of the British Empire that there is no 
international law, applicable to the relations of its different 
parts with the Great Britain and with one another. But as has 
been pointed out by Professor Westlake, they were not devoid 
of the principles of International Law. The States regulated 
their relations with the British Government, according to the 
principles of International Law, but not in accordance with 
International Law. Some Indian writers define this law as 
inter-Statal l a w . F r o m  this point of view Indian States 
form a peculiar type of law which at least according to the 
definition given by Dicey could not be defined as constitutional 
law and it is equally futile to define them by terms like 
"inter-Statal law" which have no universal recognition. As 
was done by the State Committee which left it undefined "they
( ‘5)fall outside both international and ordinary municipal law.
(1) Westlake; The Native States: Law Quarterly, 1910,
Vol. 26, p.312.
( 2) Pannikar ; 1 . 4 Li,?. .
(3) St6te Committee, p. 25.
Therefore they said that "the States were sui generes. i.e. 
there is no parallel to their position in history, that they 
are governed by a body of convention and usage not quite like 
anything else in the w o r l d . A s  far as this body of usage 
and convention is concerned, it is for convenience’ sake 
defined as "a very special part of the constitutional law 
of the Empire." It might be used in this sense not as defining 
the relationship of the United Kingdom but those of the Empire, 
though the legal status of the Indian States was superior to 
that of the Dominions who had the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Privy Council and were subject to Parliament derogatory to their 
legal sovereignty. What it is desired to point out is that it 
would have been much better to leave the relations undefined.
In the second place constitutional law was used to define the 
Imperial character of the Crown, and to this extent there was 
some justification. There v/as one glaring omission in that 
neither in the report nor in the article did Professor 
Holdsworth attempt to maintain the distinction between the 
statutory use of suzerainty and paramountcy in the Imperial 
character. But he has rightly maintained paramountcy as 
the source of prerogative and not vice versa, that means he 
recognises that the "state territory is not -British territory 
nor are the subjects whilst residing in their States British
subjects...........  Paramountcy.........  does not depend
on the Common Law; and though in some respects the mode 
of its exercise has been prescribed by statute, its existence 
is not dependent upon statutes. Existence depends upon
(2)treaties, engagements and Sanads supplemented by usage..... "'
He maintains that "other powers are only exercised by the 
paramount power in partnership with the States - one example 
is the control of military forces of the States, paramountcy 
therefore is a part only of the prerogative." But "paramountcy
(1) Ibidem.
(2) The Indian States and India, 426.
is a very distinct part of the prerogative." This distinction 
he brings about in two ways. "In the first place, its ambit 
and in the second place the legal basis upon which it rests are 
different. Prerogative extends over all countries which are 
governed by the Crown, either by itself, or by the.British 
Parliament, or by the Parliaments of the Dominions; and it 
extends over all the subjects of the Crown in that country 
and over aliens temporarily resident there. Paramountcy, 
on the other hand extends only over the Indian States and 
the Indian States are subject only to that part of the 
prerogative which is included in the term paramountcy.......
paramountcy  does not depend for its existence on
common law, but on treaties, engagements, Sanads supp3.emented 
by usage and suffrance." The Legal Council on the other 
hand established that the Crown had no sovereignty on any 
state by virtue of prerogative or of any source other than 
cession from the rulers of the State. There is no contro­
versy about the treaties which seceded sovereign rights, 
it is only the usage, sufferance and other political practices 
for which a theoretical explanation with a special kind of 
prerogative was propounded. Usage in municipal law was said 
to be itself sterile; capable of creating neither rights nor
(p)
obligations.'-  ^ Julian Palmer said, "we cannot say that 
because a thing was done once or twice a right to do it 
again arises.
The usage and sufferance was further supported 
both by Sir W. Holdsworth and Lee Scott but in different ways. 
The element of consent was deduced by both of them from the 
acquiescence in the actions taken by the paramount power in 
relation to the States. There is no evidence that the States 
had acqiiesced in them. Almost all writers have quoted
(1) State Committee, p. 61.
(2) Legal Opinion; State Committee, p.67.
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Lord Reading’s reply to the Nizam about Berar in which. Lord 
Reading had emphasised the point that paramountcy was the 
sole judge and arbitrator on the points of dispute between 
the paramount power and the State, also between the States 
themselves. By many it has been adduced that the Nizam’s 
silence was an acquiescence recognising the rights of para­
mountcy to make arbitrary decisions. Unfortunately writers 
of today like Professor Watmul^^^ of America quote Reading's 
letter which after the conclusion of the treaty^^^on Berar, 
establishing the joint sovereignty of British Crown and Nizam, 
had lost its importance. The fact that Reading’s did not put 
an end to the Nizam’s claim on Berar, and the Brit|.sh 
Government had to revise the so-called Perpetual Lease 
Agreement proves that, what was attempted was nullified by 
subsequent actions. The same was the case with other States; 
there was no voluntary consent, if there was any consent at 
all it was brought about by some kind of pressure. Such 
consent in municipal law cannot be justifiably recognised, 
but the well-known principle of forced consent in International 
law might be applied to the relations with the States.
Now the question arises whether' the treaties, 
engagements and the principles of usage and suffranee could 
be binding on all States, or whether each State has its own 
particular ease. There is no doubt that a good number of 
treaties have common clauses like cession of foreign powers, 
defence, protection, etc. but that does not mean, that common 
clauses inserted in the majority of treaties justify their 
generalisation. It is true that the Political Department 
of the Government of India tried to build up rules of 
precedence out of the various incidents in relation to the 
States. They tried to find guidance for the policy of the
(1) The Status of Hyderabad during and after British
Rule in India: American Journal of International
Law. Jan. 1949*
(2) The Agreement of 1936.
British Government on particular occasions in relation to 
a particular state out of the stock of history. This was 
like the experts of the foreign department giving their 
opinion on a ceirtain issue deriving guidance out of the 
history of their government’s relations with that particular 
country. There was ho legal force given to the precedents that 
is known in the domain of law. Each State had its own historica] 
background and own treaties with the British Government.
VII.
A certain action taken in connection with any 
State was legally defined as an Act of State. The sole 
judge of such acts was the British Government. If it relied 
upon any precedent of a similar situation it was entirely 
a guidance directing and influencing a sovereign state in 
its action with regard to another sovereign state.
Julian Palmer gives a different name to the rights 
of paramountcy in relation to the States. He calls them 
resultant rights which are the product of the association 
that subsisted between the paramount power and the Indian 
States. He calls them rights because he too believes that 
the law of relationship falls within the sphere of cinstit­
ut ional law rather than international. A deep study of the 
development and changes of the paramountcy revealed that, 
in view of the disappearance of the natural sovereign, an 
attempt was made to base the natural paramountcy rights 
acquired through the office of Vakil-ul-Mutlaq, on some 
other suitable basis. The only basis that the legal minds 
could deduce was that of usage and sufferance, because the 
rights that the treaties gave to the paramount power were 
not compétent to cover the whole field of the policy of
the British Government. Usage and sufferance were found 
untenable in the eyes of law and as a result of this defect 
ahother basis, that of resultant rights, was supplied by 
Julian Palmer. The difficulty is solved merely by admitting 
the international character of the relationship. Super­
ficially the incapability of the States for the declaration 
of war and peace, the existence of the jurisdiction of the 
British Government over Railways, cantonment areas, Residencies, 
Civil Stations and over European subjects and occasional 
interference in the internal affairs of the State, seemed 
to be great objections.
Intervention is not unknown in the sphere of 
international law. The issues that were made a cause of 
intervention by the British Government could be well covered 
by the definition of Intervention in International law.
In International law the checking of sovereignty by exterior 
action of sovereignty is known as intervention.Great 
Britain sent her troops in 1826 at the request of the 
Portuguese Government against a threatening revolution on 
the part of the followers of Don Miguel; and in 1849, at the 
request of Austria, Russia sent troops into Hungary to assist 
Augtria in suppressing the Hungarian revolt. The Indian 
States had agreed by treaties to seek help in case of danger 
from within and this was in no way derogatory to their 
sovereignty as was the case with Portugal and Austria. It 
could not be a violation of the territorial sovereignty of 
the States. Then there was the case of intervention by 
Great Britain, France and Russia, the guarantors of the 
independence of Greece for which the title.was acquired 
by Article 3 of the Treaty of London of 1863. The purpose
(1) Oppenheim: op.cit. p. 250.
Of this intervention was to re-establish constitutional 
government. This was an intervention in the internal affairs 
of an independent sovereign State. In the same way a State 
that had guaranteed by treaties the form of Government of 
another State or as in India the reign of a certain dynasty 
over the same, had a right in case of a threat to that dynasty 
to in t ervene.There  was not a single case of intervention 
in the internal affairs of an Indian State by the paramount 
power which could not be covered by any of the seven categories 
enumerated by Oppenheim. The other cases of jurisdiction can 
either be covered by the doctrines of servitude or extra­
territoriality.
As far as the declaration of war and peace is 
concerned the States have surrendered these rights to the 
paramount power, hence the declaration of war and peace on 
behalf of the paramount power automatically applies to the 
States. It is not their incapacity, but the delegation of 
this capacity is affected through treaties. This is the 
repository international personality of the States with the 
Paramount Power. It had not lost its personality by its 
delegation. As regards Railways, and cantonment jurisdiction 
it is the right ceded to the paramount power in accordance 
with defence and protection treaties. It is a well known 
fact that the Railways in India were planned in accordance 
with the requirements of the defence of the country. Besides 
this the jurisdiction was limited by the terms embodying it, 
as had been established in the case of Queen Empress versus 
Mohammed Yousuf uddin, 1897. I. A. 137.
Contrary to the Railway jurisdiction a different view is
(2 )
held as regards Air. The States seem to have partnership 
contract rather than subordinate surrender, the jurisdiction
(1) Ibidem, pp.251-254.
(2) In recent times Indian delegations to international
organisations consisted of members of British
India as well as of the States. ,
both on Railways and Cantonments was temporary. The fact 
that this jurisdiction was transferred back to the States 
proved beyond dispute that the jurisdiction was qualified 
by the terms of its delegation. The repository power over 
this jurisdiction though exercised all the attributes of 
executive sovereignty short of dominium. As soon as the 
paramountcy lapsed or the paramount power and the States 
agreed to its termination, it came to an end.
So far an attempt has been made to clarify the 
view that as far as the legal status of the States is concerned, 
they were fully sovereign and this sovereign status was 
recognised by the British Government and British courts.
Their delegation of foreign affairs and defence implied 
co-operation with the British Government in these fields.
Their relations were governed by the principles of international 
law. International law was not applicable to the relations 
of the States with the British Government in the same way 
as it was in the case of the Dominions. Their position was, 
as far as legal status was concerned, higher than those of 
the Dominions. Their relations were not devoid of inter­
national principles.
Were the Indian States international persons? 
Undoubtedly they were sovereign persons as they were not 
incorporated in any British Dominion or in any other State.
Their status was not analogous to a federated State which 
loses its dominium in the part of its sovereignty which is 
transferred with its dominium to the federal government in 
terms of the federal subjects. In other words, as a result 
of the formation of federation the locus of sovereignty of 
the constituting States changes. There was no such change 
of locus amounting to the organic formation of a new legal 
personality like federal government implying dominium, so 
the criterion of divisibility did not apply and hence there
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was no loss of their sovereign personality. Openheim
rightly remarks: "Independence is not unlimited liberty for
a State to do whatever it likes without any restriction.
Further he states: "And it is generally admitted that a State
can through conventions, such as a treaty of alliance or
neutrality and the like enter into many obligations which
hamper it more or less in the management of its international
affairs. Independence is a question of degree whether the
independence of a state is destroyed or not by restrictions."
Strictly speaking there is hardly a State in existence which
is not in one point or another restricted in its territorial
supremacy by treaties with foreign powers. There were many
sovereign states which had concluded treaties with other
states which imposed such restrictions that they appeared to
many writers of international law derogatory to their
independence but that was not the case. For example, various
treaties of the United States with some of the Republics of
the Caribbean which gave the United ; States the right of
intervention and obliged the latter not to conclude any
treaty endangering their independence or granting their
territory to a foreign power. Or the case of South Africa
through Article 4 of the Convention of London 1884 stipulating
that South Africa should not conclude any treaty with any
foreign state other than the Grange Free State without
approval on the part of Great Britain. The Cuban Republic also
was made to undertake not to enter into such treaties with
foreign powers as would impair the independence of Cuba.
ground
Some writer treated Cuba on this/just as a protected State of 
the United States.
Then it can be asked were they internationally 
recognised as sovereign independent States. There was no 
possibility of such recognition. The States had suspended
(1) Oppenheim:
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their international personality in favour of;the paramount power, 
This surrender had brought about restriction on them. The 
States were international persons but placed under servitude. 
This restriction was defined according to the terms of the 
treaties the States had contracted with the paramount power.
It is undoubtedly an established fact that the 
Indian States had restrictions imposed on their personality 
but what It is desired to maintain here is that such 
restrictions did not amount to destruction of their personality. 
To quote Oppenheim, "Such imperfect International personality 
is, of course, an anomaly, but the very existence of a State 
without full sovereignty is an anomaly in i t s e l f . T h i s  
question has been answered affirmatively by Westlake too:
"It is not necessary for a State to be independent in order 
to be a 6State in international law." in support of this 
view many other authorities could be quoted: "That they
can be full, perfect and normal subjects of international 
law, there is no doubt. But it is wrong to maintain that 
they can have no international position whatsoever." India 
herself was a member of the League of Nations and IJ.N.O. 
before she became fully sovereign and independent. Thus 
it can fairly be stated that the Indian States even when 
not recognised as fully sovereign States were not devoid 
of any international position.
The Indian States have been recognised as sovereign 
States and the actions taken by the British Government 
towards them were treated as Acts of States. The authors 
who have agreed to accept States with imperfect international 
independence in the international sphere as having inter­
national personality, excluded the Indian States not on a
(1) Oppenheim: p. 114.
(2) Westlake: i. p.21.
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matter of law but on a matter of fact. They seem to have had 
no data to decide the case of the Indian States. For 
example, O p p e n h e i m d o e s  not include them in the list 
of protectorates just because he could not find their heads 
6mjoying immunities in international law. As a matter of fact 
it has been held in the Case of Stratham v. Stratham^^^ that 
the Gaekwar of Baroda could not be made a respondent to a 
case because he was recognised as a sovereign.
The Indian subjects were considered as foreigners 
in British India. In Emperor v. J.R. Tewari, criminal 
Revision Case No. 128 of 1925 under the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act of 1915 concerning d'State subject of the State of Benares 
of Bombay, readily took it for granted that "one who is the 
subject of an Indian State can not at the same time be a 
subject of the British Government and that he therefore is 
necessarily to be treated as an absolute foreigner liable 
to be expelled from British India." The Indian subjects 
of course were British protected subjects when abroad because 
the affairs concerning them while they were abroad came into 
the foreign affairs for which responsibility was taken by 
the FaraitoUnt power, henoe this style was implied in the 
treaties concerning foreign affairs. They were excluded 
from the list of British subjects even when abroad for the 
purposes of British nationality.
The ease of Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. The Raja of 
Faridkote established the rule; that "Nevertheless, for 
other purposes and within the domain of private international 
law, such States are to be regarded as possessing an independent 
civil criminal and fiscal jurisdiction." These facts prove 
that for private international purposes too the Indian States
(1) Oppenheim: op. cit. pp.165-6.
(2) Supra.
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were regarded as sovereign States.
There is one more strong point in favour of the 
fact that before surrendering their international affairs 
the Indian States possessed international personality.
Had not the Indian States been, at any time in history 
independent and henoe capable of conducting their foreign 
affairs, how could they delegate these rights to the paramount 
power? Can a person give something to another person which 
he does not possess? This is not possible. The fact that 
the treaties included clauses governing foreign affairs 
prove ipso facto that the paramount power recognised these 
rights to be possessed by the Indian states otherwise that 
would not have formed a clause of the treaties.
The fact that the Indian States did not lose in any 
of the six ways their Statehood, as described by Oppenheim 
negatively prove that they did not destroy their International 
personality. They would not have retained this'personality 
had they changed their persons in any of these ways. Their 
incorporation with other states would have certainly destroyed
. . j .
their personality. "If however a State permanently hands 
ovàr the control of its foreign relations or any material 
thereof to another State it would then cease to be fully 
sovereign, although if it retains its political separateness 
with some capacity for separate foreign relations, it will 
not cease to be an international person, a State may be 
semi-sovereign and still become a member of the international 
body." It may, therefore, be established that the relations 
between the Indian States and the British Government were of 
political character and the legal position was left untouched. 
Even the subordination as revealed by the treaties was of a
political nature. ___________________________
(1) Cobbett, p. Cases on International Law, p.55.
There were States, of course, which had no treaties, 
so to speak. Their relations were defined hy the common 
terms of the treaties of other States. The fact that they 
#ere small in size and importance or that they had no 
treaties did not minimize their legal sovereignty. Even 
the States of Kathiwar and Mahals in Orissa where the British 
Government had assumed control over a good many branches of 
government have been treated as sovereign.Such control had its 
sanction in the consent of the rulers who delegated them to 
the British Government in the interest of the administration. 
The States therefore big or small were equql in their legal 
status but different in their stature.
VIII.
Could these treaties, governing the relationship 
with the State be transferred to any successor sovereign 
government in India? Opinion is divided on this point. The 
Indian States Committee advocated direct relationship which 
for the first time Was admitted in section 210 of Montagu- 
Chelmford Report. Professor Holdsworth maintained that it 
was not possible to effect any such transfer because the 
relations are a special part of prerogative and have a direct 
relation with the Crown, and the Government with full sovereign 
attributes in India would be a new Government altogether.
It was in view of this theory that the State Committee 
recommended that the relations between the paramount power 
and the States would cease to be entrusted to the Governor- 
General in Council and was to be handed over to the Viceroy.
Treaties of a political Character, according to 
International Law and British practice can not be made
■binding on the State in Sucoession. The theory propounded 
hy Holdsworth and Julian Palmer was that the treaties were 
assumed hy the Crown as a paramount power which was distinct 
from the British Government in India. They had a special 
and direct connection with the Crown. This theory was given 
legal sanction only in the Government of India Act 1935, 
not hy any positive inclusion of the term Viceroy in the Act 
itself but through the Letter Patent appointing Lord Linlithgow 
as Governor-General and Viceroy of India. The same Act 
designates the head of the Indian Federation, as Governor- 
General of India and the Person dealing with the States on 
behalf of the Paramount Power as the Crown Representative.
" We d o  appoint you ...... our Governor-General
of India and our Representative f)r the exercise of our
functions in our relations with Indian States ..."
"Ahd we do hereby declare that so long as you shall hold 
the said office you shall while in India bear in addition 
to the styles and Titles of the said Officer, the Style and 
Title of our Viceroy.
Thus for the first time in the history of the 
States, their demand for the recognition of direct relations 
with the Crown was given^somewhat legal sanction. But the 
Indian national writers do not accept this legality. . "The 
successor Dominion Government could not be deprived of 
paramountcy as it is inseparable from the sovereignty of 
British I n d i a . " I t  is argued on the other hand that
the,Government of India was the seat of paramountcy.....
the relations of the Indian Princes were all along with the 
Government of India and through it with the Crown after 1858.
These rights and duties of paramountcy were
(1) The Gazette of India Extraordinary 1st April 1937.
p.3.
(2) Paramountcy in Indian Constitutional Law by
R.B. Naik, p.291.
(3) Ibidem.
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considered as the covenants nmning with the land or praedial 
servitudes and attached to the government for the time being 
of British India whatever form it t a k e s . A n d  also that 
if the Government of England ever became a Republic the 
treaties would be just as binding upon the new Republican 
Government as upon the monarchial Government; and that therefore 
a change in the form of Government makes no difference to the 
binding force of treaties.
Holdsworth replying to these suggestions said:
"In the first place, the rights and duties involved in 
paramountoy, involve rights and duties which relate not only 
to the States and British India but also to the Empire as a 
whole. In the second place, some of the rights and duties
involved in paramountoy.........are of so personal a character
that they cannot be deemed analogous to covenants running with 
the land or praedial servitudes."(^)
Ihere is nothing personal in a constitutional 
monarchy which does not come strictly speaking within the 
purview of Parliamentary authority, hence in the perspective 
of Governmental advice. Even the prerogative is subject to 
Parliamentary authority. Parliament can make what alteration 
it pleases in prerogatives. In the case of A.G. versus 
De Keyser*s Royal Hotel 1920,^^^the Court of Ageal and the 
House of Lords held: "in any case so long as a statute giving 
power of the same nature as the prerogative remains in force, 
it supersedes the prerogative and the Crown is not entitled 
to act under the prerogative." In order to waive this objection 
Holdsworth holds that the prerogative is not the source of 
paramountoy but on the contrary paramountcy is the source of
(1) Sir Viswaswami Aiyam: Indian Constitutional Problem,
210-213,
(2) Ibidem, p.214, asquoted in Ihe Indian States and
India by Holdsworth.
(3) Indian States & India. Law Quarterly Vol.46, 1950.
p.450-31.
(4) A.C. 1920, p.508.
a separate prerogative of the Crown which rests on the basis 
of treaties, engagements, Sanads, usage and sufferance.
This clearly indicates that the distinction maintained in the 
prerogative ordinary and exbraordinary; subject to parliament 
and beyond the scope of its control are not known to the Law 
of the Constitution in England. It can be justified only 
on one ground of practice. The cession of territories in 
India has been treated as a special prerogative and could 
be effected without the sanction of Parliament. Ihstead 
of all this technical complication, in a straight forvjard 
way it can be said that the treaties being of an international 
character could only be assumed by the successor of the 
sovereign Govein ment with the consent of the other pgrty 
to it. As regards the change in the form of Government 
it is quite plain that India by becoming a sovereign state 
did not only change the form of Government but emerged as a 
new international personality. How far could these treaties 
have been made binding had they not been denounced will be 
discussed in the proper place. The mere fact that the Indian 
States were treated at least legally as sovereign States 
establishes the principle that besides other considerations 
the principles of international law should be applicable 
on this point.
Besides this legal point there were tther political 
considerations affecting this topic. The Indian people 
struggled to attain independence from foreign rule and also 
directed their efforts towards responsible government in the 
States. The Congress gradually from the policy of non­
intervention and sympathy changed its policy to direct 
intervention. "The Congress stands for the same political,
(1) The Indian States and India. Law Quarterly,
Vol. 46. 1930. p. 423.
(2) Keith: State in succession.
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social and ecQQomio freedom in the States as in the rest 
of India and considers their status as integral parts of 
India which cannot be separated." Thus ran the resolution 
moved at Hafeipura in.1930. This was a clear indication of 
the policy that the Congress had decided to take in relation 
to the States. Congress encouragement and direct help in 
the Satyagrahas of the State peoples are proof in themselves 
that Indian Independence also implied responsible government 
in the States, with their integration with the rest of India.
The British Government as a paramount power had 
the obligation on the one hand of protecting the dignities 
and privileges of the Princes and on the other hand was 
awakened to the rising tide of the political consciousness 
of the people. The policy adopted was one of non-intervention 
coupled with advice to the Princes to adapt themselves to the 
changing situation. As to the question whether the paramount 
power had any obligation towards the protection of the rights 
of the Indian subjects, the only reference on this point is 
implied in the Queen’s declaration. All these points fall 
in the purview of the later chapters. What is here desired 
is only to refer to the allied points, so that they may be 
exhaustively discussed.
The last important point that needs clarification 
is the fact that the rulers of the Indian States and their 
subjects were given titles by the paramount power. The creation 
of the Chamber of Princes by Royal Proclamation in 1921 is 
also an event which demands explanation. It is a fact that 
the Indian rulers and their subjects were given honours.
This was a somewhat ceremonial aspect of the Imperial character 
of their relations. The attendance of the Indian Princes at 
the Durbars also a ceremonial, implied subordination. But
(1) Indian Annual Register, 1938, pp.299-300.
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this ceremonial aspect cannot be carried so far as to be 
given a constitutional importance, as was the case in the 
Moghul Empire. In the Moghul Empire ceremonials were 
Institutions signifying legal characteristics. Ever since 
the disappearance of the Moghul Emperor, the British Government 
consciously based its relationship on treaties etc. The 
Durbar was held and honours were bestowed upon Indianrulers 
and their subjects after the Moghul fashion. The Indian rulers 
did not object to this because the honours from the Moghul 
Emperor in its period of decline vfere in ho way derogatory 
to their authority, instead they were an advantage to them.
The supremacy of the Moghuls was not the same as was the case 
with the British Government. The British supremacy was 
becoming more and more apparent and effective. On the part 
of the Indian States the ceremonial character of the honours 
was treated on a different basis than that of the legal 
relationship with the Crown. Whatever the contention of 
the Indian States and their supporters, this evidently proved 
the acceptance of protection and supremacy. This practice 
with its historical background can be in no other way 
justifiably explained.
The creation of the Chamber of Princes by Royal 
Proclamation was quite in accordance with the spirit of the 
treaties. The Indian Princes had not only handed over their 
international affairs but their relations inter se. They 
were not therefore in any way entitled to set up a body 
providing a common platform for all of them, unless consent 
was given by the British Government. Without the consent 
of the British Government any such attempts to set up a 
body like the Chamber of Princes would have been contradictory 
to the treaties. Besides this, the Chamber of Princes was 
not supported by all the Princes and some of the most
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important held themselves aloof. This faot itself explains 
well that the mere fact that the Creation of the Chamber of 
Princes was brought about through Royal Proclamation could 
not make the States legally bound to it. legaGLly, proclamation 
had no more importance than an expression of consent. As 
this factor was common to all States instead of individual 
intimations of the consent, a common pronouncement was made 
to that effect,
The Indian States, as has been observed, were 
protectorates in the true sense of the term. Thopigh 
"suzerainty" was used in order to define statutorily the 
nature of the relationship, its use was not in its original 
feudal sense. The term was used in the sensé closer to that 
of Protectorate, because it was based on conventions. The 
fact that the Indian States could be better described as 
Protectorates has been proved by the following points:
1. The rulers of the Indian States were given
immunities as Heads of States while they 
were outside their territory.
2. The actions taken by the British Government
were defined as Acts of State.
3. The subjects of the Indian States were
foreigners as far as British India 
was concerned.
4. Historically the Indian States were as much
sovereign and independent under the 
Moghul supremacy as was the case with 
the sovereignty and Independence of the 
East India Company.
5. The fact that the treaties have clauses
referring to the surrender of foreign 
relations on behalf of the States, 
proved that the Indian States had 
this.title and its acceptance was 
implied in the acceptance of the 
treaties to that effect both by the 
East India Company and the British 
Government.
6. The surrender of International affairs
and defence did not amount to division
of sovereignty in that sphere. The
Indian States were recognised as sovereign
States by the British Courts and enjoyed
all privileges. Their relations therefore
were governed by the principles of International
Law.
From the point of view of internationallaw, 
they were not perfect international persons. Their 
inperfections lay in the extent of the restrictions and 
servitudes or condominium as was the case of Berar accepted 
by Conventions. This restriction, servitude, or condominium 
did not amount to the destruction of their international 
personality. It was a kind of diminutio but it was 
diminutio miniina. How the treaties were denounced in the 
Indian Independence Act and what they implied in the accession 
to the Indian Union will be discussed in the proper place.
THE HrVOLüTIOH OF SELF-DETERMINATION
It is proposed, in this chapter, to trace the principle 
of self-determination in the constitutional development of India 
which has not only determined its course towards independence hut 
has also influenced allied problems. It may still play an 
important part in the future. Before the facts forming the 
landmarks in its progress are enumerated It is desirable first to 
refer to the theory of trust propounded by Burke. The foregoing 
discussion on this aspect has established that the administration 
of India passed on to the Crown on the basis of trust and this 
theory may be contested as far as the form of the Act of 1858 is
oonoerned but there can be no disagreement on its substance. It
was in view of the theory of trust that almost all the statesmen 
who had some knowledge of Indian administration propheoied about 
Indian independence. The people of India had revolted against 
the Company and had been subdued with the help of British armed 
strength. The Mutiny was in itself the result of mal-administrâtion 
by the Company as the French Revolution was the result of the 
tyrrany of the rulers. A revolt of the people of which an example 
was already near at hand for Britain could have certainly led 
British Statesmen to realize the importance of the people.
However the arrangement of direct rule was neither a permanent 
annexation nor an extension of British Sovereignty in perpetuity. 
Strictly speaking it was an executive Sovereignty, with the 
inherent sovereignty of the people of India kept in abeyance. The 
name of the Crown in this context was more legal than real. The 
reality of the sovereignty of the Crown was as much as the 
authority of the trustee is real. Even the Executive Sovereignty 
was, in faot, exercised by the Secretary of State for India who
was given the authority even to over-ride his Councillors. The
people of India remained as expectant recipients of the Sovereignty. 
The Parliament was a superentending body exercising a check on the 
authority of the Secretary of State.
Macaulay reminded the Parliament of its duty that 
"We may educate our subjects into a capacity for better 
Government, that having become instructed in European knowledge 
they may in some future age demand European Institutions.
Whether such a date will come I know not. But never will I 
attempt to avert or retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the 
proudest day in English History.^^^ The policy advocated by 
Macaulay was in fact executed when in 1885 the Indian National 
Congress was created under British auspices. The Congress in fact 
was treated as an instrument for forming contact between the 
Government and the people. Similarly with a view to enlist the 
cooperation and support of the influencial people and interests 
a different procedure was adopted, for which two guiding principles 
seem to have been provided. The first was a good government. 
which implied a change of government to direct government. The 
second principle as the representative character of this 
Gpvernment. Representation does not in its earlier phases signify 
the representation of the people as a whole but that of the 
people and interests which held influence in some way or other.
It clearly implied that a subordinate ruling class was to be 
created, for this an indigenous institution was at hand. The 
institution of the "Durbar" was to be utilized for this purpose.
The spirit undoubtedly was that of the "Durbar". But the form 
that was given to it was British. Again in Macaulay’s words it 
was an engrafting on despotism of those blessings which were the 
natural fruit of liberty. As in Britain it was preparing for a 
transition from an autocratic to an enlightened aristocratic 
Government, Britain had passed through such changes, that is an 
enlightened aristocracy intervening between autocratic and 
democratic governments. In the case of India there was not only 
a hereditary aristocracy but also a landed and commercial 
aristocracy.
(1) Goupland (Sir Reginald) India: A re-statement.
P. 292 (summary of speech reproduced) See also
Hansard, XIX, 1833, 536.
Sir Syed Ahmed Khan had brought home the faot that 
mutiny was the result of neglecting Indian counsel and sentiments. 
Before him many other statesmen who had any knowledge or 
experience of Indian administration, including Dalhousie had 
emphasised the need of admitting Indians to the administration.
The reforms soon after the enactment of 1858 seemed to be 
inevitable from this point of view, and the act which may be said 
to have the representative principle into Indian politics. The 
Indian Council Act, 1861 extended the scope for admitting Indians 
into the legislative Council but it was only a representation 
through nomination. It is, therefore, difficult to assess the 
meaning of the term "representation" in this context. It is 
evident from the nature of the arrangements thus provided that the 
Indians were taken into the confidence of the Government, not as 
the representatives of the people but as a better avenue for 
forming contact between the Government and the people. The fact 
that the control of Finance or the executive were outside the 
purview of this body ruled out the possibility of this stride 
being in the direction of Parliamentary Government.
On the side of administration the need to enlist and 
train Indians was felt. In order to achieve this object, the 
introduction of a British type of education was felt necessary.
It is characteristically English that the ultimate aims were 
hidden away from sight in the final enunciation of the policy that 
was to determine the mode of training Indian assistants to help 
their masters in the administration. This aim ultimately 
inspired the concentration on English literature and science. 
English literature was to be introduced not only as a means of 
teaching the language of the administration but more important 
than that was to become the classics for Indians. English was to 
take the place of Sanskrit, Arabic and Persian. The British 
rulers had made practically no efforts to gain insight into the 
resisting forces of culture in India. The Brahman genius had 
disrupted Buddhism from within. It had also stood firm to a great
extent under the onslaught of Muslim culture, coming to India 
from political as well as missionary sources. The survival of 
Indian culture was due to its amazing capacity for adaptation to 
circumstances, its power of absorbing what was life-giving,of 
modifying what was non-essential, and of rejecting everything 
that would have weakened the foundation of its social system.^ 
Indians be they Hindus or Moslems could not be satisfied with 
English as their classical literature bereft of spiritual 
inspiration instead of their own classics in Sanskrit, Arabic and 
Persian. The gap thus left and the failure to enrich the individual 
personality on the one side and material prospects through the 
admission to the administration forced Indians to develop a dual 
personality.: "In all this there is no wilful hypocrisy. On the 
platform they enunciate in all sincerity sentiments that are a 
real part of their educational apparatus and professional life.
But in their conduct they obeyed forces that were outside their 
professional life and swayed their whole personality.^^ The 
Uhrest thus created in the spiritual domain was bound to have its 
repercussions, âs the conflict of Hindu and Moslem cultures had 
already given birth to the Bhakti movement. To the conflict 
between the East and the West attached the most imaginative and 
enthusiastic Hindus and Moslems, and there dame, into" existence 
revivalist movements, Ray Brahama-samaj and later Arya Samaj were 
the results of this revivalism among the Hindus, Tariqa-e- 
Muhammedia, the Wahabi movement, and even that of Qadyani were the 
most significant among the Moslems. These movements were in 
reality attempts on the part of their founders to revalue the 
tenets of their religion. The purpose in fact was to counter the 
Western influence on thought and to fill the gap that it had left 
in the spiritual domain. It is interesting to note, that the 
British system of education that was adopted with a view to 
westernisation failed in its purpose and on the contrary set afoot
(1) The Education of India: Authur Mayhew. P. 39 - 40.
(2) Ibid. P. 214.
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great resisting forces which turned the character of the political 
organisations which once were cradled by the rulers themselves.
The other important feature of the constitutional structure was 
the admission of Indians to the administration keeping them away 
from the policy-making. The incompatibility could not be dragged 
on indefinitely. Very soon the demand to shape the policy of 
administration on the one side and revivalism on the other 
brought new forces into play in Indian politics. The major step 
taken, was to introduce the reforms of 1909.
II
The Morley Minto Reforms of 1909 were in fact a well- 
planned scheme of concessions to meet the demands of Indian 
nationalism half way, which had assumed an active and revolution­
ary character especially in Bengal and Bombay thereby leading to 
the assasinations of the officials. The most significant aspect 
of these reforms from the Indian standpoint was the introduction 
of the principle of election both at the centre and in the 
provinces. But again this concession was further characterised 
by British caution; instead of being based on territorial 
constituencies, had given different interests agency for election.
A small official majority was retained at the centre. But in the 
provinces elected members out-numbered the official members. On 
the side of the executive Indians were appointed not only to each 
provincial executive council but also to that of the Governor- 
General. These reforms were still in line with the Council Act of 
1892 which intervened between those of 1861 and 1909 as a half­
way house. The foremost issue of this period being a change from 
nomination to election, but the changes were coming in more 
swiftly because the sense of subjection had become predominant 
and the Congress which in 1892 had received the concessions in 
the form of this Act with a view to satisfying its aspirations 
had now changed into an extremist movement. There were still 
moderate nationalists whose leadership was in Gokhale’s hands
They were thinking In terms of colonial constitutional development. 
But they were already losing their grip on the extremists whose 
activities were accentuated by two facts. In the first the 
legislative councils were still regarded as Durburs rather than 
as Parliaments and in 1909 no less than in 1893 both the authors 
of the measures of advance and their critics, liberals as well as 
conservatives, declared as categorically as Macaulay in 1855 that 
India was not qualified for Parliamentary Government^^ In the 
second place there was no substantial change to meet the national 
aspirations of the extremist group. In the words of the authors 
of the Montagu Chelmsford Report "The change was one of degree 
not of kind."^^^
The colonial model representing the concession of self- 
government to the colonies was in one respect at least very 
different from that of India. In the colonies the ©iropean races 
presented some racial difficulties, but they were overwhelmed 
by those who were from British stock. On the contrary Indians 
were not only excluded from the colonies but also caused a conflict 
between the interests of the white and 2 .1 peoples. The
cultural conflict accentuated by the sense of frustation and 
subjection was bound to influence, the course of Indian politics. 
Even if a moderate like Gokhale had welcomed the reforms of 1909 ; 
it was only with the understanding that it was a liberal step 
towards the goal of self-government, which he had demanded in his 
presidential address at the Congress session of 1905. From the 
extremist point of view which was gaining strength in national 
life, the Reforms were entirely unsatisfactory. The idea of 
nationhood had already accumulated sufficient support to thrive; 
there were new classes coming into the forefront. Education on 
Western lines had created a new class of professional men who 
were better equipped with Western knowledge to fight a national
(1) Goupland. Indian Constitutional problems. Vol.I. P.35.
(2) Montagu Chelmsford Report, ed. 9109
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cause. They were at the same time deeply rooted in the ancient 
culture and were inspired by the idea of revivalism. Such people 
were gradually gaining strength in the rank and file of the 
Congress.
The commercial interests of Britain were much more 
important than the political, the British enjoyed monopolies in 
the field of commerce, this was naturally against the Indian 
commercial classes. The commercial classes finding themselves 
at a loss to break the monopolistic barriers enjoyed by British 
commercial interests naturally rallied round an organisation, 
which could at least form a centre of their future hopes. The 
Indian commercial classes were to play an important part in the 
rise of the Congress movement and in its strength in the future.
The Moslems having lost their power, had acquiesced 
in the status quo. Soon after the Mutiny their energies were 
concentrated mainly on denouncing the responsibility of their 
complacency in those disturbances; Sir Syed being their 
representative. Soon after that with the realisation of the 
liberal attitude of the rulers they found it necessary to safe­
guard their interests separately because they as the preceding 
ruling class were the object of suspicion. Revivalism in the 
Moslems in India had worked differently from that in the Hindus.
The Moslems were taken by a feeling of rivalry which with a sense 
of revivalism kept them away for a long time from Western 
education in which their fellow country men had already made some 
headway. It was Sir Syed who realising the consequences of such a 
policy took the lead in introducing Western education to Moslems.
For these reasons Sir Syed warned the Moslems even at the earlier 
stages to keep themselves away from the Congress. He as a 
member of the Governor-General’s council had advocated in 1883 on 
the Central Provincial Local Self-Government Bill, the unsuitability 
of the system of representation by election which he said means 
"the representation of the views eufid interests of the majority of 
the population." The Parliamentary system had thus awakened
Moslems to new anxieties. The fact that the Congress had 
gained strength enough to attract the attention of the 
Government inspired the Moslems to prepare themselves for the 
1909 reforms which were much in the air. As the Moslems had 
already decided not to make common cause with Congress, they 
created the All India Moslem League, which held its first Session 
in December 1906. Suffice it to say that the idea of nationhood 
that was gaining strength in Indian Politics took two directions. 
The Moslems developed the idea of protection and weightage into 
the doctrine of self-determination later. National self- 
determination was to be developed in such a way that it implied 
not only the independence of India but of the Moslems as a 
separate nation as well. It is proposed first to study the idea of 
nationhood matured with the object of attaining freedom from . 
British rule for India in which both Hindus and Moslems were 
united. Then it will be observed in what different directions it 
crossed the subsections of Indian life and how far the people of 
■tîhe Indian States were concerned with it.
The Congress was thus prompted to make room for the 
Moslem claims and in its constitution itself amendments were made 
to the effect that a fifth of the total number of representatives 
on the All India Congress Committee would consist of Moslems. 
Another article imposed a restriction to the effect that no 
subject could be discussed or resolution carried in the Congress 
if three-fourths of the Moslems or of the Hindu delegates objected, 
provided that they constituted not less than a fourth of the 
whole assembly, and further that in all proposals made for the 
extension of Indian self-government, the interest of the minorities 
must be duly safeguarded.(I ) Though the demand of the Moslems for
(1) The Constitution of the Indian National Congress 1912 
articles 13 and 26: Congress in Evolution by Sir
Verney Lovett as quoted by Coupland P. 46. Vol I.
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separate electorates was rejected, the changes thus brought into 
the constitution clearly indicated that congress was in a r’ather 
acoonmodating mood for further concessions. Even the Moslem 
League was not entirely unprepared to enter any contract with 
the Congress to make common cause for Indian freedom, The 
common factor between them was the desire to attain self- 
government. At the meeting of the Council of the League in 1913 
a resolution was adopted demanding a system of self-government 
which could be made best suited to India. But it rejected the 
Colonial Model of self-government with joint electorates. The 
Congress on the other hand had already denounced separate election. 
The Congress and the League had the common demand for self- 
government but the Congress insisted on joint election whereas 
the League demanded separate election. There was another point of 
difference: the League Resolution explicitly inserted the
connection of the British Crown whereas in that of the Congress it 
was implied. It was in such sircumstances when a sense of 
self-determination was dawhing on two most important political 
bodies of India that the War broke out. The sense of a common 
object was so strong that in 1916 the Congress and the League 
ratified an agreement known as the Lucknow Pact. The ratification 
of the agreement alarmed British statesmen and as a result of that 
the well-known announcement of 1917 was made on 20th August by 
the Secretary of State for India in the House of Commons. "The 
policy of His Majesty’s Government, with which the Government of 
India are in complete accord is that of the increasing association 
of Indiana in every branch of the administration and the gradual 
development of self-governing institutions with a view to the 
progressive realization of responsible government in India as an 
integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that 
substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as 
possible, and that it is of the highest importance as a 
preliminary to considering what these steps should be, that there 
should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those
in authority at home and in India............
"I would add that progress in this policy can only be
achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the
Government of India on whom the responsibility lies for the
welfare, and advancement of the Indian peoples must be judges of
the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by
the cooperation received from those upon whom new opportunities
of service will thus be conferred, and by the extent to which it
is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of
responsibility.
"Ample opportunity will be afforded for the public
discussion of the proposals which will be submitted in due
course to Parliament.^
It is interesting to note that the term "responsible
government" was not legally defined. Grey had pointed out in
1851 that responsible government was a system well understood
but not legally defined. He therefore depreciated its insertion
in an Act, "Responsible Government must not be based upon
( 2 )Statutory conditions bpt on the faith of the Grown."' To quote 
Goupland, "The words ’responsible government’ are indefinite and 
can be variously construed, and it was disclosed after his death 
by his biographer that Lord Gurzon had himself inserted the words 
in the draft of the declaration, in the belief that they had only 
this rather vague and loose meaning. He was greatly perturbed, it 
is recorded, to find that he had committed himself to the form of
Government in India against which less than 10 years before, he .
( 3 )had warned Lord Morley." The term ’responsible government’ 
though legally undefined had assumed a definite meaning in the 
course of its historical development. Such was the case in
(1) Montagu Chelmsford Report. P. 5.
(2) Wheare, K.O. The Statute of Westminster, 1931,
Oxford 1933, P. 27.
(3) Goupland op. cit. Vol. I. P. 53.
England ever since the Civil War and similar were the developments 
in Canada and the Indian statesmen were used to interpret such 
terms in the knowledge of the historical development of both 
England and her colonies.
The announcement of Responsible Government was 
negatived by the sub-clauses which were most diplomatically 
worded. The Responsible Government itself implied the retention 
of the British connection, whereas many liberal thinkers of the 
earlier age were thinking in terms of relinquishing control.
This did not fall short of Indian expectations because both the 
Congress and the League had committed themselves to the demand 
for self-government. But it was negatived by the sub-clauses.
In the first place the full recognition of the principle of self- 
determination was not recognised because the judges of the time 
and stages of the concession toward self-government were 
declared to be the rulers both in England and India rather than 
the consciousness of nationhood in the people of India. The 
declaration was not in any way novel. It had been long 
recognised. In the second place the possibility of "ample 
discussion" from the point of view of the Indian political parties 
was bound to accentuate the conglioting demands.
The Report when made public revealed the fears 
entertained by the people of India. From the point of view of 
the principle of self-determination the report justified the 
apprehension assumed by British statesmen for the Parliamentary 
system of government in India, not only because India was not 
yet ripe for universal adult Franchise but also because India 
inherited religious difficulties which could not be solved unless 
the people themselves resolved to find a solution for it. The 
Act of 1919 was drawn more or less on the line suggested. 
Responsible government even in the provinces was further limited 
and the dyarchy dividing the subjects as transferred and 
reserved limited the scope of the fully fledged legal personality 
for the .provinces. India was legally distinguished as British 
and Indian India. But at the same time the idea of federation
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thus set afoot, on the one side implied, devolution of powers from 
the central Indian Government to those of the provinces and on 
the other side the Indian states were not all together out of 
theushheme of all India Federation. Thus the effect in practice 
was that the Indian constitutional problem had taken the form 
of a triangle within India - self-determination, the minority 
problem and the Indian states. The future problem was thus 
consciously or unconsciously given a frame within,,which:thè-■ 
political forces were set at play. As far as the minority 
problem was concerned, a challenge was thrown to the people of 
of India in the inspiring address of the Report to solve the 
communal problem among themselves. This challenge proved a 
source for a new demand for the powers to frame constitution 
which was unknown in the early history of colonial constitutional 
changes.
When the Act of 1919 was ready to be put into practice 
the temper of Indian nationalism had changed. The unrest in 
India which had in some parts of India taken the shape of 
violence and had prompted the British Government to envisage a 
new policy of reforms had entered a new phase, under the 
guidance of Gandhi jl. The Congress in 1920 had resolved on the 
object of attaining Swar^ aj by the people of India by all 
legitimate and peaceful means. The fact that the source of 
attainment was attributed to the will of people, marked a definite 
deviation from the previous policy. As a means of realizing 
this object the weapon of non-violence was officially adopted.
They denounced the Act of 1919 as well as those moderates who 
had extended their cooperation to the Government. The entry of 
the Turkish Empire to the War on the German side and its 
consequences, which gave birth to the Caliphate movement among 
Indian Moslems. For Gandhi ji, there could be no better 
situation for making common cause with, and enlisting, Moslem 
support than this. The non-cooperation campaign of 1920 was 
launched and was carried on by both Hindus and Moslems in order
7to uproot British rule in India* The circumstances that followed
the Lucknow Pact and encouraged the Reporters to insist on the
communal difficulty owing to which they had accepted separate
electorates for Moslems, were no more at the time of its
operation. The Moslem League and the Congress were so united
between 1919 and 1924 that the Indian atmosphere was most
unsuited for any such scheme. Even when the Moslem League held
its session separately at Lahore Jinnah said "steps must be
taken to scrap the present constitution and devise a constitution
in consultation with the representatives of the people which
will give them a real control and responsibility over their
a f f a i r s . " T h e  reference to the people though mild is quite 
significant in pointing out that the Moslem League as a separate
entity did not fall short of the mark in demands for the rights
of self-determination for the people. Further both important
organisations were against the constitution.
Ill
Meanwhile important changes were taking place in 
international politics among the war aims the most important was 
the right of self-determination promised to the people in the 
event of victory. However cautious might be the application of 
this principle to the Western world. Eastern peoples could never 
prepared to take it for granted.
When the Peace Conference opened the difficulty for 
the British delegates was obvious when the clauses of the Peace 
Treaty came for discussion and especially the application of the 
principle promised during the War, it was obvious that the same 
principle was interpreted by the French, British, and Americans 
with different emphases. "However fervid might be our indignation 
regarding Italian claims to Dalmatia and the Dodecanese it could 
be cooled by a reference, not to Cyprus only, but to Ireland,
(1) Quarterly Register, Vol. I. No. 2
Egypt and India."^^^ "The British and French Empires were faced 
with widespread secessionist movements. Violent nationalist 
movements threatened to make foreign rule impossible in Egypt 
and India. The Arab world from Morocco to Iraq was rising in a 
general demand for the rights of self-government. There was 
undoubtedly difficulty in arriving at an agreement on a definition 
of self-government, especially in the discussion that followed 
over India, Japan and Germany which revealed divergence of 
opinion.
Within the Commonwealth itself a remarkable change
was brought about by a resolution at the Imperial War Conference
of 1917 moved by the Prime Minister of Canada to the effect that
India be brought into the sphere of associateship with the
Dominions.......... "Dominions as autonomous nations of an
Imperial Commonwealth and of India as an important part of the
same, should recognise the right of the Dominions and India to
an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations and
should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultations
( 3 )in all important matters of common Imperial concern . . . ."
India was not only an associate but a full member that was to be 
fully represented at all Imperial Conferences in future. In 
1918 Sir S. Sinha and the Maharajah of Bikaner were allotted 
seats on the War Cabinet and a new political office was created 
in addition to that of the Secretary of State for India namely 
that of High Commissioner for India. A step further was taken 
when Indian delegates sat in their own right at the peace 
conference and signed the Treaty of Versailles on behalf of India. 
India became a member of the League of Nations, whereas all its
(1) Alfred Cobban: National Self-Determination,
referring to H. Nicholson; Peace Making 1919, 1933 
P. 193.
(S) Ibid.
(3) Proceedings of the Imperial War Conference 1917 [cj. ■-
8566) P. 40, 49, 50.
members were bound by the Covenant^^^to be fully self-governing.
The same was the oase with Labour and other international 
oonferenoes•
Besides these changes the Montagu Cheïsford Report, 
the Commissions Report and the Commission of the Army opened a 
new vista with a view to accommodating both civil and military 
services in the changing circumstances* The burden of these 
recommendations was to increase the rate of Indianisation. This 
was accepted and a beginning was made to attain this objective in 
1924 and in 1934 a military training centre was formed at Dehra 
Dun. More important than these recommendations is the legal 
point raised in connection with the British members of the Indian 
Civil Service. Against the common usage of the British 
constitution, the members, who were, in legal terms, executors of 
the trust on behalf of His Majesty and therefore the servants of 
the drown for this particular purpose, were to receive a 
contractual guarantee from the Indian authority. To cite the 
Report itself "The present organisation of the services came into 
existence when admittedly the centre of political gravity was 
outside India and when the service took a leading part in the 
shaping of policy. Those conditions have appreciably changed and 
will change further, and it is but natural there should be 
dissatisfaction among the services with their position and also 
among the Legislatures with the restraints and limitations 
imposed on their powers in relation to the services.
India both in the Commonwealth and International 
spheres emerged as a perfect legal personality. In international 
law India seemed to have acquired this status in spite of two 
drawbacks; though the Indian delegation consisted of British 
and Indian members, they were nominated by the Secretary of State, 
hence could not be taken as the representatives of the people. In 
the second place there were no means of expressing the will of the
(1) Article I Paragraph 3, as quoted by Goupland. op cit. P.84
Indian people in India’s foreign policy in the fullest democratic 
sense. But both these drawbacks were not in any way the drawbacks 
denying international personality to India. The membership of 
the League of Nations implied the recognition of international 
personality, whatever by the form of government and limitations 
thereto. There is another approach to this fact. When the East 
India Company’s Government passed on to the Secretary of State 
at least legally there was no change of status. The connection 
with the Crown was on the basis of trust and the offices 
including the Secretary of State in Council were appointed in 
order to execute that trust. Thus the personality of India 
remained unhampered. India found its place amidst the Dominions 
as well as in international conferences in her own right. She 
was undoubtedly till then not a Dominion, but this did not involve 
inferior status in international law. The fact that the 
resolution was made in the Imperial Conference to admit India to 
full membership which was confined to the Dominions only shows 
that India though not a Dominion was as good as a Dominion. The 
necessity for Indianising the services in India and providing 
means of democratic governance were not overlooked. There was no 
conflict, between the principle of self-determination and India’s 
international legal personality; on the contrary it was an 
advantage. A great advance had to be made from the internal point 
of view towards full realization of self-determination. It is 
desired here to show that India was a legal international 
personality even though the will of the people was absent. What 
was lacking was to ascertain this will. However this was a 
domestic aspect and was therefore beyond the scope of inter­
national affairs.
India had as early as 10?6 been admitted to the 
Universal Postal Union. The Accession under Article 17 of the 
Berne Convention of October 9, 1874. The procedure of admission 
was exactly the same as for foreign state. No action on the part 
of British Government was necessary in order,for British India to
secure a c c e s s i o n / T h e  1878 Convention was signed separately
for British India and Canada; a coranon representative signing
for Great Britain and for Canada but a separate representative
( S )
signing for British India. This merely proves the fact that 
the international personality of British India under the Company 
continued and her admission to the League of Nations in 1919 was 
just a recognition of this continuity.
Indian political opinion was too uncooperative and 
restless to be satisfied with the constitution of 1919. It could 
only be worked for a time with the help of the moderates. The 
moderates now were among both Hindus and Moslems. The impending 
necessity for taking,.anothersstep towards re-examining the problem 
was obvious. The Simon Commission or statutory Commission was 
appointed in November 1927. As expected it could not satisfy the 
aspirations of the people for the very reason that there was no 
one on this commission who dad the confidence of the people. The 
details of its boycott and later events are details of history.
The appointment of the Commission in the light of the challenge 
thrown by the Montagu Chelmsford Report inspired Indians to solve 
their problem among themselves. As a result of the Resolution 
carried at the All Parties Conference (1928) a Committee was 
appointed to determine the principles of a Constitution of India.
It was in itself a challenge to the Simon Commission and at the 
same time a reply to the chalLenge thrown by the Montagu Chelmsford 
Report.
The Simon Commission was undoubtedly a step towards 
solving the problem of India from the British point of view.- The 
most unfortunate situation was faced by the Commission. It is 
doubtful how far the intentions of the British Government were 
aimed at solving it with all sincerity. Difficulties undoubtedly
(1) Stewart. R. D., Treaty Relations of the British Common­
wealth of Nations. (1939) p. 117. Ref, to 
Benjamin Akzin. "Membership in the Universal Postal 
Union." A.G.I.L. Vol. XXVII, 1933. P. 651.
(2) Ibid.
were there. But there are records as well to show that these 
were exploited to permit delays and bargaining. When the new^ 
of the expected boycott reached Lord Birkenhead, he in a 
private letter to the Governor-General wrote "I should therefore 
like to receive your advice if at any moment you discern an 
opportunity for making this (statutory Commission) a useful 
bargaining counter or for further disintegrating the Swarajist
party .........  If such an acceleration affords you any
bargaining value use it to the full, and with the knowledge that 
you will be supported by the G o v e r n m e n t ^  Such is the record 
which if reviewed even in the changed circumstances to take a 
dispassionate view one is lead to oonclued that the British 
Government took advantage of the forces that proved helpful to 
slow down, the progress of constitutional development. Perhaps 
they were cautious at every stage to ascertain the success for 
which the cooperation of the people of India was necessary. 
Strictly speaking the Indian national Congress or the Moslem 
League had hardly cooperated in working the constitution of 1919. 
The only prompt cooperation came from the moderates in both camps. 
The decision of the Congress to fight the election was a plan to 
wreck it, somehow the background under which the Simon Commission 
started its work was too strained to still the enthusiasm of 
the none-cooperative congress to boycott it. There were 
undoubtedly communal difficulties and it was in view of that, that 
as a result of the All Parties Conference the Nehru Committee was 
appointed.
IV
The Nehru Committee drafted a model constitution for 
India with a view to attaining; Dominion status, but the most 
remarkable contrast with the Dominions was that it had attempted 
to legalise all that was customary and conventional, in the case
(1) Krishna. K.B. The Problem of Minorities (1936) P.37 
(with reference to Earl of Birkenhead, Frederick 
Edwin Earl of Birkenhead, the last phase, 1935 
Vol. II P. 251)
Iof the Dominions* For such an accommodation between complete 
secession from the British Eapire to which the Congress had 
already oomitted itself and the Dominion form of Government. 
Ireland was an example to be followed. The article defining 
this relation was in fact, a reproduction of the first article 
of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. It was further stated that 
the King’s representative, the Governor-General was to act on the 
advice of the Executive Qounoil which was to be formed on the 
Prime Minister’s advice. The basis formed by a legal and 
contractual relationship which definitely pointed towards the 
people’s right to self-determination rather than to the Grown 
was strengthened by general constituencies on a baais of adult 
suffrage. Two other notable points dealt with, rather summarily 
were defence and the civil service. The main burden was to show 
that a Dominion may not necessarily be capable of protecting 
herself as was hel# by Keith. The second point of importance was 
the definite trend of the drafters towards a unitary rather than 
a federal form of Government.
The Report could not be adopted unanimously. There 
were people like Jawaharlal Nehru who were not prepared.to 
commit themselves to acquiescence in Dominion status. Besides 
there was the Hindu - Moslem question, a centre of conflict.
This will be dealt with later. The Indian states too were given 
a place and sympathy was expressed and support was promised to the 
people in their struggle for self-determination with the object 
of attaining full responsible governments in the States.
The Simon Commission with full Imowledge of the 
breadline thus laid down had in a way concrete teams for bargain­
ing. The spirit of this bargaining seems to have dominated 
future events, unfortunately the bargaining was conveniently 
substituted with other controversies. The Report, however, a 
source of the triangular controversy i.e. the communal question, 
the states, and the freedom of India proved in itself a beginning
for Ironing out the differences and problems. The Simon Commission 
got its terms of reference widened to take the states into the 
purview of its recommendations.
The Report in one way laid down the foundation of the 
elasi-ticity and comprehensiveness of the constitution that 
India was to receive in the future. Instead of periodical 
investigations and recommendations, it recommended a constitution 
with such elasticity as to suit future concessions without any 
major change in its frame. Responsible government in the 
provinces as a part of federal scheme were recommended powers of 
raising loans and framing budgets recommended with one limitation. 
It was the emergency and discretionary powers of the Governors, 
this in future found its place in section 93 of the Government of 
India Act, 1935. Nothing substantial was contributed towards 
the immediate realization of self-government or responsible 
government at the centre. On the other hand it was singled out 
as a distant objective. Thus the federal realization itself was 
pushed back and a unitary government with its dualism recommended. 
The possibility of establishing a convention underwhich certain 
subjects such as defence, and foreign affairs were to be treated 
as being the responsibility of the Government to the Secretary of 
State and parliament, while on other subjects the Government was 
to be responsive to the non-official members of the legislature.
It was this dualism which was bound to arrest natural progress, 
as was the case with *dy#archy* in the provinces.
The history of Round Table Conferences, Select 
Committees, and the White Paper which was the result of voluminous 
recommendations of these bodies, are details which do not demand 
separate treatment.
The Round Table Conference was in itself a step 
tempered by caution to the demands of Indian nationalism to frame 
their own constitution, however unsatisfactory, the Nehru Committee 
was a concrete example of how the people of the different parties 
could be brought together to sit round a table to solve the
problem. The British Government by organising the Round Table 
Conferences not only provided a means of great achievement but 
at the same time conceded half-way the demand for self-determi­
nation which implied constituent rights as well. Before the 
recommendations and the outcome of these conferences are 
mentioned, it is necessary to review the course of self-determi­
nation that was to give the Moslems a separate identity and 
ultimately make them a separate nation. These conferences were 
responsible for making a thorough examination of the communal 
problem, and assessed the essence of Moslem aspirations and 
ambitions.
1 •
The Moslem League came into existence as a result of 
the introduction of the principle of election in Indian politics. 
Before that the sense of the jisMbctlojn of Moslem* interests 
f.Vrdtn those of other communities in India was present in the 
minds of Mdslemzleaders. There were some Moslems, AHadreubt-ediy 
who were members of the national congress but the community as a 
whole remained id.ttstinct' ffbbn the Congress. The fact that the 
Moslem League as a separate political organisation for Moslems 
on the parallel of the Congress in itself implied that their 
aspirations for the freedom of the country though common with 
other sections of the population were at the same time qualified 
by separate interests. Soon after the creation of the Moslem 
League the demand for a safeguard through nomination changed into 
a demand for separate election. A Moslem representative elected 
in a common constituency in which Hindu voters were in a majority, 
was bound to be the man who could saitsfy the demands of the 
majority at the expense of his own Community and therefore even 
the reservation of seats was not considered to be a sufficient 
safeguard for the Moslem interests. The Moslem deputation 
headed by the Aga Khan among other facts stated to the Governor- 
General that the number of Moslems in India was greater than the 
population of any great state in Europe. This sense of numerical
i m
strength accentuated by the historical background provided a 
basis for weightage. The reforms up to 1919 accepted the 
principle of a separate electorate for Moslems. The Simon 
Commission too could not denounce it. The gradual political 
experience gained by Moslems and the data of their strength in 
different parts of India awakened them to new aspirations.
The Moslems in India were not only a great minority
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but a majority as well. The realisation being a majority in 
some provinces gave the Moslem League dual objectives. Firstly 
the Moslem League pledged itself to the safeguards for the 
minorities in the provinces where they were in minority and at 
the same time in view of the development of constitutional 
tendencies towards federalism promised to safeguard the Moslem 
majority interests in provinces where they were in a majority.
The first contract that the Moslem League entered 
into was at Lucknow in 1916 the agreement known as the Lucknow 
Pact. The Luclmow Pact offered the Moslem League'ia recognition 
in its identical capacity of sole Moslem representative 
organisation from the Congress. The Congress accepted separate 
electorates as well. This pact could not last long, and Hindu- 
Moslem differences increased. The other point of contact with 
the Congress was during 1919 and 1924 when the Moslem Khllafat 
movement and the movement of non-cooperation and disobedience 
allied under the common antagonism towards British rule.
In the Lahore session of 1924 Linnah clearly defined 
the dual object of the Moslem league in six of the basic principles 
that were necessary to safeguard Moslem rights. Among these six 
principles two items were to emphasise that the Moslems regarded 
complete provincial autonomy and the need for caution in any 
territorial distribution that might affect Moslem majority 
provinces. Besides these demands, these principles reiterated the 
unsuitability of pure and simple democratic institutions for 
India unless they were suitably modified to safeguard the Moslems.
(£75
The Congress under the leadership of Gandhiji had 
not only become a dynamic and revolutionary body though relying 
on non-violence as its weapon for political agitation, but at 
the same time had revivalist tendencies looking always back to 
past history, culture and even technique. Revivalsim in politics 
implied Hindus and Moslems striving to return iback) to their past 
history and traditions. They could not have done so unless they 
had crossed the period of * rapprochement *. They ignored the 
common factors that had helped two fundamentally different and 
distinct cultures to live side by side, ’♦in fact the two 
revival!sms stimulated each other, competed with each other and 
became more and more different in o u t l o o k , T h e  Moslems thus 
except for a very brief period which was entirely a contractual 
participation, never joined Congress. Gandhiji introduced 
religion into politics. It was n good weapon to bring the Hindu 
masses under Congress, but at the same time it was very 
difficult to keep the dividing line between politics and religion. 
In Professor Beri Parsed*s words, "It was like walking on an
edge of a razor, to give religion its due weight in politics and
(2 )to keep life as secular as possible." Congress officially 
adopted non-violence. "It could be adopted by anyone as a 
policy. To preach it as a religious tenet, as a principle 
binding under all circumstances, and to bring suffering on 
oneself as a method of changing the opponent’s heart, had the 
appearance of Hindu or rather Jain and Buddhist inspiration. 
Gandhini’s revivalism with the introduction of spiritualism and 
non-violence into politics provoked other groups and added to 
political feuds. Undoubtedly spiritualism for India was 
inevitable, nay all politics "stand in need of spiritualism in 
the sense of moralisation," that is to say permissions with 
principles of truth, sincerity, disinterestedness, and
(1) Beni Parshad : Hindu Moslem Question.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid. pp. 50 - 51.
humanitarianism. But spiritualism beyond them tends to 
reproducetreligious atmosphere, dogma and ceremonial in politics. 
It smacks of a reversion to theocracy and is doubly dangerous in 
a country which follows more than one religion. Congress under 
such strong forces with nominal Moslem representation on its 
executive Committee, and accentuated with urdu Hindu language, 
became an antagonisito and predominantly Hindu organisation. It 
lost the attributes of a national organisation. The Moslem 
League was on the other side of the scale putting Its weight into 
winning over the Moslem masses for its solidarity.
Gandhiji had a genius for dominating Congress in spite 
of the fact that in later years he had ceased to be even a 
primary member. It was entirely due to Gandhiji’s technique and 
to his lieutenant’s organising capacities that he forced his will 
on the Congress. When the Congress accepted the invitation to 
the second Hound Table Conference, he was its sole spokesman. 
These Conferences revealed the fact that the communal problem was 
based on some essential facts, and it could not be solved by 
the sub-committee appointed for this purpose and which was 
piloted by Gandhiji. The two main points of controversy in 
themselves point out the course that the Hindu Moslem question 
was taking. The Moslems were out for the fullest possible 
provincial autonomy and the federal structure with as few 
residuary powers as possible as the centre. Thus they aimed at 
making the Moslem majority province least controlled by the Hindu 
dominated centre# At the same time they pleaded for separation 
of Sind from Bombay. The Hindu representatives on the other hand 
were in favour of a stong federal structure with the maximum 
possible residuary powers. The members who were in favour of 
separation of Orissa from Bihar were unwilling to see Sind added 
to the Moslem majority provinces. The other major point of , 
difference was the separate electorates which now had been 
extended not only to Moslems but to other communities as well,
Gandhiji could not accept the separate electorate for the
depressed Glasses and his fast and. the consequent Poona Pact are 
well-known landmarks in constitutional history. The Act of 1935 
on these two major points tried to strike a via media between 
Hindu and Moslem claims. The federation thus realised was 
neither a strong nor a loose one, it was rather a half-way 
solution. The Gommunal award already announced was adopted with 
the modification of the Poona Pact. All these facts have been 
narrated to show on the one side the points of controversy 
between Hindus and Moslems were gaining strength and on the other 
side the ascendancy Gandhiïii had gained in Gongress.
VI
Congress even constitutionally is a unitary body. It 
has its different provincial organisations but the hold of the 
working committee has two-fold strength because the general body 
has never disagreed. When the Constitution of 1935 was ready to 
be put into operation. The Congress rejected it. The Moslem 
League rejected the main part of it, but was prepared to work 
the provincial part. Both Congress and the Moslem League 
contested the first elections. The Congress won the majority 
of seats in six provinces. Then the Government invited its 
leaders to form Ministries they demanded safeguards that the 
discretionary and emergency powers of the Governors would not be 
used. However the Congress accepted office but unfortunately the 
Congress Governments thus formed were brought strictly under the 
control of the High Command and a triumvirate set up to direct 
and control the provincial ministries. Interference from above 
in the provincial ministries was extra-constitutional. India 
had no homogeneous atmosphere suitable for a majority rule. Even 
in Western democratic countries coalition governments have been 
adopted in times of crisis and necessity, Congress refused to 
include any Moslem League members in the cabinet. "Orthodox 
parliamentarianism led the Congress leaders to forget that one- 
party theory even if true of political agitation was not in the 
absence of an accomplished revolution applicable to ministerial 
office. The change from extra-constitutional action to
governmental responsibility............. was a change of scale
and method of the profoundest significance and called for a
fresh evaluation and arrangement of political forces. The country
was passing through a crisis and crises haVe usually been
( 1 )surmounted even in England through coalition . . . The
League on the other hand became conscious of handicaps both in 
its own organisation as well as those allied with the constitution 
itself. Their thinking minds set out for a solution - a solution 
which could make them masters of their own affairs. The position 
of Moslems even in the majority provinces was not very secure.
The ©ongress members of the legislatures in Bengal and Sind 
wanted one thing, their purpose was to defeat the Moslem League. 
Punjab was the only Moslem province where there was a stable 
Moslem government, not of the League but of the Unionists. The 
Frontier Province was in fact a Congress province since the red 
shirt leaders had formed and alliance with the Congress. The 
Moslem League used the same technique that the Congress was 
using not only to bargain in the Hindu majority provinces, but 
also to gain ascendancy and strict disciplinary control over the 
Moslem majority provinces. A Moslem League"high ; command was 
created as a counterpart of the Congress high command. This 
proved the beginning of the Moslem-League’s rise for which the 
Congress was entirely responsible. The responsibility lies with 
the Congress because it rejected the separate electorate which 
had long ago been accepted in the Lucknow Pact. It was further 
responsible because the controversy over a strong or loose 
federation was its own creation. These facts awakened the Moslems 
to new dangers and stirred them up to new aspirations. They were 
numerically strong enough to form a nation. They had a different 
culture, traditions, and heroes from whom to derive inspiration. 
The revivalist and religious tinge of Congress policy gave them 
a warning of future fears. They had besides this large areas
(1) Ibid.
with their own majority to form a separate state. This was the 
solution that was brought forth.
m
The principle of self-determination could no more be 
denied to the Moslems. They claimed they had all the attributes 
that any nation in Birope had for the application of this 
principle. Pakistan was the demand which could be attained 
through the realisation of self-determination for thelMoslems.
Now that self-determination for India was bound up with self- 
determination for Moslems as well, the last step was taken when 
in August 1942 a resolution of the All India Moslem League 
assented the right of 100 million Moslems in India to establish 
a sovereign state consisting of the provinces in which they were 
in a majority.
In international politics the principle of self-
determination was working in favour of Moslem inspirations.
"The Sinn Fein rebellion in Ireland was not against the mis-
government of a twentieth century feiglish Government; it was a
revolt in the name of four centuries of history. Inhere history
has dug a ditch as deep as that between the Catholic Irish and
the British state, where even the last hope of reconciliation
has been thrown away, as it was in the year before 1914
secession of a rule based on naked f o r c e * T h e  Anglicization
by the state had given a strong sense of nationalism to the Irish
and Scots leading the revival and preservation of their native
culture. "British policy diverging from the sounder lines it
had followed in Canada by supporting the Protestant Royalists at
( 2 )
all costs laid the foundation of parition." The danger of 
secession in the case of Canada and South Africa could not be 
avoided in the case of Ireland. The history of the British
(1) Cobban : p. 75.
(2) Cobban ; P. 85.
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Eànpire provides two classioal examples of self-determination, and 
in each case, self-determination was pushed to the logical 
conclusion of secession, as a result of the use of force and 
unsound diplomacy which strengthened the claim to the sovereignty 
of the people. The history of Ireland proved a classioal example 
for India in two respects. The Irish struggle was the result of 
differences of economic interest, religion, descent, bitter 
historical enmities, and alien ascendancy. India’s case as an 
alien race was still stronger and the Indian National Congress 
seemed to have followed the Irish model rather than that of any 
of the Dominions. In the second respect it was a classical 
example for Moslems because the secession was the result of 
religious differences. The principle of self-determination had 
passed through different phases in Europe. It was first the 
basis for the claim of the people’s sovereignty against the 
Divine Right of Kings and their autocratic governments. It passed 
through its ebb and tide and the same principle became a source 
of inspiration for nationalism in Germany. During the 1914 - 1918 
War and after it, it had a still greater part to play in the re­
making of the Imperial map of Europe and Asia. It was the rock 
of this principle on which the vessels of the Great Empires of 
Europe and Turkey dashed and ruined. Communities Inhabiting 
territories with distinct languages, cultures and histories were 
given the right of carving out states for themselves. The idea 
of nation and stste became synonymous. It was this principle 
which gave birth to the problems of minority and boundary 
adjustments. It was natural that India should have had to deal 
with the same principle in its different aspects. The principle 
of self-determination, Implying the people’s sovereignty was 
bound to set forces in play which were to define the people. Thus 
the principle with its extension to India, shifted the stage of 
political changes from Europe to India. The Congress played the 
same part in pushing it into action that British policy had done
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in the case of America and Ireland, The lack of liberal oomrad- 
ship in sharing power in the provinces with the Moslem League was 
the result of orthodox parliamentarianism. The Congress tried to 
take the Moslem masses into its fold over the head of the Moslem 
League, All the qualifications for the application of the 
principle of self-determination for the Moslems were already in 
existence. They were more favourable to the Moslems thah to any 
nation in Europe, that was needed was the awakening and driving 
guidance through the historical sources both from the commonwealth 
and the international spheres.
The centralisation of India started with the 
Regulating Act of 1775 and reached its Climax in the time of Lord 
Curzon when even a distinct area like Burma was annexed with India. 
But very soon it was realised that the control of the Governor- 
General of Bengal extended over the Presidencies of Madras and 
Bombay in order to bring them under direct control, however 
inevitable in Lord Olive’s times was outdated in later years for 
a big country like India. The Indian Council Act of 1861 gave the 
Provinces a legislative Council with a non-official majority. 
Idrther it was through the Reform of 1919 when under the dyarchy 
seçii-responsible governments were made possible. Under this Act 
the Provinces were the Agents of the Central Government, but the 
trends towards their legal independence were distinct. The Act 
of 1935 gave them full legal personality subject to the 
discretionary powers of the Governors only. All these facts go 
far to explain that the realisation of self-determination was not 
only to be carried into communal politics, but into the sphere of 
regionalism as well. In a country as big as India the various 
languages, communities and climates, naturally implied regionalism. 
As a matter of fact it is the conception of regionalism which 
proved a first step towards Moslem self-determination. The Moslems 
were first awakened to the regional majorities and demanded a 
loose federation with the minimum possible number of powers at the
centre. The Congress dominated Nehru Committee’s Reports 
proved unsatisfactory to the Moslems, because it rejected their 
two fundamental claims for separate election and loose federation. 
The burden of the opinion of Hindu delegates at the Round Table
Conference was against these two claims. This proved the source
of distrust. The fact of the strength of the scattered Moslem 
minority would have come to nothing more than a separate 
electorate had there been no areas of majority for them. The 
Separation of Sind was a logical consequence of this awakening.
The provinces of India took their shape on the 
principle of administrative convenience. Neither economics, 
language, religion nor culture played any part in their making.
The Moslem League resolution moved at its session at Delhi for
strengthening the provincial autonomy was conceded by the Congress
by adopting the linguistic basis for re-marking the boundaries of 
provinces in accordance with this demand. Its provincial ' 
organisation is based on the linguistic areas of India. Nehru 
himself has given his opinion in its favour. "The future of 
Surma valley is a living question in Assam, and the Assamese are 
keenly desirous that Sylhet should be transferred to the 
administrative province of Bengal so as to leave them an area 
which is linguistically more homogeneous. The people of Sylhet 
I found were equally in favour of this change and on the face of 
it, the desire is reasonable. Sylhet is not only linguistically 
Bengali but its economy is more allied to that of Bengal than 
Assam p r o p e r . A m o n g  the reasons, he enumerates religion as 
well, because the people of Sylhet district are predominantly 
Moslems. If this principle is applicable to Sylhet district why 
not to Sind, Orissa, C a v A n d h r a ,  , and Pakistan as
well. The Indian Constitution framed by the Indian constituent 
assembly has provided room for future changes. But the policy of 
the central Government seems to be to deny those very principles
(1) Nehru, Unity of India : London, P 191,
irà
of re-making boundaries on the linguistic basis on which they
had organised the Indian Congress. Nehru had admitted; "I
might add that my frequent references to linguistic areas, and
the languages of the provinces necessitate that the provincial
(1)
units should correspond with the language area." This is one 
out of many issues on which the principle of self-determination 
has still to play its part.
The principle of self-determination giving sovereignty 
to the people once carried to India could not be kept within the 
legal barrier of British India. The Indian States were undoubtedly 
distinct legal areas but the force of universal truth that had 
crossed larger areas and distances than the Indian states 
presented were bound to give the right to the people of the states. 
There was nothing illegal in their claims for responsible 
governments to check the despotic governments of the rulers. It 
is true that there were treaty relations with the Paramount 
Power which promised protection to the rulers and their dynasties 
against the dangers coming both from without and from within.
The enactment of Indian legislature to save the Indian Princes 
from criticism in the Indian Press was a step to meet this 
obligation. But the fact that the British Government in India, 
itself was experiencing the same fate proved it futile to make 
any further effort in this direction. It will be too legalistic 
to interpret treaties of protection to be the protection from 
new democratic forces which were unknown at the times of the 
conclusion of the treaties. The forces were causing changes ail 
over the world. How could a power suffering from such forces 
protect the States from them? The Gongress attitude towards the 
States was neutral in the beginning. This neutrality changed 
into sympathy and ultimately since 1929 the Congress openly 
declared that the states should be brought into line with British 
India by the introduction of responsible government.^^  ^ When the
(1) Ibid. P. 258.
(2) : C>p c:K i - p. 27.
///^
Responsible Ministries oame into power in 1937, the Congress 
encouraged, supported and in some oases guided the agitation 
carried on by the people. Separate organisations were set up
both under Congress and the Moslem League to deal with the
problem of responsible governments in the States*
The situation of India, its geographical and economic 
interdependence, common interests in communication, are factors 
which go to emphasise the need for a common policy of defence 
and foreign affairs. It was this factor of its geographical 
situation and economic dependence on other parts of India which 
a paramount power could not neglect* The Montagu Chelmsford 
Report, realising this important factor in relation to India and 
the Indian States considered it necessary to iron out the 
complexities it had. The Butler Committee was appointed to 
clarify these complexities. The Simon Commission considered it
imperative to get its terms of reference extended to cover the
States. Undoubtedly all of them emphasised the importance of 
distinct relations for the Crown with the States and propounded 
theories which accepted their legal entities. But none of them 
minimised the common factors that were to influence the course of 
Indian independence in which the States were bound to be 
Integrated. The principle of self-determination for the people 
of the states was as important as the territorial affinities with 
Britsih India. It was this principle of self-determination which 
played its part in consolidating both India and Pakistan and it 
is the problem springing from this principle which still has to be 
solved in at least one state, and even after the accession to 
India and Pakistan the problem of responsible government for the 
people of the Indian States still forms a major part of politics 
in both countries.
ASSERTION OF SELF - DETERMINATION.
Dominion status was declared to be the aim of Indian
constitutional development, as far back as 193.7* But it has been
observed that the insertion of the term "Dominion" was made by Lord 
f 11Ourzon'  ^ because it lacked legal precision. Further Dominion 
status as judged from the nature of the autonomous powers which 
existed in the self-governing colonies was restricted and did not 
imply anything more than the concession of responsible government 
coupled with the reserved powers of the Governor-Q-eneral. The
Governor-General in his capacity as the representative of the Crown 
still held powers which did not fall within the sphere of responsible 
government, ' Again, from the stand point of international affairs 
these self-governing Dominions formed units of the Empire and their 
existence was unknovm to international law. The World War I 
undoubtedly accelerated the speed of the changes as a result of 
which the Dominions gained national identity and their admission to 
the League of Nations in their own right. The declaration of 
Dominion status for India, therefore, was of a limited autonomous 
power on the analogy of the Colonies.
Indian views of national independence had far outgrown the term 
Dominion Status itself. Dominion Status was rejected when the 
Nehru Report was turned down. The Congress and the Moslem League 
were undoubtedly divided on the questions of communal representation 
and that of united India. But they were unanimous in their demand 
for complete independence. Maybe the League left this aspect more 
or less out of discussion because the Congress had always emphasised 
this aspect and the League had nothing to disagree with. From the 
stand point of the Congress Indian independence was explicitly 
defined as severance from the Commonwealth. The Muslim League
(1) Coupland, R, (1833-19:55)*
Vol. I, p.33.
preferred to leave this ambiguous.
The Dominion Status pledged in the declaration of 1917 and also
in the preamble of the,Act of 1919 could have been extended any time
without any difficulty.. The Act of 1935 was made elastic enough to
be adjusted in future to the changed status* But the changes that
the term had undergone increased the difficulty. Moreover the
British Commonwealth as it existed before World War II was not
legally defined in all its details by the Statute of Westminster 
(i)1931. It was only a partial legalisation of the non-legal
conventions governing the relations of the British Dominions which 
owed their origin to the Imperial Conferences, The nature of the 
British Commonwealth was such that its success depended on the good­
will of the Dominions to observe the non-legal conventions. India 
could join only as a willing member. The Act of 1935 came into 
operation only in the Provinces, The Central Government of British 
India continued in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 
1919 except that its powers - executive and legislative - were to 
be restricted to the matters assigned to it in the Act of 1935. The
delay in the full operation of the Federal constitution of 1935, 
among other reasons, was due to the failure to get the states into 
its scheme. This delay caused suspicion as to the sincerity of the 
pledge of the British Government for Dominion Status.
The outbreak of World War II and the Viceroy’s declaration of 
war on behalf of India changed the circumstances. There was no 
reference made to the Legislature, The declaration was made both 
on behalf of British India and the States, As far as the States 
were concerned the conduct of their foreign affairs was in the hands
of the paramount power and the declaration of war on its behalf
(2)
implied their participation too. There were no responsible
governments in the States. The princes contributed to the cause of 
War and there was no legal ground for criticism levelled again the war 
efforts,whatever the moral aspect, the occasional utterances of the 
people in their political organisations were not important enough to 
be taken into account because there was hardly any political organ-
(1) 22. George V. c,h. 1931.
(2) Case Ho. 16. The Digest of International Law
Gases. (1939-UO).
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isation to carry such weight. The case of British India was 
different. Though there was no legal obligation on the Governor- 
General to consult the ministers or the legislature for the purpose 
of the declaration of war, he did it in his capacity as the 
representative of the Grown. The case from factual considerations 
Was very different. There were responsible governments in the 
provinces and the legislature at the centre had a right to vote on 
the financial bill which was closely connected with the war effort. 
The discretionary powers of both the Governor-General and the 
governors of the Provinces, of course, had provisions to meet the 
emergency cases and the financial bill or any such similar measures 
could be adopted without the consent of the legislatures. Any such 
attempt would have certainly set the clock back. Thus the war
created a situation which definitely contributed to the solution of 
the deadlock.
The Congress held that the issue of war and peace for India 
could only be decided by the Indian people, and invited the British 
Government to declare forthwith in Unequivocal terms their war 
aims.  ^ The declaration^of Lord Linlithgov/ on behalf of His 
Majesty’s Government made on October 18th, 1939? was taken to be 
entirely unsatisfactory and then followed the resignations of the 
Congress Ministries in the provinces.
The stand taken by the Moslem League in this situation was for 
the partition of India as it was set forth in the r e s o l u t i o n ^ ^ - )  of 
the Moslem League passed on. March 23rd, 1940, at its Lahore session. 
The growth of Moslem self-determination and the reasons therefor 
have been already given.
II.
In view of the circumstances described above there were only 
two issues thht the British Government had to decide upon. First, 
the question of independence and the time involved for it. Secondly
.(1) Banerjee, The making of Indian Constitution,
Document No. I, p.1,
(2) Ibia. p.ii-.
(3) Ibia. pp.22-23.
the question of partition* As far as the first was concerned the 
British Government was already pledged to Dominion Status on the 
analogy of the other Dominions, Now both the changes brought about 
in the British Commonwealth due to the attitude taken by Eire and the 
Union of South Africa, and also due to national sentiments in India, 
in view of the War, had pressed them to evolve a formula which could 
satisfy the Indian demand. The main difficulty was time, Indian 
opinion was demanding immediate responsible status* British 
Government was cautious so as not to commit itself to immediate 
surrender. The Muslim League had grown both in strength and 
prestige. Its declaration of jpakistan had aroused enthusiasm 
throughout the Muslim population of India, The British Government 
could not ignore its strength. In a way the declaration of Lord 
Linlithgow to postpone the Act of 1935 and to consult all the Indian 
political parties for any future constitutional changes was a reply 
to the Muslim League’s, demand for the abandoning of the Act of 1935 
in favoLU? of partition. Again the suggested expansion of the 
Governor-General *s Executive Council comprising the members of all 
the political parties in British India and Indian States implied the 
denunciation, of the orthodox majority rule as was witnessed in the 
provinces with the Congress ministries, instead, the seed of 
coalition government v/as sown as a possible suggestion for the 
solution of the communal problem. More definite terms were put 
forv/ard in March, 1942, in The Draft Declaration* Sir Stafford 
Cripps, a member of the War Cabinet, was sent out to India by the 
Cabinet to discuss the proposals with Indian leaders. The main 
proposals were ; I, A Constituent Assembly to be set up after the 
cessation of hostilities to frame a constitution for India. II,
The Indian States were to participate in the Constituent Assembly. 
Ill, The British Government would accept and implement the 
constitution subject to (1) the right of any province to refuse and 
to retain its existing constitutional position, provision being made 
for it to accede later if it so decided. With such non-acceding 
provinces, if they so desired, His Majesty’s Government would be 
prepared to agree upon a new constitution giving them the same full 
status as that of the Indian Union and arrived at by an analogous
Iff-
procédure; (2) The signing of a treaty between His Majesty’s Govern­
ment and the constitution making body. The treaty would cover all 
necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of respons­
ibility from British to Indian hands, and make provision for racial 
and religious minorities. But the treaty would not impose any 
restrictions on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the 
future its relationship to the other member states of the Common­
wealth of Nations. IV. The constitution making body would be 
composed of representatives of British India elected by proportional 
representation by the members of the lower houses of the provincial 
legislatures, voting as a single electoral college and would include 
the representatives appointed by the Indian states. V. Until 
the new constitution could be framed the British Government would 
retain the control and direction of the defence of India as part of
their world-war effort. VI. The leaders of the parties were
(1)
invited to join the Viceroy’s Executive Council.
The negotiations broke down as the Congress insisted on 
immediate responsible government, at least in fact if not in law*
The Muslim League followed Congress and reiterated the demand for 
Pakistan, It is desirable to reserve comments and criticism on the 
proposals and their failure to obtain agreement thereon because there 
are other plans and statements set forth on behalf of the British 
Government to solve the deadlock, the survey of which in 
chronological order would help a better appreciation of the efforts 
and the final assertion of the principle of self-determination.
In June, 1945? Lord Wavell, who had taken charge as Viceroy, 
made a move to secure the consent of the Indian parties for the 
Indianisation of the Executive Council v/ith the exception of the 
Viceroy and the Goramander-in-Ghief, The appointments were to be
made on an equal proportion of Muslims and caste Hindus, besides a 
the representation of other communities. This plan failed as no 
agreement could be reached regarding the formation of the Executive 
Council, In this context a passing reference may be made to 
Desai-Liaqat Formula in respect of the distribution of portfolios 
in the Executive Council. It was proposed that the Congress and the
(1) Ibid. pp.56 - 60.
Muslim League should have 40 per cent of the portfolios each, and the 
other communities were to receive 20 per cent. It was this formula 
which, though modified, provided a basis for the future interim 
government.
There was a change in government in England and the Labour
Government which came into power announced on February 19th, 1945»
M  )that a mission of three Cabinet Ministers^ ^,was to visit India to 
work out a possible solution of the deadlock. The Labour Govern­
ment was impressed by the Parliamentary Delegation which had gathered 
information during its visit to India in the winter of 19144/5 that 
immediate steps ought to be taken towards the solution of the Indian 
problem# The Cabinet Mission was its result. On 15th March, 1946, 
Mr Attlee, the Labour Prime Minister, declared in the House of 
Goirimons, "Is it a wonder that...,, she (India) should herself have 
freedom to decide her ov/n destiny. What form of government is to 
replace the present regime is for India to decide; but our desire is 
to help her to set up forthv/ith the machinery for making that 
d e c i s i o n " . H e  again observed that in India they could not 
"Allow a minority to place a veto on the advance of the majority".
He further pointed out that India "will find great advantages in 
remaining within the British Commonwealth, but if she elected to go 
outside it Britain would make the transition as smooth and easy as 
possible".
The Cabinet Mission interviewed many Indian leaders belonging 
to all parties and groups and ultimately a conference was held in 
Simla with the representatives of the Gongress and the Muslim League. 
In spite of a good deal of discussion and correspondenceno 
satisfactory solution could be found, and the Mission made a state- 
ment^^^ on the l6th of May. The salient features of this statement 
were
1, There should be a Union of India comprising British
India and the States. The subjects that the Union
(1) Lord Pethick-Lawrence - Secretary of State for India.
Sir Stafford.Cripps - President of the Board of Trade.
Mr A.V, Alexander - First Lord of the Admiralty.
(2) Vol. 420, dated 15th March 1946. p. 1421. A 
summary may be found in the Indian Annual Register or 
the British Annual Register for 1946.
3) Ibid, p.1421.
4) Grad. 6829.(correspondence), (5) Gmd. 6821.
was to deal with were; Foreign affairs, defence and 
communication, coupled with powers to raise finances 
required for these subjects.
2. The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature 
formed from the British Indian and States representatives. 
Any questions raising a major communal issue in the 
Legislature should require for its decision a majority, 
the voting of each of the two major communities, as
v/ell as a majority of all. the members present and voting.
3. All subjects other than those ceded to the Union and all
residuary powers should vest in the provinces.
4. The States should retain all powers other than those 
ceded to the Union.
3. Bhovinces should be free to form groups with Executives
and Legislatures and each group could determine the 
provincial subjects to be taken in common.
6, The constitution of the Union and of the groups should
contain a provision whereby any province by a majority
vote of its legislative Assembly might call for a re­
consideration of the terms of the Constitution after an 
initial period of ten years, and at ten-yearly intervals 
thereafter.
7. The Constituent Assembly was to be framed on the
following basis ;- The members of each Provincial
•Assembly, were to be divided into two groups, general 
and Muslim, except in ,the Punjab where they were to be 
divided into three groups, general, Muslim and Sikh.
Each group was to elect its own representatives to the 
Constituent Assembly by the method of proportional 
representation with the single transferable vote. The 
number of seats allotted to each province and community 
was to be in proportion to its population, in the ratio 
of one to a million. The total number from governors’ 
Provinces was to be 292, to these were to be added 4 
representatives of the chief commissioner’s Provinces 
and not more than 93 members from the Indian States.
im.-
The method of election from the Indian. States was left 
to be determined by consultation. The States would in 
the preliminary stages be represented by a negotiating 
committee. The Constituent Assembly thus formed would 
hold a preliminary meeting in which a chairman and other 
officers were to be elected, and the general order of 
business was to be decided upon. And an Advisory 
Committee on the rights of citizens, minorities, and tribal 
and excluded areas was to be set up. Thereafter the 
provincial representatives would divide up into three 
sections, A. B. & 0. These sections were to proceed to 
settle provincial constitutions for the provinces included 
in each section and were also to decide, whether any 
group constitution was to be set up for those provinces, and 
if so with what provincial subjects the group was to deal.
Then the representatives of the sections and of the 
Indian States were to re-assemble for the purpose of 
settling the Union Constitution.
8. The Paramountcy of the Grown over the Indian States was
( 1 )to lapse. ' '
9. An Interim Government was to be set up, having the 
support of the major political parties.
The proposals of the Cabinet Mission could not be considered as
entirely satisfactory to all sections of the Indian population.
However, the Muslim League accepted it in as much as it provided the
possibility of setting up a Muslim state - Pakistan. The Gongress
decided to accept the plan with a view to framing the constitution.
( o )
The Sikhs^*^ on getting some assurance from the Secretary of State, 
and particularly from the Congress, agreed to implement the plan.
For the administration of India during the Constitution-making 
period the Cabinet emphasised the need for setting up an interim 
government composed of the representatives of the major parties. The
Viceroy announced on l6th June that invitations had been issued to
(1) Gmd. 6835 (Memorandum by the Mission on States and
Par amount cy), see also pages relating to the Indian States 
. , / in Gmd. 6^ 52."^ ' '
(2) papers relating to the Sikhs. Gmd. 6862,
mIndian leaders with a view to forming the best available coalition
interim government. The Executive was to comprise 5 members of the
Congress and 5 of the Muslim League and four others representing
various interests. The Viceroy also declared that in the event of
two major parties, or either of them, proving unwilling to join in
the setting up of a coalition government on the above lines, the
Viceroy would proceed with the formation of an interim government
which would be as representative as possible, A good deal of 
(i )correspondence' took place on this issue. However no success
could be achieved, in obtaining an agreement between the Congress and
the Muslim League, Meanwhile a Caretaker Government was set up.
This was felt necessary in view of the fact that the Viceroy could
not proceed vfith the Muslim League Ministry at the centre, as the
Muslim League had accepted his offer and in view of the Congress
rejection the Muslim League had to press for the fulfilment of the
promise to set up a coalition government, whereas the provinces with
(2)
the Congress majority had outnumbered those with the Muslim 
League majority. Then came the provisional government with Pandit 
Nehru, The Viceroy still continued his efforts to secure the 
cooperation of the Muslim League. As a result of this an interim 
government was set up which consisted of fourteen members, five 
representing the Congress, five the Muslim League, and one each 
representing the Anglo-Indians, Parsees, Sikhs and Indian 
Christians.
III.
The first session of the Constituent Assembly commenced on the 
6th December, 1946. The Muslim League members did not attend owing 
to the differences arising from the interpretation relating to the 
voting in sections of the Constituent Assembly. The Viceroy and the 
Indian leaders visited London with a view to solving the difficulties 
in the way of the cooperation of the Muslim League. No agreement 
could be reached.
At the London conference discussions centred largely round the
(i) Gmd. 6861.
■ (2) 9 out of 11.
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interpretation of paragraph 19 of the Cabinet Mission scheme,
providing for the constituent Assembly after a preliminary session
to divide into the three inter-provincial groups of regional areas
to plan their respective futures. The Congress held that each
province of a group was entitled to meet separately on the question
of joining the group. In view of the probably unfavourable attitude
of Assam, a mainly Hindu province, towards the proposed North East
grouping and that of the North West Frontier province with Congress
leanings towards the North West grouping, the issue was of great ■
importance. The view taken by the Muslim League was that the
decision should rest with each group as a whole. This was shared
by the authors of the scheme and supported by the legal advisers
of His Majesty’s Government. On 6th December His Majesty’s
( -1 )
Government issued a statement^  ^ reiterating this interpretation and 
stating that the decision of the groups should, in the absence of 
agreement to the contrary, be taken by a simple majority vote in each 
section.
In view of this deadlock created by the controversy over the
interpretation of paragraph 19 of the Cabinet Mission scheme, the
British G-overnment announced the taking of necessary steps to effect
the transference of power into Indian hands by a date not later than 
(2)
June, 1948. It was also stated that in case there v/as no
agreement between the two major parties, the government would have 
to consider as to whom the pov/ers were to be handed over on the due 
date, v/hether as a whole to some successor government, or to more 
than one successor government in such other way as might seem most 
reasonable and in the best interest of the Indian people. This 
statement may be suitably described as an award by the British 
Government in the face of disagreement between the Muslim League 
and the Congress.
Lord Wavell was succeeded by Lord Mountbatten in March, 1947.
On June 3rd he issued a statement declaring that the partition of 
India as a v/hole and also of the Provinces of Bengal, Assam and the 
Punjab, was the only solution of the political deadlock. A
(1) Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. Dec. 1947? p.8304.
Also Tke Times, London, ?th Dec. 1946.
(2) Gmd. 7547.
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referendum was to be held in the North West Frontier to decide whether 
that province would join India or Pakistan, A referendum for a 
similar purpose was to be held in the district of Sylhet, The 
Constituent Assembly was to be divided into two sections, i.e. for 
Pakistan and India. The boundaries of the divided provinces were 
to be final3.y fixed by a Boundary Commission,
The plan under the pressure of circumstances was accepted by the
Congress, the Muslim League and the Sikhs. The référendums in the
North West Frontier Province and Sylhet district were in favour of
partition and Pakistan. Thus the Indian impasse was ultimately
solved through an award of the British Government. To quote Lord
Mountbatten - "In the absence of such agreement the task of devising
a method by which the wishes of the Indian people can be ascertained
(1)
has devolved upon His Majesty’s Government",
IV.
The Second World War has been responsible for the speedy arrange­
ments and quick decisions that brought India to her independence.
There have been changes'"' in other Dominions during this period.
In India the problems were twofold: long terra solution v/as needed to
solve the communal problem, and a short term arrangement to meet the 
emergency created by the War. The Government could not carry out the 
War plans successfully without enlisting the cooperation of the 
people, 'In all the plans set forth by the British Government to 
solve the Indian political deadlock, the twofold objective was pre­
dominant. Thè realisation of this fact by the British Government 
was not without some delay. The attempts during Lord Linlithgow’s 
Viceroyalty to seek cooperation by conceding trivial measures 
proved unsatisfactory in gaining the purpose. Even a promise to 
confer Dominion Status after the cessation of hostilities was 
characterised, by Gandhi as a post-dated cheque. The Congress demand 
for the declaration of war aims in unequivocal terms, when the Allies
(1) Speeches of Lord Mountbatten; ■ Nicholas K. I9I1.9.
Speech broadcast on l6th May, 1947.
were fighting for the freedom of all the nations, was tacitly made to 
get recognition of India’s freedom. They demanded the denunciation 
of imperialism, and immediate independence for India, It was in 
no sense non-coopération in War, on the part of India, provided only 
that she got independence. There was an extension of cooperation 
implied in asking for war aims and independence together. The
Muslim League too extended cooperation but v/ith different 
qualifications. In the case of the Muslim League the promise for 
cooperation in. war effort .was explicit provided the Government 
conceded their demand for constitutional changes. The situation 
became worse when the application, of the Atlantic Charter' ' was 
denied in the case of India, It was, however, subsequently 
clarified that the framers of the Atlantic Charter v/ere mainly 
concerned v/ith the European nations involved in the War. Under 
these circumstances the expansion of the Viceroy’s Executive Council 
could not gather any support. The demand of India was for 
immediate independence, at least in fact if not in law.
As far as the question of a ^  facto responsible Government at
the centre was concerned, it could be set up without any difficulty.
The act. of 1935 had undoubtedly imposed restrictions on such a
government and any government within the scope of this Act could not
possibly satisfy Indian demands. But any concession towards
setting up a fully responsible Government was in accordance with the
analogy of the Dominions. The' Dominions in fact attained
responsible- government first and then followed the legalisation of
the de facto status. And even the legalisation was not carried to
the limit. In Canada Lord Byng, the Governor-General, refused
dissolution on the advice of Mackenzie King, the Liberal Prime 
(Minister, This is one of the many instances that go to prove that 
there was a divergence between ^  facto and legal status of the 
Dominion. In India too such a d^ facto responsible government was 
not an impossibility and in fact the Interim Government ^ Was a
(1) Article, 3* Atlantic Charter,
(2) Bee Stewart, R.B. Treaty relations of the British
Commonwealth, p.40, where he cites a recent case of 
reservation, ■ namely. The Navigation Act, 1935.
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responsible government witbin the definition of the term. The
British Government, in spite of the conditions both in regard to
( 1 )an nnfavoiirable atmosphere for a responsible Government^ in its 
true sense as Mr Nehrn complained, and also in respect of the 
extreme national sentiments in favour of breaking away from the 
Commonwealth, was not too slow in yielding to this demand. In 
other words, India became a. Dominion in fact first, then followed 
legalisation by the Indian Independence Act, There was, in this 
respect, a close analogy with other Dominions, the only difference . 
being that the process of attainment of de facto dominion status 
and its legalisation were effected in quick succession and thus 
the delay witnessed in the case of the other Dominions was avoided. 
This phenomenon has far reaching significance. It should be 
treated, in the interest of the smooth development of the Common­
wealth, as a guiding example illustrating the principle that 
possession of thorough knowledge required to construct a piece of 
work should help to avoid delay and errors involved in thé process 
of its invention.
The only concession the Indian leaders were prepared to make 
was to have a fully responsible Government at the centre with 
arrangements for the prosecution of the War in collaboration with 
the Allies, They were prepared to postpone the legalisation of 
this ^  facto status till the end of the War. Thus even in the 
claims of the Indian leaders the twofold aspect of the problem was 
distinct. The British government wanted to proceed step by step, 
whereas the Indian Political Parties wanted to settle terms with 
the Government independently of each other; neither was possible. 
In the long process of negotiations the British Government realised 
that they had to take their final decision with regard to Indian 
independence once for all. The Indian political parties were 
convinced that they could not settle terms with the Government 
separately,. The British Government in the Draft Declaration was 
more definite than ever, both in regard to Indian independence, as
(1) Mr Nehru remarked that the Muslim League Members 
of the Interim Government acted as king^s 
party.
to the coimimnal problem which after the demand for Pakistan was no 
more a minority problem, but had taken shape as a conflict between 
two majorities. The subsequent attempts in Lord Wave11* a proposals 
evidently showed that in place of attaining agreement on the long 
term plans the Government tried to secure cooperation at least in the 
short term arrangements. These facts go to prove that in the 
circumstances, as they then stood, the Government distinctly 
visualised the twofold aspect of the problem. The short term 
solution of the deadlock was given priority not only because the War 
effort demanded it, but because it would have certainly provided a 
firm basis for the solution of the long term aspect of the problem. 
The two were interdependent and closely related.
In India the minority problem had a long and chequered history^ 
It was further complicated by the fact that besides the Muslims 
there were other minorities which were equally conscious of the 
majority rule. Among them the Scheduled Castes as the untouchables 
were constitutionally defined and Sikhs were important. In the 
Round Table Conferences representatives were invited not only of 
all the communities of India but also of different shades of opinion 
of one community. Against this tradition all minorities, except 
the Sikhs, gradually sank into insignificance. According to the 
Act of 1935 among the objects of the discretionary povfers vested in 
the Governor-General and Governor was the protection of the 
minorities. As far as the Draft Declaration was concerned the 
minorities were consulted and it was also envisaged that the Treaty 
would make provision for the protection of racial and religious 
minorities. But the Cabinet Mission did not go beyond consulting 
the different interests. When they met at 8im]_a, it was in fact 
a tripartite conference in which the Muslim League and the Congress 
appeared to settle terms with the Government. The fact that the 
Sikh leaders also participated in some of the negotiations was only 
because the creation of Pakistan had involved the partition of the 
Punjab in which the Sikh community being evenly distributed had a 
distinct interest. The other communities were out of the question. 
The British Government ceded its right to protect minorities and 
took it for granted that the crux of the problem had narrowed down to
/ftf.
the question whether the Muslims should have the right of self- 
determination in all the provinces where they were in the majority 
or the same principle was to be applied to those portions of the 
Punjab and Bengal where non-Muslims were in a slight majority. The 
logic in this case was that if the Muslims demanded self-determinâtior, 
in disregard of the geographical unity of India, because they were in 
a majority in some provinces, the same argument should apply in the 
provinces without regard to their geographical unity. Thus the 
assertion of self-determination definitely laid down the principle 
that the majority of the population was to be ascertained without 
regard to the geographical and administrative units. It was only 
a solution of the problem as far as it related to the conflict of 
two self-conscious geographical majorities.
The principle of self-determination as ascertained and enforced
in the international sphere was not exactly what has been applied in
India. The principle as ascertained is known as plebiscite, Ifo
plebiscite was held in India in the true sense of the word. Instead
it was asserted on the simple majority votes of the Legislatures,
This was because the Muslim League and the Congress were recognised
(1)
as the successors of the British Government in fact. The only
province which seemed to be geographically allied to Pakistan but 
politically affiliated to the Congress as far as the provincial 
legislature was concerned was the North West Frontier, It was 
therefore necessary to ascertain the will of the electorate. Then 
there was the district of Sylhet which, being predominantly Muslim, 
had to be detached from the province of Assam in accordance with a 
referendum. In both of these cases the referendum was to decide 
which of India or Pakistan they preferred. As the principle of the 
partition of India as a whole had not been decided by plebiscite, so 
there was no case to resort to a plebiscite to ascertain the will of 
a province or in partitioning another. It was taken for granted
(1.) Mr Attlee *s reference to the procedure adopted for the 
appointment of the Governor-General on the advice of 
Indian leaders. Second Reading. Hansard, Vol.2139, No.
139, Thursday, l6th July 19h7, pp.2760-61. He said "Both 
the Congress and the Muslim League have been recognised 
in the Bill as successor authorities".
Ibid.. See also the Opposition’s views and the Secretary 
of State for India’s reply on this point, pp.25hO-hl.
that Indian politics had taken a turn where partition was the only
solution, and the Congress and the Muslim League, the only political
bodies to have a say in the matter. In fact neither party was
willing to leave out an area in which their community had a majority
(1)
under the Government of the other party. The Congress demanded
the partition of Bengal and the Punjab as a counter-demand for the 
partition of India by the Muslim League, The Muslim League used the 
same argument in. its demand for the Sylhet district. The solution 
of the Indian problem was based on the principle of the division of 
India in accordance with the majority areas of the Muslims and non- 
Muslims, and the geographical and administrative unity was ruled out. 
Muslims of India under the constitutional changes gradually 
developed the idea of self-determination for the Indian Muslims as a 
whole, and therefore put forward a case for a separate nationhood.
At the time of the assertion of self-determination it was narrowed 
down to the Muslim majority areas, instead of all Indian Muslims, 
as no provision was made for the transfer of populations or for other 
similar problems. It may, therefore, be assumed that Muslims and 
non-Muslims both in India and Pakistan along with other minorities 
had lost their case for self-determination. There were minority 
protection arrangements made by both the successor governments, and 
their implications will be dealt with in subsequent pages.
The principle of self-determination thus established in case of 
the formation of Pakistan was strikingly similar to the principle 
recognised in the western world. Bven the conflict between this 
principle and geographical and economic considerations has been 
resolved, more or less in the same manner. This further establishes 
the fact that the scene of such political changes is shifting from 
West to East under the influence of similar democratic forces. The 
following observations of Stuyt appear as if they are the deduction 
of the changes that have taken place on the Indian sub-Continent,
"The principle recognizing the rights of people to determine their 
political fate may be applied in various ways ; the most important, 
of these are, on the one hand the formation of an independent state,
(1) Speech of Lord Mountbatten, op, cit. l6th May, 19h7,
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and on the other hand the right of choice between two existing 
states. The principle, however, must be brought into line with 
that of the protection of minorities; both have a common object - 
to assure to some national group the maintenance and free develop­
ment of its social, etlmicaH. or religious characteristic.... The 
fact must, however, not be lost sight of that the principle that 
nations must have the right of self-determination is not the onl.y 
one to be taken into account. Even though it may be regarded as 
the most important of the principles governing the formation of 
states, geographical, economic and other similar considerations 
may put obstacles in the way of its complete recognition, under 
such circumstances in the nature of a compromise based on an 
intensive grant of liberty to minorities may appear necessary
according to international legal conception and may even be dictated
(1 )by interest of peace". It is quite evident that the principles
of fundamental rights and protection of minorities in the Indian 
sub-Continent after partition, which was a partial recognition of 
the principle of self-determination in view of geographical and 
other difficulties, have also gained legal sanction not only due to 
international obligations but also due to the fact that both 
governments have undertaken such obligations.
Indians made their demands for constituent rights when virtually 
the non-party conference set up the Nehru Committee to frame a con­
stitution for India, Since then the demand for constituent rights 
have formed a major factor in all the political negotiations. The 
efforts of liberal leaders, especially that of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, 
in the field of the constitution is v/ell Imown to every student of 
the Indian Constitution. The British Government virtually accepted 
this demand as a challenge to Indian politicians among whom no agree­
ment could possibly be attained. The British Government since then 
proceeded in all their statements and plans on the assumption that 
the work of framing the constitution for India was left to Indians.
(1) Stuyt, The general principles of law. Note 9,
pp.182-183.
' /M.
What was needed on the part of the British Government was to provide 
a basis for setting up a body with powers to frame a constitution 
acceptable to all parties. The framing of the constitution prior 
to independence was necessary because there could be no transfer of 
pov/er possible without a constitution. The constituent body v/ith 
sovereign rights could also be a party to enter into a treaty with 
the British government which would cover matters arising out of the 
transfer of powers to Indian hands.
The formation of a constituent assembly must be such as to 
ensure as broad and accurate a representation of the whole of the 
population as possible, A constituent assembly of this nature 
could only be true in its definition when based on the adult 
franchise. The plan set forth by the Cabinet Mission and the 
Viceroy for setting up a constituent assembly for India was obviously 
lacking in the spirit, of this democratic principle. There were 
reasons for it. India was threatened with disturbances and dis­
order which, were likely to develop into civil war. The British 
Government had fixed a date for the transfer of powers. The time
left for any arrangements for the transfer was limited. To quote
Lord Mountbatten again - "The one point on. which every community 
was agreed, and on which all British officials were agreed, and 
with v/hich I very soon agreed myself was that a decision at the 
earliest possible moment as to how we were to transfer power was 
a prime necessity, if we were to put a stop to communal strife and
bring back the atmosphere of peace and friendliness without which
(1)no progress can possibly be made". The British government was
av^ are of the defect in the constituent assembly. To cite the
Cabinet Mission, "The most satisfactory method would be by
election based on adult franchise, but any attempt to introduce such
a step now vmuld lead to a wholly unacceptable delay in the
(2)'
formulation of the new constitution. "
The British Government was thinking of defining the relations 
of India to the United Kingdom as well as the Commomvealth through a
(1) Mountbatten, pp. cit. p. 20,
(2) Gmd. 6821, para, 18.
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treaty. This was possible only with a body having power to enter 
into a treaty. There was a better solution and one more in line 
with the spirit of the development of the Gommonwealth. To bring 
into existence a body of this character was dependent on the enact­
ment of the British Parliament. An Act conferring Dominion Status 
and also providing a constitution for the transition period would 
certainly eliminate the process of setting up a body with treaty- 
making powers and then entering into a treaty. By enacting the 
Indian Independence Act the British Parliament effected the transfer 
of power into Indian hands, defined the relations of India and 
Pakistan, with the United Kingdom and the G.ommonwealth, and also a 
constitution for the transition period. The Act of 1935 was wide 
and elastic enough to serve this purpose. Thus the Constituent 
Assembly was left with the task of framing a constitution without 
any trouble of providing for day to.day constitutional needs.
The Cabinet Mission plan envisaged an assembly for the whole of 
India with certain qualifications. The provinces were divided 
into three groups A. B. and G. Group A. consisted of Madras,
Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Orissa,
These happened to be predominantly Hindu provinces. The Group B. 
consisted of the Punjab, North West Frontier Province and Sindh.
These provinces happened to be predominantly Muslim. Group C. was 
made up of Bengal and Assam in which Bengal was a Muslim majority 
province, whereas in Assam Hindus were in the majority, but the 
total effect was that Bengal and Assam together sent 34 non-Muslim 
and 36 Muslim representatives to the Constituent Assembly. Besides 
these provinces there were representatives from the Chief Commission­
er’s provinces, Delhi, Ajmer-Marwara and Coorg to join Group A. -and 
the representative from British Baluchistan was to be added to 
Group B.
The crux of the problem was in regard to paras 4 - 8  of section 
19 of the plan. The differences of opinion as regards their 
interpretation which existed between the Congress and the Muslim 
League and the final statement of the British Government expressing 
their agreement with the view held by the Muslim League on the basis 
of the opinion of their legal advisers have already been recorded.
This made it imperative to divide the Constituent Assembly into 
tvm as ultimately these tv;o sections emerged as the Constituent 
Assemblies of India and Pakistan.
With the idea of federation for India, the States and their
participation were considered an important factor in Indian politics.
In the chapter on the States it has been observed that in spite of
their sovereign identities, the Reports of the Montagu-Ghelmsford
Committee and of the Simon Commission dealt with them as an
important part for the success of federation. The Act of 1935 was
shelved mainly because the States,were reluctant to join. In the
Chapter on the evolution of self-determination it has been noticed
that the legal barriers formed by the sovereign identities of the
States could not stop the infiltration of the ideas for responsible
government in the States. The statements and plans under review
also dealt with the States. The only thing that the British
Government was reluctant to transfer to the successor governments
was paramountcy. Paramountcy as defining the relation of the
States with the British Grown on analysis has been found to have
(1 )
two aspects, _ inter - dependence based on the strength of the
British government in India and the geographical factors involving 
such relationships; the legal aspect depending on a contractual 
basis such as treaties etc. The British Government could and did 
declare the lapse of paramountcy, but could not and did not 
denounce the de facto interdependence between the states and 
British India. Undoubtedly this interdependence could never be 
justifiably or even desirably defined as paramountcy. In the 
Cabinet Mission plan the states were provided v/ith representation 
in the Constituent Assembly and they were allotted 93 seats. There 
was only one thing, which denied the principle of self-determination 
for the people of the State; namely the fact that the state 
representatives were to be selected by a method to be determined b^r 
consultation,. Even in the Act of 1935 the method of selection was 
left to the discretion of the rules. This was the basis divergent 
from that adopted in British India, but it was in no way an entire
(1) See Chapter on States.
denial of the principle of self-determination from the people of 
the States. The representatives of the States in a sovereign body 
Gould be nobody else but the true representatives of the people of 
the states whose v/ill under the changed conditions had become 
sovereign. The arrangements made for state representation in the 
Constituent Assembly envisaged by the Cabinet Mission plan were 
only a compromise measure rather than a permanent feature.
l U
THE TITLE AND THE SCOPE OF THE ACT^^^
I.
The short title of the Act has been defined as the 
"Indian Independence Act". Mr. Harold Macmillan the member for 
Bromley speaking in the debates of the Commons on the second 
reading of the Bill observed, "I must here frankly say that my
friends and I do not much like the title of this Bill......
the more so because I understand it is a phrase which does not 
result from any Indian request, but is due to the sole initiative 
of British draftsmen. This phrase seems to us to dwell too 
much on one aspect of the Commonwealth system, for it is the 
peculiar glory of the free nations which comprise the British
(2)
Commonwealth that they are both independent and inter-dependeht, " 
or in Mr. Wilson Harris' opinion, the use of the term 
"Independent Dominions" involves a certain contradiction. 
Dominions as between themselves are interdependent, not 
independent.^^^ In replying to this the Prime Minister remarked, 
"With regard to the word "Independent," that again one may 
quarrel over, but I think one has to consider both history and 
psychology in this matter. It is a fact that is not generally 
realised throughout the world that although it is properly said 
that there is interdependence, there is complete independence 
in the Dominions from any control, whether from Whitehall or 
from parliament. That is the important point that needs to be 
stressed. It is not perhaps quite the same as if this was being 
formed from one country which had never been in the position of 
being under this Parliament and YiThitehall. I think that is the 
point that Indians really want to have emphasised; they quite 
accept the position and know the advantages of being in
the/_________ ^   ---
(1) The Indian Independence Act 10 & 11 George 6.0.30.
(2) Mansard, Volume 439, Ho.139, Thursday, lOth July 1947.
Col.2480
(3) Hansard, Volume 440, 14th July 1947 (Committee
stage) Col. 42.
the (sic) D o m i n i o n s . H a v i n g  heard this explanation 
Mr. Harris raised another question in this context, "Is allegiance 
to the Grown which is inherent in the position of any Dominion 
really consistent with the use of this term." The Prime Minister 
replied, "I think so, because the King is king of Great Britain, 
king of Canada and of any Dominion,
The Prime Minister in his speech relied on the fact 
that a subject nation when admitted to the rank of equality was 
bound to demand explicit and unequivocal definitions of the 
terms defining their relationships. This is undoubtedly partially 
true, but it is not the whole truth. Interdependence has long 
been abandoned as an essential basis of intra-0ommonwealth 
relationships. This is not to suggest that interdependence 
has been altogether eliminated from the list of the factors 
underlying that relationship. What it is desired to clarify 
is that interdependence as an essential and basic relation in 
the changed Commonwealth has been abandoned and instead it has 
come in as an extra factor supporting the basic conditions and 
principles of this relationship. How it may be asked when and 
how did this change come about. It is a commonplace of 
Commonwealth relations that a member can remain neutral if it 
so desires. If neutrality is possible in spite of the continuity 
of the relationships, then the logical conclusion would be that 
the factors making neutrality possible should not be made a 
basic and essential condition for the membership of the 
Commonwealth. Neutrality on the part of one or more members 
while the Commonwealth is at war makes it inevitable that the 
belligerent members cannot share the interdependence existing 
among themselves during war, with those who proclaim themselves
neutral/  . . . ................. . ...............
(1) Ibid. Col. 43.
(2) Ibid.
neutral. The neutral members being members of the community 
of nations have to maintain their neutrality in accordance with 
the law of the nations. What will happen if interdependence 
demands something which goes contrary either to the very purpose 
of neutrality or to ihternational law? Naturally the neutral 
members will solve the conflict and that in one way only. The 
choice will be for neutrality and international law rather than 
interdependence. Keith had observed "To declare war or make 
peace or assert neutrality separately from the rest of the Empire
would virtually be an act of secession...... Keith carries
the logical conclusion to secession and this can be the only 
logical conclusion if interdependence is treated as a fundamental 
condition for membership of the Commonwealth. But what has 
actually happened in the case of Eire? Was it that Eire seceded 
as a result of her neutrality during World War II? Did all the 
members of the Commonwealth exclude Eire from membership? The 
answer is undoubtedly in the negative. By this policy of 
neutrality Eire's detachment from other nations of the Common­
wealth during one of the most critical periods in their history 
was undermined but the character of her association with it
was not fundamentally altered........... The invitation extended
for the Commonwealth Conferences of 1944 and 1946 lay down 
explicitly the principle that neutrality did not, from the 
standpoint of the members of the Commonwealth, cause the secession 
of Eire from the Commonwealth.  ^^  ^ It is therefore true as well 
as desirable to treat interdependence not as a fundamental 
condition for membership of the Commonwealth but as an extra 
favourable factor to support and strengthen the relationship.
In view of this conclusion it is safer to say that interdependence 
comes/____________________________________ .____________________ ^
(1) Keith, A.B.: Dominions as Sovereign States,
ed. 1938, p. 205.
(2) The Commonwealth and the Nations; Nicholas
Mansergh, p. 208.
(3) She was not invited in 1948. Though Eire did not
participate in the Conferences of 1944, and 46, 
the emphasis here is on the fact that invitation 
was extended, which implied that she was still 
considered a member of the Commonwealth.
comes in the field of Gommonwealth relationships as an extra 
factor having its origin in the consent of the members; and 
therefore its existence or disappearance should not affect the 
fundamental factor governing the relationship. This is equally 
justified on the grounds of the divisibility of the Crown.
The Crown acts in the interest of that particular Dominion to 
which it is attributed. There is no interdependence just because 
there is one king. The position is that there are as many crowns 
as there are Dominions. The unity of the Imperial period or 
even of that of the autonomous Dominions has long been abandoned. 
The Crown acts on the advice and in the interests of the Dominion 
concerned. If all the Dominions have common interests which make 
interdependence advantageous, then only does it come in the 
purview, but as an extra factor, created entirely by a favourable 
situation. In other words interdependence does not depend on 
its own title ; it is only the situation that the common interest 
of the Commonwealth creates and the Dominions individually give 
it the title and only then does it emerge. In other words 
interdependence remains as an element of policy and politics 
rather than as an integral part of the legal and constitutional 
principles and conventions governing the relationship.
There is a marked difference between India and the 
other Dominions as compared from the standpoint of the legal 
basisc of their respective relationships with Great Britain. 
Colonies were part and parcel of the British Empire, They 
received authority through gradual devolution without affecting 
the legal character of their relations with the mother country. 
This was . the case at least till recently. Their neutrality 
while Great Britain was at war appeared to be a legal inconsist­
ency; through there are writers like Schlosberg^^^ who do not 
contribute/ ___________________________ _ ________ ___
(1) Schlosberg (H.J.); The King's Republics,
London 1929. See Ch. on Neutrality, 
pp. 44-50.
contribute to this view. But India stood in her relations with 
Great Britain oh a different footing. India was brought into 
relationship with the Crown, not as a colony but as an Enqpire'  ^
in itself thereby retaining her individuality and identity.
Her neutrality even before attaining Dominion status was as good 
and legally consistent while Great Britain was at war as that 
of Hanover.
The question of allegiance has been answered to by 
the Prime Minister, when he pointed out the divisibility of the 
Crown. This question has far reaching bearings on the policies 
India and Pakistan have adopted, but discussion of this will 
be better postponed to subsequent chapters. What is desired 
here is to understand what the title of the Act bears out and 
also to assess its scope. Related problems can be better dealt 
with when the determination of the exact terras and their 
implications will -be., examined.
There arises a difficulty in the use of the word 
"India". It may be argued, in the first place, that "India" 
is a geographical expression and comprises both British Indian 
and Indian states; secondly, as far as the use of the word 
"India" in the title goes, it gives independence not only to 
the Indian Dominion but also to the Dominion of Pakistan. During 
the debates this point also was raised by Mr. R.A. Butler : 
"Perhaps we might be given a little explanation as to what 
"India" means here, and what it means under the new connotation.
I understand that it has been arranged with the parties concerned 
as an agreed m a t t e r . T h e  Prime Minister with reference to 
this/___________________________________________________________
(1) When India joined the Imperial Conference in 1917,
it was as an Empire, and therefore the use of the 
term 'inter-imperial* appears to be quite appropriate 
because there were thus two Empires brought together. 
The British Empire and the Indian Empire, Cf*. Wheare; 
op.oit.p.27N.I.'The term is inaccurate. The relations 
it purports to describe are not relations between 
empires - which is what ' inter-imperial' means - but 
relations between parts of a single empire.' This was 
not the case at least since the time India joined 
this relationship as an empire in itself..
(2) Hansard: op.cit. col.40.
this question observed: "Whether we should call the Dominions 
India and Pakistan, that is largely a choice of names decided
by the Indians themselves   We are awfully apt to talk of
"Americans" when we do not mean the people of North and South 
America. We often talk of "Americans" and do not mean the 
people of the whole of North America, In the same way, I have 
no doubt that we shall continue to talk of "Indians" although
one part is particularly called India...... We had a good deal
of talk on this when the 1955 Act was discussed. We always had 
to distinguish between British India and Indian India.
The first reference to distinguish between British 
India and Indian India was made in the Interpretation Act.
It is a well known fact of history that the Government of India 
Bill 1919 was adopted with the words "British India" substituted 
for "India". "India" was not a geographical expression as well 
as the name of a State as the Prime Minister observed."India" 
was a geographical expression only. The name of the State was 
"British India", The other states were known by their individual 
names, e.g. Hyderabad state, Mysore state, etc. India comprised 
both, but excluded when used in geographical sense, Burma, which 
was part of British India. The Colonial Daws Validity Act 1805^^^ 
excluded "India", i . both British India as well as the 
Indian states from the purview of that Act. Even in the view 
of the British Indian Courts^ the Indian states were foreign 
territories and this was the case even of Berar^ ^  ^which was 
administered by the British Indian Government.
(1) Hansard: op.oit. col.44.
(2) 28 & 29 Victoria 1889, sections 3-6.
(3) Hansard: op.cit, col.44.
(4) 28 & 29 Victoria C.63, 1865.
(5) See Chapter on the States.
(6) See Fitzgerald's article on Beraiv
Now the question arises as to how far the use of 
"India" was correct in view of the legal precision of the name 
of the state British India which gained independence and was also 
partitioned by the same Act. The Indian independence Act does 
not only speak of the independence of British India and its 
partition but also enacts the lapse of paramountcy over the Indian 
states. The Government of India Act of 1935 provided for the 
accession of the Indian states into the federation and nothing 
in the Act was to extend to the states unless they acceded to 
the Federation. The Indian Independence Act enacts the lapse of 
suzerainty, hence the use of "India" in this connotation seems 
to be justified because not only British India through this 
enactment became independent but also the Indian states regained 
independence as a result of the lapse of suzerainty and the 
denunciation of treaties that imposed subordination.
As regards Pakistan it is quite clear that Pakistan 
had no existence for the purposes of law before the 15th August 
1947 though in fact two governments, one for Pakistan and the 
other for India, were de facto in existence before the appointed 
day. The Act itself came into effect on the 15th August. Both 
could come together and they did. The Act speaks of the 
"Dominion of Pakistan", and the legal name, the "State of 
Pakistan" owes its origin to this Act. The fact that the word 
"Pakistan" was not inserted in the title of the Act may be 
explained in two ways. Firstly it was a short t i t l e , a n d  
was not expected to include everything’ in it. The Dominion of 
Pakistan finds expression in the Act itself. Secondly, the term 
"India" was used as was explained by the Prime Minister in its 
geographical sense including the areas comprising Pakistan, hence 
it reflects nothing on the legal name "Pakistan State".
( 1 )  Willmot V .  Rose ( 1 8 5 4 )  2 3 .  Q.B. 2 8 1 .
"the title cannot over rule the clear meaning 
of the enactment."
mThere remains the last, but not the least, point, 
namely that there is nothing in the title of the Act to suggest 
partition as well as independence. So the point arises whether 
the Act should be treated as a partition Act as well. The 
language used in the .Clauses of the Act providing for the creation 
of two Dominions; "An Act to make provisions for the setting up
in India of two independent Dominions...... " does not clearly
use the term "partition". Gould it be interpreted as implying 
other than partition? It needs no emphasis to see that the 
setting up of two Dominions in place of one State is a result 
of partition. Clause 9(b) section 2 of the Indian Independence 
Act runs as follows : - "For dividing between the new Dominions 
and between the new provinces to be constituted, the powers, 
rights, property, duties and liabilities of the Governor-General 
in Council or, as the, case may be, of relevant provinces which, 
under this Act are to cease to exist." Here is the word "dividing" 
explicitly used and if read with other clauses of the Act it can 
only be construed as the Act bringing about partition. The 
principles of construction and their application to this Act may 
be postponed till we come to deal with them individually and also 
to probe into their implications. It is now, undoubtedly, a 
settled rule that the title of the statute forms an important 
part of the Act^^^ and may be referred to for the purposes of 
ascertaining i-|;s general scope^^^ and thus it may be profitably 
employed to throw light on its construction and this rule applies 
both to the long and to the short title but the title can not 
over rule the clear meaning of the enactment. In interpreting 
the intention and meaning of the Act v/ith a view to ascertaining 
its scope, it should be read in the light of other provisions.
This Act contains sufficiently clear words dealing with partition.
(1) Fielding v. Morley Corporation, 1899. Oh.a 3#
(2) Fenton V. Morley, 1903. A.O. 447.
t w
A reference to the modern tendencies as decided in 
the leading cases, in order to take a broader view for the 
purposes of construction seems to be necessary. It has been 
observed that in interpreting the constituent, or organic statute 
such as the British North American Act the construction must be 
the widest p o s s i b l e . E v e n  a statute is said to be justifiably 
construed contrary to its literal meaning when a literal con­
struction would result in an absurdity or inconsistency, and the
words are capable of another construction which will carry out 
the manifest i n t e n t i o n . I n  South-Eastern Railway v. the 
Railway Commissioners reference was made to the speech of the 
minister on the introduction of the Railway Canal and Traffic Act. 
In view of these leading cases the list of which is undoubtedly 
not exhausted, and also in view of the word "dividing" used in 
the Act itself, the only construction manifesting the intentions 
of the Act would be to describe the Act as one providing for
partition and hence it could be named not only an Act of
Independence but also of partition. ^ ^  ^
Then comes the question; was it not a secession or 
breaking off of a new state from an existing state? The answer 
is in the negative. Because the setting up of two Dominions 
and independence are simultaneous phenomena. A break-off could 
only be either through revolt followdd by recognition by the 
parent state or by a treaty with the same. Had India gained 
independence prior to partition and had the break-off been the 
result of any contract then, it would have been a ease of 
secession, but as both independence and the setting up of two 
dominions happened simultaneously, it can be interpreted as a 
partitioning Act. This case is further supported by the fact
(1) Corporation v. King, 1935. A.C. p.500. See also
The Governor-General v. Raleigh Investment;
Co. ltd. (1944) F. C.R. (India) 22a.
(2) Experte Walton (1881) 17 Oh. D. 746.
(3) The words in the Clause 9(b) Sec. 2 say; "For
dividing the powers, rights, property "
Rights certainly includes juristic personality and 
all the rights attributed to it (see Chapter on 
the succession of state under the Act infra)
that "partition" had been used and meant throughout the 
negotiations for the settlement of the Indian political deadlock 
and during- the debates on the Indian Independence Bill as well. 
This has its significance in relation to the problems of state 
succession and it will be dealt with in all its details there. 
Suffice it here to say that the Indian Independence Act was 
inter alia a partitioning Act.
The Act is said to be "An Act to make provisions for 
the setting up in India of two independent Dominions, to sub­
stitute other provisions for certain provisions of the Government 
of India Act 1935 which apply outside those Dominions, and to 
provide for other matters consequential or connected with the 
setting up of these Dominions." As is quite clear, the Indian 
Independence Act of 1947 on the one hand is a measure to confer 
de jure Dominion status that de facto was assumed by India just 
a few months earlier, and on the other hand to borrow Mr. Attlee's 
phrase it was an 'enabling Act', which makes provisions for the 
needs of both constitution and governments of the future. This 
Act makes provision at the same time for partitioning^India 
"between the new Dominions" and the provinces of Bengal, the 
Punjab and Assam as defined in the Act of 1935 with a view to 
bringing into existence the new provinces of Eastern Bengal and 
Western Bengal; Assam with the exclusion of the Sylhet district 
that was to be annexed to Eastern Bengal, and Eastern and Western 
Punjab. The boundaries^of these new provinces were to be 
determined by the ' a w a r d ' o f  the boundary commission appointed 
for this purpose. Meanwhile the boundaries for the purposes of 
the setting up of the new Dominions until they were finally 
determined by the Commission were defined in Section 5 (3) a.b.c.;
(1) Sc. 2, 3, 4.
(2) Sc. 3 (3).
(3) It may be noted here that "award"has been used
throughout whereas "decision" by the agreement 
of all the members also was a possibility.
min other words if the 'award* followed the enforcement of the 
Act the two states had for the purposes of law defined boundaries. 
The Act provides no permanent constitution as was the 
case with the Ceylon Independence Aet^^^ but makes temporary 
provision for the Government' ''and legislature. Though the 
provisions were temporary they were complete a,s they covered the 
adaptation of the Act of 1935 for the purposes of the Government 
of the new Dominions. And the limitations with which the Act of 
1935 was enacted were removed.
As a result of the setting up of the new Dominions it 
was necessary to define the position of the states^^^ tribes^ 
on the one hand and on the other hand it was also necessary to 
change the Royal style and titles(^) With this change it was also
(7)made consequentially necessary to denounce all the responsibilities
connected with British India and the States. •
The Act was drafted on the presumption that there was to
be one Governor-General for both the Dominions, This, hov/ever,
was not possible and two spparate Governors-General were appointed
but the provisions of the Act were broad enough to cover this and
no change from this point of view was necessary. The Governor-
General of pre-partition India was the Governor-General in the
(8)
Act, who v/as entrusted with powefs to put this Act into practice. 
This is the most important clause of the Act as it covers a wide 
field connected with the partitions and other administrative and 
legal matters. As will be observed, this clause became the centre 
of contention.
The Secretary of state for India and his services^ 
were accordingly dealt with, and the amendments of the connected
(1) George 6.c.1947. (2) Sc. 5, 6, & 8.
(3) 80. 8 (3) (4) Sc. 7, À ; A :
(5) Sc. 7 (h) (6) Sc. 7, Clause 2.
(7) Sc. 7 a.h. (8) Sc. 9.
(9) Sc. 10 & 14.
Acts^^^ in respect of administrative matters as well as of the 
armed forces were provided. There was provision also for the 
British armed f o r c e s ^ w h o  were to leave India after some time.
As the Secretary of State's office was being wound up provisions 
were made for legal proceedings too(^^ It was also necessary to 
make provision for the separation of Aden^'^^and to define the 
operation of the Act of 1955 outside the two Dominions^^^in view 
of the changed context. For the purposes of interpretation all 
details were laid down in Section 19.
The Act has three schedules : the first gives the 
description of the districts provisionally included in the new 
province of East Bengal and the second those of the west Punjab.
The third has in the first part modifications of the Army Act 
and the Air Force Act in relation to the British forces and the 
second and third parts of the third schedule, contain modifications 
of the Army and Air Force Acts in relation to the Indian forces,
- II .
The above description gives in broad outline the scope 
of the Act. It will be of great interest ahd profit to compare 
this Act as far as the definition of Dominion Status in this Act 
is concerned in order to make a comparative study with both the 
Statute of Westminster (1951) and the Ceylon Independence Act (1947), 
Before any comparison ia made it is desirable to assess on the 
one side the factors that were responsible for the enactment of 
the Statute of Westminster and on the other side those which 
preceded the Indian Independence Act. In the preceding chapter 
a study of the forces influencing the assertion of the principle 
of self-determination in the final phase has been made in detail.
In this context only a reference to them would suffice well for
(1) Section 10 (5), 7 v. (2) Section 12, 15.
(5) Section 15* (4) Section 16.
(5) Section 18.
the purposes of comparison. Conditions in Oeylon were very- 
different from those in India and any reference to Ceylon would 
be only to the Ceylon Independence Act itself, rather than to the 
factors of history or the circumstances under which the Act came 
into existence.
The Statute of Westminster was to a large extent 
declamatory and therefore a measure to recognise and define the 
then existing position^^^ The recommendations of the Imperial 
Conferences of 1926 and 1930, whatever be their limitations, were 
remarkably significant in one respect. They advocated the removal 
of the inequalities that existed between the Dominions and the 
Dnited Kingdom in view of the proclamation of equal status in 
1926. The recommendations were twofold. They recommended the 
removal of those inequalities, "not by the method of legislative 
change only, but also by conventional c o n v e r s i o n s . I t  was in 
keeping with the spirit of the characteristic constitutional 
structure of the British Commonwealth, The Statute of Westminster 
was not the sole legal measure to remove all Inequalities, because 
the Conferences of 1926 and 1950 had already dealt with some of 
them and through .constitutional conventions equ,ality of status 
was most satisfactorily achieved. This was done with "the knowledge 
and upon the condition that certain other resolutions in respect 
of the remaining inequalities would be carried into effect in the 
terms of the Statute of Westminster. The Statute was only a 
partial measure and that too a declamatory one.
It is of great interest to note in this context that 
the conferance of 1950 could not deal with all the points that 
were raised in connection with inequalities, and besides this 
difference between the problem and its actual handling there was
(1) Wheane K.C. Statute of Westminster & Dominions,
p. 125.
(2) Ibid, p, 124.
(5) Ibid. p. 54
a difference of another kind existing in the "legal elements" 
which formed a part of the constitutional status of one "Dominion" 
from another. There was a difference of view among the Dominions 
as to the extent to which they desired to get the legal inequal­
ities removed through the Statute itself. In view of the 
resolutions laid down by the Conference of 1930 qualifying the 
operation of the Statute in respect of certain Dominions, 
provision was made in the Act itself, for such qualified operation 
in respect of these Dominions, It may here be mentioned that the 
changes brought about both by the conventions and by legal 
measures were interdependent. The legal measure was inevitable 
because merely conventional resolutions were not enough to 
remove all the legal inequalities that existed in view of some 
Acts of parliament i.e. The Colonial Laws validity Act, Merchant 
Shipping Act, 1894, and also the Colonial Laws of Admiralty 
Act, 1890. The change in the Royal Title and also in that of 
the Parliament are points of importance to be borne in mind for 
the purposes of comparison.
The question as to how far the Statute apart from
the resolutions of the Imperial Conferences was successful in
its object may be better answered in Wheare's words, "As has
been seen, it is doubtful whether the Statute has succeeded
in the first of its tasks, which, in the words of the King's
Speech in 1931, it was intended to perform, 'to make clear the
powers of Dominion Parliaments. « " ( 1) xs not only the power
of the Parliaments of the Dominions which failed to be defined
with legal precision, but also the term "the Dominion" itself,
(2 )According to the Statute the term "Dominion" ^ 'was said to mean 
"any of the following Dominions, that is to say, the Dominion 
of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of
(1) Wheare, op.cit, p.305.
(2) The Statute of Westminster, Section 1.
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New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State
(2)and Newfoundland' ." The nature of the co-operation amongst 
the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations in those d$ys 
was such as not to demand more than what was actually provided 
for. It "was natural that the Commonwealth witnessed changes and 
it progressed by the way of adjustment. The inequality involved 
in the status of the Governor-General both in his relations to 
his ministers and in his relation to the British Government 
attracted attention and was accordingly dealt with in the 
Conferences, Then there was the question of the legislative 
powers of the Parliaments in relation to the doctrine of extra­
territoriality, The Colonial laws Validity Act had necessarily 
to be amended in order to give the powers of legislation in 
respect of repugnancy to the Parliaments of the Dominions.
In view of the differences that existed in the 
Dominions themselves, the adoption of the Statute was effected in 
different ways. In 1934 South Africa re-enacted the Statute, 
so as to make it one of the South African Statutes, This differ­
ent method was aimed at making the South African Parliament 
entirely independent of the Imperial Parliament, The Irish 
Free State as it was then known through the Constitution Act 1956 
removed the crown from the sphere of all internal activities, and 
through the Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936, 
empowered the Executive Council to appoint diplomatic represent­
atives and conclude treaties in the name of the king. In other 
words the king was to act only in the sphere of external affairs 
and C.n the advice of the Executive. It implied that the king 
derived his powers from the Dail and hence from the people. In 
Canada it operated without any change in the wording. Australia 
and New Zealand only in 1942^^^and 1947^^^ respectively.
(1) Reference to its secession from the Commonwealth
will be made later.
(2) Newfoundland in view of the economic crisis lost its
Dominion Status in 1933 (24 Geo.5 02) and has 
now joined the Canadian Federaiaon.
(3) The Status of the Union Act, 1934. No, 69.
(4) No. 56 of 1943. (5) No. 38 of 1947.
It may be of interest to note here that the effect 
of the Statute in the international sphere was not to put an end 
to the powers of legislation of the Imperial Parliament; at least 
in respect of Canada, Australia and New Zealtkid. Another point 
worth noting in this context is that despite the provision for 
legislation by the Imperial Parliament, on the request of the 
Dominion concerned, there was no restriction whatsoever on the 
full growth of the international personalities of these Dominions.
The term "Dominion" was, in this sense, used to describe 
the status of the countries like South Africa and Irish Free 
State to whom full legislative autonomy was intended to be granted 
amd also to countries like Canada, Australia, New Zealand (and 
of course Newfoundland was included) who of their own free will 
had consented to receive a "restrictive legal competence."
But even by including section 4 in the Statute the United Kingdom 
Parliament has not abolished, in strict law, its power to legislate 
for the Dominions. Professor Wheare maintains that, ".... it is 
a rule of construction. It is not directed to the United Kingdom 
parliament, it is directed to the Courts. And so long as it 
remains unrepealed, it is effective for that purpose. But it 
does not render it legally impossible for the United Kingdom 
Parliament to legislate for a Dominion without the request and 
consent of the D o m i n i o n . I t  is one of the many other consider­
ations before the draftsmen of the Indian Independence Act 1947, 
to make necessary changes in the wording of this section 4.
How far this change in the wording has proved successful in 
bringing about the desired effect will be noticed in the subsequent 
chapter.
III.
With this background in view it is desirable to see 
hovf India stood from the legal point of view in relation to the
(1) Wheare op.oit. p .153.
United Kingdom* It has been observed that India passed into the 
British administration; and the Secretary of State in Ooimcil 
in the United Kingdom and the Governor-General in Oonncil in 
India were the real rulers, but the identity of India remained 
unimpaired. V/ith the changes in circumstances and the changes 
in political conditions in India and authorities and powers 
entrusted to the Secretary and the Governor-General gradually 
devolved upon the local executives. Although the Secretary of 
State legally held all the powers,that were originally vested in 
him even in the Acts of 1919 and 1955, the tendency was to devolve 
them through conventions so as to avoid interference in Indian 
affairs. Ihe report of the joint sélect committee on the 
Government of India Bill 1919 observed, "In the relations of the 
Secretary of State with the Governor-General in Council, the 
committee are not of opinion that any statutory changes can be 
made, so long as the Governor-General remains responsible to the 
parliament, but in practice, the. convention which now governs 
these relations may wisely be modified to meet fresh circumstances 
by the creation of a legislative assembly with a large elected 
m a j o r i t y . A g a i n  in the ease of the Governor-General»s relations 
with the Executive it was observed, "It would be inadvisable to 
seek to define the Governor-General*s (or the Governor’s) relations 
with his ministers by imposing a statutory obligation upon him 
to be guided by their advice, since to do so would be to convert
a constitutional convention into a rpile of law...... the
declaration.of special responsibility of the Governor-General 
(or the Governor) with respect to any matter does not mean or 
even support that on every occasion when the question relating 
to that matter comes up for decision, the decision is to be that 
of the Governor-General (or the Governor) to the exclusion of
(1) Report of the Joint Select Committee on the
Government of India Bill, 1919» Discussion 
on Clause 55 of the Bill.
his m i n i s t e r s I t  was also agreed in the Parliament that 
the Secretary of state should cease to control the administration 
of the transferred subjects in the P r o v i n c e s . T h e  tendency 
to devolve powers by constitutional convention rather than legal 
measures are analagous to those in the Dominions. This tendency 
was stronger in 1957 when the Act of 1955 came to be enforced 
and the formation of the Congress Ministries depended on the 
solemn promise that the Governors would make least use of their 
powers given by the Act of 1955. The record of the vmrk of the 
responsible governments in the Provinces proved that the constit­
utional conventions worked well as long as there was no serious 
political conflict.
The Act of 1955 did not confer full responsible 
government at the centre and envisaged a sort of dyarchy with 
distinct lists of transferred and reserved subjects. There was 
no change in the central government as the expectation of the 
participation of the States in the federal scheme was not fulfilled. 
The war created a situation in which a step forward was inevitable, 
and the expansion of the Governor-General*s Executive followed.
It is claimed by the Executive Councillors that they enjoyed de 
facto the position of responsible ministers.^ S u b s e q u e n t  events 
have already been studied. The steps taken up to, and for the 
setting up of the interim government were entirely based on 
conventions. The interim Government itself relied on conventions.
In other words in India changes were brought about on the analogy 
of the Dominions relying on Constitutional conventions rather than 
legal measures. The Interim Government was a fully responsible 
government and the Governor-General acted entirely on its advice.
There is another angle for reviewing the status of 
India as compared with the Dominions. In India secession of 
territories was not dependent on the sanction of parliament
(1) Joint Parliamentary Committee, paras. 74 & 75*
(2) Montagu Chelmsford Reforms, para. 291.
(5) Coupland, op.cit.
(4) The Law of Treaties - Arnold Duncan Mohair, p. 28.
See also the Law Officer’s Reports reproduced there.
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This prerogative of annexation or secession enjoyed by the 
crown independent of Parliament was brought within the scope of 
federal legislature of those of the provinces as the case may be^^^ 
thereby making it dependent on consultation with the government 
and the legislatures concerned.
India’s personality in international law was often 
said to be anomalous because she joined the League of Hâtions 
and concluded treaties of an International character while she 
was governed by the Parliament and enjoyed least attributes of 
self-government. Before any criticàl.-View of this opinion is 
taken it is necessary to refer to one fact, the King and Emperor 
of India delegated powers of an international character to the 
Governor-General and on the strength of these delegated powers, 
the Governor-General concluded treaties with foreign countries, 
as for instance with Afghanistan. The King and the Governor- 
General whenever they acted did so as the King and the Governor- 
General of India. That was the only theoretical basis for 
concluding treaties in the name of India as a matter of her own 
right. The fact that Parliament held control over Indian affairs 
was based on the theory of trust. Whenever they questioned any 
point about India or discussed Indian affairs, they did so in 
the capacity of a supervisory body with full recognition of 
India’s identity. The fact that the Government in India was run 
by a Governor-General who was a British national should not 
influence the legal case for India’s personality^ in international 
law. It would have been quite a different case if India had been 
annexed to the United Kingdom thereby losing her identity. The 
King acted as the head of the State of India, and the fact that 
India joined the League of Hâtions and concluded treaties of an 
international character in her own right is the sufficient ground 
to recognise her legal personality in international law. As far
(1) The Government of India Act 1955. Section 110(b)(1) 
Section! 511(1).
as territorial autonomy and its devolution into Indian hands 
was concerned, this was just a local matter. A close analogy 
can be drawn with any country where an absolute monarch surrenders 
his absolute powers to the people thereby bringing into existence 
a Parliament and making himself a constitutional monarch. In 
international law the country had its existence independent of 
whether it was under an absolute monarchy or a constitutional 
monarchy. In the case of India two facts have already been 
proved, first, the sovereignty exercised in the name of the 
British King by the Secretary of State through the Governor- 
General was entirely executive. The people were recognised as 
the holders of creative sovereignty. Secondly, the position of 
the Parliament was supervisory. The divisibility of the Crown, 
recognised in the case of the Dominions, in fact existed ever 
since the Emperor of India disappeared and the Crown was substit­
uted for the purposes of performing the executory duties of the 
Indian Government. It was not a substitution in all its aspects.
Viewed entirely from the British point of view as well, 
the change of Government brought about by the Government of 
India .Aot', 1858 was not a change of international character.
The Act speaks of reversing the rules relating to the governance 
of India placed in trust for the Crown. The ground for such 
terminology was based on the fact that the sovereignty of the 
British Grown was claimed earlier. The Act was to bring about 
an internal change in the form of Grovernment. The internal 
changes therefore should not influence the identity of a State, 
because "a community is able to assert its rights and to fulfil 
its duties equally well, whether it is ruled by one dynasty or 
another, or the form of government is a monarchy or a republic. 
These governments are regarded merely as agents through whom the 
coDmmuhity expressed its w i l l . A s  even from the British point
(1) Hall: International Daw.
of view there was no succession of international personality 
effected Toy the Act of 1858, therefore there should he no contro­
versy on the point whether the personality of the state as it 
existed under the East India Company* s government passed on 
unimpaired even when the government was said to he ruled in the 
name of the Crown. As regards when and how that succession took 
place, that has already heen dealt with.
A point may arise as to the period before India joined 
the Deague of Nations. What was her status in international law 
before that? The time when India joined the League of Nations 
marks only the extension of recognition in the international law 
to India. In other words it signifies the admission of India to 
the community of nations which before that was entirely confined to 
European nations,* this was the case with Japan and Persia, but 
it does not imply that these eastern countries possessed no 
international personality before that. The second point, which 
could be raised, is hov/ could an international personality be an 
dependent on the British diplomatic services. The reply to this 
involves the point of distinguishing of equality of status and 
inequality of function as was raised in respect of the Dominions.
"The inequality of function expresses itself mainly in the fact 
that the Dominions still avail themselves in many cases of the 
services and organs of Great Britain, in particular for the protection 
of their citizens abroad and for obtaining information as to conditions 
in foreign countries. The discussion here is only on the point
whether an international personality can avail itself of the services 
of another personality. This has been the peculiar characteristic 
of the British Commonwealth and therefore there should be no objection 
to the continuity unimpaired of India’s personality in international 
law. This of course is only to emphasise the existence of such 
international personality. The diplomatic services were established
(l) Chapter I.
(3) Oppenheim; International law, vol. Ip.
even before the enforcement of Indian independence,
How remains the question of the applicability of the 
doctrine of extra-territoriality by the Indian Legislature before 
the Indian Independence Act. The Statute of Westminster inter alia, 
settled the controversy about the powers of the Dominion Parliaments 
to make laws having extra-territorial operations. In two cases 
the Federal Court of India expressed the view that extra-territorial 
operations could not be a ground for holding legislation by Indian 
legislature ultra vires the Legislature. The observation of the 
court was undoubtedly "Obiter”. Again in Wallace v. Commissioners 
the Federal Court referring to previous case (supra) remarked that 
"We have nothing to add to the reasoning there set out.” In this 
case also tile observation by Spens C.J. was "obiter”.
These observations of the Federal Court, certainly 
"obiter”, lay down a modern view as compared with the view expressed 
earlier^that the subordinate legislatures shall not be held to 
possess any extra-territorial jurisdiction unless it is conferred 
upon them expressly or by necessary implications. The modern 
view as expressed by the Federal Court of India emphasised that 
there was no such presumption. The view was based on the decision 
of Croft V. Dumphy(^) In this case the Privy Council considered 
the application of the doctrine independently of the Statute of 
Westminster in respect of Canada. Having gone into the point of 
the competence of a state in international law to pass certain 
kinds of law having operation beyond the conventional limits of 
the seaward belt i.e. three miles, and relying on the support of 
the authority on international law, established that the impugned 
provision in the Canadian legislation was within the coup et ence of
(1) Soon after entering the Government Mr, Nehru took stpps
to form diplomatic relations with U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.
(2) let Governor General in Coimcil v. Raleigh Investment
Co. Ltd. 1944. F.C.R. 229.
2nd.Wallace Bros.& Co. Ltd. v. Commissioners of Income 
Tax, Bombay. 1945. F.C.R.(India) 65.
(5) MacLeod v. Attorney General for New South Wales. 1891.
« ox ^ ^"0. 455.(4) Croft V. Dumphy. 1933. A.C. 156,
its legislature. "It will thus be seen, when the Imperial 
Parliament in 1867 conferred upon the Parliament of Canada full 
power to legislate regarding customs, it had long been the practice 
to include in Inperial Statutes relating to this branch of law
executive provisions to take effect outside territorial limits......
In these circumstances it is difficult to conceive that the Imperial
Parliament in bestowing plenary powers on the Dominion Parliament 
to legislate in relation to customs should have withheld from it, 
the power to enact provisions similar in scope to those which had 
long been an integral part of Imperial legislation and which 
presumably were regarded as necessary to its efficiency." It is 
obvious that the question was decided relying on the implied 
competency of the Dominion Parliament in accordance with international 
law, and the Statute of Westminster and its retrospective effects 
as envisaged in section three were left open. Another case cited 
in support of this construction in Governor-General v. Raleigh 
was the British Goal Gorporation^^^ The view relied upon was,
"in interpreting a constituent or organic statute  the widest
possible aptitude must be adopted," Speaking of the limitations 
imposed by the doctrine of extra-territoriality the Lord Ghanoellor
(P)
had observed that, that was a doctrine of somewhat obscure extent. 
Even in the caise of Australia the then Justice E v a t t d o u b t e d  
the existence of the restriction against extra-territorial legislation 
when Australia had not adopted the Statute.
Goming to the point Spens 0.J. in Raleigh’s case remarked, 
"though the Statute of Westminster is not applicable to India the 
Constitution Act of 1935 has to be interpreted in the light of the
djs eussions on the subject that had been taking place between 1926
(1) Ibid. p. 166.
(2) The British Goal Corporation v. King 1935. A.C. p. 500.
(3) Ibid. p. 520.
(4) Trustees^, Executors à Agency Go, Ltd. v. Federal
Gommissioner of Taxation. 1933. (49.Gom.L.R. 220)
and 1935...... " Spens O.J, also pointed out that "the Federal
leglislature’s power of extra-territorial legislation is not
limited to the cases specified in clauses (a) to (e) of Subsection
E.1, of Section 99 appears clearly from entry No. 23 of List I
of the 7th Schedule relating to fishing and fisheries beyond 
territorial waters." It is a rather liberal view which was
undoubtedly in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution. The
construction of the Constitution Act like other instruments if
made without any reference to the events responsible for their
enactment is likely to be out of tune with the ever changing 
circumstances. There are writers like 8.D. Sharma(^) who hold
that the interpretation so widely made is not sound. Even he does
not deny the principle of necessary implication in respect of
"police,revenue, public health and fisheries," and, "to a ’reasonable’
limit further than the conventional three miles limit of territorial
waters  or in case of e^gpulsion from India to the use of
necessary force outside the territory " He has relied much
on the conservative principle of interpretation. But such a strict
principle of construction does not seem to be in tune with the
Commonwealth which has developed and grown in status mostly in
deriving its strength from implied principles of autonomy and
sovereign attributes or from conventional devolution of the same 
rather than by legal measures. It has also been observed in the
preceding pages that the fact that India was excluded from the list 
of the Dominions did not imply that she was inferior in status as 
compared to the other Dominions. India had retained her identity 
as an international personality and was superior to at least 
Newfoundland which continued to be enumerated in the list of the 
Dominions even after the Dominions Status was suppressed in 1933.
The views held by Spens C.J. in the light of the foregoing 
observation was not revolutionary. In the context of political
(1) J.C.L. Vol. XXVIII Parts III & IV. pp. 91-95.
Applicability of the doctrine of extra-territoriality 
to Indian legislature.
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trends in India, the spirit of liberal construction seems to be 
rather difficult to appreciate in its true perspective. The case 
made by Slaarma could only be justified on the ground of demanding 
the extension of the Statute in respect of the doctrine but not
on any other. This is enough to compare the situation preceding 
the attainment of India’s Dominion Status as compared with the other 
Dominions. In spite of all that was established by the Courts of 
law in respect of this doctrine, it was obvious that none held that 
the Statute was unnecessary for the Dominions. Similar was the 
case of India and more justified in view of political trends and 
other considerations.
The details of the case Governor-General v. Raleigh are 
of great interest especially frofei one point of view. They point 
out the tendencies that were prevalent not only in the discussions 
of the Acts of 1919 and 1935 but also in their construction by a
Court like the Federal Court of India. In view of the facts one 
feels no hesitation in observing that the Indian Independence Act 
like the Statute of Westminster was to a great extent declaratory, 
and to borrow a phrase from Mansergh it was "a symbol of achievement 
rather than the beginning."
The last point that needs attention is the inequality 
arising from the existence of the appeal to the judicial committee 
of the Privy Council. There is hardly anything of special significance 
as compared with the practice of the other Dominions and it will be 
discussed when dealing with the implication of the Act in this 
respect and the abolition of the appeals both by India and Pakistan.
VI.
The comparison of the situation as it existed before the 
enactment of the Statute and the conditions preceding the passing 
of the Indian Independence Act requires further clarification on
one point. As has been seen in the approach towards Dominion Status 
both from the standpoint of the resolutions of the Imperial
Conferences as weL1 as from the angle of the Statute, there were 
at/
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at least three main categories - Canada, Australia and Hew Zealand 
could for the sake of convenience he grouped together in spite of 
the fact that the Canadian approach is very different from that 
of the other two. The fact that the Union of South Africa adopted 
the Statute through the Status of the Union Act 1943 and provided
Cl)
for a separate seal instead of the Great Seal of the Realm^ was 
a divergent approach in itself and when the issue of neutrality 
in 1939 was decided in favour of war hy a majority of 13 in a
(O)
house of 153 members, among them only 147 voting'* ^It was 
established that the South African approach though not as revolu­
tionary as that of Eire was basically the same. The Irish 
approach has been demonstrated not only by the Constitution Act 
and the removal of oath Act of 1933, and the declaration of a 
Sovereign Independent Republic but also by the fact that she 
preferred to remain neutral while the Commonwealth was at war.
How the question arises, to which of the three cate­
gories do India and Pakistan belong, at least, as far as the 
Indian Independence Act is concerned. The Indian Independence 
Act "inter alia" is in a sense an adoption of the Statute of 
Westminster because the words of the Statute are enacted in 
Section 6 (2) of the Indian Independence Act; of course, not the 
same because it is more like the Status of the Union Act. The 
Ceylon Independence Act also resembles the Statute of Westminster 
and in this case the resemblance is closer, firstly because the 
enactment of the Ceylon Independence Act involved the repeal of 
the Colonial Laws Validity Act whereas in the case of India it 
did not, as that Act did not apply to India. In the second place 
through an agreement what was Constitutional convention propoundec 
through the Imperial Conferences has been made formally binding. 
Thus a formal definition of the relationship of the Commonwealth 
was expressed.
(1) Royal Executive Functions and Seal Act, 1934.
(2) Dr. Mansergh op.cit. p. 15.
The Indian Independence Act fiom this point of view is very different 
from that of.Oeylon. These are the few points which have been 
dealt with besides the problems of partition and their consequences. 
The study of their comprehensive implications is desirable not only 
because they define the nature of the Commonwealth as it exists 
today but also because Pakistan is still ruled in accordance with 
the adapted Constitution of 1935 which was made in accordance with 
the provisions for this purpose in the Indian Independence Act.
The Indian Independence Act as far as its clauses go, 
in respect of the setting up of tvra Dominions and dividing the 
provinces, has far reaching effects. The problems of state succession 
are many and complicated. No comprehensive treatment of the Act 
would be complete unless the problems of state succession both in 
view of the partition of India and from the standpoint of the 
accession of the Indian States to the new Dominions were sufficiently
considered. This gives a mere or less complete picture of the 
scope of the Act.
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8TAŒ UNDBH THE APT.
The question of # e  at»cession of the international 
personality of pre-partition India has caused a controversy 
and writers (1) on international law have so far held divergent 
views on this question. The same question was raised by the 
export committee dealing with the consequences of partition in 
respect of foreign relations. (2) The members of the Gommlttee 
also disagreed on iâie question of the succession to international 
personality of pre-partition India. The members representing 
India held the view üiat the formation of Pakistan was the 
result of secession and as such ihe juristic personality of pre­
partition India continued; in the new Dominion of India and 
Pakistan came into existence as a new state. The members re­
presenting Pakistan were of opinion that the personality of 
pre-partition India disappeared all together as an entity and 
was succeeded by the independent Dominions of equal interna­
tional status both of whom were eligible to lay claims to the 
rights and obligations of pre-partition India. In view of 
these divergent opinions and on the suggestion of Lord Mount- 
batten, the Partition Gouneil decided to evolve a formula with 
a view to meeting the oase of both sides. The Governor- 
General promulgated an order entitled the Indian Independence 
( International Arrangement) Order (S) 1947^ to give legal 
form to the agreement in regard to the devolution of interna­
tional rights and obligations upon the Dominions of India and 
Pakistan*
(1) e.g., H« B. Sankar: International personality of
Inaia & Pakistan (United Asia W l  I No,3) & D.ÏC. 
sen; The Partition of India and succession in. 
international law. (Indian law Review 1947.)
(2) Proceedings of the Expert Gommittees Vol. 3 Govt.
of India publication^Report of the Expert 
Committee No. 9*
(3) , No* G.G.O. 17 New Delhi* 14.,the August 1947 ibid. gp.
293-94.
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According to this agreement:
1. Membership of all international organisations 
togetaer with the rights and obligations 
attaching to such membership devolved upon the 
Dominion of India.
2. Eights and obligations having an exclusive 
territorial application to any of the new 
Dominions devolved upon the Dominion which 
comprised the area related to such application*
3. Eights and obligations under all international 
agreements to whloh India was a party immediately 
before 15th August devolved both upon the 
Dominion of India and uponthe Dominion of Pakistan 
and if necessary was to be apportioned betiveen 
the two Dominions*
The question of the international succession was discussed 
during m e  debates on the Indian Independence Bill in the 
House of Commons. It was observed, “the question of the 
international status of the two new Dominions is not one vhioh 
will be finally determined by the terms of this Bill. it is 
a matter for members of U.N.O. and other foreign states as 
much as for H.M.G. in the Our own view is that -fâie
new Dominion of India continues the international personality 
of existing India and that she will succeed as a matter of 
international law to membership of TJ.N.O, which existing India 
enjoys as an original signatory of the Seoi Francisco charter... 
.***. our hope is that on the establishment of the New 
Dominion of Pakistan she will be accepted as a new member of 
the family of nations.......(1)
The other arguments ^ i è d  upon by the representative 
of the Indian government may be summarised as follows:
1. Variations in a state’s territory or a change
(1) ibid. P. 289, quoted by Mr. Patel in his note.
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In its odnÉtitution does not affect the identity 
of laie state* In support of this argument he 
cited the oases (1) of Prussia in 1807?, when it 
was deprived by the Treaty of Tilsit of half of 
its territory*
8* Austria in 1859 lost Lombardy.
5. Prance in 1870 lost Alsaoe and Lorraine.
4. Oseohoslavakia in 1938 yielded the Sudeten land 
and other portions of its territor^r to Germany, 
Hungary, and Poland.
He further argued that a sufficient nucleus of territory, 
with the capital and machinery of government remained to carry 
on a personality capable of discharging general obligations. 
Such was the case in the reparation of the entire province of 
Burma from India in 1937.
II. As regards o onstitutional changea it was argued 
that a change in the form of government does not in any way 
alter the international personality of a state.
The question of the succession of international persona­
lity was again raised op. the application of Pakistan to XJ.N.O. 
stating that its member, India', being partitioned, the member­
ship continued in the two successor Dominions, India and 
Pakistan and therefore Pakistan automatically became a member 
of Ü.N.O. Pakistan however was prepared to apply ^anew in 
oase it was desired.
The question was studied by Dr. Van Kerno assistant 
secretary-general for legal affairs and a memorandum was 
submitted by him with the approval of Mr. Trygve Lie, which 
was released on 12th August. According to this it was 
treated as a oase of break-off to fora a new state and it 
was held that there was no change in the international status 
of India and that it continued', "as a state with all its 
treaty rights and obligations of the old state." In support
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of this view the analogies of the separation of the Irish 
Free State from Great Britain and of Belgium fiom the Nether­
lands were cited.
Apart from separation. 1he Indian Independence Act was 
treated as that which brought about the basic constitutional 
change in India as a result of which India acquired a new status 
in the United Nations, In view of these observations i t was 
decided that
1. The new Dominion of India continued as an 
original member state.
2. Pakistan had to apply for admission.
3. India, in view of its changed status was 
however to issue new credentials (1) to 
its representative after 15th August.
II.
In view of the above summazy, it is desirable in the 
first place to ascertainthe status of pre-partition India in 
international law. It has been held throughout this thesis 
and substantiated with arguments that India was not annexed to 
the U.K. nor was it converted into a colony and as such main­
tained the identity of its juristic personality which was for 
the first time admitted to the family of Nations in 1919 when 
India became one of the founder members of the League of 
Nations. The fact that India was not self-governing in. the .
sense that the other colonies were was a matter of domestic
concern and had no bearing on international law, "India is 
not included in the self-governing Dominions. The position is 
separate and distinct and its status regulated by the Government
of India Act of 1919.....  it may be said that whatever the
internal government of India may be,
(1) See details in United Nations Bulletin, ISth August, 1947.
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it is considered an independent state, In the sense that 
it is a member of the League of Nations and possesses powers 
of iSaking treaties as do the Domlnions^^* In view of this 
fact it is wrong even to say that "the status of India re­
mained peculiar in the eyes of international law." (1) The 
fact is that India having been admitted to the family of 
nations gained recognition of the fact of juristic personality 
she already possessed. %ie reoognition supplied the 
necessary evidence that the personality existed. Further 
the state is at liberty to ohoose any form of government as 
its agent. The fact that India had a constitution different 
from those of the self-governing Dominions did not diminish 
the significance of her international personality in 
international law.
The Indian Independence Act in itself was nothing more 
than an enactment of a constitutional character as far as its 
clauses concerning Dominion statues go. therefore the con­
stitutional changes effecting the form of government were not 
matters which necessarily would have implied any change of 
credentials If it was accepted that the juristic personality 
of pre-partition India continued in the Dominion of India.
33ie Crown reiaained the crown of % e  new Dominions and the 
appointment of the represeitatives was made even after 
independence by the Crown. ihe fact that after independence 
it was made on the advice of the new Dominion had no bearing 
on international law. It was a matter of domestic and con­
stitutional character.
It may be safely deduced that the act conferring
Dominion statues, pure and simple without reference to partition
is a matter of constitutional importance only and therefore
the question of state succession does not arise at all. In
view of this it will be wrong to say as is said in the above
(1) American Journal of International Law. 1927. Editorial Oom-
(1) Gârkar H. B. united Asia, P.231. ments p.98.
mquotation iiiat India "succeeds as a matter of international law 
to membership of U.N.O," There is no question of succession.
What should have been written is, "India ’continued», as a matter 
of International law in membership of U.N.O." The continuity 
of the juristic personality of India even after independence 
could be established beyond dispute only if it had been an act 
of conferring Dominion status pure and simple. But it is not, 
it is more than that. It has clauses providing for division of 
territories as well as of assets (1). Therefore the question 
cannot be considered solely on the basis of Dominion Status.
It suffices here to s ^  that India in international law possessed 
a juristic personality before partition and 1he questionw hether 
that personality completely disappeared or continued in one or 
both the new Dominions has got to be decided.
1^.
It is necessary at this stage to explain what state 
succession means and in what aspect this theory of state 
succession is applicable to the Dominions, State succession 
is said to occur only when changes affect a state, or part of 
a stqte, as an international person, either in its extinction, 
birth, secession, or anneoation. To cite Stuyt, "State 
succession may be said to occur when a part of an existing state 
becomes a new state or when a part of an existing state is 
acquired by another state or when ihe whole of the territory of 
an existing state is absorbed by another given state." (2)
The list is by no means complete. Keith has attempted to 
olassi:^ cases of state succession, but even
(1) Clauses 9.1.b. Indian Independence Act (mark the term
’dividing*.
(2) General principles of law as applied by international
tribunal to disputes on arbitration and exercise cf 
state jurisdiction by A. M. Stuyt, (The</-fague 
Martinus. 1946) R, 69,
he has rarely referred to cases of division (1) • In the 
present context, 1he interest is mainly in the cases of 
dismemberment of International personality. To cite Oppenheim 
"A state ceases to be an international person when it ceases 
to exist. praotj.cal causes of esttinction of states are : 
merger of one state into another, annexation after conquest in 
wary break up of a state into several states, breaking up of 
states into parts which are annexed by surrounding states." (2) 
Keith discussing the oases of break-up of a state refers to 
Hall, saying', "Hall here seems inconsistent; he admits "that 
in the case where a state brealcs up so that one part remains 
representative of the old state, that part alone is responsible 
for the general debt - the fact remains that the general debt 
of a state is a personal obligation - yet he accepts the 
theory of partition for a total break-up", (3), The theory 
of state succession in relation to India and Pakistan has to 
be assessed to determine whether it was the total brealn-up of 
pre-partition India thereby bringing about an end to its 
personality or was only a secession thereby continuing the 
personality in the Dominion of India. In other words it has 
got to be proved on certain criteria, and therefore the first 
task is to find out the criteria #.
The succession of state in reality is a principle of 
private law and is developed froDi the notion taken from the 
law of property ,(4). But it is not followed strictly in 
all its aspects. The extinction of a state is comparable 
with the death of an individual (5) but states do not die
(1) Keith A*B: The Theoiy of State Succession 1907 (Stevensons
Ltd., London.)
(2) Oppenheim/urt. I*. 149.
(3) Keith op. cit. p. 100* See Hall W* E. Elements of
International law No. 1. p. 116 8th ed. 1924.
(4) Briefly: J.L. The law of Nations (Oxford 1949) p.135.
(5) Ibid.
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in any literal sense. In reality there is no true analogy
(C yf
between # e  succession to an hérédités and that of a state (1) 
and again according to Huher the state succeeds to the rights 
and iâàhilities as its own. The personality of tae former 
state disappears absolutely , end whet succession succeeded to 
is not to the personality but to the "Jura" (2). Keith 
further rejects the idea of Roman heir on the ground that the 
conception of an heir in the early Roman law)that of a person 
who had to be heir whether he wished to be so or not, whereas 
the succession of(state in international law is effected 
through an æ t  of the will of the state. (3). Tin ref ore the 
disappearance of a state should be understood in the sense 
that it undergoes such fundamental changes as to detach from 
it the identity of a juristic person and other mlrfcers 
connected with it have to be interpreted in the terns of 
treaties and similar arrangements. .
The first criterion that has been rôL ied upon by writers 
and supporters of 1he view of secession rather than partition 
is the fact that "a sufficient nucleus of territory and cf 
the machinery of government remained to caray on a personality 
capable of discharging general obligations."
There is no disagreement on ihe view that the loss of 
territory should/be a criterion to judge the continuity or 
extinction of the juristic personality of a state* Even Ben 
who holds the view of partition in contrast to secession 
relying on Hyde and Huber says that territory should not form 
the basis of consideration in this respect,
(1) Hurst (Sir Cecil) : International La#papers) London,
1980, p.79. V.
(2) & (3) Keith op. cit. p.3,
(4) Hrierly', J.L. The law of Nations op. ott.p24.
(3) Sen. Op. oit.
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Prussia was obliged to surrender more tb.an half of its 
territory but she continued to exist as an international stete* 
Such was also the case with Saxony in 1815. Similarly In 
Î822 Brazil which was considerably lai’ger than Portugal in 
area and population seceded from the kingdom of Portugal but 
the juristio personality of the Kingdom of Portugal continued 
in international law.(l) Another striking example is that of 
ahrkey when it lost most of its territorial possessions and 
was transformed into a republic « The Ottoman Debt Arbitration, 
held that in international law the Turkish Republic was deemed 
to continue the international personality of the foimer 
Turkish empire (2). To conclude, territorial loss could not 
be a certain criterion for judging the continuity or 
extinction of the personality of a state*
Sen discusses this question of secession on three
bases
1. The transaction leading to territorial changes
must be an act of international law.
2. The parent state must be a party to the trans­
action in its international capacity.
3. How far the transaction in any manner refjeets
on the extinction of the international persona­
lity of the parent state.
On these three bases he concludes that in tae ease of 
India there was no act of international law to which India 
was a party in her international capacity, nor was there s ay - 
thing in the Indian Independence Act even raaotely suggesUng 
that the Dominion of India was a continuation pure and simple,
(1) Ibid.
(2) Annual Digest 1925 <1 26, pp. 78 and 79.
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of India’s juristic personality on the oontrary it is
manifest from the provisions of 1he Aot that the territory of
India in its entirety was partitioned between the two new
Dominions. He;, therefore, holds that it was not a case of 
of
breakaw^ but/a total break-up and that there was no expressed 
or implied reservation in the Act, for the continuity of the 
juristic personality of India* To quote him, "The correct 
view appears to be that India has ceased to exist in interna­
tional law| and her place has been taken by the Dominions of 
India and Pakistan." (1).
Thus having rejected the territorial criterion for 
judging the continuation or extinction cf the international 
personality of a state on which all agree', the question arises 
what should be the ground for judging the ease of India.
Before any principle be dèâuced in. order to discuss the Indian 
oase, it is desirable first to deal with some of the commonly 
cited analogous, or so called analogous cases of secession or 
dismemberment of states in in.temational law* The cases 
relying on the loss of territories need not be cited again as 
that basis has been rejected.
Among the oases cited by both sides, those of Belgium 
and the Irish Free State are of great importance. Dr. Van 
Kezmo relied on these two cases and observed that they were 
oases of breakaway. Oloseljr allied is also the question 
whether if their separation be interpreted as dismemberment 
they should be distinct from that of Pakistan on the ground 
that they had a separate political existence in history and 
their unification was the result of their subjugation which 
was in disregard of the wishes of the people. To borrow 
Barkan’s words, "Ireland had a separate history and political (2) 
existence before tae Union of 1800; Belgium had also a
(1) Ibid. P.106
(2) probably he wants to refer to legal identity before the
union.
separate existence before the Vieima Settlement of 1815 and 
regained independent status after the stDoessful revolt in 
1851." (1)
To take the Netherlands first, it may be recalled that 
it was a case of real union. The effect of real union 
according to Oppenheim is that "the member states of the Union 
although fully independent make one international person, 
two states which hitherto were separate international persons 
are affected in that character by entering into a real union, 
for through that chahg# they appear henceforth together as 
one and the same international person." (2) In international 
law such real union does not take cognisance of their con­
stitutional autonomous status of individual identity, whatever 
be its characteristiosf, but the fact that two international 
persons come into a real union establishes the fact -fâiat 
their original individual personalities come to an end and 
thereby a new jurist to personality emerges and thus they 
become one and the same international person. Any change 
in their personalily thereafter as far as international law 
is concerned will have to be judged from the standpoint taat 
the change thus brought about is in the life of one juristic 
persona. The difference of separate historic existence or 
constitutional autonomy or any o-fâier such difference of a 
eonstitutional character should not influence the analogical 
comparison as far as in the aspect of international law is 
concerned. The oase of India, therefore^ could not be 
distinct and different on this ground if some other similar 
phenomena existed. To cite Keith, "the real union and 
federal union are fisr international law purposes, one, 
though from the point of view of public law they differ in
(1) Sarkar.: op. oit. p. 255,
(2) Op. oit. p. 144.
the respect Indicated by Westlake'; for it is undeniable that 
the United States have much of their internal distinctness 
merged through federal legislation, whereas Norway and Sweden 
had no common legislature at all and Austria and Hungary only 
the delegations." (1) On this basis it can be stated that 
for ihe purposes of consideration of the changes in interna­
tional law no account of the conditions relating to itibldc 
law should be made. India was a Federation, Holland and 
Belgium a real union, their diffei’ence lay In matters of public 
law but not in international law. The analogy as far as 
international law is concerned is correct and satisfactory.
Now the question is whether the separation of Belgium 
from Holland amounted to secession or dismemberment. Keith 
cites many examples of secession amon^ which the cession of 
Lombardy by Austria to Sardinia tbrou^ the treaty of 10th 
Novembei^’J 1859^ ; and the cession of Savoy and Nice to France by 
Sardinia through the treaty of S5rd August, I860', and of 
Heligoland by Great Britain to Germany in return for certain 
territories in Afrloag according to the treaty of 1st July*, 
1890î‘, are a few." (2) The common characteristic is that in 
every oase secession was effected according to a treaty between 
two sovereign states* Another common feature is that they 
result from the cession of territories forming part of states 
or their possessions* The ease of the Netherlands and 
Belgium though apparently distinct he treats as analogous to 
cession. It must be noted here that for the sake of con­
venience :>.im classification Keith uses the term "cession" in 
a broader sense to include in it the oases in which rules of 
state succession have to be decided in accordance with the 
principles of International law or are regulated by treaty.
Thus Ihe term includes cession pure and simple ms well as 
the split of states as was the oase of the Netherlands.
(1) Keith op. oit. p. 93.
(2) Keith: Op. oit. p.lO.
To borrow his expression, "analogous to oesslon is the case 
of the separation of the Netherlands and Belgium in 1831 to 
1839 * Holland remained the s ame‘, b ut granted Belgium 
freedom and sovereignty." (1) In spite of the fact that in 
the oase of Belgium Keilh finds a distinct situation and 
characteristics he treats it though not as cession in its 
original sense but as analogous to it. It should also be 
borne in mind that the separation of Belgium was the result 
of the principle of the identity of separata nationhood and 
it was absolute division on the basis of territorial nation­
hood as was the case with Pale is tan. Ever since the Union 
the two nations had merged their separate identities and had 
thus become one in the eyes of international law. When they 
broke up into two, the oase in its international legal aspect 
was exactly similar to 1iiat of Pakistan. It has already been 
observed that the creation of Pakistan was the result of the 
recognition of the principle of self-determination. Moreover, 
other authorities do not contribute to the view of break-up. 
For instance Pradier Fodere categorically asserts that the 
dismemberment of the kingdom of the Netherlands resulted in 
the suppression of the ancient state. Pauchille is equally 
emphatic. He holds that the international personality 
ceased to exist as a result of its division into two new 
states Belgium and Holland. Bustamante Y. Sii^en contributes 
to this opinion establishing the extinction of the inter­
national personality of the former state. (2).
Considering the oase of the Irish Free State the 
argument set forth by Sen that it came into existence as a 
result of a treaty concluded by Great Britain in 1921 holds 
good?, the treaty being an act of international law but the
CD Ibid. p.11.
(2) Quoted by ^en op. oit* p.197.
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priiiîiple cannot bo applied in each and every ease.(l) It Is 
possjble that the personality of a o ertain state might oome to 
an end as a result of a treaty between the states taking its 
place , Such a treaty is possible on the same ground on which 
Poland was held as a party to the Treaty of its formation.(2). 
Ireland oame into union with Great Britain in 1800 and as a 
result of this union its former personality oame to an and# 
Irish nationalism demanded separation of the whole of Ireland 
but in view of m e  religious differences between ihe Gatholics 
and ike Protestants they had to concede the partition thereby 
leaving the Northern part united with Great Britain. The 
sep^ation of the whole of Ireland on the strength of separate 
nationhood with the intention of dissolving the union would 
have certainly amounted to dismemberment of the juristic 
personality of Great Bütain, but m e  fact is that the Union 
and the legal personality thus brought about remained 
unaffected by the fact that the Irish Free State accepted a 
trea'iy defining secession of a part which in no way reflected 
dismemberment. Again excluding m e  question of territory 
it can be stated that the union of the whole of Ireland o me 
brought about remained unaffected in spite of the fact that 
there was loss of territory simply because there was no 
reference in the treaty to such dissolution.
The Irish Free State itself «aac held a different view
as regards the theory of state succession. There are two
oases manifesting m e  difference of view on this point between 
the Supreme Oourts of the Irish Free State and that of the 
United States* The SupremeGourt of the Irish Free State in 
the ease of Fogarty Ys. O’Donoghue (S) held that the government
(1) Besides this was the Irish view.
(2) Gerimn-Folish mixed Arbitral Tribunal: 1925*
(5) Oase No# 76* Annual Digest 1927.
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of the Irish 5’ree State was the su&oessor of the de facto 
goverment of the revolutionary period# The Supreme Court 
of the U.S*A. in ihe oase of Guaranty Safe Deposit Company (1) 
held that since the Irish I’ree State which was set up by an 
Act of the British 'Parliament succeeded to the old govermient 
of Ireland and not to the revolutionary organisation known as 
the Irish Republic which did not succeed in establishing a 
de facto government# Striotlsr speaking from the standpoint 
of the Irish Court it was a state established through revolution 
and as such should fora a new state and the recognition by the 
parent state in no way affects ihe personality of the parent 
state# Prom the standpoint of the American Supreme Court 
a new state came into existence as a result of breakaway and 
therefore should not affeot tlB international personality of 
the parent state# It would have been a different case if 
Ireland had had a separate international identity and in 
that case 1he act of conferring Dominion status pure and 
simple without affecting the former identity would never 
have Involved the question of state succession# The Crown 
in international law continued but as a Crown for the purposes 
of the Irish I’ree State# Ih© emergence of a new state in 
international law was a phenomenon involving the issue of 
state succession and on the grounds above discussed it was a 
oase of secession#
s *
There is however one example in which partition of a 
state has been recognised# Stuyt with reference to the 
information supplied to him by Professor J# Bas devant of 
Paris University refers to the arbitrlalf decision dated
(1) Ibid Oase ITo. 77.
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Ootobar 12th', 1833, In which the oonsequaases of the
uoev'fi-
division of the Swiss Gahton Basel have-Worn disoussecl (1),
One important point that shows a olose analogy with the idea 
of division of public domain as has been recognised in ihe oase 
of the partition of the public domain of pre-partition India 
was also recognised in this case# The principle was laid 
down that *^the University of Basel did not enjoy an absolute 
private law character and so its property could be divided 
as the public domain of the state#” (2) Compared with this 
principle is the rule laid down by Oppenheim for a state 
breaking off that ”sueoess ion with regard to fiscal property 
takes place only to the extant found on that part of the 
territory #”(2? Pakistan succeeded (4) to all properties , 
assets and belongings of pre-partition India in aocordanoe 
with the decisions taken by ihe partition council composed 
of the Indian and Pakistan members and presided over by lord 
Mountbatten or in the event of failure according to the 
proportion fixed by ihe statutory tribunal set up for this 
purpose # Contrary to this is the view held by tae writers 
who say that the international personality of pre-partition 
India continued in the Indian Dominion# 35aey question 1iie 
validity of the division of property and o ther assets 
situated within the territory of the Indian Dominion# Por 
instance Sarkar observes, ”from the view point of international 
law'^ - one can however question the validity of the seceding 
state’s demand for a share of the public property and other 
assets territorially situated in the old state# (5).
(1) Stuyt Op. oit. PP.71-74.
(2) Ibid#
(3) Gppenheim, op# oit# P. 194,par a 84#
(4) See details of the partition arrangement reached by
the Partition Council in the proceedings of Ihe 
Expert Committees. Govt# of India Publication 1948 
in 3 vols#
(5) Sarkaÿ: op# eit# p# 234#
A straight answer to this is that the division of the public 
property and assets was legally provided for in the Indian 
Independence Act on the basis of the agreement reached 
betiveen tie Congress and the Muslim League with the British 
government# The British government recognised both of them 
as its successors# Even before the enforcement of the Indian 
Independence Aot^ that is', prior to I51h August, 1947', these 
were two interim governments acting on behalf of India and 
Pakistan # The decisions on the partition of the property and 
assets of pre-partition India were made by the agreements 
between the two governments # As regards the two governments 
it was said that; “this view with regard to international 
personality on behalf of Pakistan is reinforced by the fact 
that to-day two governments are functioning in the country, 
one for pWcistan and one for India with equal status*” (1)
In 0 tier words the government of India was dissolved de facto 
and replaced by two governments of equal status. In view 
of this fact the principles should be deduced from what has 
actually taken place under the authority of the agreements 
between these two governments# And according to the principles 
thus deduced It should be concluded that India was divided.
The division of assets was not based on any instrument of 
secession in which oase SarkaK’s question as to the claim op. 
the property and assets of pre-partition India would have been 
justified* On the contrary'; Ihe theory of secession in the 
face of the agreements by these two governments that were 
legalised', by the Indian Independence Act wi1h retrospective 
effect or by the orders of the Governor-General under 1he 
authority of this Act cbes not stand.
The question arises whether #ie principles on which 
the division of the public property and assets of pre-partition 
India took place can be a sound ground for justifying tie 
extinction of juristic personality. It is undoubtedly tirue
(1) Expert Committee Brooeedings Vol. Ill# P# 207.
that there is no succession of personality in the sense of 
the succession of a private person. She succession in 
international law is not in its strict sense succession to 
personality, it is rather succession to ’ jura’. But it 
certainly involves the question of the division of property 
and assets besides other rights and obligations and therefore 
could be one of the grounds,: if not the only ground; for 
considering the question of oontinuiiy or extinction of 
international personality. Besides the division of property 
and assets closely reflects the nature of changes in the 
organisation of the government which acts as an agent of a 
state and is therefore helpful to ascertain the extent to 
which the continuity of this organisation was affected. In 
the note presented on behalf of India it was claim d ihat a 
sufficient nucleus of territoay and of the machinery of 
government remained to carry on a personality able to discharge 
general obligations* A glance at the list of contents of 
the three volumes of the prooeddings of the expert committde 
manifests the fact that each and every organisation besides 
the administrative departments and defence forces were divided 
betveen India and Pakistan. Where such division was not
found desirable the assets were evaluated and on the basis of
\
this evaluation they were apportioned. It is quite different 
to say that the government cf India had sufficient machinery 
of government to prosecute the obligations of its personalilgr 
because such arrangements were made in the interest of the 
administration of both governments-; but in fact as well as 
in principle Üie whole administration was dissolved and 
apportioned between the two states. % e  procedure adopted 
was such as to maintain as much efficiency of the administration 
as possible but this did not reflect on the principle of 
division, on the other hand it was made on the basis of 
agreement between the two governments.
I-
low it remains to examine how for the act itself can 
he interpreted well enou^ to throw light on "die question of 
state suocession. As is evidenced from the statement 
already quoted of the spokesman of the British Government made 
in the House of Commons at the time of the passage of the 
Independence Bill, the Aot was not meant to provide any such 
definition and the question was left to the decision of the 
foreign governments and the appropriate organisations. But 
this statement clarifying the views held by the British 
Government cannot be Interpreted as binding upon the con­
struction of the Act itself. In spite of this observation, 
for the purposes of legal investigation, it is necessary to 
examine the Aot from this standpoint* However', this is 
further necessitated in view of the fact that the clauses of 
the Act have been invoked both by the expert Committee and 
by other writers on this question*
The only Glauses of the Ast that have any bearing on 
this question areî-
1* Se* 2 (1) Subject to provisions of subsection 
3, and (4) of this section, the territories of 
India shall be the territories under the 
Sovereignty of His Majesty which immediately 
before the appointed day y were included in 
British India except the territories which under 
Subsection (8) of this section are to be the 
territories of Pakistan*
On the strength of -this clause, it was contended that:
(a) Clause 2 of the Indian Independence Act distinctly 
brings out that the territories of India shall be 
territories under the sovereignty of His Majesty 
which immediately before the appointed day were 
included in British IndiaÇ with e ertain exceptions; 
this establishes ttie identity of the Dominion of
India with the India of to-day (pre-
partition India.)
/
(h) After certain northern and eastern portions 
of its territories are separated from India, 
nearly three quarters of tie territory will 
still he comprised in the remainder along 
with the capital of the state (1).
In other words the size of territory and ihe continuity 
of the Capital in the light of this section have been sought 
to prove the continuity of the international personality.
It has already been established that ihe size of territory is 
not one of ‘the fundamental factors determining the question 
of state succession# The same answer suffices in relation 
to the continuity of the previous Capital.
(2) The other clause which relates to this question 
runs as follows
9 - (1) The Governor-General shall by order 
make such provision as appears to him to be 
necessary or expedient - ’inter alia’.
(b) for dividing beiween the new Dominions, 
and betv/een the new proviixîes to be constituted 
under this Act, the powers, r#its', property, 
duties and liabilities of the Governor-General 
in Council or, as the case may be, of the 
relevant Provinces which, under this Act, 
are to cease to exist;
This clause definitely speaks of constituting "die Hew 
Dominions and the new provinces* The words - “the new 
Dominions and..,* the new provinces to be constituted under 
this Act”, established the fact beyond doubt and therefore 
beyond dispute that the new Dominions thus constituted 
under this Act had no existence whatsoever before this 
enactment; at least not in law. Had it not spoken of
(1) Expert Committee Bo* IX. Cp. oit# p. 206
the constituting of the new Dominions', there could have 
been at least some doubt as to their origin but as it is 
there is no doubt* The two Hew Dominions owe üieir origin 
to "this Aot*
The second phrase of this clause says that "the 
powersi; rightsr; property?, duties and liabilities of the 
Governor-General in Council or, as the case may bef, of the 
relevant provinces which, under this Act; are to cease to 
exist”; the question is who ceases to exist* What is 
governed by the word “which”? Is it the Gov error-general 
in Council and the Governors of the said provinces or üieir 
powers, rights^^ property, duties and liabilities? Or again*, 
"which” is confined to the provinces, and the Goveanor-general 
and governors stand unaffected* The word ’which’ undoubtedly 
covers only the provinces* But one wculd obviously be 
imlined to ask what rule of construction of necessary 
implications it provides as regards (a) India; (b) the 
offices of the governors and governor-general', (c) the rights 
and obligations* The provinces are described as being 
constituted in the same way under this Act as the new 
Dominions* There is no distinct mode of creation provided 
for them. In the oase of ihe new Dominions they are con­
stituted as a result of the division of the territory of pre­
partition India and similarly the new provinces are created 
as a result of the division of Ihe previous provinces of 
Bengal', Assam and the Punjab. If these provinces as a result 
of constituting the new provinces cease to exist ihe logical 
implication would be that the p: epartitioii India out of which 
the new Dominions have been constituted, too should have 
ceased to exist* It could have been interpreted in some 
other way if both the creation of the new Dominions and 
that of the new provinces was not governed by ihe words ’to 
be constituted.*
The offices and Ihe rights and obligations referred to 
also should cease to exist unless provided otherwise, in the 
Act. (The Act.as alz'eady said was drafted in anticipation 
that there should be one governor for both Dominions but 
afterwards it was made known that the Dominion of Pakistan 
would like Jinnah to be appointed as governor-general of 
Pakistan. The Aot was worded in such a way as to meet the 
situation in either oase.) Even if it is presumed that there 
was to fee one governor-general for boih the new Dominions, 
it does not imply that the office of the Governor-general too 
would have been* one. lhat was suggested was that the offices 
of the govern or-generalship of the two new Dominions would 
have been held by one person* As such the office of the 
governor-general of prepartition India too came to an end; 
hence the necessity of taking the oath anew. If he had con­
tinued in his office*; without any change in its continuity, 
there would have been no necessity for the renewal of oath.
The Act made him more dependent upon his ministry than ever 
before; but this ought not to have necessitated the renewal 
of -the oath. He still held office on behalf of the Crown* 
There was no change in this respeott, nor was there any 
transfer of powers from the Crown thereby bringing about any 
change in the legal basis of his statnis and his relationship 
with the Grown. The fact that the Govern or-general in spite 
of still being the “representative of the crown and the 
person of lord Mountbatten held the office, the renewal of 
the oath was considered necessary, establishes the fact that 
the office of "the Governor-general of prepartition India too 
came to an end; fend from the ISth A^^
governors-general assumed office in the two new Dominions.
Prom this the logical conclusion follows "that not 
only the provinces, but India with all its administration was 
dissolved by this Aot and Ihe dissolution of the government
in its entirety establishes the fact that the personality of
an
prepartition India came tc/end.
2he word ’rights’?, needs a little e3q>lanatlon. Hall 
in his footnote refers to the varying views of writers on 
international law on the question of state succession* He 
states, “Grotius for example says that if a state is split up, 
’anything which they held in common by the parts separ­
ating from each other must either be administered in common 
or be rateably divided in respect to territory’' its rights and 
obliga'klons are not impaired and if they have not been 
apportioned by fecial agreement?, those rights are to be 
enjoyed and those obligations fulfilled, by all the parts in 
common’ * Again quoting Phillimore who amplifies the views 
held by Grotius and Kent, says, "If a nation be divided into 
various distinct societies?, the obligations which had accrued 
to the whole, before the division’, are!, unless they have been 
the subject of a special agreement, rateably binding upon the 
different parts." Hall comments on these observations in these 
words. ’It is difficult to be sure whether these writers only 
contemplate the rare oase of a state so splitting up that üxe 
original state person is represented by no one of the fractions 
into which it is divided!; or whether they refer also to üxe 
common ease of such portion of the state territory and 
population by secession that the continuity of the life of 
the state is broken* If üxe former is their mealing their 
doctrine is correotl; so far as property and monetary obligations 
are concerned; if not, it would be hard to justify their 
language even to this extent* Ho doubt üxe debt of a state 
from which mother separates itself ought generally to be 
divided between the two proportionately to their respective 
resources as a matter of justice to the creditors?, because it 
is seldom that the value of their security is not affected by 
a diminution of the state indebted to them?; but ihe obligation
is a moral; but not a legal one* The fact remains that the
general debt of a state is a personal obligation*"
Two important conclusions flow from these observations, 
lirst, the writers recognise the fact that a state can be 
split into two or more parts and the righ'bs and obligations 
of the former state can be apportioned among them rateably; 
by special arrangements to this effect. Secondly the cases 
of cession from dismemberment are distinct, for the obvious 
reason that in. the first case the continuity of the persona­
lity is presumed whereas in the second case, the loss of 
personality is established. In the ease of split of state 
as a result of which loss of personality occurs, the ri^ts 
and obligations could possibly be divided rateably. The 
word "division" does not necessarily imply that it should 
be effected in two equal divisions*
" the provisions of the Indian Independence Act
do not make it manifest that British India was totally 
partitioned between the two new Dominions, f or in that 
oase one would have expected two equal divisions of Üïe 
country in terms of square miles without any recourse to 
plebiscite." (2j
The property of prepartition India has been divided 
between the two new Dominions in accordance with the 
decisions taken by the Partition Oouncil, which in most of 
the cases was able to apportion the assetsjin accordance 
with some formula or other.
To cite one out of many examples of apportionment of the
(IJ Hall, W. E. International law. op. cit. p.116 
(2) Sarkar op. cit. p. 233.
assets and liabilities between the two states reference can 
be made to the sharing of the securities held in Gash Balance 
Investment Account by the prepartition India and silver Reserve 
held by prepartition India*
It was decided by the partition Gounoil that
(a) Pakistan’s claim, if any, for sharing in 
the securities held in the Gash Balance 
Investment Account was covered by the decision 
to a%ot 75 crores in cash to Pakistan.
(b) Silver Redemption Reserve: It was agreed 
that Pakistan should get 17^ per cent of 
the He serve .(1).
It is unnecessary in this context to deal with the 
ground on which this formula was evolved. Similar formulae 
were evolved in other cases of liabilities as well. When­
ever the Partition Oouncil failed to come to some decision 
it was referred to the Tribunal set up under the order of 
the Governor-general for the purposes of arbitration.
As regards the Title of ihe Act there is hardly any­
thing more to add to what has already been stated in the 
preceding chapter (S). It may be recalled that ihe title 
of the Act vis a part of the Act, but it should not preclude 
the possibility of interpreting ihe Act in relation to other 
clauses; therefore ihe Act is not oaaly that of Independence 
but also of ihe partition. The fact that the word ’partition’ 
has not been inserted in the title does not establish in it­
self that nothing more than independence was intended.
The other point closely connected with the question of 
state succession is about the beginning of the state of 
Pakistan. Was it on the 15th August, 1947, that the state
(1) Expert Committee Ho. II Report. Op. oit, p. 98.
(2) The title and scope of ihe Act.
mPakistan oame into ©xistenoe or oan the date of its birth 
be traced still further back? It is quite obvious that the 
state Pakistan was unknown to the world of law', both municipal 
and international; before the 15th August 1947; but that 
does not necessarily mean that Pakistan did not exist before 
that date. This point needs clarification in view of the 
fact that ihe State-Pakistan has been treated in this thesis 
as a contracting party to the arrangements of partition, if 
not in law; at least in fact* The question then arises if 
Pakistan had no existence, what so ever, in fact, or in law; 
how could it become a party to all these arrangements?
It may be recalled that India assumed full responsible 
status in fact with ihe commencement of the Interim Government 
that was composed of the representatives of both ihe Congress 
and the Muslim League. The Governor-general continued but 
wiih a changed policy acting according to the advice of his 
ministers. Once the results of the referendum and ihe 
decisions of the legislatures of the provinces were taken in 
favour of Pakistan, in fact two parallel Governments were set 
up, one responsible for the particular matters concerned with 
India and the other for ihe problems connected with Pakistan. 
These two governments under one governor-general, in fact, 
enjoyed the status of responsible govemmen'bs and were in no 
sense inferior to their predecessor ihe Interim Government.
The Capital for the interim purposes for both these governments 
continued to be Hew Delhi. The Governor-general acting on 
the advice of that particular Government which the matter 
under decision concerned and for the matters of common concern 
a common agreement was reached. In view of this de facto 
situation one would be tempted to conclude logically that, 
in fact, Pakistan as well as the Hew Indian Dominion came into 
existence before the appointed day. It is wrong to say "that 
the Indian Dominion or ihe Dominion of Pakistan had no existence
of their own.
In some oases (1) the question of the beginning of 
a State was raised and it was held that Gzeohoslovakia came 
Into existenoe by the resolution of 28th Ootober, 1918; and not 
by virtue of international treaties which took for granted the exis 
anoe of a state which was a signatory to them; or again, in 
another oase it was observed that Ihe foundation of the 
A'ustrian Republic did not date from ihe ratification of ihe 
Treaty of St. Germania but from the resolution of the Austrian 
Constituent Assembly of 30th Go taber; 1918*” The new 
Dominions too came into existence; it may be said on the dates 
when ihe Congress and the Muslim League accepted the state­
ment of the 3rd June Government of His Majesty. It is 
difficult to fix one date, because the statements were acdepted by 
the fiCsdiitteeiyLeagta on the 15th June; 1947, and the
9th June, 1947; respectively* However it may be said that 
the foundations of the State Pakistan in view of the date of 
its acoeptance was laid down on 9th June, 1947, and that of 
the Indian Dominion on 15th June, 1947* The treaties of St. 
Germania or that of Versailles took the existenoe of the states 
of Czechoslovakia and Austria for granted whereas the Indian 
Independence Aot gave legal sanction to de facto existence.
It also implied the recognition of üiese two Hew States by 
the British Government, therefore it may be said that the legal 
recognition was extended on the 18th July , 1947; when Ihe 
Bill became an Act*
In the preceding pages, an attempt was made to 
establish the legal position of state succession and Ihe 
commencement of the two new Dominions with their legal con­
sequences. It is by no means an attempt to establish the 
theory of universal state sucoession for the very reason 
that with the disappearance of the juristic personality of 
prepartition India all the personal rights attributed to it 
Cl) Oase Ho, 8,11 Annual Digest 1925@86.
malso came to an end. It would certainly have created a 
difficuly iituation for other countries. The difficulties of 
this nature were fully realized and agreements were reached 
to meet tais situation. Such arrangements are not novel in 
international law. In order to f o m  a comparative view of 
the arrangements made between India and Pakistan and o ther 
normal rules in the light of precedents it would be desirable 
to consider these arrangements under the headings2-
(a) Political lights and Duties;
(b) Local Rights and Duties ;
(c) Fiscal property and Debts;
(d) Oontracts,
A better appreciation would be possible only if one 
were to glance at the partition machinery for üiis purpose.
It was deoiddd at the meeting of the Indian Cabinet
(Interim Government) on 6ih June; 1947, inter alia,
(a) ’that when the question of partition had 
been legally decided, and after the members 
of the existing Cabinet resigned, a Separa­
tion Committee should be set up by His 
Excellency in consultation with the leaders, 
with H. 1. as Chairman. It was noted üiat
H. E. would not act as arbitrator in this 
Committee, but would merely assist in re­
solving differences between the two parties 
or at least in reducing them to the minimum.
(b) That there should be set up along with the 
Separation Committee a standing tribunal or 
a panel of umpires to whom points of differ­
ences which could not be resolved; could be 
referred. On 17th June, 1947, a press note 
was issued by the Govern or-general in which 
new broad outlines of the machinery set up
19/
for working out the administrative conséquences of the 
partition was laid down. It was said in the press note that;-
’Broadly spealcing; there will be a special Oommittee 
of the Cabinet consisting of the Viceroy; two Congress men 
and the Muslim League members of the Interim Goverment who; 
through a steering Committee of two officers, will conduct 
and coordinate detailed investigations at expert level on 
various problems arising from the partition of the country.
There are all together ten such expert Committees and each 
of them will receive assistance from üae Departments con­
cerned
As soon however; as the decision of the provinces 
indie ate that there will be partition the Special Committee 
of the Cabinet will be replaced by a F#rtition Council which 
will represent thw interests of the two future Governments.
The Expert Committees will deal with such problems as 
division of the Armed forces; organisation, records, personnel, 
assets and liabilities ,rbv#hues, currency and exchange, economic 
relations, domicile, foreign relations and contracts." .... (1)
The Partition Council was set v/p according to the 
decision (2) of the Special Committee of the Cabinet.
To begin with #ie question of the political Rights and 
Duties be taken first; Gppenheim states* “Ho succession 
takes place, .*..., with regard to rights and duties of the 
extinct state arising either from the character of the latter 
as an international person or from its purely political 
treaties (S)“ The extinction of an international person 
may take place in different ways, for instance a state may 
be absorbed by another state, the parts of a state may be 
annexed by the surrounding states thereby bringing about an 
end of an international person as was the case of Poland or
(1) Proceedings Vol. I. Op. oit. 31.
(2) dated 26th June; 1947. Held. p. 33.
(3) Gppenheim; op. oit. p. 148.
a state may be split up in two or more parts and each part 
m&j become an international person; as was the oase of pre­
partition India; but the difference in tae phenomena of 
changes does not make any difference in the legal consequences 
flowing from them because the legal basis in all such oases in 
spit of the differences of the objects behind them is the 
fundamental fact that an international person comes to an 
end; whateve# be the mode of effecting such changes* Therefore 
the political Rights and duties also cane to an end with the 
disappearance of prepartition India* Apart from this, there 
are treaties which run with the land and in such cases the 
treaties continue to be in force and succession takes place in 
the case of that state which holds the territories that are 
related to tie treaties in question such are the treaties 
governing the boundaries, for example; in the case of the 
treaties with Afghanistan regarding boundaries; the Pakistan 
Government was bound by them as a result of succession* (1).
Sir Itoiren Mittra, Solicitor General to the Government 
of India, divides tie treaties into three categories*
(a) Treaties of exclusive interest to Pakistan;
(b) Treaties of exclusive interest to India; and
(o) Treaties of common interest.
The treaties mentioned in categories (a) and (b) come 
under one heading; and will devolve on the r espeotive 
Dominion in view of the fact that they run with the lands 
and will devolve on Üie Dominion that holds the territories 
connected with them*
As regards % e  treaties that are of common concern, 
he suggests the formula propounded by IbHair in the light 
of Oommonwealih practice; viz*, “such treaties will have 
effect as if the Treaty was effected after consultation 
between the governments of the two Dominions in accordance
(1) J?roceedings Ex* Com. MX; op. oit. p. 214 See Sir 
Dihren Mittra’s notes.
with the procedure indicated by Mo Hair*" The question here 
is whether such treaties will, as a result of the emergence of 
two new states, lose their force or continue. The view taken 
by Sir Dhiren Mittra seems to be in favour of their continuance. 
It is not impossible provided it is so agreed by the two States 
and no objection is taken by the other states who are party to 
them* In this case the practice of the Commonwealth, viz., 
the application of one treaty on the territories mentioned 
therein, certainly solved the problem* The views expressedby 
the expert committee also were in agreement on the continui'ty 
of the treaties but the strict legal view would be to say 
that this arrangement amounted to the renewal of these treaties, 
the treaties that run with the land or those of commercial 
interest would certainly continue of their own title provided 
there mean no legal political, strings attached to it. The 
arrangements thus made to divide the treaties into three 
categories was based on agreement and not on any rule of law.
The situation created by the legal consequences would have 
been to bring them to an end but the arrangement reached 
provided the necessary sanction for renewing them. One 
treaty could be binding on two Dominions in view cf the 
practice of the Oommonwealth as in both cases it was entered 
into in the name of Ihe Crown and as such would be applicable 
to the terri tor iesmentioned therein and consulted thereupon.
The basis of this formula is the unique characteristic of 
Commonwealth practice and therefore does not reflect on the 
legal position as it emerges in conséquences of 'ihe extinction 
of "the personality of prepartition India.
The arrangements reached; both in respect of treaties 
as well as the diplomatic relations of prepartition India 
were based on a formula. Again this formula was the outcome 
of agreements between the two governments that ; -
(a) Membership of all international organisations
mtogether with rights and obligations attaching 
to such membership; will demüÿe solely upon 
the Dominion of India.
(b) The Dominion of pate is tan will take such steps 
as may be necessary to apply for membership 
of such international organisations as it 
chooses to join.
(c) Rights and obligations under international 
agreements having an exclusive territorial 
application to an area will devolve upon the 
Dominion which is in possession of those 
territories.
(d) Except the agreements falling in *üae above 
category (c) of an exclusive territorial 
application, rights and obliga'fcions under all 
international agreements to which India is a 
party immediately before the appointed day will 
devolve upon the Dominion of India and upon
the Dominion of Pakistan, and will be apportioned 
b©'tween the "two Dominions.
This formula is broad enough "fco include all "the topics 
of the problems of state succession both of an international 
as well as of a municipal character. It at the same time 
provides a clue to the fact that the personality of pre­
partition India cannot be said to be continued in the Dominion 
of India for the reason that India has been able, leaving 
aside of course the question of the renewal of credentials of 
the Indian representative, to continue her membership and 
Pakistan had to apply as a new state. The question of 
membership in the first place could have been continued by 
India on the basis of this formula too without prejudice to 
the question of "ftie extinction of the personality of pre­
partition India and in the second place Ralston had to apply 
in either case, as with the disappearance of the personality
Of prepartition India the membership also came to an end,
India too as a new state should have had to apply whidi was 
not done.
Elis; however, does not correspond either with 1he 
juristic position as established in the preceding pages, nor 
with the view in favour of the continuity of the personality 
of prepartition India, The change in the status of India, as 
was argued in the legal opinion of the Assistant Secretary 
general for Ihe legal Department of the U. H. 0., did not 
necessitatethe change in the f o m  of credentials because;-
“The position of British Indian Ambassadors abroad 
after partition will depend upon the terms of the letters 
accrediting them to foreign states. The appointment is 
usualiy by the Grown. It may be that in the case of British 
Indian Ambassador the King acts on the advice of the Govern­
ment of India but that; vis-a-vis the foreign power, is 
immaterial. The King remains King of both Dominions and 
he will be the authority to appoint the Ambassadors for the 
Dominions. 3here is no transfer of power in this respect 
from the King, We are therefore, of opinion that the appoint­
ment of the ambassadors already made will not lapse on the 
appointed day. In view of the fact that the two Dominions 
may not like to have the same Ambassador and that the 
Ambassadors’ authority extends personally to matters con­
cerning British India as at present constituted it will be 
desirable as soon after the appointed day as possible to 
renew the letters accrediting the Ambassadors on the advice 
of the two Dominion Governments, and if ihey do not agree to 
the existing Ambassadors being common Ambassadors restrict 
the existing Ambassadors* authority to matters concerning 
the Dominion which is willing to continue the present 
Ambassador,(1)“ The Expert Oommittee scrutinized the 
terms and opined that....’The only change reqiired in the
credentials is one of form; namely the omission of the 
(1) Expert Committee IK proceeding op. dLt. pp. 212-213.
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description of Emperor of India* in reference to the King, 
by virtue of the acquisition of Dominion status by India.
We are not sure, however, if fresh credentials need be 
presented for this purpose only; as a mere matter of form.
In any oase these need not be presented unless a foreign 
power to whom our representative is accredited asks for it*" (2) 
It follows that ihe change of credentials for the reasons of 
change in status - i.e., from a subordinate position to an 
independent one; as was presumed by the Assistait Secretary- 
general, was not a matter of international law, the only 
ground for the justification for renewing the credentials was 
that the representative speaking on behalf of ihe whole of 
India; including Pakistan and the states; lapsed on 15th 
August, 1947* On this ground certainly U.H.O* would have 
been justified in the demand for renewing the credentials; 
othexv/ise not. It can also be deduced from tMs that the 
fact that either of the two Dominions could continue the 
Ambassador or the other representatives to foreign powers 
and U.H.O; was possible only in view of the fact that there 
was no change in the Crown but as has been seen, as far as 
India is considered; the King was the King Emperor only and 
with the termination of the trust the King Emperor of India 
too disappeared for both municipal as well as international 
purposes , and instead a new King who was the King of the 
Commonwealth was substituted and as such even this change 
of the head of states did not necessitate a change of 
credentials* However "the question of the continuity of 
diplomatic representatives have to be studied without pre­
judice to "the ques"bion of the extinction of the personality 
of pre-partition India. This arrangement it may once 
again be stated was possible in view of the practice of the 
Commonwealth; and both the new Dominions could have been 
represented by the same persons if they so desired.
(8) Ibid.
The whole discussion may be summarised as follows2- 
(1) India was an international person even 
before independence*
(S) The conferring of Dominion status being a 
constitutional act did not bring about any 
change in the international field; the true 
phenomenon that caused changes in the inter­
national field was the fact that India was 
parMtioned,
The creation of Pakistan cannot be said to be the result 
of secession because:-
(a) The partition; though based on agreement 
between the de facto governments of India and 
Pakistan was not brought about through any 
international transaction in which India
had been recognised as an international person 
as was the case with Ireland*
(b) It is not through an international treaty 
but through an act of parliament which at 
the most oan be treated as a document of 
conveyance were that all the changes brought 
about*
(o) It was done by the British Parliament in Üae 
capacity of a trustee relying on the consent 
of the future recipients of %ovemignty*
(d) The Aot itself speaks of division of treaties, 
rights and obligations and the terms lead 
to the conclusion that both tre new Dominions 
have been newly carved out of prepartition 
India as was the oase with the new provinces 
and if the old provinces ceased to exist as 
a result of this creation of new provinces, 
this holds equally good for India too.
Ce) The formula evolved for the pxxrposes of 
terminating this controversy has not laid 
down the juristic position, nor was it 
possible to do so throng an agreement; it 
is a formula to lay down some principle to 
meet the consequences of partition and the 
question of personality has been left out 
unresolved.
(f) The fact that India was able to retain her 
membership of the international bodies or her 
diplomatic representatives should be con­
sidered without prejudice to the question of 
the continuity of juristic personality*
Firstly because this was possible in view of 
the agreement to such arrangement laid down in 
the formula evolved and secondly because the 
King remained untouched with all his powers to 
appoint the diplomatic representatives. This 
has no bearing on the question of the continuity 
of personality.
(g) The Act brings about tie dissolution of the 
whole administration followed by ihe partition of 
the armed forces, personnel, assets. « îe .
The other questions of the rights and obligations 
under contract entered into by ihe prepartition Indian 
Government and similar matters were settled in accordance with 
the décisions of the partition Committee and has hardly 
anything of extra significance, to be mentioned separately.
As regards the question of nationalliy It may be said 
that àO. the citizens remain outside tW:5#ffect of any 
legislation of either Dominion and those within ihe Dominion 
till something otherwise enacted. This question will have 
to be dealt with in the Chapter on The British commonwealth,
hence no further discussion is desirable at this stage.
mThe last point which need be mentioned under this 
heading is üie effect of joining the Indian states in the 
federal schemes of India and Pakistan* Is the federation 
thus created with the Indian states a new state or an 
enlargement of the former? As was the case with Italy; 
which was; in fact; an enlarged state of Sardinia, so India 
and Pakistan should he treated as an enlargement, and as such 
continued the former personality*
As regards the Rights and obligations resulting from 
the annexation of Indian states by the Dominions of India 
and Pakistan; it may be said that they were devoid of all 
political treaties which came to an end with the lapse of 
paramountoy and besides these political rights and duties 
there was hardly anything that could be said important 
enough to be discussed in this c ont ext. As regards civil 
servants and o ther similar matters there were various 
clauses of safeguard entered into; the instruments of accession 
of the other contractual matters; it may be said that; in the 
majority of eases; the states did not lose their legal 
identity even after annexation as they merely became federated 
states. There were states which merged into other adjoining 
provinces or formed separate unions; of these it is necessary 
to say that the matters were dealt with at the time of the 
effecting of the mergers and must be studied separately in 
each case.
THE TERRITOEIES OP THE I «  DOMINIONS.
I.
The Indian Independence Aot can be said to be a treaty
in one sense, i.e. it contains clauses governing the division
of the territories of India and the demarcation of boundaries.
"A boundary treaty, when completed, is not a contract but a
conveyance, and the boundaries established are, as in the case
(1 )of private law, good against the world"'' The Act itself
contains claused defining the conveyance of sovreignty as well 
as the partition of the territories of pre-aprtition India,
As has been set forth, the Indian Independence Act is also a 
document of conveyance. The difficulty in this ease arises from 
the fact that the state, Pakistan, cannot be treated as arising 
from a secession because it was not the Government of India which 
was a party to the arrangements effecting the partition but the 
British Parliament which, in its capacity of trustees and super­
visors as has already been established, brought about this part­
ition with the consent of the natural recipients of the sovreignty. 
In this sense, it can justifiably be held that it was an arrange­
ment for future effect among the three parties, i.e., the British 
Government on behalf of Parliament, Congress on behalf of the 
future India, and the Muslim League on behalf of the people of future 
Pakistan; and the British Government had actually recognised the 
Gdngress and the Muslim League for practical purposes as successors. 
It is only in this sense that the Indian Independence Act is also 
a Treaty, though not in the sense of a contract, but a conveyance 
in itself.
The question may arise that there can be no treaty without 
two sovreign parties, but there are instances in support of the 
fact that it is possible that one or more parties may become 
sovreign through the treaty itself, and in this case the treaty 
will be classed with the transitory type of treaty and will be
(1) The Theory of State Succession: Keith, p.27.
%ol
said to effect a conveyance. "There must, indeed, he two 
parties to a contract, hut it is quite possible that one of 
these parties becomes a sovreign state merely through the 
contract itself. It is true that such a contract belongs 
to the so-called transitory type of treaty that it effects 
a conveyance and gives the state created a fight to its 
position as a right *in rem* good against the world and not
revocable by the other state"^. Keith relies on the
instances in which the British Government was a party.
But the case of Poland may be cited as an example. Poland
had no existence as a state before the Treaty of Versailles 
and it was the Treaty of Versailles itself to v/hich it ov/es 
its]egal recognition. Therefore it may be safely deducted that 
the clauses for the conveyance of sovreignty and the partitioning 
of territories can be understood on the analogy of the cases of 
the Sand River Convention of 1832 and the Bloemfontein Convention 
of 1834, which have been cited by Keith with only one qualifi­
cation. The Act is not in the form of a convention, but it is 
common ground that there is no form or procedure prescribed for 
a treaty in international law nor does the law of the United 
Kingdom prescribe any particular form. It follows that the
resolutions^^) passed by the Congress and the Muslim League 
accepting partition on behalf of the future India and Pakistan 
and the statement of the Cabinet setting forth the scheme of 
partition followed by a legal measure, the Indian Independence 
Act on behalf of the British Government are solemn declarations 
to tliB effect.
(1) Ibid p.28.
(2) Ibid p.28.
(3) See McHair, op.cit. Chapter "Form and Language".
(h) Resolutions of acceptance; Congress: 13th June, 19U7j
Muslim League, 9th June, 1949. (See Proceedings Expert 
Committee, Vol.I, pp.6-8)
II:
Coming to the Act, the provision for the territories of 
the New Dominions have been dealt with in Sections 2,3 and l\m 
These Sections define not only the means and procedure for 
partitioning and demarcating the pre-partition Indian 
territories that were to be considered parts of the New 
Dominions till the boundary commission determined them finally* 
Section 2 deals with the territories that were to be part of 
the territories of Pakistan, subject to the clauses mentioned 
therein, in which the possibilities of the decision of the 
referendum in the North Western Frontier and in Sylhet were also 
taken into consideration* Section 3 provides, in the first 
place, for the dissolution of the province of Bengal as 
constituted in the G-overnment of India Act, 1933, and instead 
makes provision for the constitution of two new provinces viz* 
East and West Bengal* The province of Assam was also in a 
sense to be dissolved as the district of Sylhet was to be 
treated as territory of the new province - East Bengal* Section 
4 provides for the dissolution of the province of the Punjab as 
constituted in the Government of India Act, 1933, end makes 
provisions for setting up two new provinces viz* East and West 
Punjab* In sub-section 3 (3) and section k (2) provisions for 
boundary commissions for Bengal and Assam and the Punjab have 
been laid down* The main question after passing the Act was 
only in regard to the boundary commission which was to be 
appointed by the Governor-General. The decision of the Legis­
latures of Bengal and the Punjab and that of référendums in the 
North Western province and Sylhet were made known while the Act 
was passing through the various stages in Parliament. In 
other words there was no controversy as far as the partition 
of India in general and of the Provinces in particular was 
concerned* The Indian Independence Act was drafted in such a 
way as to be able to meet every situation. In this chapter.
after the above observations, it is necessary to deal with the 
boundary commissions, their awards and the controversies thereon, 
and the subsequent settlement, through the Bagey, Indo-Pakistan 
Boundary Disputes Tribunal, The matters relating to state 
succession in relation to territory have been noticed in general 
terms in the above paragraph, and will be dealt with in more 
detail subsequently.
The Bengal boundary commission (1) was constituted by the 
Governor-General on the 30th June, that is, before the
Indian Independence Act came into force. The members of the 
commission thereby appointed were : -
Mr. Justice Bijan Kurran Mukheyjea.
“ ” 0. J. Biswas,
" *' Abu Saleh Muhammed Akram and
" ” 8. A. Rehnian with
Sir Cyril Rad cliff e K.O. who, in view of the agreement 
of the parties, was appointed chairman.
The terras of reference of the commission were as follows;- 
“The boundary commission is instructed to demarcate the bound­
aries of the two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining 
the contiguous areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, In doing so, 
it will also take into account other factors". It was also 
desired that the decision should be announced before the 15th 
August which was the appointed day for bringing the new 
Dominions into existence.
There was another Bengal boundary commission relating 
to Sylhet district and the adjoining district of Assam appointed 
by the same order and with the same personnel. The terms of 
reference of the Commission in this case were*- “In the event 
of the referendum in the district of Sylhet, resulting in favour 
of amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, the boundary commission will
(1) Gazette of India Extra Ordinary, August 14, 1947 
Ref. No. D.50/7/47R.
ralso demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Bylhet district and 
the contiguous Muslim majority areas of the adjoining districts 
of Assam.
The Punjab boundary conmission was constituted by the 
announcement of the Governor”General, above cited, and in this 
case the members were;
Mr, Justice Din Muiianimed,
" ” Muhammed Muhir,
” ” Meher Oh and Mahajin and
” " Teja Singh,
and Sir Cyril Radoliffe was the Ohaiman, The terms of 
reference in this case were: “the boundary commission is instr­
ucted to demarcate the boundaries dfthe two parts of the Punjab, 
on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous ma jo id. ty areas of 
Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into 
account other factors. “ In thl.s case also, it was desired 
that the decision should be announced before the appointed day.
It is not necessary for the purposes of this thesis to 
reproduce the avfards of the Chairman in detail. What is 
desired here is to ascertain the .principles which emerged from 
the awards thus given by the Chairman of the commission in view 
of the controversies over the terms of reference existing not 
only among the parties but also among the members of the 
commission representing them*
All interested parties, the Congress, The Muslim League, the 
Hindu Maha Sabha, and other such organisations were heard. There 
was no unanimity in any of the three cases in question and in view 
of the differences existing among the m^bers of these Commissions, 
the Chairman gave his award. The Chairman for the purposes of 
giving his award took certain basic questions into consideration 
which were in themselves indicative of the points of controversy.
There were undoubtedly large areas about wliich no controversy 
existed, For the sake of convenience the basic questions formul.ated 
by the Chairman will be dealt with in the order of the Commissions 
described above. Then references will be made as to how they are
related to the points of controversy, thereby the principles will 
be deduced from, the award pronounced in consideration of these 
basic questions.
In the first case. Sir Cyril Radoliffe said, “in my view, 
the demarcation of a boundary line between East and West Bengal 
depended on the answer to be given to certain basic questions, 
which may be stated as follows;
1. To which state was the city of Calcutta to be assigned, 
or was it possible to adopt any method of dividing the 
city between the two states?
S. If the city must be assigned as a whole, to one or the 
other of the states, what were the indispensable claims 
to the controij, of territory, such as all or part of the 
Madia river system, oiïï the Kulti rivers upon which the 
life of Calcutta as a city and port depended?
S. Could the attractions of the Canges-Padma-Madhumat 1 hiver 
line displace the strong claims of the heavy concentration 
of Muslim majorities in the districts of Je 8 so re and Nadia 
without doing too great violence to the principles of our 
terms of reference?
4. Could the district of Khulhausefully be held by a state 
different from that which held the district of Jesso re?
5. Was it right to assign to Eastern Bengal the considerable 
block of non-Muslim majorities in the districts of Malda 
and Dinajpur?
6. Hriich stateb claim ought to prevail in respect of the 
districts Ikrjeeling and Jalpaiguri in which the Muslim 
population amounted to 2.4^ of the whole in the case of 
Darjeeling end to 23.08^ of the whole in the case of 
Jalpalguri, but whfc h constituted an area not in any 
natural sense contiguous to another non-Muslim area of 
Bengal,?
7. To which state should the Chittagong hill tracts be 
assigned, an area in which the Muslim population
X.00
was only 3% of the whole but which It was difficult to assign 
to a state different from that wliich controlled the district of 
Chittagong itself.
As regards the Sylhet and adjoining district areas, there 
was a difference of opinion among the members of the commission 
in regard to the interpretation of the terms of reference. Two 
members on Pakistan’s side maintained that the commission was 
entrusted with authority to detatch from Assam, any Muslim areas 
of any part of Assam that comes under the description of contiguous 
areas to East Bengal, They contended that the words ’adjoining 
districts of Assam’, could only be interpreted as meaning any 
districts of Assam that adjoined East Bengal, the other two 
members held that the powers of the commission were limited to 
the district of Sylhet, and the contiguous Muslim majority areas 
(if any) of other districts of Assam that adjoin Bylhet, Sir 
Cyril Radoliffe concurred with the view of limited construction 
of the terms, “in my view the question is limited to the 
district of Sylhet and O.aohar, since of the other districts of 
Assam, that can be said to adjoin Sylhet, neither the Gavo Hills 
nor the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, nor the Lushai Hills have anything 
approaching a Muslim majority of population in respect of which, a 
claim could be made. " There v/as another aspect of the question.
Out of 35'Thanas’ in Sylhet, 8 were non-Muslim majority ’thanas’
Out of these 8, Sulla and Ajmcriganj ’ thanas ’ were evenly divided 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, but actively surrounded by pré­
ponde ratingly Muslim areas. The other 6 stretched continuously 
along part of the Southern border of Sylhet district and were 
divided between two sub-divisions, one of the sub-divisions, 
known as South Sylhet with a non-Muslim majority, whereas the 
other subdivision Karimganj with a Muslim majority larger than 
the first one (l). In other words, when considered from the 
point of view of the sub-division only. South Sylhet had a non-
(l) The figures given in the Award of Sir Cyril Radoliffe, 
seemed inconsistent, and so have been dropped.
ILO/
Muslim majority in Sylhet district, with regard to the district 
of Oachar, one ’Thana*, Hailakandi, had a Muslim majority and 
was contiguous to other Muslim thanas’of Sylhet district. This 
’thana’, with the ’thana* of Katlichara lying to the south, formed 
the suh-division of Hailakandi, in which Muslims formed a majority 
of 51^, It was essential for “normal communications”, that the 
area should be under one jurisdiction, and to borrow Radoliffe’s 
phrase, “the Muslims would have, at any rate, a strong presumptive 
claim:for the transfer of the subdivision of Hailakandi, com­
prising a population of 166,536, from the province of Assam to 
the province of East Bengal,
In view of the above description any boundary would have created 
difficulties and therefore reference to other factors was made
necessary. To quote Radoliffe, " a study of the map
shows, .....that a division on these lines would present problems
of administration that might gravely affect the future welfare and 
happiness of the whoId district. Not only would the six non- 
Muslim "thanas" of Sylhet be completely divorced from the rest of 
Assam, if the Muslim claim to Haila khandi were recognised, but 
they formed a strip running east and west, whereas the natural 
division of the land is north and south, and they effect an 
awkward severance of the railway line through Sylhet, so that, 
for Instance, the junction for the town of Sylhet itself, the 
capital of the district, would lie in Assam, and not in East Bengal, 
"In these circumstances I think that some exchange of terr­
itories must be effected if a workable division is to result.
Borne of the non-Muslim territory and Hailakhandi must be re­
tained by Assam." (l)
low coming to the award of  the Punjab boundary commission, 
again there was disagreement among the members of the Commission. .
The differences of opinion largely centred round the Significance 
of the term, ’other factors’, and especially round the weight 
and value to hë attached to them. In the case of the Punjab, 
representations were made to the Ooramission on behalf of the 
states of Bikaner and bahawalpur, both of which were interested 
in canals, whose head works were situated in the Punjab province.
On this point Radoliffe obseived, "interest of tills sort cannot 
weigh directly in the question before us as to the division cf 
the Punjab between the Indian Union and Pakistan, since the 
territorial division of the province does not affect rights of 
private property, and I think that 1 am entitled to assume, with 
confidence that any agreements that either of those states has 
made with the provincial government as to the sharing of water 
from these canals or otherwise will be respected by whatever 
government hereafter assumes jurisdiction over the headv/orks con­
cerned. I wish also to make it plain that no decision that is 
made by this commission is intended to affect whatever territorial 
claim the State of Bahawalpur may have in respect of a number of 
villages lying between Sulemarke Weir and Gurka Perry."(1)
The demarcation of the boundary inJ^Wjab was complicated by
two-fold difficulties; firstly, there were a number of rivers, and 
by
secondly/the canal system which was developed under the conception 
of a single administration. In addition to this there was the 
difficulty of road and rail communications. Further, "there was 
also the stubborn geographical fact of the respective situations of 
Lahore and Amritsar, and the claims to each or both of these cities, 
which each side vigorously maintained." Besides this, there were 
large areas in respect of whlc h the parties maintained claims, and . 
again to cite Radoliffe, "the truly debatable ground in the end 
proved to lie in and around the area between the Beas and Sutlej 
rivers on the one hand, and the river Ravi on the other." In view 
of these difficulties, it was found impossible to enforce the princit3„e
(l) Gazette, op.cit. Award of the Punjab boundary commission, 
para. 8,
of the contiguous majority areas. It was also found difficult 
“to envisage ,a_ satisfactory arrangement, for the joint-control 
of the intake of the different canals dependent on the head 
works", which would have resulted if the territories of the West 
Punjab were extended to a strip on the far side of the Sutle.:j,
It is of great importance to refer here, especially in view of 
the present controversy over the distribution of canal waters,
to Sir 0. Sadcliffe’s observation in this respect "although
I made small adjustments of the Lahore and Amritsar district 
boundary to mitigate some of the consequences of this severance; 
nor can I see any means of preserving under one territorial 
jurisdiction the Mandi hydro-electric scheme which supplies 
power to the district of Kangra, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore, 
Jullunder, Ludhiana, Perozepore, Sheildapur and Lyallpur. I 
think it only right to express the hope that, where the drawing of 
a boundary line cannot avoid disrupting such unities as canal 
irrigation, railways, and electric power transmission, a solution 
may be found by agreement between the two states for some joint 
control of what has hitherto been a valuable common service." (1)
It may be noted here that this is mainly said d) out the 
upper Bau?i Doab Canal of which the headwork now as a result of 
the demarcation of the boundary lies on the side of India, which 
it runs into the territory of Palîistan, Thus forming a point 
of contention.
Another point of great importance along with the summary 
of these awards which is common in all of them is the fact that 
in case the description that Radoliffe has given of the boundaries 
differ from his delineation of the boundaiy illustrated on the maps, 
the description was to prevail. It may also be noted here that 
Radoliffe did not hear the oases prescribed by the parties in person 
nor was he able to make local inspection or demarcate (S) the
(1) Gazette op,cit. Punjab Award, para.11.
(2 ) The terms ’demarcation’ and delineation’ in these pages 
are used in the sense of marking out the boundary lines
on paper.
boundary on the spot* He relied on the maps, which, inmost cases, 
were old and did not, therefore, represent the actual situation.
The defects were soon obvious and disputes arose between India and 
Pakistan, both in regard to a number of points in the Bengal and 
Sylhet boundaries as well as about the distribution of water of the 
canals and the definition of the rivers which ran through both states. 
Before the intricacies of the contoversies and the awards on the 
disputes concerning Bengal and Sylhet can be assessed, it is desirable 
to say a word or two about the term 'other factors* and then analyse 
the awards above described with a view to deducing the principles 
that the arbitrator seems to have followed*
III.
As regards the term 'other factors', a question was put to 
Lord Mountbatten at the Press Conference held at New Delhi on the 
occasion of the announcement of the partition plan. Lord Mountbatten 
replied as follovf's; "The term 'other factors* was put in for the 
purpose of allowing the Commission the maximum latitude in dealing 
with this problem." Referring to concrete examples in this respect, 
he observed, "In the district of Curdaspur, in the Punjab, the 
population is 50.4^ Muslim, I think, and 49.6^ 0 non-Muslim, with a 
difference of 0,8/, You will see at once that it is unlikely that the 
boundary commission will throv/ the whole of the district into the 
Muslim majority areas. In Bengal the district of Khulna is the 
reverse case; by a very small fraction of percentage it falls into 
a non-Muslim majority area, so you cannot say that the whole of the 
district will go into the non-Muslim area* The point is that we have 
adopted these districts for one purpose, and one purpose only. It is 
the simple way by which you can divide the members of a legislative 
assembley,"(l) It is clear from this statement that the term,
'other factors', was Intended to cover the need to effect the division 
of.the districts and also this was obviously necessary in view of the 
fact that the 'district basis' was taken into consideration for
(1 ) Mountbatten's Speeches, op,cit. p,30. Press Conference, 
New Delhi, 4th June, 1947.
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dividing the members of the leglislatures conveniently. But the
question is, was it the only consideration intended, to be covered by
the term 'other factors', or was the arbitrator given ample latitude
to rely on this term in order to apply it to other considerations
as well? Radcliffe's awards establish beyond dispute that he took
a rather liberal view of the construction of this term. He was not
even reluctant to effect the exchange of territories. The exchange
of territory involved, in a sense, divergence from the terms of
reference because the demarcation was not to be made on the principle
of contiguous areas alone, but on those which were Muslim or non-
Muslim majority areas, Radoliffe in this sônse was bound to draw
a line whic.h would have certainly created enclaves of one state
within another, or, in most casés, the demarcation of the boundary 
had
would have/to be made not on a natural geographical basis but on 
the principle of majority areas and thus would have caused disruption 
of coimunications and economies, and would have created adminis­
trative difficulties. The question how far he succeeded in adhering 
to the principle of liberal construction for mitigating the chanced 
of disruptio.n by adopting other alternatives, and if so, what were the 
problems then existing is something quite different. He, undoubtedly, 
had to perform the duties of an arbitrator in view of the lack of 
unanimity among the members. The duty of the demarcation of 
boundaries in itself is an arduous job and goes back to ancient times. 
The Romans developed the idea of boundary making into a cult, the 
worship of the God, Terminus. The comnon landmark was sprinlcled 
with the blood of a slain lamb.(l) The difficulties of boundary 
making, especially that of solving the conflict between natural 
features, for example Moun.tains, rivers, economic factors and the 
factors of race, 1 angua^e and culture, were paramount for the 
boundary makers of Europe and America. Radcliffe's work was further 
complicated by the vigorous claims of the parties. He could rely on 
the liberal construction of the terms, of course, to borrow his own
(1) International Boundaries, Jesse S. Reeves, The American 
Journal of Internation Law, Vol.38, 1944, pp.633-544,
phrase, "without doing too great violence to the principle of the 
terms of reference,"
Radoliffe has used, to a great extent, a precise legal 
language in describing the boundaries. He was cautious not to 
use ambiguous words in describing the boundaries; however, 
differences arose over the interpretation of his description 
especially because there was divergence between his' description 
and illustration. The parties, i.e. India and Pakistan, very 
soon realised that the task of interpreting the awards was more 
difficult than that of giving the awards themselves, ±t viras 
further complicated by the fact that certain portions of the bound­
ary both in Eastern and Western Paliclstall, appeared at least in 
Pakistan's view, to have been drawn without regard for the natural 
considerations, for example tite boundary crossing the Upper Bari 
Doab Canal and the river Ravi could have been taken to the north­
eastern side along the course of Ravi river, instead of, for some 
distance parallel to the course of the river and then towards the 
north-western side and where it joined to the boundary of Kashmir 
State, Had he followed the Ravi river course it would have been 
more natural, (l) There are other such compla.ints on each side, 
and Radcliffe's decision being an avirard there was no chance of 
claiming an alteratiônf-in the boundaries themselves and thus, the
parties contended on the interpretation of the awards, " but
it is difficult to think that it is in fact drawn on the principle 
of contiguous majority areas which Wir Cyril Radcliffe's report
accepts- as the fundamental basis,. clearly too, Tehsils
boundaries are not sacrosanct since Kasur Tehsil Is split for no 
clear reason. This being so it is difficult to see why Gurdaspur 
should not have been allotted to west Punjab, with the boundaries 
modified in the North and South to give gontiguous non-Muslim 
majority areas beyond the Madhupur headworks and joining Amritsar 
Tehsil to East Punjab. It is true that communally Gurdaspur
(l) See map points A, B, showing the course cf the river and 
A, C, shaving the boundary drawn by Radoliffe,
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has a hare Muslim majority hut culturally it was overwhettiingly 
Muslim, and it was perhaps the only area in the Bari Doah where 
the Muslims were in the lead industrially.” (1) Such are the 
remarks of a geographer who has actually participated in the case; or 
”we have accepted the award though, speaking frankly, I must admit 
that I have not been able to follow the logic or the justice behind 
the Punjab Award. It has deliberately handed over to the East 
Punjab tracts v/hich are clearly contiguous to the West Punjab 
with an overwhelming majority of Muslims thus going against the 
fundamental basis of the terms of reference to the Commission”(2); 
those of the Pakistan spokesman.
It may be pointed out here that "although the demarcation of 
a boundary is a political question, the settlement of conflict by 
an international tribunal is a judicious question”; (3); therefore, 
the award had to prevail without regard to other political con­
sideration. Both the G-overnraents have accepted it. It may be 
asked that the Boundary Commission owe their existence to the 
Indian Independence Act and as such how could it be an international 
Commission, As explained earlier, the Indian Independence Act, is, 
in reality, a legal expression of the agreements reached among the 
three parties, namely the British Government on behalf of 
Parliament, the Congress on behalf of the future Indian Government 
and the Muslim League on behalf of the future Government of Pakistan, 
The Commission, besides this contractual basis, was entrusted with 
the task of adjudicating between the two sovreign states and the 
nature of the work implies that the principles applicable to the 
interpretation of award could be nothing else but those of the law 
of nations. Stuyt emphasises, in the light of the principles laid 
down by the international tribunals, two points. Firstly, "whenever 
the Royal Acts and dispositions do not define the dominion of a
(1) Dr, Oskar Spate, The Punjab Boundary Award - Asiatic Review,
aiiuary, 1948.
(2), H.E. Habib Ibrahm Rahematoola; High Commission for Pakistan
The Ideals and Prospects of Pakistan; Asiatic Review, 
January, 1948.
(3) Stuyt, A.M. , The General Principles of Law, p.Rlr.
shall
territory in clear terms, the arbitrator/decide tte question 
according to equity, keeping as near as possible to the meaning 
of the documents and to the spirit which inspired them”(1); and 
secondly, in arriving at their decisions the Commission will take 
into account ethnographical, historical principles, political 
interests of each party, military, strategical and economic 
factors as well as the local interests of the population”(2)■
IV.
The divergence in the interpretation of the boundaries was 
due to the fact that there was divergence between the description 
and the illustration of the boundaries on the maps which did not 
represent the actual situation, as they happened to be old and 
inaccurate. Besides there were rivers in Bengal which were 
always changing their courses, and thus the maps dravra in 1926 
were very different from the situation that existed in 1947*
Radoliffe has not laid down in detail all tie legal 
consequences of demarcating the boundaries, but it would be OTong 
to say that he had not taken cognisance'of such legal problems.
At least in the case of the Punjab boundary he has definitely 
envisaged the possibilities of establishing joint control over 
the headworks in which both parties were interested. This 
clearly indicates the fact that though such matters did not fall 
within the scope of the terms of reference of the Boundary 
Oomraissions, he, nevertheless, took cognisance of such matters 
of common interest and made them binding bn both parties. His 
terms of reference were wide enough and it is not too far wrong 
to say that such matters for which no definite rules of international 
law existed, he has indicated them in explicit terms, in his award. 
The matters governed by international law were unnecessary and 
amounted to too wide a construction of the terms of reference to 
be included in his award.
(1) Ibid, No.80,
(2) Ibid.
India and Pakistan took possession of certain territories which 
both parties claimed as their own. This vms the case in Bengal and 
Assam. In one case (1) the matter came up before the Federal Court 
of India, for a decision whether territory claimed by India but in 
the possession of Pakistan could be said to be included within the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Court of India. It was held that any 
territory which the government of ^ndia certified to be within the 
Dominion of India was also within the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Court. The fact that it was possessed by Pakistan was not a 
matter affecting the jurisdiction of the Court. This case is cited 
here only to show that problems of this nature were accumulating 
and in view of these facts, by a special agreement concluded between 
India and Pakistan on the ilpbh December, 1948 at the inter-Dbminion 
Conference held at New Delhi, an indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes 
Tribunal was set up. The two Dominions agreed to the settlement 
of the disputes as follows
1. A tribunal to be net up at as early a date as possible, and 
not later than January 31st, 1949 for the adjudication and 
final settlement of the following boundary disputes, arising 
out of the interpretation of the Radoliffe award and for de­
marcating the boundary accordingly:-
(a) The East D©ngal Disputes concerning:
(i) The boundary between the district of Murshida- 
bad (West Bengal) and the district of Rajshahi 
including the ’thanas’ of Nawabgunj and Shibgunj 
of pre-partition Malda district (East Bengal), and
(ii) The portion of the comiion boundary between the 
two Dominions which lies between the point
on the Ganges where the channel of the river 
Mathabhanga diverges according to Radcliffe’s 
award and the northernmost point where the 
channel meets the boundary between the ’thanas’ 
of Daulatpur and Kairimpur according to the award.
(1) Midnapur Zaraindari Co.Ltd., -Vs. Province of Bengal and others.
Federal Court Law Report, 1949.
(2) Gazette of India Exttra Ordinary, dated 2nd May, 1950, pp.56 - 103.
»7
(b) Tlie East Bengal-As sam disputes concerning;-
(i) The Patharia hill reserve fwest; and
(ii) The course of the Kusiyara river.
(8) The Tribunal shall consist of three members, one member 
nominated by each of the two Dominions of India and 
Pakistan, such person being one who is holding or has held 
high judicial office and is acceptable to both Dominions.
In the event of disagreement between the members, the decision
of the chairman shall be finaJ. in all matters. The Tribunal
shall report within three months from the date of its 
sitting.
(3) After the Tribunal has adjudicated upon the disputes, the 
boundaries shall be demarcated jointly by the experts of 
both Dominions, If there is any disagreement between the 
experts regarding the actual d,emarcation of the boundary 
in situ, such disagreement shall be referred to the Tri­
bunal for decision, and the boundary shall be demarcated 
finally in accordance with such decision.
(4 ) The TrSibunal shall prescribe procedure to be followed for 
adjudicating upon the disputes as well as for deciding the 
point oi? points of disagreement, if any, arising from the 
demarcation of the boundary.
The cost of the Tribunal and of implementing the agreement, in 
addition to the staff normally employed by the two governments was 
to be equally borne by the two Dominions.
The Government of India nominated the Jlon. Ohandrasekhama 
Aiyer, retired judge of Madras High Court, and the Government of
Pakistan, the Hon, Shahabuddin, judge of the Dacca High Court in
East Bengal, and with thé agreement of both governments, the 
Hon, Algot Bagge, former member of the Supreme Court of Sweden, 
was appointed Chairman.
The Tribunal, thus ocmtltut ed, in its informai meeting of 3rd 
December, 1949, laid down rules for procedure in pursuance of the
agreement of the two governments. They were;-
1, That the Tribunal wuld be known as the Indo-Pakistan
Boundary Dispute Tribunal;
2. That the hearings concerning East and West Bengal disputes
should take place at Calcutta and the hearings concerning
East Bengal-Assam should take place at Dacca;
3. That the hearings .should be open to the public, the Tribunal
reserving to themselves the rlgh$ to make exceptions to this 
rule ;
4. That the Tribunal should hear oral arguments by Counsel of 
each party, in the dispute concerning the boundaiy between
the district of Murshldabad and Rajshahi, the Indian Government 
beginning and the Pakistan Government replying; in the dis­
pute concerning the river Mathabhanga, the Pakistan Government 
beginning and the Indian Government replying; in the dispute 
concerning the Path%Rla hill reserve forest the Indian Gov­
ernment beginning and the Pakistan Government replying; and in 
the dispute concerning the river Kusiy ara the Pakistan Govern­
ment beginning and the Indian Govemment replying;
5. That the procedure should, be Informal;
6. That the proceedings should be recorded by the secretary- 
gone ral appointed by the Tribunal, a: full shorthand report 
being also made.
The Hon. G, de Sydow, Judge of the Court of Appeal at Stockhdlm, 
was appointed secretary-general by the Tribunal, On the side of 
India spoke the Advocate-General of West Bengal S.M. Bose, 
assisted by Messrs. M.N. Ghosh, M.M. Sen, K. Bag chi and K.K.Sen, 
and on the side of Pakistan the case was presented by Mr.W,W.K.Fage,K. 
assisted by Messrs, Payyaz Ali, Advocate General of East Bengal, and 
Mr. Meshbahuddin, but later on, Mr. Page was dropped and Mr. Payyaz 
Ali assisted by Messrs. Mansur Alam and Meshbahuddin continued.
In the dispute concerning Murshldabad-Rajshahi-Malda, the 
question was whether the boundary line, running along the river 
was flexible or rigid. This dispute arose from Radcliffe’s award, 
whihh said, "The line shall then turn south-east down the river 
Ganges along the boundary between the districts of Malda and 
Mur Shi dab ad; Rajshahi and Murshidabadj Rajshahi and Nadia, to the
point in the north-western corner of Nadia where the channel of 
the river Mathabhanga takes off from the river Ganges. The 
district boundaries, and not the actual course of the river Gan.ges, 
shall constitute the boundary between East and West Bengal"(l).
The other question connected with this dispute was what the district 
boundaries thus defined were. The fact; was that the district 
boundaries were constituted under the government notifications in 
accordance with the Bengal District Act (No.4 of 1866) (2). Under 
these notifications the district boundary in the disputed area was 
the river Ganges or Padma, except in the Rampurboalia area where 
the boundary was on land. It may be noted here that the Island 
known as the Rampurboalia area was situated in the river under 
question, and the boundary line drawn by Radoliffe went over * it.
In other words the boundary line on this island was a boundary on 
the land, vdiereas the other parts were along the course of the river 
Ganges, which was always changing its course. If this dispute is 
studied with reference to the sketch-map (3) given, it will appear 
that the boundary line along the river is marked A, B, and the 
extension of this line from B to G is on Ihnd, and then again from 
point G to D and onwards the boundary is along the course of the 
river. Pakistan claimed that the line from A to D, except the 
boundary on land B to G was flexible. India held that the line 
was fixed and this line had to be determined as it existed on the 
date of the award.
The members disagreed and gave their divergent opinions and 
In view of this the Ghaliman gave his opinion, which, in accordance, 
with the agreement, was to be final. According to him, "the first 
question to examine is whether the district notification line in the 
river Ganges consisting in ’the mid-stream of the main channel of 
the river Ganges’ or ’the mid-stream of the river Ganges’ was rigid 
and subject to correction only through a new notification, of if this
(1) Radoliffe award, op. cit. para 5.
(2) See Boundary Dispute Between India and Pakistan by M.M. Sen, in 
the Judieiai/Review ,6f India, 1951.
(3) Map No.l.
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line in the river Ganges was a flnid line."
He caiïie to the conclusion that the district boundary in Ihe 
river Ganges was not a rigid line. Another question which he 
discussed was Whether the boundary between India and Pakistan as 
established in the award was embodying the flexible line of the 
district boundaries or whether the boundary between India and 
Pakistan is a stationary line. He concluded that in the area in 
dispute the district boundary line consisting of the land boundary 
portion of the district as well and the boundary following the course 
of the river was the boundary between India and Pakistan, and it was 
a fixed one. He further held that if the demarcation of the line 
of the boundary was to be as it existed at the time of award, that is, 
12th August, 1947, then it should be the one as existing on the da.te 
of demarcation and that should be at the latest within one year of 
the publication of his decision.
The question in the Matlravbhanga dispute was to determine, the 
point of take-off of Mathabhanga from the main river Ganges. Falling 
that, what should be deemed to be the point of take-off and how 
should it be detemined. India in this case put forward the argu­
ment that if the arbitrator once draws a line, stating that the line 
drawn by him is a river indfmting the boundary, then it should be a
boundary without consideration whether the line thus drawn was on
land or water, or was rightly or wrongly drawn. On the other hand,
Pakistan contended that there was a divergence between the boudary as 
described in the award and the one delineated and Illustrated in the 
map, and, therefore, the position of the take-off in accordance with 
the ternis of paragraph 10 of his award the description ipust prevail. 
Radoliffe had laid down, "If there should be any divergence between the 
boundary as described and as delineated on the map,
the description..... is to prevail." In this case, Bagge observed
that, "it must be held that the awards makes a difference between the
description and the delineation on the m a p ......so far as it is
possible to get a solution from the description, the delineation
on the map is only an illustration of that solution."
Coupled with the question of the point of take-off was the
need to determine whether the boundary along the course of the river
was fixed or fluid.
As regards the first point, Pakistan claimed that the take-off
of the river Mathabhanga was further north and therefore the boundary
should be from further north, shown in the sketch map point 7, and
not point D as drawn by Radoliffe. In other words, Pakistan claimed 
on
that/the main river Ganges the river should be from point Y to E 
instead of D to B as drawn by Radoliffe (1).
%gge held that the boundary line, ’'Between India and Pakistan 
slia 11 run along the middle line of the main channel of the river 
Mathabhanga, which takes off from the river Ganges, in or close to 
the north-western corner of the district of Nadia at a point West- 
South-West of the police station and the camping ground of the 
village Jalangi.........and then flows southwards to the northern­
most point of the boundaries of the ’thanas’ of Darla^pur and
Ear impur....... The point of the take-off of the river Mathabhanga
shall be connected by a straight and short line with a point in the
mid-stream of the main channel of the river Ganges,.. (2)......... In
I the sketch map the given point X represents the point of take-off I
I . /
and from that point a straight line to the mid-stream of the river/ 
Ganges which will be the shortest line, which is represented by  ^
point 0 and thus the boundary will be represented by the line 
ÛXE and not YXE as claimed by Pakistan, or the line DE as claimed 
by India, As regards the second point, it was decided, in con­
currence with the decision of the first dispute that the boundary 
running along the stream should be rigid, or the line from B to X 
should be rigid.
The third dispute was about Pathan!a Hill ^orsst. The facts 
of the case were;-
In 1920 the ' orest was proclaimed a Rgserved Forest with defined 
boundaries, %fore 1940 there was only one ’thana’, Jaldhup, but
(1) See sketch map No,2.
(2) Bagge’s opinion, Nisp-Qte 2, p.87.
in 1940 by the notification of the Government of Assam the 
’thana’ Jaldhup was abolished and, the ’thanas’ ofIfêa^ nibazar and 
Barlekha were created instead. And according to the notification 
of the same year, the Reserve ’^orest area was excluded from the 
’thana’ Barlekha, but it was not included in the adjoining ’thana’ 
of Patha^kandi, Radcliffe delineated a boundary cutting the 
forest area into two parts. The map on which Radcliffe drew 
the lines was prepared in 1937 and reprinted without any alterations 
in I9U7* India claimed that the portion of the forest shown on 
the side of Pakistan should come to India. The measures given 
by her were;-
(1) There being divergence between Radcliffe’s description 
and delineation the description must prevail.
(2) The forest was definitely excluded from the ’thana’
Barlekha and, therefore, by necessary implication and on 
the proper construction pf the award, it should go to 
Pathaidtehandi, a ’thana’ on the Indian side.
Pakistan’s claim was that Barlekha included the Forest area 
for all administrative purposes and it was never given to Path- 
a^khandi and, therefore, the,.whole of the Forest area must come to 
Pakistan.
In this case, not only was there divergence between the des­
cription of the boundary in the award and its illustration on the 
map, but the description itself was incomplete. Therefore, the 
Chairman observed, "If the description is incomplete, we must 
be allowed to use the map not only as an illustration to the des­
cription but also as affording the necessary completion of the 
description,"(1 ) and the Chairman he^ -d that for this demarcation 
the illustration of Radoliffe was to prevail and, therefore, the 
forest was partitioned as delineated ôn the map. The other tv/o 
members also came to the same conclusion though their reasoning 
differed.
(1) Bagge’s opinion, Dispute No. 3. Gazette op.cit.p.9y^ .
The fourth dispute was about the Kusiyara river and it arose 
from .Radcliffe’s award in, the following words. ’’In those cir­
cumstances, I think that some exchange of territories must be 
effected if a workable division is to result. Some of the non- 
Muslim ’thanas’ must go to Bast ^engal and some Muslim territory 
and ^ailakandi must be retained by Assam, Accordingly, I decide 
and award as follows:
A line shall be drawn from the point where the boundary 
between the ’thanas’ of Pathapkandi and Kulaura meets the 
frontier of ïripuîra State and shall run North along the 
boundary between those ’thanas’, then along the boundary 
between the ’thanas’ of Patharkandi and Barlekha and then 
along the boundary between the ’thanas of Karimgunj and 
^eani’bazar to the point where the boundary meets the river 
Kusiyara. The line shall then turn to the Bast, taking the
river Kusiyaua as the boundary and run to the point where the 
river meets the boundary between the districts of Sylhet and 
Oachar. The centre line of the main stream or channel shall
constitute the boundary ’’. " .
The case for Pakistan was that the river Kusiyam was not the 
one named on the map as Kusiyara, but was the one named as Sonai. 
India on the other hand contended that the river shown as Kusiyara 
is also known as Boglia and, therefore, there was no divergence 
between the avmrd and the map, and the boundary delineated should be 
followed as the correct boundary. It may be noted here that the' 
Kusiyara as shown on the map was on the northern side whereas the 
Sonai river, which Pakistan claimed to be the Kusiyanea was on the 
South, There was thus confusion as regards the name of the river, 
but there was no difference between India and Pakistan on the point 
that the Kusiyara river was not the one shown on the map, ^agge 
observed, "It seems to me that under such circumstances the name 
of the river used in the description does not give in itself a 
sufficient guidance. The fact that. Sir Oyril Radcliffe has, 
in delineating the boundary, followed the first-mentioned river 
must then be taken as a sufficient proof that this river is the 
river referred to in the description.
"My conclusion is, therefore, that from the point where the 
’thanas’ of Earimgunj and Beanibazar meets, the river described as
the Sonai river on the map..... is the boundary between India and
Pakistan." (1),
Thus the disputes between India and Pakistan over the boundaries 
were resolved with the help of the Tribunal in a peaceful manner.
The Tribunal’s powers in accordance with the terms of reference 
were limited to the interpretation of the clauses of the award which 
formed points of controversy between the two Governments. They 
were not a Court of Appeal to set right the defects of the decision 
of a lower court. They were obviously bound by the 10th paragraph
of Radcliffe’s award which laid down that in case divergence between 
description and illustration arose, the description was to prevail. 
The question here is whether the Tribunal has crossed the limit of 
these terras. The description would certainly prevail if there was 
no defect in it. But if the description was incomplete, then the 
illustration was called in for help to make it complete, and the 
results arising therefrom should be construed as the description 
prevailing over the illustration as was the case in the third 
dispute. Suppose the illustration and description are both 
defective, then with a view to making the description prevail, it 
was found necessary to seek help from other relevant evidence and 
equity to interpret the intentions as accurately as possible. It 
may be argued (2) that the decision of the Chairman in the second 
dispute was not within the terms of reference, but it is clear 
that the decision to find a new boundary was based on the observation 
that "it must be held that the award makes a difference between the 
description and the delineation on the map.,.. So far it is possible 
to get a solution from the description.... the delineation on the 
map is only an illustration of that solution." In view of the com­
pleteness of the description and inaccuracy of delineation in this 
case a solution was found. Stuyt states, "The arbitrators shall
(1) %gge’s opinion on Dispute /+, Gazette op.cit. pp.102-103.
(2) See Sgn’s article op.cit.
determine the dividing line in accordance with existing treaties and
the modifications established hy the conditions, hut they i^iay, leaving
to one side strict law, adopt.an equitable line in accordance witlyche
necessities and convenience of the two countries. " (1 ) The principle
case
of equity applied in this/is not so wide as Stuyt establishes. This 
was a solution to make the terms of description more accurate and 
definite, thereby bringing them into correspondence with the actual 
facts. It may be concluded that the description has prevailed in
every case over the illustration, and if anything different from the 
illustration has resulted, it was dud to the fact that the maps used 
were defective, Bagge, whenever, the description was incomplete, 
sought to complete it with the help of the illustration, and to make 
it more definite and to correspond with the situation on the basis 
of other evidence.
Coming to the demarcation by the Punjab Boundary Commission, it 
may be noted that, controversies rage between India and Pakistan, and 
it will be of interest to note some of the main features of these 
controversies. There is no difference on the interpretation of the 
boundary line drawn in this area, but the problems have emerged out 
of the consequences of the demarcation of the boundary. With a view 
to appreciating the controversial issues, it is necessary to recall 
certain facts connected with these iâèues.
The pre-partition Punjab, meaning the land of five rivers, via,, 
Sutlej / Beas, Eavi, Chenab, Ihelum, from time immemorial had been 
dependent on the irrigation system based on these rivers. The 
irrigation system under British rule, v/as further developed, the 
rivers being dammed at suitable placed by means of 'headworks’ from 
w^hich one or more great canals as large as major rivers were taken 
out, Y/hich swept across the lands. The rivers were interlinked 
by a series of link-canals virhich enabled a canal to draw supplies 
from a river other than that from vfhich it took off; and apart from 
floods, all the water thus available was utilised for i&rigation 
purposes. Before partition the irrigation system v/as developed
;i) Stuyt, op.cit, p. 26 (No,80.^
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in view of the natural advantages offered by the province as being 
a unit, and besides this, other provinces also, e.g., North West 
Frontier province, including the states of Bahawalpur and Khairpur 
were inter-linked in this system.. Viith the partition of Punjab, the 
boundary was drawn in such a way that it cut the rivers and some 
canals as well. Three rivers of the Indus basin, viz., Sutlej,
Beas and Ravi, flow through Bast Punjab, (Indian territory) into 
West Punjab (Pakistan territory). The Beas merges with the Sutlej 
a short distance from the territories of Pakistan, and the upper 
Bari-Boab Canal (see map 1), which comes from the river Ravi, runs 
through both Indian and Pakistan territories. Further, the head- 
works on the combined Beas and Sutlej rivers thus have come within the 
jurisdiction of East Punjab, while Pakistan, including the Khairpur 
state which has acceded to Pakistan, are mainly dependent on these 
rivers. It may also be noted here that the other three rivers,
Indus, Jhelum and Ohanab, are within Pakistan’s jurisdiction, while 
their sources lie in Jammu and Kashmir states. The headworks, of'the 
upper Jlaelum Canal are also located at Mangla, seventeen miles 
within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. ■
The Pakistan Government claims that in accordance with inter­
national law, Pakistan is entitled to an equitable apportionment of 
the waters of these risers. In other words, Pakistan should receive 
not only supplies of water as it did before partition, but also have 
a right to share equitably in the increased use of the basin’s water 
made possible by engineering works that are under consideration by 
the Indian Government. They also claim that in demarcating the 
boundaries between East and West Punjab, the Punjab Boundary Comm­
ission proceeded on the assumption that the arrangement for the 
distribution of waters as it existed before partition, would 
continue even after partition. On the other hand, India claims 
that the exploitation of the rivers that lie within her jurisdiction, 
as for example, the Beas tliat merges with the Sutlej, is India’s 
sovereign right* It is understood that India is also contemplating 
the construction of huge dams on the upper reaches of the Sptlej 
river which flows on into Pakistan territory and Pakistan, on this
point claims tïiat by demarcating an international boundary this 
river has been rendered’hot a national river” or ’pluri-national’, 
and, therefore, India has no right to exploit the river in such a 
way as to divert the waters of this river thereby depriving Pakistan 
of its share of the supply of water from the Sutlej. There is also 
the complaint that the E&st Punjab Government is building up a 
headwork where the ^eas and Sutlej meet.
After partition in view of the differences on the division of 
the assets of the province, a Statutory Arbitral Tribunal was set 
up. The East Pakistan Government had claimed that the province 
was one and the development of irrigation for the province was made 
from the finances of the province and therefore the irrigation system 
on the West Punjab should be valued and the assets divided. It was 
decided by the Arbitral tribunal that the assets should be valued 
at twice their original cost, with a view to dividing them and this 
decision was accepted.
The Punjab Boundary Commission had.a difficult task in 
demarcating the boundary in the face of these controversies.
Radcliffe had explicitly referred to the Upper-BarKDoab Canal and 
the Muslim majority areas of the angle formed by the Beas and Sutlej 
rivers. He had also taken cognisance of the common interest of 
both the states in some of the canals and their headworks and had 
thus envisaged a sort of joint control of the two states in order 
to preserve the common service of water. He was also aware of 
the difficulties created by the demarcation of the boundary in a 
province connected with chains of rivers and canals. It is 
obvious that the above-cited paragraph of his award has suggested 
ih plain words the lines on which the successor states were bound to 
form agreements on the distribution of the waters of the rivers and 
canals. As regards the rivers, there are definite rules laid down 
in international law that:-
(a) If the river lies wholly, that is, from the source to the 
mouth, within the boundaries of one state, such states own 
it exclusively.
(b) When they run through the territories of more than one state
and, are, therefore, named ’not national’ rivers; such, 
rivers are owned by more than one state. (1)
It may also be noted that ’’the flow of ’not national’ and 
international rivers is not within the arbitrary power of one of 
the riparian States, for it is a rule of international law that 
no state is allowed fo alter the natural conditions of its own 
territory to the disadvantage of the natural conditions of a territory 
of a neightbouring state,” (2) In view of these principles it is 
not difficult to find a solution acceptable to both parties. The 
temporary agreements with regard to the sharing of water that have 
been accepted by both parties for some time can reasonably provide 
a ground for permanent agreements Radcliffe has even given to the 
extent of enyisaging joint control of headworks in which both were 
interested. He did not lay down details of the principles of law 
defining the rivers and their canals thus running in the territories 
of the two states in the first place, because it was out of the 
scope of his terms of reference; and secondly, because such matters 
were too complicated and wide to be brought within the scope of the 
Commission; thirdly there are rules of international law governing 
such matters. The Bagge Oommisslon on The Bengal and Sylhet con­
troversies regarding,the interpretation of the Radcliffe awards in 
respect of these boundaries could also be a sound ground for the 
matters to be settled by negotiation and arbitration.
The other important question which has come to the fore 
after the partition of India is to the Durand line. This boundary 
line is being disputed by Afghanistan. The Durand, line was delimited 
in an agreement between Afghanistan and undivided India (3)s dated 
12th November, 1893.
This boundary was laid down as making the limis between the 
claims of pre-partition India and Afghanistan to authority over the 
border tribes, and so forms the boundary of the area within which the
(1) Oppenhelm: Vol. I, p.361.
(2) Ibid. p,370.
(3) Aitchison’sî Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, 1933 Vol.XIII,
pp.236-237.
mIndian Government was directly responsible. The Afghan Government 
contends that the boundary thus demarcated was. not an international 
boundary, in other words, they are contemplating setting up a buffer 
state between what is now Pakistan and Afghanistan, viz,, PuMioonistan,
The fact is that the boundary of pre-partition India on this 
delimiting Afghanistan and pre-partition India was laid down in 
accordance with an international agreement between two sovreign 
states. The boundary thus laid down after an international agreement 
is not affected by cmnges within a state. The Government of the 
United Kingdom (1) also recognises the Durand Line as the boundary 
between Afghanistan and present-day Pakistan.
The frontiers on the North-west of India are, to borrow Lord 
Curzon’s (2) phrase ”three-fold". After the Durand line, next 
comes the inner administrative boundary which limits the territory 
of the autonomous tribes within the responsibility of pre-partition 
India lying between the international boundary and the settled dist­
ricts of the North-West Frontier province. Apart from this, there 
is the northern boundary of Afghanistan itself, which was demarcated 
by Britain and Russia.jointly, and formed the limits between the 
Areas respectively under the influence of these two powers. In 
this respect this strategic frontier or boundary "includes the pro­
tected buffer state of Afghanistan, hence that coundry is for some 
purposes within the Indian Empire," (3) This is vifhat Lord Gurzon 
meant by threefold frontier. The Pakistan government, as far as is 
known from the press, does not claim the extension of protection over 
Afghanistan, though Afghanistan by its geographical situation happens 
to be a buffer state for Russia, ^akistan and Iran. Now the policy 
of the Pakistan Government with the tribes is not the same as that
(1) better dated 9th May, 1951, from the Ooramonwealth Relations 
Office, London, addressed to the writer in reply to the 
query.
(2) Fawcett: Frontiers, pp.86 and 87. See also Bagge: Inter­
national Boundaries.
(3) Ibid. p.87.
of pre-partition India under the British rule. They have already 
removed their faces from this area.
It may also he recalled that the pre-partition boundaries were 
laid down on the other frontiers of India under most uncertain geo­
graphical knowledge and on inadequate maps. However, there;is hardly 
anything left undefined and it may safely be concluded that India 
and Pakistan are well demarcated, not only between themselves but 
also in relation to their neighbours (1) on all sides. Tibet 
also provides some interest, as India and Pakistan are concerned 
not only in view of the boundary uncertainty (2) but also the changes 
that are likely to take place there. Y/ith the exception of these 
minor points of interest, there does not exist any controversy 
challenging international peace.
(1) See Holdwitch; Indian Borderland;
B-aberton; Anglo-Russian Relations concerning Afghanistan,
(2) The boundaries between India and Kashmir on one side and Tibet
on the other are undefined.
Tlie Indian States and The Act.
It may be recalled here that the Indian States were fully 
sovereign in law and their legal status though "sui generis" 
was closer to that of protectorates than of vassal states*
It is true-that the text-book writers on international law have 
treated them as vassal states, but that was a mistake of fact 
rather than of law. It has also been noted that the term 
suzerainty in relation to Indian states has to be interpreted 
so as to mean the supremacy of a powerful state over a weaker 
state amounting to protection. In this sense the relations 
were contractual and the states had surrendered external re­
lations and defence to the paramount power, as it was known, 
through treaties and therefore the international personality was 
not extinguished but was placed under servitude* ' In other 
words the attributes of sovereignty in the matters concerning 
the Indian states exercised by the paramount power were the 
result of delegation rather thanjsubtraction as is the case in 
a federation* There was 300 super-state on the parallel of a 
federation created as a legal person in consequence of such 
subtraction of the attributes of sovereignty.
The Indian states were foreign territories both for the 
British governments in Great Britain and India, There was no 
legal remedy avaniable to the states for actions taken against 
them. Such acts were Acts of State. The Indian states had 
not lost their international personalities, but at the same time, 
they did not enjoy them as they had surrendered these rights to 
the paramount power. If considered purely from the political 
point of view they lacked in independence.
It has also been noted that there existed a good deal of 
controversy over the theory of personal relationship be tween 
the Princes and the Grown* The Indian view, especially that of 
the nationalists, was that the paramountoy of the British Grown 
was not co-extensive with the rights of the Grown flowing from
treaties. It has been established that the connection of the 
Grown with the government of India after the disappearance of the 
Moghul Emperor was only for the purposes of the government of 
this territory thus passing under trust. it was distinct from 
the Grown of Great Britain^ hence the divisibility of the Grown,
The relation of the crown therefore, with the Indian states 
whatever be their title, was for^purposes of Indian government.
The relation-ship was personal because the parties to the treaties 
were on the one hand the Indian Princes and on the other hand the 
Emperor of India. This personal relationship did not amount to 
the detachment of the affairs from Indian territories*
With this back-ground the clauses of the Indian Independence 
Act connected with the Indian states may be investigated.
Clause 7.1(b) runs, "The suzerainty of His Majesty over Indian 
states lapses and with it all treaties and agreements in force at 
the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the 
rulers of Indian states, all functions exercisable by His Majesty 
at that date with respect to Indian states, all obligations of 
His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian states on the 
rulers thereof and all powers, rights, authority jurisdiction 
exercisable by His Majesty at that date,in or in relation to Indian 
States by treaty grant, or usage, sufferance or otherwise" (1).
oÇ-
Explaining this clause, the Prime Minister observed in the/_Oonimons 
at the second reading that, "His Majesty’s Government could not 
and will not in any circumstances transfer paramountcy to an 
Indian Government, With the transfer of power to two Indian 
Dominions, it is necessary to terminate the paramountcy and 
suzerainty of the Grown over the Indian States, and, with them 
the political engagements concluded under paramountcy and the 
mutual rights and obligations of the Grown and states which 
derive thereof". He,further referring to the termination of 
such political engagements, stated that "« they depended for
(1) Indian Independence Act. 10 and 11 George VI G.30.
their implemen tat ion on our part, and on the continuance of the 
responsibility of Great Britain for the government of India, and 
with the transfer of power to two Dominion governments, it would 
be impossible for the British government to carry out these 
obligations"(1).
The question arises, in the first place, whether the 
termination of treaties was necessary only because the govern­
ment of India was being handed over tothave new government as 
the prime Minister observed or was it necessary because the 
British Government was surrendering responsibility for the 
government of India, In other words termination of treaties 
would have been equally necessary if India without division 
had become a Dominion. According to the views expressed by
the Butler Committee and expounded by the theory of personal
contract, it was claimed that any change in the government, 
which would be responsible to the legislature instead of the 
CroTOi, would make it necessary either to provide arrangements 
for the continuity of such personal relationship or terminate
them all together. In the case of Indian independence there
the
were two Dominions set up in consequence of/partition of India 
and according to this theory the very fact that the governments
were thus set up without predudice to the number, made it
obligatory on the part of British Government to terminate them 
as in accordance with the Indian Independence Act, no provision 
was made for their continuity.
In the second place it may be asked to what extent this 
dénonciation may be said to be applicable; and whether this 
also terminates the treaties in regard to the leased territories, 
exercise of jurisdiction and other similar matters. And if 
all these matters and the treaties governing them were thus 
denounced, did they also affect the situation in fact? Was 
it with the denunciation of the treaty obligatory on the part
(1) Hansard: July 10th, 1949, Ool. 2463
mof the British Government to create a situation in fact consistent 
with the legal denunciation of the treaties? To cite one out of 
many exapples, was it necessary for the British Government to hand 
over the territories of some of the Indian States that were ad­
ministered under the treaties of lease, which were thus terminated?
Then comes the question, whether these treaties governing the 
relationship which had a long history ©ould unilaterally be ter­
minated, or were the states also willing to bring them to an end.
The Congress and the nationalist writers (l) claim that para­
mountcy has passed on to the successor governments and, therefore, 
no termination whatsoever effects the relationship between the Indian 
Government and the Indian States,
In order to prove this, they rely on the arguments put forward 
by the British Government for the justification of their imperial 
policy and the Congress Leaders and nationalist writers dondemned 
them while B&ltlsh paramountcy existed. Now to rely on the arguments 
which they once condemned themselves sounds like a new imperialism.
The attempt to distinguish between foreign imperialism which relied 
on the strength of the paramountcy of the Crown, and the Indian 
Government relying on ' its own paramountcy does not make
any substantial, change as far as the peoples of the states are 
concerned. In view of these arguments put forward for the con­
tinuity of paramountcy, it is necessary to examine the issue both 
under the clauses of the Act as well as other constitutional changes 
that had taken place in india up to the time of independence. Before 
considering these factors it is first necessary to settle the legal 
issue Involved*
II
Paramountcy, as has already been established even in its 
political aspect was based on two factors; firstly, the Indian
(1) Naik: Paramountcy, op. cit.
states came into contact .with the East India Company through 
treaties and as a result of the military strength, the Company 
had: gained, they gradually accepted the military paramountcy; then, 
the Company became ’Vakll-ul-Mutlmq’ or the paramount ministers of 
the empire, and on the strength of this relationship, they claimed 
paramountcy 'de jure’ and when the government passed to the Crown, 
the same claim was continued. But on the side of the Indian Princes, 
with the disappearance of the Moghul Emperor, there was no recognition 
of the Company or. the British Crown as replacing the Moghul Emperor. 
They always believed and accepted the view that their relations 
were governed by the treaties they had entered into with the East 
India Company, and the acceptance of their obligation by the 
British Crown through Queen Victoria’s proclamation. They un­
doubtedly rejected all the prerogative rights of the Moghul Emperor 
passing on to the British Grown. They confined the supremacy 
of the Grown to the explicit terms of the treaties. There was 
nothing more and nothing less than that. Even the terms ’usage’ 
and ’suffrance’ were used to convey contracts accepted by the 
parties by custom and practice or even acquiescence, as distinct 
from the instruments of treaties. If there was any difference 
between treaties, and sufferance and usage, it was only in the 
form of expression and acceptance of contracts. Both were fund­
amentally contracts.
The Butler Committee expounded the theory of personal contract 
as a means of providing a compromise between the claim of the Cro?m 
succeeding to the prerogatives of the Grown and the contention of 
the Princes that the Grown succeeded only to the rights of the Bast 
India Company and that the position of ’Vakil-ul-Mutlaq’ or para­
mount ministership came to an end with the disappearance of the 
Moghul Emperor, llie compromise was successful only in one sense, 
that it was defined in a term lacking in legal precision. The 
ambigudus term ’personal contract’ was satisfying to tlie Princes, 
because it was a compromise in another respect as well. The 
Princes claimed that their relations were with the Grown, independent 
of the Indian Government, therefore a Government responsible to an 
Indian leglislature could not succeed to those. The Indian national 
leaders and writers opposed this view and contended that they were
only in relation to India and, therefore, the successor government
should succeed to them as well.
So much for the historical background and the controversies ‘
raging around it, but the Indian Independence Act has got to be
interpreted in the light of the legal position as it was defined
in the Act of 1935. According to this Act, the head of the
Indian Government acted in a double capacity, lie 'was the governor-
general as well as the Viceroy, The term Viceroy, first used by
Queen Victoria, was for the first time legalised through the
Government of Act of 1935, With this legalisation the
relationship also was implicitly defined in legal terms. No
the
interpretation of the clause governing/terminatlon of treaties in
the Indian Independence Act would be complete without reference
to the Act of 1935. Whatever be the fact in history the legal
position was definite and therefore the theory of personal contract
has got to be taken into consideration for the purposes of the
construction of this Act, It is difficult, of course to confine
this theory to the conventional relationship established through
treaties, sufferange and usage, rather than to extend it to the
prerogative of the Moghul Empire, With this qualification, it
can safely be deduced that the relationship was with the Orov/n, for
the purposes of India only and they were entirely of a political
character. There was nothing of prerogative rights involved in
it. As a result of state-succession, the treaties must necessarily
have been terminated even if they were not denounced through the
Indian Independence Act, It is an established rule that no treaties
of a political character are inherited as far as the successor
governments are concerned. The case of the administrative matters
the
has been noticed in the Indian Independence Act in/provision/) for the 
arrangements of the transitory period. It is said that "provided 
that, notwithstanding anything in paragraph B or 0 of this section, 
effect shall, as nearly as may be, continue to be given to the pro­
vision of any such agreemait as is therein referred to v/hich relate 
to customs, transit and communications, posts and telegraphs, or 
other/m'y%r8, until the provisions in question are denounced by the
ruler of the Indian state or person, having authority in the tribal 
areas on the one hand, or by the Dominion or the Province or csther 
part thereof concerned on the other hand or one superseded by sub- 
se quent agreement s," ( 1 )
the partition of India thereby setting up two Dominions not 
only involved vital changes of circumstances in which the contin­
uity of treaties which were mostly ’inter alia’ guarantee treaties^i 
became impossible to carry out the obligations of these treaties 
but also with partition the personality of India for the purposes 
of which these treaties were concluded with the Indian states(was) 
extinguished (2). treaties of alliance or of arbitration
or of neutrality or of any other political nature fall to the 
ground with the extinction of the state which concluded them." (3) 
Even if the views expressed by the national writers claiming the 
continuity of paramountcy to the Dominion. Government is accepted 
the question arises whether, under the changed circumstances 
caused by the setting up of a national government in *^ ndia, vrauld 
it have been possible to fulfil the obligations which guaranteed 
not only protection of dynastic rple but also the privileges 
attributed thereto. The national government, in view of the 
life-long policy of the Congress whom it represented, would not 
have been able to acceptthe treaties ’in toto’. Succession to 
paramountcy partially excluding all. such obligations, would not only 
have been illogical but would have also amounted to dissolving of 
existing treaties followed by the entry into new ones. The 
doctrine of ’rebus sic stantibus’ is revoked in special circumstances 
and. the principle that "when a state is of opinion that the obli­
gations of a treaty have through a vital change of circumstances 
become unbearable, it #iould approach the other party or parties 
and request them to abrogate the treaties", both'.can be proved to 
have been strictly observed. Although change in the form of a
(1) 10 & 11 George 6, 0,30 Section 7* 1*
(2) See chaplet; oh Succession of International personality,
(3) Oppenheim: Vol,1, p.48; see also paras,, 539, 550, 575.
does not in itself justify a resort to the clause ’rebus sic 
stantibus^in the Case of Indian Independence, the changes have 
amounted to a conflict between the ideology of the successor 
governments and the nature of the guarantee treaties and obligations 
involved therein. The only logical conclusion that can be reached 
is that the changes were so vital as to revoke the doctrine ’rebus 
sic stantibuA’. It may further be established that the termination 
of the treaties as explained by the Prime Minister was brought 
about only because there was a change of government or because there 
was a change in the form of state (1) as was claimed by the theory 
of personal contract. Strictly speaking, though there was change 
of state as it broke up into two, therefwas no change in the form 
of state, because the Grown continued according to the Act. It is 
doubtful if this point was present in the mind of the Minister
when he referred to the setting up of two Dominions because the 
British Government seemed to have favoured the theory that the inter­
national personality of prepartition India continued in the Indian 
Dominion. Under this theory the termination of treaties does not 
seem to be justified on the ground of the extinction of personality* 
Now, the question arises whether the principle of approaching 
the parties with a request to abrogate the treaties had been ob­
served, The ansv/er to this question is undoubtedly in the affirm­
ative. The Cabinet Mission presented a membrandum to the Chancellor
of the Chamber of Princes, and made a recommendation to the following 
effect : "it is quite clear that with the attainment of independence 
by British India whether inside or outside ’i^he British Coramonv/ealth 
the relationship which has hitherto existed between the rulers of 
the states and the British Crown will no longer be possible, Para­
mountcy can neither be retained by the British Grown nor be trans­
ferred to the new government, This fact has been fully recognised
(1) Holdsworth: op, cit.
by those whom we interviewed from the states."(1) Or, "When 
a new fully self-governing or independent Government of Governments 
come into being in British India, His Majesty’s Government's 
influence with these governments will not be such as to enable 
them to carry out the obligations of paramountcy. Moreover 
they cannot contemplate that British troops would be retained in 
India for this purpose. Thus, as a logical consequence, and in 
view of the desires expressed to the# on behalf of the Indian 
states, His Majesty’s Governne nt will cease to exercise the 
powers of paramountcy."(2) t^ is quite clear from these 
quotations that the states agreed to the termination of the 
treaties and even the standing coiiimittee of the Chamber of 
Princes stated that "They are of the view that the plan 
provides the necessary machinery for the attainment by India 
of Independence as well as a fair basis for further negotiations. 
They welcome the Declaration of the Cabinet Mission in regard 
to Paramountcy, but certain adjustments for the interim period 
will be necessary." (3)
It may be argued that the Indian states had no international 
personalities and, therefore, international law is not 
applicable to.them. The only straigthforward reply that can 
be advanced is that the non-applicability of inter­
national law to the Indian states does not exclude the use 
of the principles of international law. This was admitted 
by Westlake also, (4) In view of these facts it can be 
stated that the treaties were neither terminated unilaterally 
as claimed by the Nizam nor were they dissolved with any disregard 
for the principles of international law, (5)
(1) Statement by the Cabinet Mission; VÛiite Paper on Indiai state
Govt, of India; OppusnheAm, Appendix III, p.154.
(2) Memorandum on States, Cmd. 6835, para, 5, p.12.
(3) Cmd. 6862, Enclosure 1, p.6.
(4) Papers : p{p. 620-632.
(5) Government of India’s White Paper on Hyderabad, Nizam’s
letter dp.-cito ' ' ^
III.
The geographical situation of the Indian States was such that 
their participation in the all-Indian schemes of communications and 
other economic matters had made it obligatory on their part not only 
to extend their co-operation in political matters and defence, but 
also to co-operate in other fields, thereby developing an all-India 
administration.,, In all these matters, their autonomy and legal 
sovereignty was respected but at the same time development was made 
in a spirit of co-operation. For instance, the jurisdiction over 
the railway lines passing through the territories of Indian States 
was delegated to the Indian Government In the Interests of the 
uniformity of administration. Similar was the case with all such 
matters. The termination of treaties Included "all powers, rights, 
authority or jurisdiction which amounted to include all such matters 
as well", but it would have also amounted to disruption of the whole 
administration. The Indian Independence Act, in view of this fact, 
provided for the continuity of any such agreements which related to 
"customs, transit, communications, posts, and telegraphs or other 
like matters". This was with a view to maintaining the ‘status quo* 
for the immediate purpose of administrative matters to avoid dis­
ruption but at the same time contemplated the possibility of agreements 
for transitional periods, after the coming into being of the government 
of India. The need for such arrangements was explained by the 
Cabinet mission on several occasions, and all the parties concerned 
with the administrative matters were impressed by the need for 
temporary arrangements, the agreements of which were styled 
"standstill agreements". The purpose of standstill agreements 
was to provide for the legal basis for the * status quo*-.
From the negotiations preceding the Indian Independence Act 
and the exchange of correspondence that took place between the 
Cabinet Mission and the representatives of the States, it is clear that 
the standstill agreement was contemplated with a view to giving time 
to the parties concerned to arrive at some basis of agreemfent to 
replace the treaties with the Grown. The idea of establishi.ng a
relationship on some sound basis has been predominant in the 
minds of both the Indian rulers and the Indian leaders. The 
necessity for changing the basis of relationship was justified 
because of the changed circumstances in which the will of the 
people provided the basis for the government rather than the com­
mands of the rulers. It has been observed that the changes of 
a constitutional .character in India directly influenced'the 
situation.in the Indian states, thereby inspiring the people 
to responsible government. Indian Independence was the direct 
result of the recognition of the demand for self-government and, 
as such, a change in the Indian states themselves was a natural 
consequence. The demand for responsible government in the Indian 
states and the claims for self-governanciè were basically ore and 
the same. In both cases the people formed the centre of all 
changes. Nothing could possibly be done without taking the 
people into consideration. From 1917, when, for the first 
time. Dominion Status was declared for India and political and 
constitutional changes on a federal basis were being contemplabed, 
the Indian states also were included in the schemes. The ' 
federal constitution of 1935 was the first effort to provide the 
constitutional relationship between the Indian states and the 
government of India on a federal basis. The accession was to 
be effected by an Instrument of Accession to be executed bythe 
ruler of the state and accepted by the Grown. in view of the 
treaties with the paramount powera and especially from the stand­
point of the theory of personal contract there could have been no 
other way. in recognition of the sovereignty of the states the 
accession was only confined to foreign affairs, defence and 
communications, and each state was given the choice of executing 
varied instruments. The people of the states were represented 
on the legislature of the federal government, but the mode of 
their selection or election was a matter outside the jurisdiction 
of the federal government. The same basic principle was also 
recognised in the Uripps Plan. This was again a compromise and, 
therefore, was not favoured by the indian national leaders.
Til© only solution, therefore, was to dissolve the relationship 
with the Grown without affecting the situation in fact, it was ! 
expected that negotiations between the successor governments and the 
Indian states would talce place and some sound basis of relationship 
would be found without involving the British Government or the 
Grown. This amounted only to a nullification of law which had 
become obsolete in itself under the changed circumstances,
India was given independence and Dominion Status in fact 
a few months earlier than 15th August, 1947. The denunciation 
of treaties was made through the Indian Independence Act and 
during this period the Viceroy continued to act as the Viceroy 
in relation to Indian States, but his status as a Governor-General, 
at least in fact,waa a constitutional one. During this period 
the * status quo' was maintained and in respect of all matters 
concerning the Indian Government on the one hand and the Indian 
States on the other, the Governor-General acted on the advice 
of the Indian Government^ What was, therefore, left for him 
as viceroy, was only the residuum of paramountcy after excluding 
all administrative matters, and matters concerned vmth leased, 
territories and jurisdictional function. To put it in other 
words, the residuum of paramountcy consisted of the legality 
of matters that had, in fact, passed into the control of the 
Indian Government. The denunciation of treaties in the indian 
independence Act amounted to annulling the legality that had 
already become obsolete., How far the British Government and 
Parliament were justified in creating a situation of this nature 
may be better answered by referring to the fact that the nature of 
the law of the constitution of the British Empire has been such.
The legal position has nowhere changed in the first instance,
First law becomes obsolete by the force of political understanding 
and practice which is expressed by the term convention and then 
follows the process of legalisation of the new situation thereby 
annulling the previous one. in the ease of India, the same 
process was Repeated, of course, within a short span of time.
and, therefore, the consequences of shanges in fact could-not he
avoided . It would he entirely wrong, however,sympathetic one
he towards the states, to say that the British Government or the
connoted
Grown as the personal relationship/acted in had faith. They
could neither act in favour of legality which had lost its force
nor in favour of political considerations which still lacked legality.
From the foregoing consideration, it is evident that the British 
Parliament on behalf of the Grown denounced the treaties thereby 
terminating the legal basis of the relationship that had subsisted 
but could not, and did not, effect any cîaanges in the ’de facto’ 
situation. From this, it may he concluded that the Indian states 
were bound to come to an agreement with the successor government 
without prejudice to the nature of the relationship. Failing 
this they would have created a vacuum, not only in law, but also in 
fact. The British Parliament was justified in annulling the 
treaties without any consideration of the situation in fact, bec’ause 
the majority of the i^rinces agreed to send their representatives 
to the constituent ,assembly which clearly indicated their intention 
to participate in the constitution making. This involved time, and 
in view of this necessity the- Parliament envisaged, and provided 
for, the interim arrangements. ^
IV.
Two questions arise mn this connection, in view of
the partition, how did the Indian states stand in reHa tlon to the 
two new Dominions? Vifhat were the factors that influended this 
relationship? Were the states free to choose for accession to 
either of the two Dominions, or was there something binding on 
them? In the second plaé'e, how far were the rulers free to act on 
their own discretion in coming into relationship with either of the 
two Dominions? Was their legal capacity in any way subject to 
any other consideration?
The views expressed during the debates by the Prime Minister, 
the Secretary of State and other members of Parliament with regard 
to the accession of Indian states to the Dominion were to the effect
that the states were free to join either of the two Dominions or 
remain independent. Any clause in the Act with the effect of 
advising the states would, have certainly been 'ultra vires' the
p r■‘■arliaraent. But such advice was in fact extressed during the 
debates on the Bill. Lord Listowel in the House of Lords, 
observed that, from the date when, the new dominions were set up,
"the appointments and the functions of the Crown representative 
and his officers will terminate and the states will be the matters 
of their own fate. They will then be entirely free to choose whe­
ther to associate with one or other Dominion Government or to stand 
alone and His Majesty's Government will not use the slightest 
pressure to influence their momentous and voluntary decision." (1)
The Prime Minister observed, "after the transfer of power, more 
detailed and binding arrangements will need to be concluded 
between the Dominions and the state governments, and it may well 
be that these arrangments will, in their turn be superseded by a 
more organic co-operation between the states and Dominions, But 
these latter arrangements will, of course, take time to work out, 
and the transition of the states from the lapse of paramountcy 
into a free association with the new Dominions, v/ill require 
proper discussion and deliberation". The Attorney-General 
remarked, "As a matter of international practice, so far as one 
can see, and as a matter of practinl international recognition, the 
position will probably remain very much as it is until the states 
have decided whether or not to accede to a Dominion, and if they 
do not decide to accede to a Dominion, until other states have decided 
whether or not to recognise them as enjoying the status of 
independent states. But this at least can be said with certainty 
that we do not propose to recognise the states as separate 
international entities on 15th August, when the Bill comes into 
force. We hope, as I have said, that the states will associate 
themselves with one or other of the new Dominions in a federal or 
treaty relationship on fair terms, fairly and amicably negotiated,"(2)
(1) ^ansardg op.cit.Ool.2464.D {
(2) Hansard, op,cit.Col, 105.
From these remarks, it was concluded (and action was taken 
on the basis of this conclusion) that the ^ndiai states were 
free to accede to either of the two Dominions and accession could 
be on a federal basis or on the basis of a treaty. The ruler of 
the Junagadh state taking advantage of these observations acceded to 
Pakistan as the ruler himself was a Muslim, but the majority of 
his people was Hindu, and the state itâelf was surrounded by,,.the 
territory of of Indian •^ominion. The Maharaja of Kaslimir, acceded 
to India in viev/- of the attack of the tribesmen instead of declaring 
independence as he was intending. The Maharaja himself was a 
Hindu, whereas the over-whelming majority, i.e. 80/ of his people 
were Muslims, The Nizam of Hyderabad himself a Muslim declared 
independence on the strength.of the argument that the division of 
India being on a coiTimunal basis, he could join neither. The 
popu.lationjof Hyderabad consisted of a Hindu majority with 14/ of 
Muslims. In the case of ttess three states, there v/as conflict and 
disagreement between the Dominions on the one hand, and the rulers 
on the other.
As far as the legal position is concerned, it is quitd 
clear that, after the lapse of paramountcy, the states were freed 
from all legal restrictions;, that had been imposed on them, but with 
regard to administrative and economic matters, they had undertaken 
the obligations of maintaiing the 'status quo' on the one hand, 
with the successor governments on the other. Both, in this se:nse# 
had undataken to come to some understanding to fill tn the vacuum 
thus, created in law. ' But the legal capacity of the rulers of the 
stakes was limited by tv/o factors; first in the changes of a 
démocratie'nature in which the peoples' will had become predominant 
the rulers as well were obliged to abide by the paramount will, of 
the common consent of the people which had taken the place of the 
source of law. The source of law was changing in the states.
The rulers were bound to act xp on the .common consent of. the people 
which had become conscious and active. Any disregard would have
created a situation in which not only the source of law but its 
form also would have to be finally determined. Thus the rulers 
who in the changed circumstances were only able to give the form 
to law; if they disregarded its source and force, would have placed 
themselves in a dilemma. In other words, they had become 'de 
facto' constitutional monarchs.
In the second place the interests of the states in view of 
geographical and economic considerations were affiliated with one 
or other Dominion. The states were in fact maintaining administ­
rative matters on the basis of common consent# Thus the states 
in view of their geographical situation and economic interests, 
were divided into two categories; one, affiliated to the Indian 
Dominion and the other to Pakistan.
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the 
division of %dia had taken place on a communal basis. The 
principle of self-determination which developed out of the pro­
blems of minorities into a two-nation theory established the fact 
that the division was to be made on the basis of territorial 
majorities of Muslims and non-Muslims, The states were also 
divided into two categories, those in which Muslims were in the 
majority and the others with a Hindu majority# The rulers, 
of course, were not always Muslims for Muslim majority states, 
and Hindus for Hindu majority states, as it was the case in 
Kashmir, Bikaner and Hyderabad# In view of this fact, the legal 
capacity of the rulers was further limited by the natural tend­
encies of the majority of the population of the states to j.oin 
India or Pakistan, The mimorities of the states favoured the 
view of joining the Dominion which had a majority of their co­
religionists. Thus the people were divided and thereby their 
will as well*
Under these circumstances, every party tried to justify its 
action claiming that the people of the states were in favour of 
their action. The Dominion of India claimed the accession of all 
the states within her territorial jurisdiction, on the ground that
the people or al least their majority was in favour of joining 
the Indian Dominion. The ruler of Hyderabad state claimed independ­
ence on the ground that the people were in favour of it, and any 
other action would have divided them. Pakistan claimed Kashmir 
because the majority of the state was Muslim and therefore wanted to 
join Pakistan. Further the economy was dependent on Pakistan 
and had geographical affinity. Thus at least in three cases there 
was controversy over two major issues. The first question was 
whether the choice of the ruler or the will of the people was to 
prevail on the question of accession or independence, as the other 
states had joined in such a way that there was no conflict at all.
As has bieen stated, the will of the people had become paramount 
and in the case of a conflict, it was to prevail. Both the 
Dominions and the states themselves agreed on the question that the 
final decision must rest with the people, which was to be ascert­
ained through a plebiscite on the basis of adult franchise. The 
correspondence (1) that has taken place between the two Domiunions 
and Hyderabad and the Indian government establish it beyond dispute 
that they have committed themselves to a plebiscite. It may thus be 
concluded that all the parties had solemnly undertaken to abide by 
the result of a plebiscite. The government of India made their 
acceptance of the Instrument of Accession of the ruler of Kashmir 
conditional, that is, it would be finally decided by the plebiscite 
of the people. Unfortunately this democratic principle of plebiscite 
undertaken by them both by the individual proclamations and corr­
espondence with one another, could not be enforced and controversy 
still raged.
V.
Taking first the question of kashmir it is necessary to note 
some legal issues involved. Avoiding the history of the question 
as it was referred to the Security Council by the Indian Government 
it may be stated that India complained that Pakistan had helped the 
tribesmen in attacking a territory which had legally become a part of 
India, Pakistan replied that the question involved a long history
(i) White Paper on Hyderabad, op. cit,
of misrule and oppression. The people had in faot revolted against 
the Maharaja's government, and the Indian Government._aooepted the 
Instrument of Aocession with a view to helping the Maharaja to
maintain his .i?ule and thereby his oppression of the people, who were 
Muslims.
The Security council, having heard the case from both sides 
adopted a resolution. (1) This resolution 88t up a commission with 
d ua 1 f une tions :
(a) to investigate facts pursuant to article 54 of
the Charter;
(b) to exercise without interrupting the work of the
Security Council any mediatory influence, and also 
to carry out the directions of the Security Council;
Then^followed the resolution (2) of April 21st, 1948 which 
provided for;
(a) the cessation of all fighting;
(b) a decision on the question of accession by plebiscite;
(c) The re-affirm at Ion <f the resolution of 17th January;
(d) a Commission to go at once to India and the membership
the reef to be increased.
As regards the plebiscite which is the most important part 
of the resolution, it was provided that the government of India 
should undertake to ensure that the state government would invite 
major politi&al parties to designate responsible representatives to 
share equitably and fully in the conduct of administration at the 
ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and 
carried out. The plebiscite administrator who was to act in the 
capacity of a state officer was to be empowered to nominate his 
own subordinates and draft regulations governing the plebiscite.
The conditions of an impartial plebiscite, that is without 
coercion, threatening, undue pressure or undesirable influences
(1) dated 17th January, 1948. Bee United Nations aulletin
1st February, 1948, p.87,
(2) See United Nations Bulletin,May 1st, 1948.
were to 'be ensured and magistrates were to 'be appointed to hear 
cases of divergence from these rules. Political prisoners were 
to be Released; people who had left the state under disturbed 
conditions were to be allowed to come back without any fear; there wa 
to be po victimisation; and the minorities were to be protected in 
all areas.
The Indian Government accepted the resolution with reservations. 
It asked for an assurance from the Commission that the sovereignty 
of the state would be respected. Pakistan undertook to use its 
good offices to persuade Azad Kashmir (the ifrea Kashmir Government) 
to cease fire and abide by the resolution. The commission arrived 
in India and on 13th August, 1948, after a good deal of negotiation 
it adopted a resolution proposing that each government issue separate 
and simultaneous cease fire orders. They also set forth certain 
principles as à basis for discovering the truth. Hostilities 
ceased on 1st January, 1949.
In March, the Secretary-General nominated Admiral Chester W. 
Nimitz of the United States Navy, and he was approved by the state 
government.
No truce agreement was possible in view of the differences 
existing on both sides, especially on political aspects of the 
truce, and only a cease-fire line was drawn. The Commission
worked for a good deal of time, and finally submitted its report11), 
suggesting the appointment of a mediator in its place. Dr.Chyle, 
Czechoslovakian member, gave a minority report in which he 
attacked the Commission for working under the influence of the 
United States and the United Kingdom,
Sir Owen Dixon was appointed a mediator and he also was unable 
to bring the parties together on a common agreement and submitted 
a re port (2) in which he gave all the details of his plans for 
demilitarisation and the reactions■of the Prime Minister of India 
and Pakistan thereto# At the end of almost every item it was 
stated that the Prime Minister of India rejected his plans, bdth
(1) 5th December, 1949, third interim Report (U.N.D; 8/1430.)
(2) Ü.N.B. October 1st, 1950.
for the pleblaoite of the whole state of Jammu and Kashmir or 
the partial plebiscite in the valley of Kashmir, but did not put 
forward any alternative plans. He also expressed his oonvlGtlon 
"that India’s agreement would never be obtained, to demilitarisation 
in any such forms or to provisions governing the p^tetlfkof the 
plebiscite of any such character, as would, in my opinion, permit 
of the plebiscite being conducted under conditions sufficiently 
guarded against intimidation and other foims of influence and abuse 
by which the freedom and faif'ness of the plebiscite might be 
imperilled”(l). He finally came to the conclusion that the 
partition of the state was inevitable. He stated: "At all events
I have formed the opinion that if there Is any chance of settling 
the dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan, it novif lies in 
partition and in some means of allocating the valley 
rather than in any overfall plebiscite,{2)
In view of this report and also of the fact that the all- 
Jammu and Kashmir national Conference that has been in favour of 
accession to India, recommended the convening of a constituent 
assemble^/ for only a part of the whole territory of the state, 
thé Security Cop.ncil adopted a resolution proposed by British- 
U.S. representatives, originally submitted on 1st February, but 
renewed and adopted on March, 21st, 1951, In this resolution,. 
it was recalled that, "the governments of India and Pakistan have 
accepted the provisions of the United Nations Commission for India 
and P aids tan’s resolutions of 13 th August, 1940 and 5th J miuary,
1941 j and have re-raffirmed their desire that the future of the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir shall be decided through democratic method of 
free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the 
United Nations."(3)
In this resolution it was also stated that the m i n  points
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ib&d.
(3) UiN.B. March and April, 1951 for details of discussions,
of difference^ we re : -
a. The procedure for, and the extent of, de-mllitarlsatlon
of the state; preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite;
b. The degree of control of the function of government to
ensure a free and faii? plebiscite;
It was also proposed to appoint a representative to work 
for de-militarisation and to report to the Security 
Council within three months from the date of his 
arrival on the sub-continent of India. In case of 
his failing to bring the parties to a common under­
standing for effecting de-militarisation, he should report 
to the Security Council in regard to the points of 
difference on the interprél»tion and execution of the 
agreed resolutions of 13th August, 1948 and 5th Januaiy, 
1949, The parties have been asked to: accept arbitration 
on all points of difference, and the arbitration had tp 
be carried out by an arbitrator or pan.el of arbitrators 
to be appointed by the President of the International 
Court of Justice,
This resolution has taken an effective step towards solving 
the problem of Kashmir which so far has been delayed by. the different 
political forced. The question was referred to the Security 
Council by India, which is a political body. The fact that 
disputes between states have been very often dealt with as 
political problems has failed to obtain judicial solution. in 
international law, the distinction between legal and political 
disputes and the necessity for judicious solution has been 
realised by eminent writers.(l) The doctrine to remove the 
limitations of the applicability of international law in respect 
of the sovereignty of a state is also gaining currency and 
favour. It is not desired here to go into the details of tills 
doctrine, especially because the fact that both the parties 
concerned with the dispute have committed themselves not only 
through their individual proclamations in favour of a plebiscite.
(1) See The Function of Law in the International üommunity, by 
h, Lauterpacht (1933)*
but have also accepted the resolutions of the United Nations 
Commission of the 15th.August, 1948, and of 5th.January, 1949, 
which have definitely laid down the principle of a free and 
impartial plebiscite. The term plebiscite itself is such that 
it needs to be qualified by no adjectives. The two govern­
ments have thus agreed to abide by the decision of the people. 
The issue therefore is no more political and has rather become 
a legal one, not because the accession to the Indian Dominion 
by the Maharaja who had the formal legal power of effecting it, 
was made so v/ithout any regard to the people’s will which had, 
as explained, become a source and root of his formal authority; 
but both for the reason that two sovereigns in international 
law have agreed to the resolutions of the Commission of the 
Security Council giving all details of the procedure and 
factors involved in it. There are differences in regard to 
the interpretation of these resolutions but having committed 
themselves to these resolutions, they can no more reject them 
on any ground of difference in regard to interpretation. There 
is the international Court of Justice for such purposes. Any 
action in respect of holding a partial plebiscite under the 
supervision of the interested party itself on either side would 
amount to a breach of good faith and international law as well. 
Even from the point of viev/ of municipal law such accession 
will be illegal because the accessioiP"^ of the state has been 
accepted on the condition of ascertaining the will of the 
people. Strictly speaking, the territory of Kashmir under 
such conditional accession remains a trust in the hands of the 
Indian government which is bound to fulfil the conditions, and 
so long as they remain unfulfilled, the legality of the acces­
sion even in municipal law will be subject to question. From
(1\
See Instrument of Accession: (White Paper on States, op.cit.)
the point of view of international law the accession will not 
and cannot be recognised by sovereign Independent status so 
long as the undertaking and the commitments remained unfulfilled. 
The Security Council itself is bound to enforce the undertak­
ings of the resolutions in accordance with the interpretation 
given by the International Court of Justice without any consid­
eration for the fact that either or both the parties reject it 
as long as there is danger to international peace.
VI.
The Nizam declared Independence through his ’PiV?mah*, 
stating that he could not accede to either of the Dominions as 
the division was on a communal basis. The Nizam in his letter 
to the Governor-General stated, "This was because I felt that 
my Muslim and non-Muslim subjects will feel disappointed if I 
join one or the other of the two Dominions, the division being 
on a communal line".
He v/as, however, prepared to enter into treaty re­
lations with India, short of accession (to use his own words).
He states, "I have naturally and necessarily taken into account 
the fact that the Dominion of India is my neighbour and I am 
fully prepared to enter into a treaty with them whereby a suit­
able arrangement is made in respect of land communications, so 
that all India standards are recognised, and through communi­
cations and mutual interchange facilities are .assured and 
Hyderabad contributes an agreed number of troops to the defence 
of the Dominion. Moreover I should be willing to agree in this 
treaty to conduct the external affairs of my state, in general 
conformity with the foreign policy of the Dominion of Indla'^^\
1 Letter dated 30th.Oct. 1940. White Paper on Hyderabad
Supplement, p.10.
2 Ibid, p.2.
The Government of India on the other hand pressed for acces­
sion . To quote the Governon-General’s words, "The anxiety 
of the Dominion is to achieve stability which they feel cannot 
be adequately secured unless all the states which are situated 
within their border are prepared to come into organic union 
with them. I, (Lord Mountbatten) myself as I have told your 
negotiating committee and your adviser (Sir Walter Monckton) 
believe that accession to the Union would be to the mutual 
advantage of the Dominion and your state".^ Negotiations con­
tinued but no desirable agreement could be reached, and in re­
gard to administrative matters a Standstill Agreement was 
entered into. This Standstill Agreement was not confined to 
administrative matters only. There were other political 
issues covered by this agreement with a view to providing a 
basis for the future treaty relations between Hyderabad and 
India. In the first article, it was laid down that "all 
matters and administrative arrangements as to the matters of 
common concern including external affairs, defence and commun­
ications which existed between the Grown and the Nizam immed­
iately before the 15th.August, 1947, shall, in so far as may 
be appropriate continue as between the Dominion of India or 
any part thereof, and the Nizam". The Nizam had also conceded 
that in time of war he would allow the Indian Army to be sta­
tioned in Hyderabad with his consent provided that it be with­
drawn within six months after the termination of hostilities. 
No obligations or rights of paramountcy were to be continued 
and any dispute arising out of this agreement was to be re­
ferred to the arbitration of two arbitrators, one appointed 
by each of the parties and an umpire by those arbitrators.
This agreement was to last for one year.
1 Ibid, p.3.
Soon after the signing of the agreement the parties 
began to complain against each other of disregard and breach 
of this agreement. The Hyderabad government complained that 
the Indian government stopped arms and ammunition and other 
necessary equipment for the army and Imposed an economic block­
ade^. The government of India claimed that the action of the 
Nizam’s government -
(a) in making the circulation of Indian currency in
the state illegal;
(b) in prohibiting the export of bullion and precious
stones and metals from the state;
(o) in granting a loan of 20 crores to the government 
of Pakistan;
2
was a breach of the Standstill Agreement/ The complaints and 
the charge sheets thereof against each other went on increas­
ing and both the parties published all the details of the
%
border incidents and other such matters in white papers .
Among the complaints the question of the Razakars 
(the volunteers of the Muslim political party known as 
Itte-had-ul-Muslemjah) formed a serious issue. The Indian 
government complained of this organisation as a danger to 
peace, as they were armed and raided the Indian territory, and 
terrorised the Hindu population of the state. The Nizam’s 
government on the other hand replied that the organisation was 
an old political party and the government had nothing to do 
with them, and they also stated that this organisation of the 
volunteers came into existence under the pressure of the Indian 
government that was brought to bear upon the state to join the 
Dominion. "The question of the Raaakars could not be consid­
ered in isolation and a policy to ban them could only be
1 For details see Letter of Prime Minister of Hyderabad
to Prime Minister of India, 5th.April 1948,' (Ibid, p.24)
3 See Yi/hite Papers of Hyderabad Government and those of 
Indian Government official publication.
2 Demi official letter from the additional secretary
Ministry of States Government of India, (Ibid, p.17)
carried out as a part of a concerted scheme for dealing with 
the situation as a whole, I had also said that, if the 
Hyderabad army and police were adequately armed and equipped 
to enable them to cope with raiders and local subversive 
elements (the Hyderabad government complained that the Indian 
government was encouraging raids from its territory into 
Hyderabad and also the subversive activities of the Hindu 
population of the state, thereby creating danger to peace 
and order within the state) and if provincial governments 
co-operated with Hyderabad, the "raison d' être" of the 
Hazakars would disappear"^. The differences became acute and 
in spite of all efforts nothing could be amicably settled.
The Hyderabad government suggested that the difference as re­
gards the breach of agreement alleged by India should be re-
2
ferred to the arbitration of the tribunal" as provided in the 
agreement. The Indian government rejected this on the ground 
that the agreement was only for a period of one year and the 
time left was not enough to refer the matter to the tribunal. 
"The government of H.E.H. have suggested that the points in 
dispute should be referred to arbitration and it is no doubt 
true that the standstill agreement provides for such references 
But, considering the large number of points on which differ­
ences have already emerged it is clear that arbitration on 
these points would take up all that remains of the period of 
one year for which the agreement is to run, leaving little 
scope for the Implementation of the award of the arbitrator"^.
At last the government of India took "police action" 
against Hyderabad State on 13th.September, 1948. The Hyderabad 
government had complained to the Security Council on August
1 Letter from the Prime Minister of Hyderabad, 23rd,May,
1948. (Ibid, p.42)
2 Ibid
3 Letter Sect.Ministry of States Govt.of India dated
ISth.May, 1948., para.4. (Ibid, p.39)
Slat. 1948, under Article 35(a) of the Charter which provides
for a state which is not a member of the United Nations bring­
ing the dispute to the attention of the Council or the General 
Assembly. It was explained that the police action v^ as meant 
for meeting the situation within the State which was endanger- 
ing peace in India. The case was included in the agenda of 
the Security Council and debated twice and is still on it.
For the first time in recent history, the Dutch 
government used the term "police action" for the military 
action against the Indonesian Republic. The Dutch government’s 
representative, justifying this action in law, stated at the 
United Nations that "The Republic of Indonesia, no more than 
the state of Eastern Indonesia or Borneo is no (sic) sovereign 
state. It has never been a sovereign state. It is a political 
entity to bè affiliated ultimately with the two other states I 
have named, and to be part of a federation. It has a govern­
ment which is only "de facto". But a government of what? Of 
the sovereign state? No, not of a sovereign state but a state 
in the name of, let us say. New York, or Utah, or New South 
Wales or Paraiba in Brazil, or a state in the United States of 
Venezuela"." The arguments put forward on the lines suggested 
by this quotation were not accepted by the United Nations and, 
as a result of the efforts made by the Good Offices Committee, 
the Indonesian Republic was not only able to settle her differ­
ences amicably but was also recognised as a sovereign independ­
ent state. The term "police action" in this context was a 
breach of the principles, of International law. Even if it be 
taken for granted that the military action thus taken was just­
ified in the case of the Indonesian Republic It is much less 
justifiable in the case of Hyderabad on two grounds.
1 Ü.N.B. June 15th. 1949.
2 U.N.doc. S/P.U. 171, pp.41, 42, July 51, 1947. As
quoted by Dr.All Sastuoamldjoyo and Robert Nelson:
The Status of the Republic of Indonesia.
Hyderabad State was the biggest of all the Indian
1
States which had been recognised as sovereign states by the 
British Courts. There is nothing to suggest that the Indian 
States were not sovereign in law. The fact that they were 
under the protection of British paramountcy signifies that 
they were lacking in independence which was a political aspect 
of the question, Hyderabad, after the lapse of paramountcy, 
had reverted to its position of independence as it stood before 
accepting British protection. What was lacking after the par­
amountcy was only recognition by any sovereign independent 
state. The recognition of statehood in international law is 
a controversial question. There are two theories put forward 
on this issue. There is one which is called constitutive accord­
ing to which a newly created entity, although possessing all 
the attributes of statehood becomes a state in International 
law only when, and in so far as it is recognised by other 
states, otheishold the (viz.) declaratory theory and opine 
that a state becomes a person of international law by fulfil­
ling the requirements of statehood. They assert that, "Every 
new state becomes a member of the family of nations", "ipso 
facto", by its rising into existence, and that recognition 
supplies only the necessary evidence for this fact"^.
Hyderabad state after the lapse of paramountcy re­
verted to its original status of independence. The British 
government according to the Attorney-General «s statement in 
Parliament was not prepared to recognise any of the states as
Independent states in international law on 15th.August when
3
the Act came into force. This clearly indicates that the
1 See Chapter on Indian States,
2 Oppenheim, op.c it.
3 Hansard, op.cit., col,103.
British government did not commit itself to recognising the 
Indian states as independent international entities only on 
15th.August, hut this did not and should not mean that they 
could not take any decision other than this after 15th,August. 
The purpose of this statement was only to state that the Indian 
states and the Dominion concerned should have time to settle 
the nature of their relations.
Hyderabad state came into treaty relations, though 
of a temporary character, by signing the standstill agreement. 
In accordance with this agreement provision was made for arbi­
tration. The arbitration clearly indicates that the agreement 
was that of international law. Even differences between the
federal government and the states constituting it are treated
1as matters of quasi international law . Hyderabad even if not 
a fully recognised person in international law was at the same 
time not a federated state of India. Even from this point of 
view the relations between India and Hyderabad during the cur­
rency of the agreement were matters of international law. If 
it is recognised that the Hyderabad state (as set forth above) 
was neither a federated part of India as was the claim of the 
Dutch representative in the case of Indonesia nor were the re­
lations as settled by the standstill agreement, matters of 
municipal law, the police action of the Indian government 
against Hyderabad was certainly a breach of contract and also a 
wrong in international law. There is another aspect of the 
military action of India against Hyderabad. India claimed 
that the action taken by India was directed against not the 
head of the state nor the people but against particular min­
isters who were kept in power by a military organisation known
1 Lattterpacht, op.cit. See Chapter on quasi international
dispute.
•Xbl.
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as the Razakars . This meant that the Indian government was 
obliged to take action against the government which was supported 
by the Razakars who were alleged to be causing disturbances in 
the state thereby creating the necessity for intervention in 
the affairs of the neighbouring state. The lists of raids by 
both sides seems to have been made to support the argument of 
this point. It is true that every state can take action against 
another state in the interest of self-preservation and this 
doctrine though not much favoured, has been recognised in inter­
national law. But at the same time warning has been given that
a violation of international law under the guise of self-pre-
2
servation would not be tolerated.^ If the Indian government 
considered that the conditions in the state of Hyderabad war­
rant ed police action, then it should also have adopted some 
method of informing some Impartial states and justifying the 
action taken. The Indian government failed to do anything of 
this sort.
There was another point put forward by the Indian 
government. They said that the majority of the people of the 
state had invited their help as they were helpless under the 
Razakar regime.
If this argument is strictly adhered to and the 
police action thus taken against Hyderabad is to be justified 
in the name of humanity for the purpose of stopping cruelties 
within the state, then it was obligatory on the part of India 
to set up an Interim government of the people of the state ex­
cluding the Razakars and to give them a free choice in deciding 
their future without any pressure or influence. The Indian 
government set up a military government after the police action
1 B.N.Rao's statement. U.H.B. June 15th. 1949.
2 Oppenheim, op,cit. p.245.
and Ignoring the people they sought authority for this govern­
ment from the Nizam. Even if the military government was nec­
essary immediately after the police action, there was no justi­
fication for continuing it for more than a year. The military 
government in fact was directed and controlled from New Delhi 
while it sought legal sanction from the Nizam.
Hyderabad question must in its natural sequence in­
clude Berar as well. Mr.Henderson, the Under-Secretary of 
State for India, explained the situation in this way - "I 
should like to make the position of the government clear with 
regard to Berar. Section 47 of the Government of India Act, 
1935, does in these terms, recognise the sovereignty of the 
Nizam' of Hyderabad and says:-
"Whereas certain territory (in this Act referred to 
as Berar) is under the sovereignty of His Exalted Hi^ness the 
Nizam of Hyderabad but is at the date of the passing of this 
Act, by virtue of certain agreements subsisting between His 
Majesty and His Exalted Highness, administered together with 
the central provinces".
Following the passage of the 1935 Act, the necessary 
agreement was entered into with the Nizam in 1936. The effect 
of Clause 7(1,b) of this bill is to terminate the 1936 Agree­
ment. There can be no doubt that it removes the legal basis 
for Berar’s administration, as a federated part of British 
India, In other words, Berar will ek revert to Hyderabad. 
That is the legal position. But we have to face the realities 
of the position. This province of three or four million in­
habitants, is administered entirely by officials of the govern­
ment of India and of the provincial government of the central
provinces and Berar. Any change involving the taking away of 
the administrative machine and its replacement hy the official 
of the Nizama would take some time. Therefore it would obvious­
ly be necessary for the government of India to enter into nego­
tiations with the Nizam, either to continue the existing arrange­
ments or to replace the present set-up in the light of the legal 
position.
In the light of these observations it is of Interest 
to note the reference to Berar as it occurred in the corres­
pondence between the Nizam and the Governor-General of India 
and also the change that was brought about in the clause of the 
government of India Act 1955 as adopted in accordance with the 
Indian Independence Act.
The Nizam raised the question of Berar in his letter
dated 8th.August, 1947 and said, "It is more surprising that
negotiations should be refused on the subject of Berar. H.M. 
Government and the new state Department have unequivocally re­
cognised my sovereignty over Berar and also my legal right to 
the reversion of administration over that territory on the 
15th.August, 1947. I should be prepared to arrange for the 
continuance of the status quo for the time being to enable the 
whole problem to be reasonably and amicably settled. But those 
responsible for the new Dominion wholly refuse to negotiate in 
the matter unless I first agree to accede and this, for reasons 
which I have already explained, I decline to do. I learn 
(though I find it hard to believe) that in defiance of my ad­
mitted rights the New Dominion of India mean to start their
career by seizing my territory"^.
1 White Paper Letter, Nizam’s, 8th.August, 1947, 
para.(b). Ibid, p.2.
Replying to this complaint the Governor-General said - 
" I am in a position to assure you that the Dominion of India 
are quite agreeable to the continuance of the status quo in 
Berar for the time being, while negotiations continue, and to 
the continuance of existing administrative arrangements> 
whether or not a formal agreement is reached dealing with 
this subject^."
The article 1 that refers to the treaties subsisting 
between the Nizam and the paramount power, must be inter­
preted as if it includes Berar within its context. It is 
obvious that the purpose of this agreement was to give legal 
force to the status quo. The reference in the article 1 
to all agreements in regard to administrative matters 
definitely covers the matter in respect of Berar as well.
Berar agreement of 1936 was in fact as well as in law an 
agreement for the purposes of administration. The attempt 
to exclude Berar from the scope of this agreement is 
somewhat untenable before law, especially in view of the fact 
that the reference to maintain, status quo was offered and 
accepted by the correspondence that has passed between the 
Nizam and the Government of India. Even if it is suggested, 
as some Indian writers seem to have done, that Berar should be 
excluded from the terms of agreement, then it also becomes rather 
imperative to regard correspondence and the terms thereto 
offered and accepted, binding on the.relations of Hyderabad and 
India in regard to Berar.
It has been suggested that the territories of Berar 
have been ruled not in accordance with the Clause of 47 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935, but according to the clause as
1 Ibid, p.4, dated 12th August, 1947. The Governor
General’s letter, para. 2.
2 See white paper op. cit. App. II. p. 43.
adopted in accordance with the Indian Independence Act. A 
glance at these clauses will make it clear.
Old Sec. 47 of the Government of India Act
"Whereas certain territory (in this Act referred to !
as ’Berar') is under the sovereignty of His Exalted High- |
ness the Nizam of Hyderabad, but is at the date of the 
passing of this Act, by virtue of certain agreements sub- I
slating between His Majesty and His Exalted Highness, ad- i
ministered together with the Central Provinces;
And whereas it is in contemplation than an 
agreement shall be concluded between His Majesty and His 
Exalted Highness whereby, notwithstanding the continuance 
of the sovereignty of His Exalted Highness over Berar, the 
Central Provinces and Berar may be governed together as one 
Governor’s Province under this Act by the name of the 
Central Provinces and Berar;
How, therefore -
(1) While any such agreement is in force -
(a) Berar and the Central Provinces shall, not­
withstanding the continuance of the 
sovereignty of His Exalted Highness, be 
deemed to be one Governor's Province by 
the name of the Central Provinces and 
Berar;
(b) Any reference in this Act or in any other Act
to British India shall be construed as a 
reference to British India and Berar, and 
any reference in this Act to subjects of 
His Majesty shall, except for the purposes 
of any oath of allegiance, be deemed to 
include a reference to Berari subjects of 
His Exalted Highness;
(c) Any provision made under this Act with
respect to the qualifications of the 
voters for the Provincial Legislature of 
the Central Provinces and Berar, or the 
voters for the Council of State, shall be 
such as to give effect to any provisions with 
respect to those matters contained in the 
agreement".
Hew Section 47»
Berar shall continue to be governed together with 
the Central Provinces as one Governor’s province under this 
Act (Indian Indépendance Act) by.the name of the Central 
Provinces and in the same manner as immediately before the 
es tab 11 sliment of the Dominion and any reference to this Act to
One writer suggests that it is the manner of govern­
ing and not the authority to govern that is indicated. The 
old authority to govern Berar was derived from the manner. 
Rather ambiguous words have been used to denote the mode of 
governance. If it was desired to mention the mode of govern­
ance rather than the authority there was no need to mention 
the manner of governing separately, the only need in that 
case was to make the provision to include Berar in the pro­
vince and leave off the rest of the matter of the manner of
ruling to those covered by\those which were meant for the
' ''
province itself. There was no need of any separate mention 
of the manner in this respect. The separate mention of the 
manner of ruling with respect to the past clearly shows that 
the purpose of maintaining the status quo was predominant. 
There is no escape of saying that the words used were ambig­
uous and also suggest that they were meant to evade the legal 
obligation. How far the draftsmanship has succeeded in this 
object is quite clear and it has certainly failed in its 
object, besides its legal and moral obligation^
The arrangements made for the administration of 
Berar in accordance with the Agreement of 1936, strictly 
speaking cannot be interpreted as an instrument of Accession 
for the purposes of Berar, because the sovereignty of the 
Nizam was recognised, which rendered it a condomium. The 
standstill agreement referred to all agreements with the 
Grown prior to independence hence included the Berar agree­
ment as well.
At long last the Nizam issued a 'Piyinan' dated 
23rd.November, 194-9, declaring that Hyderabad thereby became
a constituent part of the Indian federation. Again there 
1was an agreement between the Nizam of Hyderabad and the 
1 White Paper on States, pp.386-387,
government of India about the private property, privileges 
and rights of the Nizam, signed on January 25rd, 1950.
In the ’Plvman’ acceding to the Indian Dominion the 
Nizam further laid down that "in order to ensure for the 
people of Hyderabad the benefits of an honourable partnership 
in a united and democratic India shall, in view of its far 
reaching consequences, be subject to ratification by the 
people of this state whose will as expressed through the con­
stituent Assembly of the state proposed to be constituted 
shortly, must finally determine the nature of the relationship 
between this state and the union of India, as also the consti­
tution of the state itself"^. This Pivman is a declaration 
and the Nizam simultaneously surrenders to the people his 
sovereign rights not only to decide on the question of the 
relationship between Hyderabad and India but also by freming 
the constitution of the state. He thereby becomes a consti­
tutional head. There is nothing left for him except acting 
on the advice of the people. Any government set up after this 
Piumar without consultation of the people, especially if it be 
composed of people from outside the territory of the state, if 
not strictly illegal, is at least extra constitutional. The 
accession itself is not complete and any action by the people 
of the state other than accession would certainly be legal. 
Prom the time of the police action, so far neither has a con­
stituent assembly been set up in the state, nor has any de­
cision been taken by the people to the effect that Hyderabad 
should join India, To make the accession of the Nizam perman­
ent, by any other provision of the constitution or otherwise 
without any impartial decision by free plebiscite, will be 
illegal. This will foe the case of the accession of Hyderabad
1 Piv-maîî dated 23rd. Nov ember, 1949. White Paper,
pp.369-370,
pjf
to the Indian Dominion in Municipal law. Even from the point 
of view of international law the accession will not go beyond 
a "fait accompli" until any other foreign state recognises the 
accession, and no foreign state will be able to recognise the 
accession of Hyderabad as long as the case remains on the 
agenda of the Security Council, Therefore it may be concluded 
that the accession of Hyderabad will remain only temporary (sub­
ject to the decision of the people to make it permanent) in 
Municipal law and without legal sanction in international lav/ 
so long as the case remains on the agenda.
This statement from legal stand point is made to 
show that the action taken by the Indian government and the 
procedure adopted thereafter constituted wao-a breach of lav/ 
as well as of faith. The desirability of the inclusion of 
Hyderabad within the all India scheme cannot be denied and 
therefore the stand taken by Hyderabad to remain legally in­
dependent while associating with the Indian government in all 
matters of foreign affairs, communication and defence was 
reasonable. It is true that any attempt on the part of 
Hyderabad to disregard the de facto affinities with the 
Dominion of India would have been equally wrong. Even the 
inclusion of Hyderabad within the federal scheme of India, 
had a strong claim so far as the interest!of the people of 
India as a whole was concerned. But unfortunately the method 
and the procedure adopted by the Indian government, in spite 
of all the progressive and sympathetic feelings for the unity 
of India cannot be left uncriticlsed. What is to be condemned 
is not the commendable aspiration for unity and therefore for 
an organic relation of Hyderabad with India, but the fact that
1 The Ramava Case 20, Annual Digest, 1941-1942.
the Indian government took such an action which deprived the 
people of the state of their natural right, for which the 
action was claimed to he justified.
The Indian government’s policy in regard to the 
state is highly objectionable because Indian independence 
has not materially affected the people at large. The Congress 
during the British regime condemned British policy as being 
imperialistic and protecting the rulers against the will of 
the people. But after coming into power the Indian government 
preferred to settle terms with the Indian rulers over the head 
of the people and claimed that the people of the states were 
not fit for responsible government. In view of this policy 
the Indian government is changing the state into chief Com­
missioners' provinces thus taking the whole administration 
into its hands and ruling the state through its civil servants.
As regards Junagadh there is only one point which 
needs to be mentioned here. The Indian government should 
either recognise the choice of the rulers, on their ovm dis­
crimination, to join one or other Dominion as has been the 
case with other Indian rulers, or it should recognise the will 
of the people,- but not either of the two at its convenience. 
In the case of Kashmir the choice of the ruler and its legal­
ity has been stressed, and the will of the people subordinated 
to it. Whereas in the case of Junagadh it is "vice versa".
The principle of self-determination, its evolution and asser­
tion as seen already have made the legality of the ruler’s 
choice subject to the will of the people and a frank recogni­
tion of this fact must be made by the Indian and Pakistan 
governments, without consideration of the fact that one or the 
other is the loser. This is only the fundamental principle on 
which not only legality but also the moral values involved in 
the issues are justified. The disregard of this principle so
far allowed in respect of the Indian states can only he recti­
fied hy taking the decision of the people and abiding by it.
The Hyderabad case needs only rectification of the procedure 
and compensation for the loss of the people’s wealth which 
was allowed to be exported from the state not only by includ­
ing Berar in Madhya Pardesh but also by liquidating the Nizam’s 
(the richest man of the world) wealth which was in fact the 
people’s wealth and could have been very well utilized for the 
exploitation of the State’s natural resources* In all such 
arrangements the Indian government has been a party with the 
rulers in agreements in which the people had hardly any voice.
VII.
1
The Indian Independence Act has also a clause 
governing the nullification of treaties or agreements entered 
into by His Majesty’s Government and the authorities in the 
tribal area. These treaties also were nullified only "de 
jure", and the "de facto" position did not change in any way. 
This clause in the Act terminates the treaties and thereby 
removed the legal basis as it stood between the British govern­
ment and the tribal authorities but in fact this only made it 
obligatory on the part of the successor governments and the 
tribal areas to replace them with new ones. Strictly speaking 
the agreements thus nullified were not treaties, because the 
authorities of the tribal areas were not sovereign states, but 
were rather administrative authorities enjoying autonomy in 
certain administrative matters under the control of the poli­
tical agents. The successor government of Pakistan placing 
more confidence in the religious affinity decided to remove the 
troops from this area and extended the hand of co-operation and 
partnership. The India Government on the other hand decided to 
extend the benefits of settled administrations to the tribes 
in the North Eastern part of India.
1 Se 7.1.0.
m e  AOI M B  IHE LESAL STADOS OF !PHE HEW DOMINIONS.
The Indian National Congress had pledged to Complete
Independence outside the British Commonwealth of Nations when
it had rejected the Nehru Report presenting a model Constitution
for Indian Independence within the British Commonwealth.
In recent times this pledge was reiterated hy Mr. Nehru in
his address to the All India Convention held in Delhi on
March 17th, 1937. He remarked: "Independence means national
freedom in the fullest sense of the word; it means, as our
pledge has stated, a severance of the British connection,
   words are hurled at us, - dominion status, Statute
of Westminster, British Commonwealth of Nations, and we quihhle
(2)
ah out their meaning. I see no real Commonwealth anywhere,., .etc. " 
The Muslim League on the other hand had left this question more 
or less vague. The question arises why the Congress rejected 
Dominion Status all the time and was prepared to accept the 
same through the Indian Independence Act in 1947, especially 
so -sshen it was possible for her to go out of this relationship 
as Burma did? Was the change of heart in any way due to the 
fact that the Indian Independence Act had placed India and 
Pakistan in any better position than the Dominions on whom were 
conferred Dominion Status under the Statute of Westminster of 
1931. Then there arises the question, why a separate Act, 
instead of a mere extension of the Statute to India and Pakistan 
was necessary? Again, what actual differences of legal signifi­
cance exist between the Indian Independence Act and the Ceylon 
Independence Act? Such are questions that demand a detailed 
study of the legal status of the new Dominions vis-a-vis the 
Independence Act.
(1) See Chapter on "The Evolution of self-determination",
(2) Quoted by Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena in his speech
in the Constituent Assembly of India, I6th May 1949,
p. 12.
In the foregoing chapter a comparative study of 
the circumstances that led to the enactment of the Indian 
Independence Act, and the circumstances preceding the Statute 
of Westminster as far as they suggested the scope of the Act 
have been reviewed. It has been seen during these observations 
that the Statute and the Indian Independence Act both were 
declaratory because India like the Dominions, obtained 
Dominion status, in fact, before the Act came into force.
The other point observed,was that the Statute was not aimed 
at bringing about a uniformity of law in the relations of the 
United Kingdom and the Dominions as "the force of strict law 
was extended to those Dominions to which Sections 2-6 of the 
Statute extended, viz. Canada, South Africa, and the Irish 
Free State, while Australia, New Zealand, and Newfoundland 
obtained powers in the Statute in virtue of Section 10 (1),
(2) and (3), to contract out Sections 2-6 until such time as 
each saw fit to adopt them. Canada and Australia of their 
own accord accepted limitations on the powers of their 
Parliaments to amend their Constitutions. The South African 
and Irish Nationalist sentiments prompted them to take a 
different attitude towards the Commonwealth. As a result of 
this South Africa re-enacted the Statute of Westminster with 
necessary modifications. It also incorporated the Preamble 
of the Statute in a Schedule. The Actq, known as the Status 
of Union Act as well as the Royal Executive Func tions and 
Seals Act, 1934,were necessary from the South African standpoint, 
because the extension of the Statute without the modifications 
made thereto did not confer sovereign status on the South 
African Parliament. In other words the object was to make 
the Parliament of South Africa as much omnipotent as the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom.
The Irish Free State had asked for no provisions 
restricting the scope of the operation of the Statute as 
some of the other Dominions had done, hence acquired the 
fullest powers which the Statute was capable of bestowing.
But controversy arose as to the extent the Oireachtas had 
powers to amend the Constitution which, in the British view, 
was limited by the terms of the Scheduled Treaty, and according 
to the Irish point of view, no such limitations existed as.authority 
^as derived from theLpeople. These two divergent views v/ere 
expressed in two famous cases. Ryan’s case, expounded the 
legal basis of the Irish Free State Constitution, and Moore’s 
case on the other hand held that the Irish Free State acquired 
constituent powers under the Statute.
II.
It is, therefore, proposed first to examine i. 
Sections 2-6 of the Statute. The Statute is preceded by 
the Preamble which lays down the Constitutional Conventions 
or non-legal rules. It is also necessary to see whether these 
Conventions are binding on India and Pakistan or not. But 
before these Sections are examined in detail, it is necessary 
to answer the question already raised: "Why a separate enact­
ment for India was necessary. Was it not possible to add 
India and Pakistan to the list of the Dominions enumerated 
in the Statute of Westminster? In Sir Dhiren Mittra’s words, 
"Does Parliament want to make a distinction between the two 
new Dominions and the older Dominions, perhaps to the 
disadvantage of the former?’’ In his reply to this question 
Sir Dhiren Mittra asserts that "The Statute of Westminster 
was declaratory of rights which were claimed by the Dominions
and the claim to (sic) which was admitted by the Mother Country. 
India* s status before the passing of the Indian Independence 
Act was certainly less than Dominion status and a separate 
Act conferring Dominion status as distinguished from a 
declaratory Act was inevitable."This answer, it is 
submitted, does not seem to be satisfactory on two grounds. 
First, India acquired Dominion status de facto and in this 
sense Indian Independence was as much declaratory of the 
rights and status as the Statute of Westminster itself. This 
was recognised by the British Government(^ ^ Secondly, the 
term 'Dominion* did not specifically define the status of 
the Dominions with any legal precision. Newfoundland continued 
to be enumerated in the list of Dominions even after it 
surrendered this status in 1933. India, even before acquiring 
the de facto Dominion status was not in any sense inferior 
in status to that of Newfoundland after it surrendered 
Dominion status. A separate Act, therefore, can not be said 
to have been necessary as India was inferior in status or 
because the Statute was declaratory.
Among the other factors which necessitated separate 
enactment, one undoubtedly was the fact that India was to 
undergo the process of partitibn. Not only the machinery 
and the details of partition had to be provided in this act 
but also had to make a temporary provision for the adminis­
tration of the Country. These details required a separate 
enactment with legal precision. Besides this, the terms of 
the Statute were not appropriate for India or Pakistan.
First, because India was not a Colony and as such the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, was not applicable to India. 
The Statute of Westminster, inter alia, had to replace its 
rule of construction with a new one. The Colonial Laws
(1) Sir Dhiren Mittra; The Indian Independence Act:
Past, Present and Future Status of India
Perspective, Vol.2, No.4, p.7.
(2) See Chapter on "Assertion of Self-determination."
Validity Act 1865, had laid down as the rule of construction 
that an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom should he 
deemed to extend to a Colony if it was made applicable to 
a Colony hy express words or necessary intendment. The rule 
of construction enacted hy the Statute of Westminster said 
that "No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after 
the commencement of this Act shall extend, or he deemed to 
extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion, 
unless it is expressly declared in that Act that the Dominion 
has requested and consented to the enactment thereof.
The rule of construction thus enacted was adopted with certain 
alterations in the Status of the Union Act, 1934. It runs;
"The Parliament of the Union shall he the sovereign legislative 
power in or over the Union, and notwithstanding anything in 
any other law contained, no Act of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland passed after the eleventh 
day of December 1931, shall extend, or be deemed to extend, 
to the Union as part of the law of the Union, unless extended 
thereto by an Act of the Parliament of the U n i o n . " T h e  
fact that India was not a Colony and hence outside the purview 
of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, necessitated a separate 
Act but at the same time it was, probhbly obvious that the 
rule of construction as provided in the Statute which had 
failed to satisfy South Africa could not be fit for India.
The Government of India Act 1955, had imposed 
certain restrictions both in regard to powers of reservation
and disallowance and extra territoriality. It is true that
(x\
the Federal Court in Governor-General v. Raleigs' 'case had 
taken a liberal view and expressed, obiter, that the powers
(1) 22 Geo.5, 0.4 S (4).
(2) The Status of the Union Act, 1934, No. 69. S.2.
(3) Supra.
of the Indian legislature should in this respect he construed 
in the light of the requirements of a State with international 
personality hut it did not establish any rple of law ruling 
out the necessity of an enactment conferring such powers,
She Indian national sentiments were in favour of abolishing 
the powers of reservation and disallowance completely hut 
the Statute of Westminster did not make such a complete repeal, 
although it conferred powers which could he used to effect 
such a repeal.
Ihe Statute of Westminster removed restrictions 
imposed on the Parliaments of the Dominions and as a result 
of which they could enact laws repugnant to the Acts of the 
Imperial Parliament as they formed part of the law of the 
Dominions. Section 2 (2) runs; "No laws and no provision 
of any law made after the commencement of this Act by the 
Parliament of a Dominion shall he void or inoperative on the 
ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the 
provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of 
the United Kingdom or to any order, rule or regulation made 
under any such Act, and the powers of the Parliament of a 
Dominion shall include the power to repeal or amend any such 
Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as the same is part 
of the law of the Dominion," It is interesting to note that 
this Clause has been enacted in Section 6 (2) of the Indian 
Indepëndence Act which runs: "No law and no provision of
any law made by the legislature of either of the new Dominions 
shall he void,or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant 
to the law of England or to the provisions of this or any 
existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
or to any order, rule of regulation made under any such Act,
(1) Wheare: Some Constitutional Changes in the
British Commonwealth. Journal of Comparative 
Legislation and International Law. 1947-48.
and the powers of the legislature of each Dominion include 
the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or 
regulation in so far as it is part of the law of the Dominion." 
It is evident that the whole Section 2 of the Statute of 
Westminster has been reproduced word for word except the 
addition of the word 'this * underlined and omission of 'shall* 
before the word * include' and 'it' instead of 'the same'.
The omission of 'shall' as far as it is clear from the wording 
of the Act hardly has any significance in construing this 
section in some other way than the one that appeared in the 
Statute. The same applies to 'it* which has been used in place 
of 'the same*. As regards the addition of 'this' it is 
proposed to postpone discussion on this point till this 
question is dealt with subsequently.
A comparison on this point of the related sections 
of the Ceylon Independence Act would certainly be helpful 
for fufther discussion. It will be observed that the 
resemblance to the Statute in the Ceylon Independence Act 
on these points is closer and more striking. This, as stated 
at the outset, may be owing to the fact that Ceylon was a 
Colony and hence was included within the purview of the 
Colonial laws Validity Act 1865. Section I of the First 
Schedule of the Ceylon Act is almost a word for word repetition 
of Sections 2 (1) and 2 (2) of the Statute.
As regards extra-territoriality, it has been enacted 
that "The legislatures of the new Dominions shall have full 
power to make laws for that Dominion, including laws having 
extra-territorial operation!.' but strangely enough it further 
states that "the power referred to in Sub-Section (1^  of 
Section 6 extends to making of laws limiting for the future 
the powers of the legislatures of the Dominion." This clearly 
means that the legislatures of the new Dominions will be
entitled to limit their own sovereignty for the future.
It is sufficient here to point out the main differences that 
exist in the Indian Independence Act on the one hand and the 
Ceylon Independence Act and the Statute of Westminster on 
the other.
As already pointed out the Statute of Westminster 
has a Preamble which inter alia lays down the Convention that 
"it would be in accord with the established constitutional 
position of all the members of the Commonwealth in relation 
to one another that any alteration in the law touching the 
succession to the Throne or the Royal Style and Titles shall 
hereafter require the assent as well of the Parliaments of 
all the Dominions as of the Parliament of the United Kingdom": 
The Indian Independence Bill necessitated change in the Royal 
Style and Titles. It runs; "The assent of the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom is hereby given to the omission from 
the Royal Style and Titles of the words "Indiae Imperator" 
and the words "Emperor of India" and to the issue by His 
Majesty for that purpose of His Royal Proclamation under the 
Great Seal of the R e a l m . T h e  assent of the Parliaments 
of the Dominions in view of these obligations was to be 
obtained subsequently to which the Prime Minister referred 
during the debates on the Independence Bill and till then 
the Section did not come into operation, but in the words of 
Wheare, "The position of India and Pakistan is obscure.
They were not members of the Imperial Conference. India 
which was admitted to the Imperial Conference in 1947, is 
not the India of today - and even if it had been the resolutions 
that were adopted on this topic applied to Great Britain and 
the Dominions alone. Nor do they appear to have adopted, as 
Ceylon has done, the resolutions that might apply to them.
( 1 )  S 7 ( 2 )
Y et it is reasonable to assume that since India and Pakistan 
have accepted the status of self-governing members of the 
Commonwealth, these rights do in fact apply to them. Be 
that as it may it would appear that the assents of the
( ilParliaments of India and Pakistan was not sought ot obtained."^ '
This indicated that besides the Clauses of the Indian
Independence Act which confer Dominion status on the new
Dominions and make other connected provisions of law, the
Conventions of the Commonwealth too form an important part
and the Conventions therefore, should necessarily be taken 
to see whether they lend any help 
into consideration/for the purpose of determining the status
of the new Dominions under the Independence Act.
III.
Coming to the question, the status of the new 
Dominions, as already stated, the question arises whether 
the new Dominions have been placed in any better position 
than the Dominions under the Statute on the one hand and 
whether they are in any sense inferior to the other sovereign 
and Independent Countries that are outside the Commonwealth 
on the other. The last question may be put in other words 
like this: What are the limitations implied in the membership 
of the Commonwealth that a sovereign state has to accept in 
order to continue its membership of the Commonwealth. For 
this purpose it is necessary first to consider what the 
term Dominion purports:
Wheare asserts: "The Statute, taken along with 
other rules of strict law, could supply an adequate definition 
of the legal status of the Dominions; the Reports of the 
Imperial Conferences, taken along with other non-legal rules,
(1) Wheare: op.cit.
moould supply an adequate definition of the conventional status 
of the Dominion but it requires a correlation of the two 
elements to describe the Qonstitutional status of the Dominions, 
and it is the Constitutional status which is denoted by the 
term 'Dominion S t a t u s B y  the definition of the term 
in the interpretation Act 1889, the Dominions were included 
in the term 'Colony*. This Act provided an interpretation 
for all purposes. But again by the Statute of Westminster 
which defined the term for the purposes of the same Act, it 
was said; "In this Act the expression 'Dominion' means any 
of the following Dominions, that is to say
(1) The Dominion of Canada
(2) The Commonwealth of Australia
(3) The Dominion of New Zealand
(4) The Union of South Africa
(5) The Irish Free State
(6) And Newfoundland."
The terms as defined by the Interpreting Act or the Statute 
of Westminster do not in fact throw light on the nature of 
status that the term 'Dominion' implies. For example, when 
the Irish Free State was to become a Dominion, reference to
Canada was made in order to define her relations with the
Commonwealth Countries. In other words the Irish Free State . 
acquired exactly the same position which Canada had assumed, 
and in the future her progress was to be identical with that 
of Canada. It is true therefore, in the words of Sir Dhiren 
Mittra that "the word 'Dominion' whatever may be its etymological 
meaning, has acquired a secondary significance, namely a 
sovereign state with the qualifications that it is a member 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations." OJhe term, as it is
(1) Wheare; The Statute and Dominion Status.
op.cit. p.4.
(2) Sir Dhiren Mittra: op.cit. p.9.
understood today, undoubtedly has acquired a secondary
significance but as Sir Dhiren Mittra too accepts, the term
is a misnomer. It was observed, during the debates on the
Indian Independence Bill,"that 'Dominion' as used in this
clause, is a temporary appellation. I believe that the word
'Dominions' is subject to several misconceptions, and I do not
think it is suitable in this case. I should have liked to see
the words 'Two sovereign states within the British Commonwealth
of Nations hereinafter to be known for the purpose of this Act
as the new Dominions." In reply to this suggestion, the
Prime Minister remarked; "I think we need the word 'Dominion'
here just for the reason  that we understand what 'Dominion*
means under the Statute of Westminster. Whatever alterations
of the Statute of Westminster may be in the future, the Statute
today does define this position...... It means complete
(2 )autonomy,"^ * Again, Mr. Nicholson pointed out that it was 
"rather paradoxical that we should invite perpetuity for the 
name 'Dominion', launching two large new parts of the Empire 
which, whatever happens, will be on a slightly different footing
to other Dominions....... I do not know whether every party in
India interprets the word 'Dominion' in the way in which we
interpret it  I can not help feeling that a revision of
the Statute of Westminster must be overdue as soon as there is 
any retreating from or turning against the use of the word 
'Dominion'". The Prime Minister in reply to these points 
explained, "It may well be that in the future we may consider 
some other different term. The word 'Dominion' is not always
frightfully popular with our own Dominions......  obviously this
is a matter which we should have to take up with the Dominions 
at some future Conference."'*^ It, therefore, can not be deduced
(1) Hansard; op.oit. (14-th July 1947). Col.41.
(2) Ibid. Col. 43.
(3) Ibid. Col. 43.
that the term 'Dominions* is disliked by the Indians or 
B u r m e s e . I t  is considered, on the other hand, as a misnomer 
both in Great Britain and other Dominions where such psychological 
considerations are absent. It is not, however, denied that there 
is a psychological aspect of the question as well but it is 
not so important as to outweigh other factors which are more 
or less common in all Dominions and therefore suggest the need 
of a change. The change is all the more necessary because 
the lack of legal precision, and its etymological sense savour 
of domination render the conception of Dominion Status confusing 
and indefinite.
S c o t t h a d  long ago suggested that the term 
* Dominion' used to .describe the King's Dominions enjoying 
differing degrees of self government, was incorrect and 
misleading. The word 'Dominion' as a term describing the 
independent status that the Dominions have assumed as a 
result of the developments within the Commonwealth and in 
the international sphere was inappropriate. Even Wheare 
speaking on "Is Dominion status obsolescent?" had suggested 
in 1948 that we have to be ready for a situation in which 
the notion of Dominion, as we have understood it up to now, 
may seem inadequate to the needs and aspirations of these 
new Dominions, as it has been for a member of British family 
like Ireland.
It was, probably, in view of the above considerations 
that on July 2nd, 1947, Mr. Attlee aimounoed in the House 
of Commons that the titles of the Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs and of the Dominion Office were to be changed 
to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and 
Commonwealth Relations Office respectively. It was explained
(1) Mansergh: op.oit. pp.19-23, wherein he discusses
psychological reasons for lack of undert^hding
of the term 'Dominion*.
(2) Scott, F.R. The end of Dominion Status. American
Journal of International Law, Jan.1944.
(3) l/heare. Is Dominion Status obsolescent? B.B.C.
Third Programme, Listendr, Feby.1948. pp.287-8.
that the old titles were misleading,This change, especially, 
with the omission of the adjective "British" suggested in 
itself a wholehearted co-operation in every quarter of the 
Commonwealth t o adjust the institutions of the Commonwealth 
to the ever changing circumstances. It will not be far from 
true to say that the use of the term 'Dominion* in the Indian 
Independence Act implied, , not the legal and conventional 
meanings attached to it in virtue of the Statute of Westminster 
and the resolutions of the Imperial Conferences^^the significance 
of the fact that the limitations or qualifications of being a 
member of the Commonwealth - was something different from what 
it had so far been. In other words the limitations of 
membership as understood under the Statute or Conventions 
had lost its implied applicability to all that accepted that 
relationship. This certainly indicated a sort of desire on 
the parÿ of the new Dominions to be within the relationship 
but without commitments to all that the term implied in view 
of its legal and conventional significance. Suffice it here 
to mention that the Indian Independence Act conferring Dominion 
status on India and Pakistan signified the desire of these 
new Dominions to share the membership of the Commonwealth 
which could be reconciled with their sovereign status as well 
as their own interpretation of the changing conception of that 
relationship. The other aspect of this issue can conveniently 
be dealt with in the general perspective of the Commonwealth 
relationship. However it may be asserted that the term 
'Dominion* as used in the Indian Independence Bill signifies 
all that has been conferred on other Dominions by the Statute 
plus all that the Independence Act gives.
(1) Hansard, H.C. Vol.439. Col.1320. 2nd July 1947.
IV.
After the consideration of the terra 'Dominion' 
it seems justified to examine the legislative powers and 
constituent powers bestowed on the legislatures of India 
and Pakistan. As there existed an appreciable difference 
among the Dominions on the question of availing themselves 
of the advantages of removing the legal inequalities provided 
by the Statute, the method of approach of the Dominions also 
differed from one another. As remarked already, the Dominions 
of Australia and New Zealand did not want to remove inequalities 
till they thought fit to adopt Clauses 2-6 for themselves.
For the purposes of comparison a reference to the method 
adopted by South Africa and the Irish Free State would be 
enough as any attempt to seek implications of the clauses in 
the Indian Independence Act in the light of the considerations 
that determined the policies of South Africa and the Irish 
Free State would be of great interest.
The first question that strikes one in this context
is why South Africa was obliged to take a step different to
the other Dominions. Did South Africa bring about any
substantial change in her status by adopting this method?
were
The provisions of the Statute/intended to empower 
the Parliaments of the Dominions to remove inequalities.
The enactment by the Imperial Parliament for the Dominions 
was made subject to the request and consent of the Dominions, 
but to borrow Wheare's expression "in enacting Section 4, 
the United Kingdom Parliament has not attempted in strict law 
to diminish or abolish its powers to legislate for the Dominions."
Further, he states that "Section 4.....  is not a rule restricting
power; it is a rule of construction. It is not directed against 
the United Kingdom Parliament. It is directed to the Courts.
And so long as it remains unrepealed, it is effective for 
that purpose. But it does not render it legally impossible 
for the United Kingdom Parliament to legislate for a Dominion 
without the request and consent of the Dominion.On the basis 
of the theory of sovereignty which was accepted by the Courts 
of the United Kingdom and of all the Dominions except the 
Irish Free State in 1931, there seems no doubt that Section 4 
of the Statute is ineffective in law to restrict the United 
Kingdom Parliament in the sphere of legislating for a 
Dominion only with the request and coneent of that Dominion?
Or again, the observation in the Coal Corporation^case 
Lord Sankey's observation that the sovereignty of the Parliament 
in abstract law remained unimpaired. This abstract theory 
in the words of Sir Owen IQixon was "indestructible sovereignty" 
of the King in Parliament over the law throughout the King's 
Dominions. The theory of sovereignty is indestructible because 
the Courts held so and it would be rendered destructible if 
the Courts decided s o . F o r  example, the Courts may go to 
the extent of saying that the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
has thus renounced all power to make laws for the Dominions. 
Mr. McGillian speaking in the Dail Eireann on the 15th July 1931, 
observed; "so sweeping was the declaration that it put the 
British Parliament in a worse position vis-a-vis the members 
of the Commonwealth than that in which the Parliament of any 
State (not a member of the Commonwealth) stands in relation 
to other States g e n e r a l l y . T h i s  was not the interpretation 
of a Court, but it suggests the _possible view one can take 
in interpreting the aspirations of the nations for the complete 
legislative sovereignty. A liberal construction is both in 
accord with the Commonwealth constitutional practice and the
(1) Wheare: The Statute, op.oit. p. 153.
(2) Supra.
(3) Wheare: op.cit. p.155. Reference to Sir Owen
Dixon's article, Australian Law Journal,
Vol.X. Supp.p.98.
(5) ls“ u0ted'ty®Slr Dhiren Mittra.op.oit.
needs of a sovereign State. Even on the limited or conservative 
view, the applicability of any enactment of the Parliament of 
Great Britain oould be rejected by the Courts of any Dominion 
on the ground that the enactment was not carried out in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 4. It is possible 
for the Courts to take this view but the fact remains that the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom in strict law could still 
enact for another State, though only in accordance with the 
requirements of Section 4* A sovereign Parliament within the 
operative scope of another sovereign Parliament, would be a 
legal anomaly.
It seems, in view of these considerations, and the
doubts of the 'legal effectiveness and permanence' of Section 4
as a rule of construction, the Union of South Africa was prompted.
to take a different line of approach to the problems of removing
the inequality of the Union Parliament vis-a-vis the Parliament
of the United Kingdom. The main purpose of the Status of the
Union Act 1934, was to provide a rule of construction to the
the Union Parliament 
Courts of South Africa so as to render ./ independent of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom.
V.
Now it remains to be examined how far the Union of
South Africa succeeded in attaining this purpose of making
its Parliament entirely independent of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom. In the first place, the Constitution of the
Union of South Africa had certain safeguards to protect the
rights of the original Colonies which joined the Union, 
known
These Sections,/as 'entrenched Clauses', in general, safeguarded 
the continuance of the native Franchise in Cape Province.
In the second place, the Union was subject to disallowance.
to discretionary reservation and obligatory reservation under 
the instructions and also in virtue of certain provisions of 
the Act.
Taking first the question of 'entrenched Glauses’, 
it is necessary to see how far these limitations were removed 
by the adoption of the modified Section 4 in the Status Act. 
The line of argument on this point followed by Wheare is as 
follows: "Section 2 of the Statute gave power to a Dominion
Parliament to repeal or amend any existing or future Act of 
Parliament of the United Kingdom, to which a Dominion law, 
passed after the enactment of the Statute, is repugnant. 
Section 2 of the Status Act might be described, therefore, as 
no more than the repeal in advance of hypothetical future Acts 
of the United Kingdom Parliament in so far as they purport 
to extend to the Union as part of the law of the Union, unless 
and until such Acts are extended to the Union by the Union 
P a r l i a m e n t R e l y i n g  on this line of argument he holds that 
it would be effective to prevent the operation in the Union, 
until extended thereto by the Union Parliament, of any United 
Kingdom Acts whether passed in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 4 of the Statute in fact as wëll as in form, or 
whether passed in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 
in form only or whether amounting to a repeal or amendment, 
express or implied, of the provisions of Section 4.^^^ But, 
suppose Sections 2 and 4 as adopted in the Status Act conflict 
with each other, then the question arises as to which of the 
two would prevail. He, however, concludes that the 'legal 
inequality of the Union Parliament in relation to the Powers 
of the United Kingdom Parliament sto make laws for the Union 
remains even after the passing of the Status Act because the 
United Kingdom Parliament may, in law, repeal Section 2 of
(1) Wheare: op.oit.p.246.
(2) Ibidem.
the Stsitute."
In recent times, the question came to the forefront 
when the Speaker of the South African House of Assembly ruled 
that the Union Parliament was competent to pass the Representation 
of Non-Europeans Bill by its ordinary procedure, that is,
(2 )disregarding the provisions made in the Imperial Act of 1909.
The opposition in the House of Assembly challenged this contention.
V.: This involved the question:: ; how far the Parliament
is omnicoRipetônt ; vis-a-vis the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, or in other words can or can not the Act passed by 
the Parliament of the Union of South Africa without regard to 
the provision of safeguards of the Imperial Act 1909, be 
challenged in the Courts in virtue of its omnicompetenoe.
It is interesting to note that the crux of the problem was 
"the power of Parliament to vary the instrument which created 
it; because the South Africa Constitution Act was enacted 
by the Parliament at Westminster, it could not be varied by 
its creator - the South African Parliament - except in terms 
of the amending powers which it conferred." This would 
have been the case in virtue of the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act 1865, that is, any Union Act amending the 'entrenched 
Clauses' would have been void for repugnancy. "But," one 
writer argues, "in 1931, the Statute of Westminster abolished 
this restraint, and provided that any Dominion Parliament 
should have power to amend any United Kingdom Act in so far 
as it was part of the law of that Dominion." It is, however, 
quite different, he asserts, to say that "it flies in the face 
of the mutual undertakings given and required by the four 
Colonies before their merger," or to say that "The Bill (was) 
a violation...... of a valid constitutional convention."
(1) Wheare: op.cit. 247.
(2) The Times, Lend; 13.4.1951; Editorial.
(3) John Ooaker; Letter to The Times, Lond; 20.4.1951.
(4) Ibidem,
QWithout prejudice to the legal force of the Constitutional 
Convention and their use by the Courts for the purposes of 
construction, it may be stated that in strict law, in view 
of the writer, the Union Parliament has been rendered competent 
to amend the Act of the Imperial Parliament, in virtue of the 
Statute of Westminster. Needless to repeat the argument set 
forth already, that in strict law the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom may repeal Section 2 of the Statute and therefore 
despite the altered wording of the Section 4, as adopted in the 
Status Act, the legal inequality of Status of the Union 
Parliament in relation to the powers of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom oould not be removed.
VI.
Before the connected clauses of the Indian 
Independence Act, in the light of the foregoing considerations, 
are discussed, it seems desirable to become acquainted with 
the Status of the Irish Free State under the Statute.
It may be recalled that the Treaty between Great 
Britain and Ireland was signed in London, on December 6th, 1921, 
and on March 31st, 1922, the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act 
1922^^^ was passed by the Imperial Parliament giving to the 
Treaty the force of law. The Irish Free State also passed 
Acts to abolish the Oath of Allegiance, the appeal to the 
Privy Council, and the office of the Governor-General, and in 
1937 enacted a new Constitution which was approved in a referendum 
by the electorate. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this 
thesis to give all the details of the controversy about the 
source of the authority of the constituent powers of the Irish 
Free State because the only reference intended is to the views
(l) Geo.3.C.4. (l) Wlieare’s view.
expressed by the Judicial Committee in the case of Moore v.
The Attorney General for the Irish Free S t a t e . I t  may, 
therefore, be stated straight away that the question at issue 
was whether or not the Irish Free State was competent to abolish 
the right of Appeal to the Judicial Committee which was effected 
by the Irish Free State constitution (Amendment) Act 1935.
In the opinion of the Judicial Committee, the Constitution of 
the Irish Free State derived its validity from the Act of the 
Imperial Parliament, the Irish Free Constitution Act, 1922.
This Act established the Constitution subject to the provisions 
of the Constituent Act. lord Sankey, while discussing this 
point, observed that, "The position may be summed up as follows:
(1) The Treaty and the Constituent Act respectively form parts
of the Statute Law of the United Kingdom, each of them 
being part of an Imperial Act.
(2) Before the passing of the Statute of Westminster, it was
not competent for the Irish Free State Parliament to 
pass an Act abrogating the Treaty because the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act forbade a Dominion Legislature to pass 
a law repugnant to an Imperial Act.
(3) The effect of the Statute was to remove the fetter which
lay upon the Irish Free State Legislature by reason of 
the Colonial Laww Validity Act. That Legislature can 
now pass Acts repugnant to an Imperial Act. In this 
case they have done so."  ^^ ^
Wheare, discussing the effect of the passing of the 
Statute on the Irish Free State’s authority states that "on the 
conservative interpretation which has been preferred in this 
book (The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status) all that 
Section 2 (2) of the Statute did was to empower the Oireachtas
(1) A.O. (1935) 484.
(2) Ibidem, p. 498.
to repeal or amend any Act of the United Kingdom Parliament 
(so far as it was part of the law of the Free State) to which 
an Act of the Oireachtas, passed after the enactment of the 
Statute and otherwise valid, was repugnant. It did not empower 
the Oireachtas to repeal or amend every Act whatsoever of the 
United Kingdom Parliament so far as it was part of the law of 
the FreeState."^^^ But further he asserts a nice point: "Now
an Act of the Oireachtas to he 'otherwise valid' must he 
intra vires, and to he intra vires it must not purport to amend 
the Constitutional Act not to go beyond the terms of the Scheduled 
T r e a t y . H e  concludes on this view that the Oireachtas, 
even after the passing of the Statute, remained within the fetters 
imposed by the terms of the Treaty. Remarking on the decision 
of the Judicial Committee and relying on the fact that the 
Irish Free State was accorded the same Constitutional status 
that was assumed by Canada, he says that "a decision in the 
Irish question based upon the Canadian case would have been 
natural." "Instead," he says, "their Lordships adopted what 
appears to be the liberal interpretation of Section Z (2) of
the Statute The language here is ambiguous. If by
'Imperial Act' is meant any Imperial Act, then it is possible 
that the Judicial Committee regarded Section 2 (2) of the 
Statute as extending the area of the powers of the Dominion 
Legislature, and abolishing the former restrictions of ultra 
vires. But if by 'Imperial Act' is meant any Imperial Act to 
which a Dominion Law otherwise valid and intra vires, is 
repugnant, then it must be assumed that in Moore's case, their 
Lordships did not recognise a restriction upon the powers of 
the Oireachtas other than that imposed by the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act ; they did not recognise, that is to say, a separate 
ground of invalidity, viz. ultra vires, which prevented the
(1) Wheare: op.cit. 267.
(2) Ibidem.
Oireachtas from amending the Constituent Act or from trans­
gressing the area marked out by the terms of the Scheduled 
T r e a t y . T h e  judicial Committee, in short, recognised 
the principle that the Statute removed all fetters in strict 
law imposed on her, though there existed a power in the 
Parliament to legislate for the Irish Free State. Moreover, 
the fetters emerging from the Agreement, being of international 
character, in municipal law, could be removed in virtue of 
the powers conferred by the Statute. On the strength of 
these arguments it may be concluded that the Constitution 
(Removal of Oath) Act, 1933, which purported to repeal 
Section 2 of the Constituent Act and delete the words 'within 
the terms of the Scheduled Treaty' from Article 50 of the
f (4)
Constitution was valid.  ^^  Similarly, the Act of 1933 repealing 
reservation and power of the Governor-General to refuse to 
assent to Bills, or the Act of 1933^^^abolishing the appeal 
by special leave and the Act of 1935^^^ abolishing the office 
of Governor-General were valid enactments even if they happened 
to be repugnant to the terms of agreement. Still more 
important is the conclusion that "any enactment of the Oireachtas 
to abolish the Monarchy, or to provide for secession from the 
Coramonv/ealth, or to declare neutrality, would in strict law 
be valid."
There remains, the question of the new Constitution, 
adopted in 1937, under which the Irish Free State was named 
Eire; and was declared to be a sovereign Independent Republic, 
and also the question of the provision, made in the Constitution, 
that, for the purposes of the exercise of any executive function 
of the State in, or in connection with, its external relations, 
the Government may to such extent and subject to such conditions,
’1) Wheare: op.oit. pp.268-9- 
,2) Ibidem.; loraem.
3) Ibidem, in Liberal view only which was adopted by P.O.
4) No. 44, 1933. (5) No. 45, 1933.
6) No. 57, 1936.
7) Ibidem, p. 270. (8) Ibidem. (Liberal view)
if any, as may be determined by law, avail itself of or
adopt for the like purpose by the mfembers of any group or
League of Nations with which the State is or becomes associated
for the purposes of international co-operation in matters of
common concern." It may be asserted without any difficulty
that Eire, though an Independent Sovereign Republic, still
continued to be a member of the British Commonwealth in virtue
of the above cited provision in Eire's Constitution. The King,
though uhknown to the municipal law of Eire, still continued
to function as a King in her external affairs and in virtue of
this fact, it would not be far wrong to say that the allegiance
to the King in this respect disappeared from the sphere of
municipal law. The Irish view on this point will be discussed 
subsequently.
VII.
The Indian Independence Act has been described as 
a Conveyance of Sovereignty.^^^ Now it is proposed here to 
see, in the light of the provisions of the Act, how far this 
statement is correct. Section 6 (2) of the Indian Independence 
Act runs as follows: "No law and no provision of any law
made by the Legislature of either of the new Dominions shall 
be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to 
the law of England, or to the provisions of "this" or to any 
existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, 
and the powers of the Legislature of each Dominion include 
the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or 
regulation in so far as it is part of the law of the Dominion." 
It is evident that this Section 6 (2) is word for word the 
same as Section 2 (2) of the Statute of Westminster except
(1) See Chapternon the Title and the Scope of the Act.
(2) Inverted commas mine.
the word "this" which is not found in the Section 
of the Statute of Westminster. In contrast to the Indian 
Independence Act the word "this" does not appear in the 
Ceylon Independence Act. In other words, the First Schedule, 
Section 1 of the Ceylon Independence Act is nothing more or 
less than a mere reproduction of Section 2 of the Statute.
The question arises whether the inserting of "this" makes 
any difference in the powers of the legislatures of the new 
Dominions and those of the Legislature of the Dominion of 
Ceylon or those of other Dominions. In other words, "this" 
clearly means the Independence Act itself which in, virtue of 
"this" can he amended or repealed by the Legislatures of 
the new Dominions but the same can not be effected by the 
Legislatures of Ceylon or those of other Dominions.
This question can not be answered without reference 
to the divergent vieww expressed on this point by different 
authorities. Keith opined that "the rule laid down applies 
only to aji Act existing when the Statute was passed or enacted 
in future; it does not apply to the Statute itself, which 
can not be varied by Dominion Legislation, since this would 
destroy the safeguards for the Canâdian and Australian 
Constitutions." Jennings states that "it is arguable, 
however, that Section 2 does not apply to any Act which itself 
defines Legislative powers. It may be said that if a Legis­
lature has power to legislate on subjects A, B  E. by
Imperial Act, a Power to repeal Imperial Act is a power to
repeal Imperial Acts on subjects A, B E. and does not
include the power to amend the Act creating the Legislative
powers so as to apply it to subjects F......  It must be
admitted that the express saving of the British North America 
Acts, the Constitution and Constitution Act of Australia 
and the Constitution Act of New Zealand weakens this argument.
(l) Keith: The Dominions as Sovereign States, p.75»
It is nevertheless not without f o r c e . L a t h a m ,  in a
very characteristic sentence, points out that the Statute,
however creative in the political sphere, brought purely a
(2 )negative contribution in law. ^
But the Privy Council in Moore's case has recognised
that the Irish Free State was competent to go beyond the
limitations imposed by the Treaty. This has been criticised
on the ground that the language used by the Privy Council was
both ambiguous and c a r e l e s s . W h e a r e r a i s e s  a very
subtle point in this respect. Is the Independence Act (in the
case of Ceylon) or the Statute of Westminster an existing Act
of Parliament? If it is - and the case for this view seems
sound - why was it thought necessary to include "this" in
the Indian Independence Act? He further a r g u e s i f  "this"
was put in to resolve doubts for India and Pakistan, why was
it not for Ceylon also? Is some limitation intended upon
Ceylon's legislative competence? It may not console the
people of Ceylon to know that the difference is probably due
to nothing more than a diffefence of draftsmen.
In the light of foregoing quotations of the eminent
authorities on this subject and differences existing on the
point of construction it can not be denied that Section 2
of the Statute is inconclusive. There was, at least, room
left for doubts.
The Indian Independence Act, if it does nothing
else, at leastlemoves the doubts expressed on this point.
It is quite obvious that those authorities expressing doubt
outweigh those who hold that the Dominion Parliaments acquired
powers to amend or repeal the Statute itself. From the
standpoint of India and Palcistan it was necessary to acquire
(1) Jenning)and Young: Constitutional Law of the
British Empire (1938), p.265.
(2) Latham: Law and the Commonwealth.
(3) Keith: The Dominions ascSovereign States, p.182
ref. Letters on Current Imperial and International 
Problems (1935-1936) pp.38.
(4) Wheare: The Constitutional Changes in the British
Commonwealth.
(5) Ibidem.
those rights in definite, precise and certain terms.
It is very strange that the Ceylon Independence 
Act once again has been drafted in uncertain terms. This 
kind of draftsmanship raises suspicion. Section (2) of the 
Statute which has been reproduced word for word in First 
Schedule S.I. of the Ceylon Independence Act, had undergone 
considerable criticism, and doubts were expressed whether 
the Dominions could amend or repeal the Statute itself.
It was probably in view of these doubts that in the Indian 
Independence Act the word "this", precisely referring to the 
Act itself, was inserted. It may, in the light of the above 
considerations, be asserted that as far as the Indian 
Independence Act is concerned the legislative powers transferred 
to the new Dominions’ Legislatures were precise and certain 
and any interpretation of Section 6 (2) on its own strength 
is conclusive.
According to Wheare; "Section 2 (2) empowers a 
Dominion Parliament to repeal or amend those United Kingdom 
Acts only to which a Dominion Law is repugnant. But no
Dominion law is a law unless it is intra vires; and the
issue of repugnancy does not arise, therefore, unless the 
law is already intra vires. T o  put it in another way; 
the Acts of the Dominions should be within the powers of the 
Dominion Parliaments. Suppose a certain Act of a Dominion 
Parliament is repugnant to an Act of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom but the Act of the Parliament of that Dominion 
is ultra vires, it will in itself be effective to prevent 
the operation of the Act in that Dominion, unless it is
rendered intra vires. In the case of India or Pakistsm,   ( '
in virtue of the Clause 6 (2),the question of competence
does not arise at all. Whatever the Legislatures of the new
(1) Wheare: op.oit. p. 163*
Dominions enact whether extra vires or repugnant to the Act 
of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, would become the law 
of the new Dominions. The former prevail over the latter.
VIII.
The Statute, as already explained, had to replace 
the rule of construction in the S.I. of the laws of the 
Colonial Laww Validity Act, 1865. It was : "An Act of 
Parliament, or any provision thereof, shall, in construing 
this Act, be said to extend to any Colony by the express 
words or necessary Intendment of any Act of Parliament."
The Colonial laws Validity Act, itself an important measure 
in the direction of self-government in the Colonies, had 
become out of date and new measures, first in the form of 
Conventions which rendered laws obsolete, then in the form 
of the Statute replacing the limited measure of Legislative 
independence conferred by the former Act, were imperative.
No such legislation would have been complete without a new 
rule of construction. Section 4 was incorporated in the Act 
to fulfil this need. The rule of construction appeared in 
Section 4 of the Statute.
In the preamble of the S t a t u t e i t  was declared 
that "it is in accordance with the established constitutional 
position that no law hereafter made by the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom shall extend to any of the said Dominions 
as part of the law of that Dominion otherwise than at the 
request and with the consent of that Dominion." But as it 
appeared in the preamble it did not establish this rule 
on a legal basis, hence the necessity of including
(1) 3rd paragraph.
it in the body of the Statute. The same principle appeared 
in Section 4 of the Statute: "No Act of Parliament of the 
United Kingdom passed after the commencement of this Act 
shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part 
of the law of that Dominion unless it is expressly declared
in that Act that that Dominion has requested, and consented
(1)to, the enactment thereof."'*  ^ It is interesting here to note 
that reference to the "established position" was omitted from 
Section4.
It has already been observed that owing to doubts 
and uncertainties about the legal effectiveness of the 
Section 4 of the Statute, the Union of South Africa re-enacted 
this Section. This runs: "The Parliament of the Union shall 
be the sovereign legislative power in and over the Union, 
and notwithstanding anything in any other law contained, no 
Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland passed after the eleventh day of December 1931> shall 
extend to be deemed to extend, to the Union as part of the 
law of the Union, unless extended thereto by an Act of the 
Parliament of the Union.
But Section 3 giving legal effect to the Statute 
of Westminster was: "The parts of the Statute of Westminster 
1931 22 Geo.0.4 and the Afrikaans version thereof, set 
forth in the Schedule to this Act, shall be deemed to be an 
Act of the Parliament of the Union and shall be construed 
accordingly,"  ^^
Some points are raised on the question of the 
re-enactment and modification. The first point of interest 
is; how far Sections 2 and 3 agree with each other because 
Section 3 gives legal effect to the entire Statute of
(1) Section 4 (22 Geo.5, 0.4.)
(2) The Status of the Union Act 1934. No. 69 of 1934 (S.2.)
(3) Section 3: It may be noted here that the complete
Preamble and Sections 1,2,3,4,5,6,11 and 12 of
the Statute with the modifications in Sections 1,4 and
11, were scheduled to the Act.
Westminst er including the Preamble. In Jennings’ words ;
"The effect is that Sections 2 and 3 of the Union Act are 
in part contradictory. He further concludes that Section 2 
is the governing provision, since Section 4 of the Statute 
of Westminster is merely incorporated. It would therefore 
be effective as a partial amendment of Section 4 of the 
Statute of Westminster which had conferred power to repeal 
or to amend the Acts of the Parliament. But, seeing that 
there is no express provision to empower the Union Parliament 
to repeal or amend the Statute itself, he asserts that no 
positive answer can be given.
Latham suggested that "it is of course from the 
orthodox point of view, invalid. But on the assumption that 
not the Imperial but the nationalist theory is true, it only 
requires the re-enactment of the South African Act by the
Union Parliament and there will be no need to look
beyond the Union Statute Book for the whole of the written 
Constitutional Law of the Union."
It appears from the points raised in the above 
discussion that the Status of the Union Act is, from the 
orthodox point of view, invalid on the ground that Sections
2 and 3 of the Act as explained abève are contradictory.
(2)
In Nalhwana v. Hofmeyr the Supreme Court of the 
Union of South Africa decided that with the repeal of the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act, the Parliament of the Union had 
become a Sovereign Legislature of the same status as the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Court declined to 
question the Validity of the Act of the Parliament of the 
Union on the ground of its being ultra vires the Union of 
South Africa Act 1909* The Court remarked that the Bill, 
having received the Royal assent, was binding on the Courts
(1) Jennings, op.oit. p.266
(2) (1937) A.D. 229; Journal of Comparative
Legislation & International Law. 
Ser. Ill, XIX. 271.
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who would accept a King's Printer's Copy as conclusive evidence.
The Court asserted that in Section 2 of the Status of the
Union Act, 1934, the Parliament of the Union had been declared
to be a Sovereign Legislative Power in and over the Union;
and only bound by those enactments of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom which were extended to the Union by an Act
of the Union Parliament. In Krause v. Commissioner for
R e v e n u e t h e  appellate Division held that the South African
Act 1909 was amended by implication "pro tanto". The Statute
of Westminster in its own right became law of the Union.
If the Statute of Westminster was law in the Union then it
implied that any reference to the Statute in any subsequent
enactment of the Parliament should mean the Statute (22 Geo.5.0.4)
and nothing else.
Now turning to the Indian Independence Act ;
Section 4 of the Statute as modified for the purposes of the
Status Act of the Union of South Africa, 1934, appeared in
Section 6 (4) in these words: "No Act of Parliament of the
United Kingdom passed on or after the appointed day shall
extend, or be deemed to extend, to either of the new Dominions
as part of the law of that Dominion unless it is extended
(o\
thereto by a law of the Legislature of the Dominion."' *
The most important thing about Section 6 (4) is 
that the rule of construction incorporated in the Statute of 
Westminster with the modifications made in it for the purposes 
of the re-enactment in The Status of the Union of South Africa 
Act, appeared in the Indian Independence Act of the Imperial 
Parliament. This Section, as regards its validity, is beyond
question as it is enacted by the Imperial Parliament. It
would aldo have been possible that this Section if left as 
it appeared in the Statute of Westminster could be altered
in virtue of Section 6 (2) in any way the Legislatures of
(1)
(2) 10 & 11 Geo. 6. C.50. Section 4.
India and Pakistan thought suitable for these countries.
As explained already, Section 6 (2) bestowed on the Legislatures 
of the New Dominions powers to alter the Indian Independence 
Act itself. It was, therefore, immaterial whether Section 5 (4) 
was incorporated as it originally appeared in the Statute or 
with the modifications which were made in.it for the purposes 
of the Status Act of the Union. In view of the fundamental 
change brought about with the Insertion of the word "this" in 
Section 6 (2) of the Indian Independence Act, it was probably 
thought more appropriate to follow the wording of the Status 
Act rather than the Statute of Westminster in which case the 
Legislatures of the New Dominions would have taken steps soon 
after independence to amend . the Act itself. This would have, 
certainly, added to the difficulties that the Eastern people 
encountered in understanding the complex nature of the 
Dominion Status. It was a wise gesture that the wording of 
the Status Act was adopted in Section 6 (4) of the Indian 
Independence Act.
It is evident that the Union of South Africa replaced 
the Statute of Westminster as far as the Union was concerned 
with the Status Act and thereby invited the Courts to follow 
a new line of construction. In other words, they were provided 
with a new theory not to look beyond the Union of South Africa. 
To borrow Latham*s expression - "the Courts were invited to 
assert a local root to South African law and jurisdiction in 
place of the Imperial one" - but they did not succeed in their 
objective. At least, in the view of some eminent writers, 
the theoretical basis of the Imperial Supremacy remained 
unaffected. It would have been possible to attain this 
objective if there appeared no conflict between the Sections 
2 and 5 of the Status Act but as explained the Act became 
self-contradictory. It is quite a different thing to say 
that there is no difference between India and Pakistan on
the one side and South Africa on the other. From a practical 
point of view there is no difference between Canada and South 
Africa too. It is also true that the Courts in South Africa 
have adhered to the rule of construction provided in the 
Status Act, but it was at the same time open for the Courts 
to take a different line of argument and conclude that the 
Status Act was ultra vires. It is unnecessary for the purposes 
of cbmparison with the Indian Independence Act, to go into 
details and examine whether there existed any "bastion against 
parliamentary recklessness". But considering the question 
purely in the light of the above discussion, one can not help 
concluding that the Union Parliament has failed at least in 
theory to attain the objective of sovereign status thro^ugh 
the procedure adopted for the purposes of enacting the Status 
Act. But .no such limitations are implied in the Indian 
Independence Act. When Sections 6 (2) and 6 (4) are read 
together it becomes obvious that the Legislatures of the New 
Dominions have gained not only the Status bestowed upon the 
Dominions by the Statute of Westminster but also that which 
South Africa failed to attain through the re-enactment.
What was doubtful in the case of South Africa is certain and 
definite in the case of India and Pakistan,
Comparing Section 6 (4) of the Indian Independence 
Act with its counterpart in the Ceylon Independence Act, 
especially in the light of the fact that "this" is included 
in Section 6 (2) of the Indian Independence Act whereas it 
does not appear in the First Schedule Section 1 of the Ceylon 
Act, it appears doubtful whether the Legislature of Ceylon 
has become, at least from a theoretical point of view, as 
much independent of the Imperial Parliament as the Legislature 
of the new Dominions. It appears more sound to hold that the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom has not lost its legal 
Supremacy over the Legislature of Ceylon. This difference
becomes more significant when this question is considered 
from the standpoint of the Sovereignty of the Imperial 
Parliament.
There is an interesting question raised on the 
basis of the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament. Has 
the Imperial Parliament accepted any limitations on its 
sovereignty? Has it abolished it altogether through the 
Statute of Westminster? If it has accepted any limitations 
or abolished it for the purposes of the legislation for the 
Dominion in the future; was it right for a sovereign body 
like the Imperial Parliament to do this? On the strength 
of the well established theory of the sovereignty of the 
Parliament that has been accepted by the Courts of the United 
Kingdom and all the Dominions such a gesture as to bind the 
Imperial Parliaments sovereign action in the future according 
to the terms of Section 4 of the Statute would be negation 
of the very theory. It was, therefore, held that Section 4 
of the Statute was a rule of construction directed to the 
Courts but not to the Imperial Parliament.^^^To put it another 
way, the Imperial Parliament by enacting Section 4 of the 
Statute of Westminster, did not in strict law, diminish or 
abolish its power to legislate for the Dominions. The Imperial 
Parliament, in strict law, in the future could pass an Act 
with disregard to the procedure laid down in Section 4 or that 
declared in the third paragraph of the Preamble, that is 
without declaring that the request and consent of the Dominion 
Parliament has been obtained. This Act, if in sufficiently 
express terms, indicates that it should apply to a Dominion 
in spite of its being repugnant to any laWof the Dominion, 
the Act of the Imperial Parliament would be accepted to be 
prevailing over that of the Dominions and thus would amount 
to repeal "pro tanto" of Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster,
(1) Wheare op.cit. p. 153.
das'
"On this accepted theory of the sovereignty of the United 
Kingdom Parliament, no law it makes can deprive it of 
supremacy over that law." "It was argued in the Irish 
Parliament that the fact that the Imperial Parliament can
(2)
remove restrictions implies that it can at will re-impose them." 
This theory was accepted by the Judicial Committee in the 
British Coal Corporation case. Lord Sankey observed; "It is 
doubtless true that the power of the Imperial Parliament to 
pass on its own initiative any legislation that it thought 
fit extending to Canada remains in theory unimpaired; indeed, 
the Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of abstract law, 
repeal or disregard Section 4 of the Statute.
The Courts have certainly accepted the theory as a 
legal doctrine and "it is in itself a result of the alliance 
between ITbh Century Common lawyers and Parliament"; and there 
is no Statute to cite as its source. - It however, can not be 
denied that there do^  exist controversies^^^within the Empire 
as regards the right of the Imperial Parliament to legislate 
for the Colonies. The American Revolution, in substance, 
was the result of the assertion of the sovereignty of the 
Imperial Parliament in the Colonies, and equally emphatic had 
been its extension in Ireland, but in both cases the assertion 
was met with revolutions, indeed of some difference. In spite 
of these controversies there exists the legal doctrine and it 
was accepted in the Imperial Conferences. The fact that 
measures to remove these restrictions were recommended by 
these Conferences, implied that the sovereignty of the Imperial 
Parliament was recognised by the parties. The Resolutions 
of the Conference to this effect makes it all the more emphatic.
(1) Wheare op.cit. 154. Cf.Keith; The Constitutional
Law of the Dominions op.cit. p.58-9.
(2) Keith: loc.cit. p.38.
(3) (1935) A.C.p.520.
(4) Schuyler: Parliament and the British Empire,
wherein he discusses the American and Irish 
points of view.
The British sovereignty over the possessions of 
the East India Company was formally declared in 1813, but as 
already observed the scope of its operation was left indefini4&) 
When the■Parliament enacted in..1858 for the direct administration 
of India under the Grown thereby putting an end to the 
Government of the Company, it did nothing more than replace 
the Company*s administration with that of the Secretary of 
India who also happened to be a member of the Cabinet. This 
did not amount to annexation in the strict sense.' of the word.
On the other hand it is obvious that the international personality 
of India, as it existed after the disappearance of the Moghul 
Emperor, under the East India Company, was allowed to continue. 
The evidence of continuity of India's international personality 
was recognised by other sovereign States when India joined 
the Universal Postal Union in 1876$^^ The procedure of admission 
was exactly the same as for sovereign States. This instance 
is all the more important because a common representative 
signed the Convention of 1878 both for Great Britain and 
Canada whereas a separate representative signed for India.' ' 
Would it be far wrong to conclude that India possessed complete 
international personality which of course was a continuity 
of its personality under the Company when the Company itself 
was recognised both in India and in Great Britain as sovereign 
in its own right, while the international personality of the 
senior Dominion Canada was still incomplete. India*s admission, 
therefore, to the League of Nations was nothing more than a 
further step towards accepting what in fact existed.
It may also be recalled here that the direct 
administration of India in the name of the Cromi, ih substance 
was based on the theory of trust propounded by Burke in his
(1) See Chapter on "Sanctions behind British
Sovereignty in India."
(2) See Chapter on "The Evolution of Self-determination"
13) Ibidem. Cf. Stewart R.B. Treaty Relations of
the British Commonwealth, p. 117.
(4) See Chapter on British Sovereignty.
famous s pee c h e s . U n d e r  such circumstances it can not be 
said that the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament over 
India was of the kind that existed over the Colonies. The 
fact that the East India Company, a British subject, was 
recognised by the British Government as a sovereign in India 
set the relations of the Company on a different footing than 
would have otherwise been the case. The Eaja of Sarawak,
Sir James Brooke, both a servant and a subject of the British 
Crown, was placed on the equal footing of a sovereign, thereby 
establishing diplomatic relations and demanding compensations 
for the damage caused to one of the ships of the Sarawak 
Government. The position of the East India Company was 
slightly different in the fact that the British Parliament 
had set up a Committee to exercise a sort of check, but 
nonetheless the identity of the Company waw distinct. The 
proclamation of sovereignty in 1813 was made without any 
previous declaration to this effect; but still did not go 
beyond declaration. The administration of the Country and 
the exercise of sovereignty remained within the jurisdiction 
of the Company.
The British Government was bound in good faith 
to guarantee the performance of the obligations of Trust 
placed in the Company by the Moghul Emperor because they 
allowed their subject, the East India Company, to accept the 
office of Valcil-ul-Mutlaq. The fact that the Company on the 
Enquiry was found guilty of maladministration aswell as breach 
of trust, under these circumstances, forced the British 
Government and Parliament to assume direct administration.
The arrangements made for the administration of India, in 
substance, were analogous to those made for the administration 
of the mandated territories. The administration arrangements 
made "for the time being" can not justifiably be continued for 
ever. These arrangements had to come to an end as was the
(1) See Chapter on British Sovereignty.
(2) See details; McNair; Aspects of State
Sovereignty, British Year Book of Inter. law.^ >
administration of Palestine terminated. The theory of the 
sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament does not, therefore, 
apply to India; in the first place India has nerver been a 
Colony hence no theorynapplicable to them is equally sound 
for India, and in the second place, the Indian Independence 
Act in spirit is more analogous in this respect to the 
termination of the administration of the mandated countries. 
While India was under the administration of the Crown, the 
sovereignty, in its executive aspect, was exercised in hhe 
name of the Grown so it belonged to it, but there was one 
condition,that is; the sovereignty belonged to the Crown only 
in its executive aspect while the creative sovereignty was 
with the people; maybe that this remained under suspense.
The controversy over sovereignty over the mandated area is 
in international law, as much controversial as is the question 
of ownership of trust in private law. Whatever be the 
controversial aspects of this question, the premis is sound 
at least * in equity if not in strict law.
The theory of the sovereignty of the Imperial 
Parliament, therefore, was not a bar, for the transfer of 
sovereignty over India to the natural heirs with whom the 
creative sovereignty remained in suspense. The question that 
the Imperial Parliament can not bind itself by any Act for 
the future not to enact for the Dominions without regard to 
Section 4> does not arise in the case of India- The Indian 
Independence Act is, in this sense, a conveyance of sovereignty.
It may be recalled that the Indian Independence 
Act is nothing more than a mere legal expression of the 
agreements reached by the three parties, namely. The Congress, 
The Muslim League and the British Government. It was announced 
more than once during the debates on the Indian Independence 
Bill that the changes in the draft of the Bill were made in 
accordance with the agreement with the Indian parties or on
the suggestion of the Partition Council, which., as has^been 
seen in the preceding chapters, was a representative body 
acting on behalf of the Congress and the Muslim League to 
take final decision on the issues involved in the partition 
of the country, its assets, etc. At least one amendment 
was, in fact, made by the Government entirely on the suggestion 
of the Partition Council.
It will be argued that the Indian Independence Act 
does not say that the Parliament of the United Kingdom has 
abolished its power to legislate for India and Pakistan. It, 
on the other hand, definitely speaks of legislating for India 
and Pakistan and lays down a rule of construction that the 
Acts thus enacted by the Imperial Parliament can be extended 
to the new Dominion by the Acts of the legislatures of the 
new Dominions and as such the provision made in Section 6 (4) 
is nothing mdre than a mere rule of construction. This being 
a rule of construction, can not be said to be directed to the 
Imperial Parliament but is rather directed to the Courts of 
the new Dominion.
The flr:st and most important point that need be
mentioned in this context is that the Imperial Resolutions
had admitted the legal supremacy of the sovereignty of the
Imperial Parliament, All Dominions were committed to the
theory of the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament and its
implications, not only in virtue of the theory but also 
because
conventionally ./ they as sovereign States recognised it in 
the resolutions. The matter was not left to the resolutions 
only which owed its existence to the consensus of the parties 
but some of them were incorporated in the preamble of the 
Statute. Keith went to the extent of saying that the Preamble 
to the Statute has the effect of rendering secession of the 
Dominions from the Commonwealth conventionally impossible.
(1) Keith; The King and the Imperial Crown, p.449.
In the words of Wheare, India was neither the India which was 
admitted to these Conferences nor the resolutions of the 
Imperial Conferences were intended to extend to India, It 
follows, therefore, that India and Pakistan are not committed 
to the resolutions. Further, there is no Preamble attached 
to the Indian Independence Act which sets forth the resolutions 
or other conventions. The Statute of Westminster in the third 
paragraph declares the,resolution that no Act of the Imperial 
Parliament would be deemed to extend to the Dominions unless 
declared therein that the Act was enacted on the request and 
with the consent of the Dominions. The same declaration appears 
in the body of the Statute thereby providing à rule of 
construction. It is obvious that there are no such consider­
ations attached to Section 6 (4)» There is no reference 
whatsoever in the Act either to the Statute of Westminster 
or the Conferences. Nor there is any contractual binding as
is found in the case of Ceylon which has accepted all resolutions
(o')and conventions by a separate agreement.'  ^Now the fact that 
no where in the Act is said in.express terms or suggested in 
any other way that the Imperial Parliament shall not or can 
not enact for the new Dominions must be considered from a 
different and an independent angle. India and Pakistan became 
Dominions and continued to be Dominions until they decided 
otherwise. The fact that there were certain laws common to 
all the members of the Commonwealth, such as the law of 
nationality made it imperative that the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom, of course not as the Imperial Parliament, 
should take the initiative in the field of the common legislation, 
The advantages of such provisions will be discussed in detail 
in the subsequent chapter; however, it may be remakked that
(1) Wheare holds that India and Palcistan being
Dominions, it would be reasonable to assume
that they are bound by the resolutions.
(2) cmd.
the Indian Independence Act has suggested a new line of 
approach towards the Commonwealth. Section 4 is the rule of 
construction for Section 6 (2) of the Act. This Section as 
seen already has bestowed on the legislatures of India and 
Pakistan all that was conferred on the Dominions by the Statute 
plus all that South Africa would have gained by the re-enact­
ment, had there been no doubts as regards its validity, and 
also all that India or Pakistan would like to attain throu^
some amendment or repeal. For example, the abolition of oath 
for the purposes of municipal law, 
of allegiance/and the abolition of the reference to the King
in the assent of the Governor-General to the Bills, were
matters which in fact have made some substantial difference
within the sphere of the Commonwealth.
The difference lies in the fact that India and 
Palcistan in virtue of the Independence Act were able to 
accomplish all that the Irish Free State did through 
revolutionary measures; at least in the Irish view, or South 
Africa by adopting a divergent line of approach. As in 
Section 6 (2) powers to amend or repeal th§. Act itself were 
conferred, and in Section 6 (4) wording of the Status Act 
was adopted without, of course, the problems of conflict in 
Sections 2 and 3 of the Status Act, all this was possible 
without dL sturbing law. The significant changes that were 
brought about in these two new Dominions while remaining 
within the legal orbit, when compared with other Dominions 
which still have status quo or have gone out of the relation­
ship, make the difference more appreciable.
The difference further lies in the fact that the 
transfer of sovereignty to India dnd Pakistan has been effected 
in strictly express terms and unreservedly ^ence there is no 
need to call in the conventions for the support to establish 
equqlity of the Dominions vis-a-vis the United Kingdom.
IX.
The Statute of Westminster conferred powers on 
the Parliaments of the Dominions to make laws having extra­
territorial o p e r a t i o n . T h e  Parliament of Canada passed the 
Extra-territorial Act in 1933*^^^ The purpose of this Act 
was to remove doubts that were raised in the case of Croft v. 
Dunphy.^^^  The Judicial Committee had to decide, in this case, 
"whether or not certain Canadian legislation passed before 
the commencement-of the Statute of Westminster had extra­
territorial operation." Their Lordships held that the 
legislation passed by the Parliament had extra-territorial 
effect, but their decision was based on the British North 
America Act and therefore did not consider it necessary to 
decide whether the Section 3 of the Statute was retrospective 
in effect or not. It is obvious from the decision in this 
case that the considerations of a sovereign State were given 
Tfeight and the decision was based on this principle only.
As regards India, it has been discussed at some 
length^^^ that the Federal Court of India in the cases of 
(1) Governor-General in Council v. Raleigh Investment Go. Ltd. 
and (2) Wallace Bros. & Co.Ltd. v. Commissioners of Income Tax, 
declared "obiter" that "though the Statute of Westminster is 
not applicable to India,the Constitution Act of 1935 had to 
be interpreted in the light of the discussions on the subject 
that had been taking place between 1926 and 1935, and therefore 
the powers of the Federal Legislature of India was not limited
to the cases specified in clauses (a) to (b) of Subsection E.l.
of Section 9 9 . of the Government of India Act, 1935."
(1) Section 3.
(2) Cap. 39 of 1932-3.
(3) (1933) A.C. 156.
(4) See Chapter on "The Title and the Scope of the Act."
(5) Ibid.
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Observations of the Court in these cases though "obiter" 
were justified on the principles of international considerations 
on which the case of Croft v. Dunphy was decided. India acted 
as an international person even before Canada did. The 
reference to India’s admission to the universal postal union 
has been made already.
The Indian Independence Act, in Section 6 (1), 
confers powers on the Legislatures of the new Dominions to 
make laws having extra-territorial operation. It runs;
"The Legislature of each of the new Dominions shall have 
power to make laws for that Dominion, including laws having 
extra-territorial operation." There is a slight difference 
in the wording of this Section when compared with its counter­
part in the Statute but it is of no significance. The Indian 
Independence Act sets the declaration of the Federal Court 
in the above cited cases on a legal basis, as was done by 
the Statute. The Legislatures of India and Pakistan acquired 
power in legal terms under this Section to make laws having 
éxtra-territorial operation.
In Section 6 (6) it has further been clafified 
that "the power referred to in Sub-Section (1) of this 
Section extends to the making of laws limiting for the 
future the powers of the Legislature of the Dominion."
On this point Wheareraises, indeed, a very interesting 
question; How can a sovereign Parliament bind itself?
The Attorney-General, replying to a question raised on this 
sub-Section, said that "the position in regard to sub-Section
(6) was that it would be open to the Legislature to provide 
for a Federal Court of Constitution under which the powers 
of the different Legislatures are limited; certain subjects 
being assigned to the one and certain subjects to the other.
(l) Wheare; Constitutional Changes in the 
Gommonwealth, op.cit.
If it did that, it would need to make provision that the powers 
of the particular provincial legislatures should be limited.
That is the object of the Sub-Section." The wording of the 
Sub-Section (6) being in general terms, appears to be rather 
misleading and one is lead to conclude that the Legislatures 
of the Dominions will have powers to bind themselves in 
respect of lawa having extra-territorial operation. The 
Sub-Section states "that the power referred to in Sub-Section (l) 
(that is of making laws having extra-territorial operation) 
of this Section extends to the making of laws limiting for the 
future the powers of the Legislature of the Dominion." But 
why this limitation was necessary and in respect to what 
particular subject? Is it owing to the fact that Indian 
Constitution happened to be federal and the subjects allotted 
to the provincial Legislatures included certain subjects that 
involved extra-territorial questions? It is doubtful if this 
Section was necessary at all. The Legislatures of the new 
Dominions were rendered sovereign in every respect in virtue 
of Sections 6 (2) and 6 (4) and further clarification was made 
in respect of law of extra-territorial effect. The new 
Dominions assumed powers, constituent powers, both for the 
transition period as well as for a permanent Constitution.
There was no need of clarification on this point. The new 
Dominions acquired every power to make and adopt Oonstututions 
for the Countries hence it implied every power of sovereign 
character. In view of these considerations it may be construed 
that the effect of Section 6 (6) is nothing more than making 
powers of the Legislatures, which were both express and implied 
in other Sections, further emphatic. It m^st however be 
admitted that the wording is rather misleading. The intention 
of this Sub-Section as explained by the Attorney General was 
to make provisions to bestow powers for the transition period 
(1) Hansard: op.cit. Cols.82-3.
to make change in the subjects distributed between the 
Centre and the Provinces.
The Government of India Act,1935 had certain 
provisions entitling the Governor-General and the Governors 
of the Provinces to use their discretionary powers, but as a 
matter of convention they used these powers rarely and 
reluctantly. After India and Pakistan assumed Dominion status, 
"de facto" these provisions became obsolete, but it was 
necessary to abolish them altogether. In the Section 6 (3) 
it is declared; "The Governor-General of the new Dominions 
shall have full power to assent in His Majesty*s name to any 
law of the Legislature of that Dominion and so much of any 
Act as relates to the disallowance of laws by His Majesty 
or the reservation of laws for the significance of laws by 
His Majesty*s pleasure thereon or the suspension of the operation 
of laws until the signification of His Majesty*s pleasure thereon, 
shall not apply to laws of the Legislature of either of the 
new Dominions." It may be noted here that the Statute of 
Westminster did not make a complete repeal. It is true that 
the Dominion Parliaments were given powers to effect such a 
repeal; but in the case of India and Pakisatn, as appears from 
the above cited Sub-Section, it was considered undesirable to 
continue the status quo. The repeal in this respect for 
India and Pakistan is complete and exhaustive.
It was reported that a very interesting case came
before some Court of P a k i s t a n i I n  that case the
question was raised whether or not the Act which the Governor-
General of Pakistan assented to without signifying that he
was doing so in the name of His Majesty, was valid. The Court
is said to have held that such Act was invalid. In view of
this decision the provision to this effect was abolished, or
(1) The writer tried his level best to secure 
details of the case but could not.
They are yet awaited. This contention 
holds good even if the case.is considered 
as a hypothetical one.
in other words, the Indian Independence Act was amended to 
that extent. This evidently establishes that the Governor- 
General* s dependence on the advice of his minister is entirely 
like that of a Constitutional monarch. Even the reference to 
the King has become unnecessary and thereby the King seems to 
have disappeared althgether from the municipal law of Pakistan. 
The powers of discretion, of disallowance and of reservation 
altogether disappeared. The Statute of Westminster did not 
repeal them to this extent. Ceylon again in this respect is 
analogous to other Dominions.
The provision for the Instrunents of Instruction 
to the Governor General or the Governor of provinces was 
repealed in Section 18 (4). The Governor-General of the new 
Dominions and the Governors of the provinces of the new 
Dominions were required to act entirely on the advice of their 
ministers and there were no Instruments of Instruction to guide 
them in their conduct.
X.
In the Irish Free State, the authority for Constituent 
powers was claimed to be derived from the people. This view 
was expressed in the Ryan oase^^^ by the Judges of the Supreme 
Court of the Irish Free State. According to this view the 
authority for the constituent powers exercised by the third 
Dail as Constituent Assembly were derived from the people and 
also exercised in their name. The British view expressed in 
Moore's case^^^ was that the Irish Free State Parliament acquired 
powers to enact laws repugnant to the terms of the Treaty in 
virtue of the Statute of Westminster. The people were not
(1) (1931) I.R;P. 170. (The State lElL Ryan^and others
V. Lennon and others. )
(2) Supra.
3/y
reoognised to possess supreme legal authority to amend or 
abolish the Constitution or the Constituent Act. But after 
the enactment of the Statute, the Oireachtas acquired full 
power to amend or repeal the Constitution even if it was 
repugnant to the terms of the Treaty. In their Lordships’ 
view the authority came from the Statute and thus: from the 
Imperial Parliament. When the Irish Free State enactted the 
new Constitution in 1937, it was approved in a referendum by 
the electorate.
Before the Indian Independence Act was enacted, 
the Constituent Assembly was set up in 1946 in accordance with 
the Cabinet^Mission plan. The Constituent Assembly then 
in view of the difference existing between the Congress and 
the Muslim League on the interpretation of paragraph 19 of 
the Cabinet Mission plan which obliged the British Government 
to give their ruling in accordance with the legal opinion of 
the authors of the plan in favour of the view held by the Muslim 
League, was divided into two parts: one for India and the other 
for P a k i s t a n . T h e  Constituent Assemblies of India and Pakistan 
thus formed were not srovereign bodies. Now it is proposed to 
examine the status of the Constituent Assembles under the 
Indian Independence Act.
The Prime Minister explaining the nature of the Act 
during the debates on the Bill at the time of the Second Reading 
observed: "It will be the object of my Right Hon. Friends and 
myself to give the House the fullest information and explanation 
in our power, but there will inevitably be some matters on 
which it will not be possible to answer with precision, for 
this Bill is unlike other Bills dealing with India. It does 
not lay down, as in the 1935 Act, a new Constitution for India, 
providing for every detail. It is far more in the nature of
(1) See Chapter on "The Assertion of Self-Determination."
(2) Ibidem.
an enabling Bill - a Bill to enable the representatives of 
India and Pakistan to frame their own Constitutions, and 
to provide for the exceedingly difficult period of transition. 
Ever since the Cripps* Mission it has been the desire of 
successive Governments that the future Constitution of India 
should be framed by Indians and not by the Britishl^^ This 
clearly signifies that the purpose of the Indian Independence 
Bill "inter alia" was to give the legal force to the Constituent 
Assemblies of India and Pakistan set up under the Cabinet 
Mission Plan. The Indian Independence Act in Section 19 (5) 
defines the Constituent Assemblies of the new Dominions.
This Section as is evident from its wording, was drafted as 
such so as to suit any situation resulting from the referendum 
in the North-West Province and that of Assam as well as the 
decision in respect of the partition of the provinces of 
Bengal and the Punjab. Besides this, there is nothing in 
this Section about the powers of the Constituent Assemblies.
It deals only with their definition.
Section 8 (l) runs as follow#: "In the case of each 
of the new Dominions, the Powers of the Legislature of the 
Dominion shall, for the purpose of making provision as to the 
Constitution of the Dominion, be exercisable in the first 
instance by the Constituent Assembly of that Dominion, and 
references in this Act to the Legislature of the Dominion 
shall be construed accordingly.”
Sub-section (2) of this Section makes further 
clarification in this way: "Except in so far as other
provision is made or in accordance with a law made by the 
Constituent Assembly of the Dominion under Sub-Section (1) 
of this Section, each of the new Dominions and all the Provinces 
and other parts thereof shall be governed as nearly as may be 
in accordance with the Government of India Act, 1935; and the
(l) Hansard, op.cit. Col. 2473.
provisions of that Act, and of the orders in Council, rules 
and other instruments made thereunder, shall, so far as applicable 
and subject to any express provision of this Act, and with such 
omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as may be 
specified in orders of the Governor-General under the next 
succeeding Section, have effect accordingly"; or again 
Sub-Section 2 (e) of this Section makes provisions that "the 
powers of the Federal legislature under the Act of 1935, in 
the first instance, shall be exercisable by Constituent Assembly 
of the Dominion in addition to the Powers exercisable by that 
Assembly under Sub-Section (l) of this Section."
It is obvious from these provisions that the
Constituent Assemblies of the new Dominions were the creation
of the Imperial Parliament. It is also quite evident that the
Constituent Assemblies of the Dominions derived their legal
force from the Indian Independence Act. The point of interest
in the light of the above cited Sections of the Act, is to
fix the source of authority for the Constituent Assemblies
of India and Pakistan and also of the procedure of adopting
the Constitutions framed by them. To put it in another way,
it is desired here to enquire whether or not the Constituent
Assemblies were sovereign in the strict sense of the term
to frame as well as to adopt Constitutions for the new Dominions.
Then there is another point closely connected with the first one.
The Judicial Committee never said that the Oireachtas could not
adopt a Constitution repugnant to the terms of the Treaty.
Their Lordships held that the Oireachtas had powers to amend
or repeal the Constitution repugnanjb to the terms of the Treaty
but such powers were derived from the Statute. What is the
Assemblies
position of the Constituent/ of India and Pakistan? Are they 
fully sovereign both in regard to framing as well as adopting 
Constitutions for the new Dominions. If so, what isthe source
of their sovereignty? Will they be entitled to adopt the 
Constitutions relying on the authority of the people instead 
of the Indian Independence.Act?
It may here be clarified that there is nothing to 
prevent India or Palcistan to take any step within or without 
the scope of their legal competence and Britain would not 
interfere even if they transgressed the boundaries of law.
This was equally true of the Irish Free State. The point under 
consideration is whether or not, within the scope of the legal 
competence, that is, without transgressing or disturbing law, 
or in other words without creating revolution in law, the 
Constituent Assemblies of India and Pakistan could adopt the 
Constitutions of India or Pakistan in the name of the people 
thereby asserting the supreme authority of the people. India 
has in fact done this.
The Powers of the Legislatures of the Dominions 
for the purposes of making provisions as to the Constitution 
shall be exercisable by the Constituent Assemblies of the 
Dominions. The Constituent Assemblies were given all the powers 
for the purposes of making Constitutions that were conferred 
on the Legislatures of the Dominions in virtue of the other 
Sections already discussed in the above paragraphs. The 
Constituent Assemblies, therefore, were as much sovereign as 
the Legislatures of the Dominions for making laws for the 
Dominions. The Legislatures as seen already were empowered 
to amend or repeal the Indian Independence Act itself. It 
follows from this that the Constituent Assemblies of the 
Dominions will have, for the purposes of making provisions 
as to the Constitution of the Dominions, powers to repeal or 
amend the Indian Independence Act itself if it became necessary. 
This would be entirely within the legal competence of the 
Constituent Assemblies to asnend or repeal the Indian Independence
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Act; and as such became the sovereign bodies of the Dominions. 
There was. nothing fettering their action as sovereign bodies.
On the other hand, if any Act of the Imperial Parliament 
becomes repugnanÿ to Acts passed by the Constituent Assemblies 
or the Legislatures of the Dominion, they are repealed 
"pro tanto". They had, thus, powers not only to frame their 
Constitutions but also to adopt them. It appears questionable 
what the words "for the purpose of making provision as to the 
Constitution" purport. The Constituent Assemblies as such 
also had powers to lay down the procedure which the Indian 
and Pakistan Constituent Assemblies have done through the 
Objective Resolutions.
Section 6 (5) asserts that the Governor-General of 
the new Dominions shall have power to assent in His Majesty's 
name to any law of the Legislature of that Dominion and as 
a result of this all powers relating to disallowance of 
discretion and of reservation were abolished. Section 6 (5) 
abolished the authority of the United Kingdom Government and 
further in cotroboration of this Section 8 (2) (b),(c),(d) 
brings to an end all the arrangements on these points.
The Governor-General thus was rendered bound to 
give assent to any Bills presented to him in the name of 
His Majesty. But the Constituent Assemblies in virtue of 
Section 8 were empowered to make provisions as to the ConstitutloB 
of the Dominions and were free to adopt their own procedures.
In other words these bodies were sovereign even to the extent 
of providing for their own procedure. They preferred to have 
a President for each of them and thus they came out of the 
purview of the Indian Independence Act and as a result of that 
they could adopt the Constitution in whatever way they liked.
The Constitution of India was declared: "We, the people of 
India, having solemnly resolved to Constitute India into a 
Sovereign Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens:
Justice, social, economic and political;
Liberty of thought, expression, belief, 
faith and worship;
Equality of status and of opportunity; 
and to promote among them all
Fraternity, assuring the dignity of the
individual and the unity of the Nation;
in our Constituent Assembly this twenty sixth day of November,
Nineteen hundred and Forty nine, do hereby adopt enact and
give to ourselves this Constitution."
This Constitution came into force with the repeals 
of the Indian Independence Act, 1947.
The Constitution of India came into existence under 
the authority of the Constituent Assembly of India #iich 
certainly owed its origin to the Indian Independence Act, 
but adopted the Constitution under the authority exercised 
by it in the name of the people. The authority of the people 
came in virtue of the repeal of the Indian Independence Act. 
This change came into being without any legal revolution or 
disturbing the law.
It may be argued that the Constituent Assemblies
were representative of the peoples but not their creation.
It follows from this argument that the Constituent Assemblies
being the creation of the Independence Act, they can ndt derive
authority from the people. Even in the case of the Irish Free
State the theory of the people's sovereignty has been accepted 
British
by the/Courts. The Constitution was adopted by the people which 
was expressed at a referendum of the electorate. No such 
referendum was held in India. As explained already it was not 
necessary because the Independence Act was in fact as well as 
in law a deed of transfer of sovereignty and such transfer was 
not, in the case of India, inconsistent with the theory of 
the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament, for the reaenns 
already set forth.
The adoption of the Constitution by the Constituent 
Assembly may be criticised on the ground that it was not 
constituted on the basis of adult franchise and as such did 
not truly represent the people of India. This argument 
certainly has force but be it as it is, this is a political 
standpoint and has no bearing on the legal authority of the 
Constituent Assembly. It may be a strong political slogan 
for the political party opposing the ideals on which the 
Constitution is based but does not change the legal position.
Could the Constituent Assemblies adopt Constitutions 
repugnant to the term Dominion, without affecting its membership 
of the Commonwealth? This undoubtedly was not possible without 
evolving a formula to this effect. A formula was adopted for 
India. This will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.
XI.
It is proposed next to examine the question of
secession and neutrality of the new Dominions under the
Independence Act. "The Statute of Westminster" observed
Latham, "standing alone, was open to a construction which
makes secession legal but ft could not be contended that it
unequivocally did so."^^^ Wheare, discussing the legal status
of the Irish Free State, at least in one view, concludes that
any enactment of the Oireachtas to abolish monarchy, or to
provide for secession from the Commonwealth or to declare
(o)
neutrality, would in strict law be valid."'
To take the question of secession first: the fact 
that the Indian Independence Act has conferred powers on the
(1) Latham: op.cit. p. 529.
(2) Wheare: op.cit. p. 270.
new DominioiB in more explicit terms, establish it beyond doubt 
that any enactment by the legislatures of the new Dominions 
would be, in strict law, valid, India and Pakistan are at 
liberty to go out of the Commonwealth any time they think fit.
Keith holds that the Conventions declared in the 
Preamble of the Statute has the effect of rendering secession 
Conventionally i m p o s s i b l e . I t  is needless to say that, first, 
there is no legal force in the Preamble as it does not form 
an integral part of the Act. When the Statute is in clear 
and non-ambiguous terras, the Preamble can not control or extend^ 
it. The Preamble is a declaration of objects, or in the words 
of Latham,"is a declaration of Convention. But since such 
declaration derives any force it has from the consensus of 
the Parties, It is notorious that two^^^at least of the 
Dominions who in 1930 consented to the draft of this Preamble, 
did not regard it as establishing a Convention prohibiting 
secession and would not have consented to it in that sense."(4) 
India and Pakistan are not committed to them at all.
The same holds good in respect of neutrality.
Neutrality and war being the questions of international law 
should not be made dependent on the considerations of municipal 
law. The Dominions ever since they became international persons, 
had the right of declaring war or remaining neutral as they 
thought fit. Any fetter in municipal law on their neutrality 
could not be a bar to neutrality, which in international law, 
is an attribute of sovereignty. There can be no perfect 
international person without possessing the attributes of 
sovereignty like those of declaring war and peace. There 
are other considerations^^^which can be called in for the
(1) Keith; The King and the Imperial Crown (1935).
p.449.
(2) Badri Ra^ad v. Ram Narain Singh, A.I.R.1939. 157.
(3) South Africa and Irish Free State. Cf.Latham.
op.cit.
(4) Ibidem.
(5) Schlosberg: op.cit.pp.45-50.
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support of this argument but suffice it to state that Eire 
was legally quite justified in remaining neutral while the 
whole 0ommonwealth was at war; especially so in view of the 
theory of the divisibility of the Crown.
The Statute of Westminster was not only the result
of the Conventions established through the resolutions of the
Imperial Conferences but also contains some of these Conventions
incorporated in its Preamble. There is no Preamble attached
to the Indian Independence Act. It was suggested, during the
debates on the Bill, that the Bill should have had a Preamble.
Now the question arises whether or not the Conventions are
binding on India and Pakistan. The Ceylon Independence Act
has no Preamble but through a separate Agreement entered into
with the United Kingdom, it has been agreed that Ceylon will
abide by all the Conventions or non-legal rules that govern
the relationship of the Commonwealth. Wheare holds that in
spite of the fact that India and Pakistan are new States and
even pre-partition India though a member of the Imperial
Conferences was not committed to them as they were mainly
resolved for the Dominions, it would nevertheless be "reasonable
to assume that since India and Pakistan have accepted the
status of self-governing members of the Commonwealth, these
rights do in fact apply to them," During the debates on the
Bill, the Prime Minister replied to a question whether or not
the Conventions applied to the neij Dominions observed: "We are
dealing here with a particular status not with agreements made
by those enjoying that status. Whether the new Dominions accede
L2)to these agreements would be a matter for their consideration."
The legal force of these conventions is in the 
consensus,of the parties. Though India and Pakistan attained
(1) Wheare: Constitutional Changes, op.cit
(2) Hansard: op.cit.
Dominion status de facto first, they were not committed to 
these resolutions by any.express terms. It is therefore, left 
for the new Dominions to join them or not. India, in taking 
the complaints against Pakistan and South Africa, the other 
two members of the Commonwealth, to the Security Council, has 
already expressed the view that she is not committed to them. 
Whether it is desirable is another question. What is the 
residuum of the laws of the Commonwealth, and what part 
Conventions are likely to play in the future development of 
the Commonwealth; are points that may more conveniently be 
dealt:. with in the next Chapter,
The Indian Independence Act conferred on India and 
Pakistan Dominion status and thus the allegiance to the King 
of India and the King of Pakistan also was implied, but both 
Dominions have changed completely or partially the oath and 
thus the very basis of allegiance has changed, '
Both the Dominions soon after Independence abolished 
the appeal to the Privy Council and both the Acts of abolishing 
the oath of allegiance and the appeal by special leave to the 
Privy Council were within the competence of the Legislatures 
of the new Dominions for the reasons discussed in the above 
paragraphs and no repetition is either necessary or desirable.
XII.
Now it seems proper to sum up the foregoing discussion 
and see what is the residuum of the laws of the Commonwealth 
if viewed from the standpoint of the Indian Independence Act. 
This will certainly help in evaluating the changing conception 
of Dominion Status, which is replacing the legal basis with 
that of the political one. It would not be far wrong to predict
(1) In Pakistan the new Governors of Provinces
and other officers on taking office will take 
an oath to the Constitution, Law and Government 
of Pakistan. The Times, London, Sept.6th, 1951.
that the futur© of the Commonwealth, in view of the changes 
that have already taken place, and also those which will come 
in the future, depends on the true appreciation of the 
difference of the legal and political bases.
First, it has been established that a separate 
enactment for bestowing Dominion Status on India and Palcistan 
was necessary not only because India, not being a Colony, 
was outside the scope of the Colonial Daws Validity Act, 
which the Statute, inter alia, amended, but also because the 
Statute was not fit for India for the following reasons.
1. Ihe term Dominion as defined in the Statute or Interpretation
Act did not define the scope and status envisaged by 
it. The understanding of the legal and conventional 
status of the Dominions depends on the Statute and the 
Conventions embodied in the Resolutions of the Imperial 
Conference, some of which have been produced in the 
Preamble of the Statute, respectively.
2. The Statute alone did not succeed in its purpose of removing
all inequalities existing between the United Kingdom on 
the one hand and the Dominion on the other. The inequalities 
existed in respect of:
The Powers of the Parliaments of the Dominions vis-a-vis 
the Imperial Parliament. The theory of the Imperial 
Parliament created a great difficulty and an attempt 
to reconcile the theory with the objective of 
establishing legal equality was not successful and 
the Imperial Parliament was, in strict law, still 
capable of legislating for the Dominions. Therefore;
(a) The national sentiments in South Africa and in 
the Irish Free State prompted them to take a 
divergent view. South Africa re-enacted the
statute of the Union of South Africa Act. The 
Irish Free State not only made some amendments 
in the Constitution and abolished the oath of 
allegiance, appeal to the Privy Council, the 
office of the Governor-General, but also adopted 
a republican Constitution approved by the people 
in a referendum. The theory of the people's 
sovereignty, however revolutionary in the realm 
of the Commonwealth law, was made the basis of 
the Constitution. But:
(b) The Union of South Africa, due to the conflict 
existing in Sections 2 and 3 of the Status Act, 
failed, in strict law, to attain the object of 
making the Union Parliament as sovereign as the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom, though the 
Courts of South Africa held that it became 
sovereign and omni-competent.
3. The powers of the, Governor-General in respect of disallow­
ance, of reservation and of discretion, were abolished 
entirely which was not done by the Statute though the 
Dominions acquired the powers to abolish them whenever 
they liked.
êo The Statute, owing to the above reasons, was not fit for 
India and Pakistan and what was needed was an enactment 
in definite and precise terras to transfer complete 
sovereignty including the right to amend or repeal the 
Act itself. This being doubtful in the Statute, the word 
"this" was included to make it more precise in Section 6 (2)
5. The rule of Construction in Section 4 of the Statute was 
dropped in favour of the wording of the Status of the 
Union Act.
6. As a result of the changes made in Section 6 (2) and (4)
of the Statute, a complete sovereignty was conveyed to 
India and Pakistan. This was done by removing all the 
uncertainties and doubts expressed about the Statute or 
the Status of the Union Act.
7. The theory of the Imperial Parliament was not a bar to
the transfer of sovereignty to the Legislature of India 
and Pakistan because the principle on which the admin­
istration was based was analogous to that of the 
mandate-territories.
8. India and Pakistan were given Constituent Assemblies.
These Assemblies though the creation of thae Imperial 
Parliament were free to derive the authority to adopt 
Constitutions from the people as they were given the 
right to repeal the Independence Act itself.
9. These rights also make cession and neutrality legally
possible though the latter being a question of inter­
national law is assumed by a State as soon as it becomes 
an international person.
10. The Conventions are not binding on India and Palcistan
unless they agree to accept them. The validity of the 
Conventions lies in the consensus of the parties.
the
11. The new Dominions also abolished the appeal to/Privy
Council by special leave and also the oath of allegiance
(with some difference) 
to the King/ but without transgressing their powers or
creating any controversies.
The new Dominions have thus obtained all through 
legal means what the other Dominions, in strict law, failed 
to attain within the legal sphere and at least one of them
took revolutionary measures thereby disturbing the legal 
basis.
As a result of the enactment of the Indian 
Independence Act, the Commonwealth has been rendered an 
association of freewill and its legal basis which was already 
disrupted as a result of various changes, has further been 
completely removed but has been replaced by a political 
system of partnership which will be discussed in the next 
Chapter.
THE HEW DOMINIONS AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE CQMB/IOHIEALTH OF NATIONS.
The discussion under the rubric "The Legal Status 
of the Hew Dominions" concluded with the assertion that the 
changes that were taking place within the Commonwealth as a 
result of the revolutionary tendencies of the Irish Free 
State on the one side and the British attitude to adjust 
these revolutionary steps with innovations on the other, 
were conceded in the case of India and Pakistan in explicit 
terras, thereby rendering the Legislatures and the Constituent 
Assemblies legally competent to define the nature of their 
membership of the Commonwealth. This was not an innovation 
in itself as all that was conceded in the Indian Independence 
Act, from the standpoint of the Commonwealth, had taken place 
in the case of the Irish Free State and, in a sense, in South 
Africa as well. What was effected by the Indian Independence 
Act was that the consent was expressed in explicit legal terms. 
There is no need to borrow any support from the Conventions 
in order to define the status of the new Dominions, either 
in legal or Constitutional terras. The Independence Act 
enabled the new Dominions to define this status in the terms 
and in the way they thought fit for their own purposes. The 
only difference, as compared with the Irish precedent, lies 
in the fact that Eire took all the steps creating revolution 
in law which were subsequently conceded by the members of the 
Commonwealth, thereby adjusting the revolutionary changes 
within the terras of the Commonwealth laws; the consent to 
all changes no matter how revolutionary, was given in advance 
in the case of India and Pakistan. It is the task of a future 
historian to judge the wisdom of such a daring step on the 
part of the United Kingdom and other members of the Commonwealth
but it may be stated that this , step, however bold it may 
appear, when studied in the context of the Irish history 
vis-a-vis the Commonwealth of Nations, is quite in keeping 
with the characteristically British spirit of cautious 
compromise and is not without the foundation of precedent.
It appears, as subsequent events have proved, that it was a 
wise step. Probably no one, and least of all Lloyd George 
himself, had realised in 1921 that the British Commonwealth 
of Nations with the Irish Free State included, had implicitly 
pledged themselves to the changing concept of the Commonwealth 
relationship. Every step talcen by the Irish Nationalists 
was sooner or later, with or without conflict, followed by 
other Dominions. This may also be the future of the relation­
ship that was made possible for the new Dominions. The new 
Dominions remained "Dominions" in the sense that they were 
prepared to give to the term, and were able to replace it 
with, some other relationship that suited their purposes.
India has already evolved a formula through which the King 
has been recognised as the head of the Commonwealth and India 
has thus been able to continue her membership of the Common­
wealth. Pakistan is still busy in solving some more delicate 
and complicated problems necessary for the enactment of a 
Constitution fit to serve a State with Islamic ideal as an 
end, and modernism as a means, and therefore would naturally 
take more time. And Pakistan too, may ultimately adopt the 
same formula or may find out some other.
It is very often queried, Why this complicated method 
of rendering the new Dominions fully sovereign and independent? 
Was there no other simple method of transferring sovereignty 
to India and Pakistan? These questions become all the more 
important since the terra "Dominion" is applicable both to 
India and Pakistan on the one hand, and Ceylon,ont.the other.
.Again the term "Dominion" was used to define the 
status of the Dominions which were in some way or other dependent 
on the United Kingdom, and were subject to the theory of the 
sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament. Canada and Australia 
#ere, owing to the differences existing among the provinces 
on the question of constituent powers, obliged to leave these 
powers vfith the Imperial Parliament. This inequality certainly 
existed of their own accord but the fact of inequality remained. 
It would not be becoming of India and Pakistan to be defined 
by terras which implied such inequalities. The inequality in 
the case of Ceylon, in matters of defence and other 
constitutional conventions, though accepted by the Dominion 
willingly, is not without some political strings attached 
to it.
This raises the question whether any laws of 
the Commonwealth exist, and if the answer to this question 
is in the affirmative, what is their nature and whether they 
imply any subordination or binding which does not fit a 
Sovereign and Independent Republic? Then it is asked further; 
What is the need of the Commonwealth at all when an inter­
national organisation like U.N.O. is already in existence to 
serve the purposes of all nations of the world. In other words, 
what place can justifiably be accorded to a sub-caste system 
of the Commonwealth in an international community? Still 
forcibly is put the question: Why did Eire leave this relation­
ship if it was of any worth? If it does not suit a neighbourly 
nation like the Irish, how could it be of any advantage to 
the Eastern people who are basically different from the Western 
nations of the Commonwealth?
These or other similar questions can not be 
answered without reference to two facts. - 
First, how the British Empire was gradually and steadily
transformed into the Commonwealth of Nations. No study of 
historical details is called for hut a brief reference to 
the underlying spirit of this transformation is necessary. 
Secondly, to assess if there exists any system of law that 
can be applied to the regulating of the intra-Commonwealth 
relationship. The fact that there existed a"sui-generis" 
system consisting both of legal and conventional rules makes 
this query all the more necessary. The future of the Commonwealth 
greatly depends on these two considerations and this will be 
discussed in the last part of this Chapter.
II.
The term "Empire" was used by Parliament long before 
any external territories came into English possession, to 
assert Henry VIII's claim that England, after throwing off 
Papal Supremacy, had become wholly independent of any foreign 
sovereignty^^^and in Keith's words "the attainment of overseas 
possessions added to her stature not to her s t a t u s . T h e  
expansion of English supremacy started with the Union, first, 
of England and Scotland and secondly, of the United Kingdom 
and Ireland. The Union which secured independent international 
sovereignty of the units was replaced by the sovereignty of a 
Uiuted.Realm.The expansion of trade and new economic forces 
stimulated the British people to find new regions. The efforts 
of individuals were soon centralised and the British Government, 
willingly or unwillingly, took possession of these territories 
and provided for their government. There was no coherent plan, 
principle or system that was strictly adhered to in the 
management of these affairs. The Colonies, as they came to be
(1) Keith; The Dominions as Sovereign States, p.3-
(2) Ibidem.
known in political terms, formed parts of the British Empire 
which in fact was declared in Henry VIII's reign.
The first struggle between the Imperial Parliament 
and the Colonizers resulted in the Declaration of American 
Independence in 1776. The final recognition of the independence 
of the thirteen Colonies was extended in 1782-3• British 
Statesmanship was either at its height and hence unmindful 
of new revolutionary forces or was still politically too 
immature to adjust itself to new patterns. The American 
revolution forced the British Government to review their 
Colonial policy. This reconsideration resulted in two changes. 
Lord Durham^in his famous report, on the one hand,advocated 
responsible government in internal affairs, and reservation 
of Foreign relations, trade and defence for the Imperial 
authority on the other. This report proved to be the key 
to Dominion Status. After some hesitation Durham's plan was 
adopted in C a n a d a . I t  worked well and provided a pattern 
for other Colonies, namely Australia, Hew Zealand and South 
Africa.
In earlier times emphasis was placed on the local 
self-government which was adopted as the solution of the
(3)tug-of-war between the Imperial authority and the Colonizers.'’ 
But the struggle did not stop at this point and soon after 
the Colonizers gained control over all internal matters, it 
broadened out to include the matter of control over foreign 
affairs. The self-governing Dominions were the product of 
the recognition of this demand. The first World War hastened 
the final phase of the long history of self-government and 
these Dominions emerged as new international entities. It is
(1) Coupland; R.(ed.) Durham Report (1839).
(2) See for details of Canadian Nationalism:
Neuendorff G. Studies in the Evolution of
Dominion Status. London 1942.
(3) Dawson, R.M. The Development of Dominion Status
(1900-1936) London 1937. p.l.
however difficult to summarize all the events which contributed 
to the establishment of National Sovereignty both in International 
and Municipal laws; and indeed without taking them into 
consideration it is difficult to understand the subtle 
differences that exist among the members of the Commonwealth 
in regard to their sentimental attachment and in regard to the 
nature of their nationalism, as well as the differences of a 
legal and constitutional nature, discussed at some length in 
the previous chapters. It would however, be suggestive of 
the cross-currents underlying thi evolution of the Commonwealth 
to divide this historical development into seven periods, each 
denoting a certain phase of its development. Dawson^^^divides 
the history of the Commonwealth Dominions into five periods.
They are:
I. The period before the war (1900-14), when the 
Dominions had achieved complete control over all domestic matters, 
and were beginning to make cautious advances beyond these 
boundaries.
II. The War and the Peace Treaty (1914-20). This period 
witnessed the outbreak of war and the resulting stimulus to 
nationalism in the Dominions, the creation of the Imperial 
War Cabinet, and the first assertion by the Dominions of their 
right to "an adequate voice" in foreign policy. It closed with 
the international recognition given to the Dominions by their 
admission to the Peace Conference and the League of Nations.
III. The period of tentative centralization (1920-2).
This covers the two or three years following the Peace Treaty, 
when an attempt was made to perpetuate the Imperial Cabinet 
and to formulate and carry out a common foreign policy for 
the Empire.
IV. The Period of Decentralization (1922-6) extending 
from the Chanak incident of 1922 and including the Locarno 
Treaty in 1925. It is the most eventful and important period
(1) Dawson: op.cit. p.4.
of all; for it witnessed the breakdown of a common foreign 
policy and the abandonment of the diplomatic unity of the Empire.
V. The Period of Equal Status (1926 to 1936). The 
outstanding event in this period was the Report of the Imperial 
Conference of 1926, which gave formal recognition to the new 
conditions in the Empire. Subsequent constitutional develop­
ments have been, for the most part, merely elaborations or 
logical consequences of the principles enunciated in this 
report. "The enactment of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 
gave legal force to some of the decisions already reached in 
the Imperial Conferences, 1926, 1930. This was followed by 
the Union of South Africa Status Act, and the Royal Executive 
Functions and Seals Act; and in the Irish Free State by the 
Constitution (Removal of Oath) Act, the Acts to abolish the 
appeal to the Privy Council and the Office of the Governor- 
General in 1936, and also the enactment of a new Constitution.
The Abdication Act of Edward VIII also lias considerable 
importance as it brought about some fundamental changes in the 
Commonwealth,. " ^
But this classification will not be complete unless, 
in the light of recent developments, two further stages are 
shown. They are:
VI. The Second World War and the subsequent changes 
(1939-1948). This period is important owing to the outbreak 
of the Second World War and Eire's neutrality. This was the 
first time in British Imperial history that a Dominion remained 
neutral while not only the whole Commonwealth but most of the 
Democratic powers of the World had plunged into war. The 
second phase of this period started with the addition of the 
Eastern Dominions to the list of the members of the Commonwealth. 
This change was significant since for the first time alien,
nay, non-European, nations were admitted to the community of
(l) Within inverted commas mine.
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White people. Equally significant is the fact that a 
comparatively less Important country, Burma, decided to leave 
the Commonwealth, whereas India and Pakistan preferred 
independence within the Commonwealth.
VII. The new Phase of the Commonwealth (1949 to the 
present time). The importance of this period lies in the fact 
that among the Eastern Dominions India was the first to evolve 
a formula to retain her membership of the Commonwealth, along 
with a Republican Constitution. Eire on the contrary, left the 
Commonwealth but retained arrangements to continue the reciprocal 
benefits of the British Nationality enactment. This event is 
of great importance because Eire though not a member, has still 
from the practical point of view, laid down a new line of 
approach for the possible changes that are likely to take place, 
and thus continues to act as if she were still a revolutionary 
and leading member of the Commonwealth.
If one asks what is the definition of Dominion Status, 
it may advantageously be pointed out that all the Countries 
which have passed or are still passing thr ough some of these 
stages are defined as enjoying Dominion status. This list is 
undoubtedly large enough even to include a country like 
Newfoundland which continued to be enumerated even after it 
surrendered Dominion status. It is true that after the 
Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930 and especially in the 
light of the Statute of Westminster, the term "Dominion" was 
better defined but not precisely enough. Jennings wrote:
"It is indeed dangerous to make any generalization about this 
unique relationship without immediately adding a qualification, 
for Dominion status has not been cut to a pattern; it is a 
genus of which there were six species; and how many more 
there will be before this country expires only the future 
can tell. It is the expressed policy of His Majesty's
3#
Government in the United Kingdom to bring the Colonies to 
Dominion status, but Government carefully refrained from saying 
what sort of Dominion status it will be. Those who have imbibed 
the British traditions know that it is unsafe to generalize, 
that a Dominion status that suits Canada will not suit South 
Africa; that which suits New Zealand will not satisfy Eire; 
it may be that no type can be devised to suit India and yet 
it may be possible to invent a relationship which meets the 
needs of Ceylon. A status of an entirely different kind may 
be necessary for the West Indies and Malaya, and even then there 
will be the problems of East and West Africa,
It may be argued that this is the British standpoint 
and sounds characteristically diplomatic in order to tie the 
nations into a new sort of fetter thereby creating a "power 
block". For a country like India, membership of the Commonwealth 
would imply tolerance and acquiescence for the perpetuity of 
the Imperialistic regime. The Country which has emerged 
Independent after a long struggle should naturally be not only 
sympathetic but also helpful to the countries which are passing 
through the same process. Any participation of India in such 
group-activity will slow down the speed of progress in these 
countries*
To take the first question as to whether or not 
membership of the Commonwealth lacking precise definition 
is fit for Countries like India and Pakistan; one can certainly 
argue forcibly that the vague terras are as advantageous for 
such countries as they are for Britain. If the terms are made 
precise, it is quite obvious that India and Pakistan will have 
to commit themselves to these terms; which neither of them 
would be prepared to do. As regards the second question, it 
may be stated that countries like India, Pakistan and Ceylon
(1) Jennings: The British Commonwealth of Nations,
1948. pp.11-12.
(2) See The Debates on the Resolution regarding
Ratification of the Cpmmonwealth decision.
Indian Constitueht Debates : official report.
Volume No.2. pp.1-72.
remaining in the Commonwealth, would, on the other hand, he 
able to influence the progress of the Colonies and thus 
it is likely that the progress of these countries would be 
accelerated. Countries like India, Pakistan and Ceylon will
also be able to put their weight into the balance against the 
extreme views expressed by Dr. Malan of South Africa.
Next to be considered is the question whether or 
not the Eastern Dominions will, because of their membership 
of the Commonwealth, necessarily be forced to join any 
particular "power block?.. It is obvious from the fact that 
the three Eastern Dominions did not take part in the Defence 
Conference of the Commonwealth that no such commitment is 
implied. It is entirely left to their own choice to decide 
whether or not it would be in the interests of their countries 
to take part in any discussions involving matters of defence 
and strategy. Ceylon had committed herself to the Conventions 
of the Commonwealth and also had entered a defence agreement 
with the United Kingdom. It was, probably, expected that 
Ceylon would certainly participate in this Conference but 
this expectation did not come true. It further clarifies the 
position that even a Dominion like Ceylon which had to a great 
extent agreed to ally herself with the Commonwealth, could, 
if considered desirable, have declined to adhere to her previous 
commitment. It may well be argued that the defence agreement 
was entered into between the United Kingdom and Ceylon and 
hence this did not necessarily make it obligatory on the part 
of Ceylon to join the Commonwealth Defence Conference. It needs 
hardly any clarification that the agreement, inter alia, extends 
the formal acceptance of the Commonwealth Conventions. It is, 
however, not obligatory for the very reason that Ceylon is at 
libyerty, if the question is considered from a liberal view, 
to make modifications not only in the Independence Act but 
also, with due common consent, in the Agreement, too.
It may be questioned why the Agreement between 
the United Kingdom and Ceylon should be treated as applicable 
to the whole Commonwealth. Was the United Kingdom ever given 
the mandate to act on behalf of the Commonwealth? Does this 
not imply inequality, at least of function, if it is accepted 
that the Agreement under discussion is one between the members 
of the Commonwealth and Ceylon? There is certainly room to 
develop this argument further on both sides but it may be 
remembered that the Agreement between the Irish Free State and 
the United Kingdom was of such a nature, and therefore the 
Agreement between the United Kingdom and Ceylon is not the 
first of its kind.
It goes without saying that the new Dominions are 
at liberty to leave the ^Commonwealth at any time they think 
suitable for such action. Not only are the terms defining 
the relationship given meaning in accordance with the Constitutions 
national sentiments and aspirations, and above all other military 
and strategic considerations, but also the decision to leave 
the Commonwealth is entirely in their own hands. This post-dated 
document, as it is indeed, is placed in the hands of the members 
of the Commonwealth to use any time they consider it necessary.
In short, neither are the new Dominions committed to anything 
which goes against the interests of these countries, nor is 
their liberty fettered in any way so as to render their 
severance from the Commonwealth difficult.
The underlying spirit of the development of Dominion 
status can be understood only from the angle of the gradual 
devolution of authority. Much can be written on both sides 
of the question whether or not the principle of the gradual 
devolution should be adhered to in the changed circumstances; 
but nonetheless one is able to appreciate the spirit of 
Dominion status only from this point df view. India, though
not a Colony and in more than one sense a sùi generis case 
even in the British Commonwealth, still was treated on the 
model of the Colonies. Gokhle probably was the first to think 
of Indian independence in terms of Dominion status. The 
Congress had lately pledged itself to the plan of complete 
independence but at the time when powers were transferred it 
was adopted as a temporary measure. As has been seen in the 
previous Chapter India, both in fact as well as in law, 
obtained all that any other foreign sovereign State has; 
but still preferred to remain a member of the Commonwealth 
even after adopting the republican constitution. In the case 
of India and Pakistan, it must be asserted, Dominion status 
and membership of the Commonwealth have been "Independence plus" 
It is, therefore, desirable to examine whether the independence 
of India and Pakistan is "plus" from the national point of 
vieviT as well. In other words, it is proposed to examine the 
nature of the laws and conventions of the Oommonivealth.
III.
Discussing the fundamental laws and the conventions 
of the Commonwealth Latham observed: "Imperial fundamental 
law is, however, not the only or even the chief element in 
the rules which govern the Commonwealth Association. The 
basis of the modern Commonwealth relationship is equality 
but the intractable sustenianism of British legal theory 
makes it incapable,of recognising a relationship vtiich is
fundamentally equalitarian. Imperial fundamental law.....
is fundamental for the Dominions but not for the United 
Kingdom since the United Kingdom Parliament, the ordinary 
legislature of Great Britain, may in law repeal any part
of It at pleasure. To redress this inequality that body of 
doctrine which is called Commonwealth Convention has been 
called in." Again he divides these Conventions into two 
categories distinct from one another - first, those that are 
concerned with redressing inequalities of law and secondly, 
those not concerned with redressing inequality of law, and they 
are unalterable except by the common consent of the members 
of the Commonv/ealth and "may properly be described as 
fundamental to the Commonwealth Association." The Conventions 
of the first category operate in two ways: "by hindering the 
United Kingdom from altering certain rules which are essential 
to the Commonwealth, and by facilitating the alteration at 
the instance of the laws of the Dominions which though not 
essential to the Commonwealth, have still fundamental status.
A typical Convention of the first type is the 
limitation of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament by 
the recital in the Statute of Westminster that no law could 
be altered without the consent and request of the Dominion 
concerned, and a typical Convention of the second type is 
that which obliged the Imperial Parliament to make any 
amendment in the British North America Act which is requested 
by the Dominion of Canada and all the P r o v i n c e s . " I t  
hardly needs any emphasis that there exist laws governing 
the relations of Australia with the United Kingdom so long 
as the Imperial Parliament is vested with powers to amend 
the Constitution in virtue of the provision to this effect 
made in the Statute of Westminster. The Commonwealth of 
Australia being a member of the Commonwealth, all laww governing 
its relations with the United Kingdom form part of the law of 
the Commonwealth; but it can not be treated as fundamental or 
essential law. This inequality has already been removed.
(1) Latham: op.cit. pp.77-8.
(2) Ibidem.
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in the case of New Zealand.and Canada.
If the theory of the sovereignty of the Imperial 
however, is accepted, there still remains in strict law the 
supreme legal authority exercisable by Parliament in respect 
of all old Dominions. Is this supreme legal authority 
originating in the theory of sovereignty of the Imperial 
Parliament, applicable to all the members? Is such a law 
fundamental and supreme because it provides a basis for the 
membership of the Commonwealth? The answer, keeping aside 
the Indian Independence Act, indeed is in the affirmative.
The Statute of Westminster when"considered purely from the 
legal standpoint does not cause any disruption in this 
relationship; but if the theories asserted by South Africa 
and the Irish Free State thereby providing local bases or 
roots for the laws of the Dominions instead of that of the 
Imperial Parliament, be accepted, the disruption has already 
come in and there remains no fundamental law of the Commonwealth 
at ally Latham, summing up this question, asserts: "In short, 
the weakening of Imperial fundamental law by the Statute of 
Westminster and by the assertion of local roots for Dominion 
systems of law has had the effect in unitary Dominions of 
weakening or eliminating rigid elements in the local Constit­
utions. In the two federal Dominions, on tlie other hand, it 
has accentuated the difference between Imperial and local
(o)
fur.damental law, the latter being preserved in full force.
It has already been discussed in ttje previous 
chapter that membership of the Commonwealth of India and. 
Pakistan as defined by the Indian Independence Act or in 
accordance with the formula adopted by India, does not imply 
existence of any such fundamental laws. The fact that the
(1) See New Zealand Constitution Amendment (Request
and Consent Act) No. 44 of 1947, passed by the 
New Zealand Parliament on the authority of which 
the United Kingdom Parliament passed New Zealand 
Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1947. See also The
(2) ^2-14 aeo.6.G.81.
rule of construction in Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster
as modified for the purposes of the Union of South Africa
Status Act, has been reproduced in Section 6 (4) of the Indian
Independence Act is not sufficient to place it beyond doubt
that this insertion is with all the implications of the
sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament, for the reasons set
wherein
forth in the previous Chapter/the Indian Independence Act 
has been described as a document transferring sovereignty 
into Indian hands. The Indian Independence Act not only 
extended the area of power of the Legislatures of the new 
Dominions but also made them entirely independent of the 
Imperial Parliament thereby making them sovereign. India 
proclaimed people's sovereignty by repealing the Independence 
Act and Pakistan created the same effect in municipal law by 
replacing the oath of allegiance to the King by that to the 
Constitution, law and government of Pakistan. It is doubtful 
what force the rule of construction has when detached from 
all references to the Conventions which imply the recognition 
of the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament. It may, 
therefore, be stated that there does not exist any fundamental 
law of the Commonwealth as far as India and Pakistan are 
concerned. If there is no fundamental law governing the 
relationship of all members of the Commonwealth then there are 
no essential laws at all. If some members are governed by 
certain,laws whereas the others are not, such laws for obvious 
reasons can not be basic or fundamental. They may be funda­
mental in relation to those particular Dominions but not to 
the whole Commonwealth.
The fundamental law of the Empire in international 
law, for the first time came to an end when the Dominions were 
admitted to the League of Nations and thus gained international 
personality. This recognition.first was followed immediately
with constant efforts on the part of the Imperial Government 
to formulate and carry out a common policy for the Empire.
The purpose of such an attempt probably was to replace the 
disruption brought about in international law by a diplomatic 
and political pattern of common policy, but the Chanak 
I n c i d e n t o f  1922 revealed that the Imperial unity in 
international law had come to an end. The discussion over 
active and passive participation in the Charnak incident was 
nothing more than a mere reooneiliatory effort to minimise 
the importance of the break up of the Imperial legal unity.
The Imperial Conferences of 1926, 1930 resolved that"the 
Dominions were autonomous communities within the British Empire, 
equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any 
aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united 
by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as 
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." It is 
notorious that the nationalists of South Africa treated this 
as an extension of the recognition by the Imperial Government 
of the sovereign and independent status of the Dominions. 
Keith's contention that "a mere declaration by the Imperial 
Conference does not suffice to bring about sovereign inde­
pendence because international recognition should be sought 
by a formal notification sent to foreign powers by the Imperial 
Government, intimating the grant of independence, which these 
powers would then recognise if they deemed it desirable" is 
refuted by Schlosberg who observed that this "contention 
conflicts with Hall's views   nor was there any authority
as far as the author was aware to support Keith in his 
contention." It is unnecessary here to go into a details 
discussion of the theories or recognition of States, because
(1) See details Toynbee ; A. J. Conduct of British Foreign
Relations, 1928.
(2) A.M.D. 2768 p.14.
(3) See Schlosberg op.cit.pp.l2-32.Gf.declatrry Theory.
the subsequent development of the Imperial affairs established 
the ease that the commencement of the international person­
alities of the Dominions dates from their admission to the 
community of nations signing the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. 
It is not proposed to discuss the effect of the emergence 
of the Dominions as international persons on the sovereignty 
of the Imperial Parliament, partly because this has already 
been discussed, partly what is desired here is only to 
establish that the Imperial unity in international law came 
to an end as a result of this phenomenon.
If the emergence of international status of the 
Dominions, even setting aside the theory set forth by the 
South African or the Irish nationalists, is considered on its 
0¥jn merits, it is obvious that the Dominions, as far as 
international law is concerned, came to be established as 
international persons. Their inequalities in relation to the 
United Kingdom thus became a domestic matter. This was 
certainly an anomaly but it was recognised as a "sUi generis" 
case by the community of nations and there is nothing to say 
against their international status as sovereign states. All 
States recognised by the community of nations as states are 
equal in law. Having gained this international status, some 
Dominions lüce South Africa and Eire went still further thereby 
replacing the Imperial authority by the local authorities; 
while others like Australia and New Zealand, did not even feel 
it necessary to adopt Sections 2-6 till lately. Australia and 
New Zealand have greater sentimental attachment to British 
institutions because they are mainly from British stock.
Canada is less enthusiastic about them because the Canadian 
nationalism derives its strength from both French and British 
sources. The new Dominions have hardly any sentimental
Cl \
attachment at all. '
(1) Jennings : The Commonwealth, in,Asia,
If the main source of strength of the Commonwealth 
lies in sentimental attachment, then it is essentially wrong 
to ask the Eastern Dominions to remain within the Commonwealth 
because sentimentally their feelings are naturally those of 
the nations which had to suffer under an alien rule. When 
independent, they have, strictly speaking from a sentimental 
point of view, more reasons for detachment than attachment 
to Britain. If sentimental vestiges are the only foundations 
on which the structure of the Commonwealth rests, then there 
can be no room for people with alien culture, racial and 
religious differences and above all a history of subjugation 
and suppression followed by struggle and freedom. If the 
Commonwealth is to shape its future on the sentimental basis 
only, then there is no justification for the claim that it is 
elastic, and adaptable to the changing situations. Obviously 
the sentimental values are not the only basis and foundation 
of the Commonwealth. It is natural that the people with 
common culture, race, history and above all of common 
institutions, attach greater importance to sentimental 
vestiges than others, but in the Commonwealth "there is 
union without unity, similarity in diversity, variety in 
u n i f o r m i t y . I t  certainly manifests a realistic attitude 
on the part of the members of the Commonwealth that the 
Commonwealth is no more "the British Commonwealth", the 
nationals of the Commonwealth may be the national of a 
particular Dominion and also be known as either a British 
subject or a citizen of the Commonwealth. :
It is of some interest to note in this context 
how similar are the factors governing the relationship of 
the. Commonwealth to those of the Indian Empire when the East 
Indian Company jbined the ranks of the local rulers. The 
Emperor at Delhi, still the legal sovereign of the whole
(1) Jennings: The British Commonwealth of Nations.
Empire, allowed, tolerated or acquiesced in independent 
action on the part of local rulers in his Empire. The 
toleration and acquiescence helped local princes in establish­
ing their independent international relations not only with 
each other but with foreign nations like the Dutch, the 
Portuguese, the French and the British Companies. The 
character of the formal allegiance to the Emperor did not 
change, nevertheless they enjoyed independent status and 
conducted their international relations with other sovereign 
powers in exactly the same way as the British Dominions did 
in spite of the legal supremacy of the Imperial Parliament.
It will certainly need an exhaustive research to establish 
how far the British Colonial policy was influenced by their 
contract with and knowledge of the Indian Empire, but it goes 
without saying that the two phenomena are strikingly similar; 
indeed so was the case in the Roman Empire or in other 
Eastern Empires.
The other point worthy of note in this connection 
is that the East India Company in spite of all the differences 
of culture, religion, race etc. which exist today in the case 
of the Eastern Dominions as compared with other European 
races of the Commonwealth, was admitted to the ranks of 
Indian rulers ; nay, was exalted to the office of the Vakil-ul-% 
Mutlaq and addressed as "Son". The admission of the 
Eastern Nations to the Community of Nations of the Commonwealth 
is not an unusual phenomenon in the history of either Britain 
or of India. The sentimental vestiges were also in existence 
in the Indian Empire. The East India Company took advantage 
of every opportunity to disavow allegiance to the Emperor 
or to minimize the importance of his legal supremacy. The 
servants of the Company as has been seen in the first chapter 
prompted the Nizam and the Nawab Vazier of Oudh to declare
(1) See Chapter I,
independence and to assume the style of Kingship thereby 
disowning allegiance to the Emperor. It vms nothing but 
sentimental attachment due to which the Nizam rejected this 
suggestion while the Nawab . Vazier, for different reasons, 
adopted the style reluctantly. It is,therefore,not surprising 
that the nations of the British stock hold similar sentimental 
attachment to Great Britain and they are justified in it.
But the point that ought to be born© in mind is that the 
loyalty of the members of the Commonwealth can not be judged 
on the criterion of sentimental vestiges, because such a 
criterion has no common appeal :  ^ it even fails to
attract the European non-British races of the Commonwealth.
It may, therefore, be asserted that Dr. Jennings'^^^attempt 
to make differences among the Eastern Dominions from the 
standpoint of sentiment is entirely wrong and futile. They 
are one and the same. Certainly there exists differences 
of attitude towards the Commonwealth between India and 
Pakistan on one hand and India and Pakistan and Ceylon on 
the other for reasons of political and other considerations.
In short, the fundamental law of the British 
Empire that bound all its parts strongly, weakened with the 
emergence of the Dominions as international entities; 
the Dominions, after acquiring international status by 
retaining allegiance to the Crown, set up a sort of personal 
union in international law, though the status quo in municipal 
law was allowed to continue, but subsequently with the 
enactment of the Statute of Westminster the weakening process 
was carried still further, thus it was possible to replace 
the Imperial source with local roots. In the Indian 
Independence Act the possibility of snapping the legal link 
was explicitly provided. As explained already, setting apart,
(1) Jennings : The Commonwealth in Asia.
the consideration of constitutional inequalities in respect 
of self-government, the relations between India and the 
United Kingdom were, as far as international law is concerned, 
those of a personal union ever since the time Indian admin­
istration was taken under direct control. It can, justifiably 
be claimed that after the enforcement of Indian Independence 
there was no legal connection between the new Dominions and 
the United Kingdom save the allegiance to the Crown. This 
denoted a sort of personal union and was completely done away 
with by India when she adopted a formula of retaining the 
membership of the Commonwealth, whereas Pakistan confined 
it to the Governor-General of Pakistan when the oath of 
allegiance to the King for the purposes of other officers and 
Governors of the Provinces was replaced with that to Constitution, 
laws and Government of Pakistan.
There is then no fundamental law on which to test 
the loyalty of the members of the Commonwealth. This is not 
to deny that there is still some fundamental law in respect 
of certain Dominions but not applicable to all, and therefore 
can not be considered as essential law of the Commonwealth.
IV.
Now it remains to be examined what part the Conventions 
concerned both with inequality and co-operation play in the 
Commonwealth after the admission of the new Dominions. Reference 
has been made in the above paragraphs that the Imperial 
Conference of 1926 laid down resolutions thereby creating 
Conventions which, in the words of Latham, "bore all the marks 
of the United Kingdom authorship in which each paragraph, each 
sentence, almost each word imputing emancipation was balanced 
immediately by an assertion of association." It is, however,
(1) Latham: op.cit. p.599.
proposed here to see what value and significance the Conventions 
have in regulating the relations of the Commonwealth. They 
are of two categories. It may be convenient first to take 
the question of the Conventions dealing with inequalities.
India was subject to inequalities in respect of
Self-Government in virtue of the Government of India Acts,
1919 and 1935; but in view of the declaration of the Dominion
Status for India, the Conventions also gained significance
on the model of the other Dominions. It is needless to repeat
here that the Secretary of State conceded powers to the
Governor-General, and the Governor-General, though legally
competent to act in his own discretion, was instructed to
give, conventionally, due weight to the opinions of his
Councillors. The Governors of the Provinces conventionally 
of honour
gave word/not to use their discretionary powers and hinder 
the work of responsible Governments in ty.e Provinces. As 
regards extra-territoriality, it has been examined that the 
Federal Court of India followed the line of argument taken by 
the Judicial Committee in the case of the British Coal 
Corporation. Ultimately India became 'de facto' Dominion 
with an interim Government which was entirely based on the 
Conventions established in the case of Dominions. But as 
remarked elsewhere, the main purpose of the Conventions 
concerned with inequa].ity was to give the Dominions that 
equality Conventionally which was either not possible or not 
desirable to confer in precise legal terms. In other words, 
the definition of the status of the Dominions was entirely 
dependent both on the Statute of Westminster as well as the 
Conventions. India and Pakistan were conferred equality in 
every sense of the term and hence they were rendered 
independent of the Conventions concerning inequalities.
In other words, there was no need to call in the Conventions
to define their status of equality. They are given every 
power in explicit terms so it is unnecessary for the purposes 
of India and Pakistan to see how far they are binding on them.
The Preamble to the Statute of Westminster contains 
the declaration that "the Crown is the symbol of the Free 
Association of the members of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations, and as they are united by a common allegiance to 
the Crown, it would be in accord with the established 
constitutional position of all the members of the Commonwealth 
in relation to one another that any alteration in the law 
touching the succession to the Throne or the Royal Style 
and Titles shall hereafter require the assent as well of the 
Parliament of the Dominions as of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom."  ^  ^ The first occasion after passing the 
Statute of Westminster a change in the laww touching the 
succession to the Throne was effected in the shape of the 
Abdication Act of Edward VIII. According to Latham^ 
except that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom took 
initiative in this matter without consulting his colleagues, 
the Prime Ministers of the Dominions which was unconstitutional, 
everything was in order. What is most significant from the 
standpoint of the Unity of the Commonwealth is the fact that 
the Government of South Africa considered that the legislation 
by the Parliament of the Union to alter the succession to the 
Throne so far as the Union was concerned, was needed and the 
Union Parliament passed an Act to effect changes in the law 
of the succession. The abdication was dated from the time 
the instrument of abdication was signed and not from the moment 
when the Abdication Act received Royal assent. In other words 
George VI was enthroned in South Africa from December 10th.
(1) The Preamble to the Statute, 2nd paragraph.
(2) Latham: op.cit.
The Government of the Irish Free State, as it was
called then, expressed no assent to the alteration proposed,
and notified that no extension of the Act to the Irish Free
State was desired. The Oireachtas, on December 12th, passed
the Executive Authority Act (External Relations), but in the
view of the Irish Free State, this did not amount to enthroning
George VI in the Irish Free State on 12th, but was rather a
provision for the use of the King's Signature for the purposes
of appointing diplomatic and consular representatives to be
accredited to foreign countries. This in Mansergh's words
(1)was "an external Association."^ ^
Two conclusions flow from this. First, if it is 
recognised that Eire by enacting the Exterhal Relations Act, 
and also making provision to the similar effect in the 
Republican Constitution which was adopted subsequently, had 
recognised the King, then "The Commonwealth was partly 
dismembered from December 10-12, 1936, and was reunited by 
a common allegiance to the same King, George VI, on 12th 
December 1936, Hïïhen the Irish Free State received the assent 
of the Chairman of the Dail."^^^
Secondly, if the Irish view is accepted, there did 
not exist any allegiance on the part of Eire. In other words, 
the British Commonwealth of Nations, as it was called then, 
had sustained a fundamental change in its character according 
to which the last link of the Commonwealth retained in the 
shape of the common allegiance to the same King came to an 
end and a new kind of relationship described by the word 
"association" was discovered to replace the former basis of 
allegiance. In this way Commonwealth assumed a dual character.
The new Dominions owed allegiance to the King 
George VI in virtue of the Indian Independence Act which
(1) See Mansergh: op.cit. pp.203-208.
(2) Wheare: op.cit. p.290.
conferred on them Dominion status. The nationals of the 
two Dominions also continued this allegiance in virtue of
( l)their being within the definitoon of the British subjects.^
In view of the fact that India and Pakistan assumed 
Dominion status and that the contractual connections with 
the Indian States were brought to an end, it was considered 
necessary to effect change in the Royal Style and Titles by
(p)
omitting the words "Emperor of India";  ^ This as explained 
by Mr. Attlee did not come into operation till the Dominions 
gave their assent, which iit was not possible to obtain before 
the passing of the Act. In the words of Wheare the assent of 
the Parliaments of India and Pakistan to the change in the 
Royal Title was not sought or obtained. It was a Conventional 
rule. The Dominions, however, continued to owe allegiance 
to the King, George VI. There were two aspects of this allegiance. 
The allegiance of the Dominions and the alls giance of the 
people of the Dominions. India and Pakistan owed allegiance 
as Dominions and the nationals of the new Dominions owed 
allegiancesin virtue of the British Nationality Act of 1914.
India, first, in order to adopt the Republican 
Constitution, evolved a formula which was agreed to by the 
members of the Commonwealth and a declaration was made to 
this effect in London at the end of the Conference of the 
Prime Ministers of the Dominions on April 2?th, 1949. It runs:
"The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa^ India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon, whose countries are united as members of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations and owe a common allegiance to the 
Crown, which is also the symbol of their free association, 
have considered the impending Constitutional changes in India.
(1) In virtue of the British Nationality
Act, 1914.
(2) 10 & 11 Geo. 6. C . 3O .  Sec.7 (2).
The Government of India have informed the other 
Governments of the Commonwealth of the intention of the 
Indian people that under the new Constitution whmoh is 
about to be adopted, India shall become a sovereign Independent 
Republic. The Government of India have however declared and 
affirmed India's desire to continue her full membership of 
the Commonwealth of Rations and her acceptance of the King as 
the symbol of the Free Association of its independent member 
nations and as such as the Head of the Commonwealth.
The Governments of other countries of the Commonwealth, 
the basis of whose membership of the Commonwealth is hereby 
not changed, accept and recognise India's continuing memberdiip 
in accordance with the terms of this Declaration.
Accordingly the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon hereby 
declare that they remain united as free and equal mmmbers of 
the Commonwealth of Rations, freely co-operating in the pursuit 
of peace, liberty and progress."
Before discussing some important consequences of 
this declaration, it is desirable to use the interpretation 
given to it by the Indian Government. The Prime Minister,
Mr. Rehru, moving the Resolution to ratify the Declaration 
in The Indian Constituent Assembly, observed:
(a) "You will notice that while in the first paragraph that 
which is referred to as the British Commonwealth of Nations, 
in the subsequent paragraphs that is referred to only as the 
Commonwealth of Rations....
(b) There is reference in connection with the Commonwealth 
to the King as the symbol of that Association. Observe that
the reference is to the King and not to the Crown  The
point is this that so far as the Republic of India is concerned, 
her Constitution and her woT'klng are concerned, she has nothing
3&J
to do with any external authority with any King and none of 
her subjects owe any allegiance to the King or any other
external authority...... The Declaration therefore states that
this is the new Republic of India...... owing no allegiance to
the King as the other Commonwealth Countries do owe, will 
nevertheless be a full member of this Commonwealth and it 
agrees that as a symbol of this free partnership or association 
rather, the King will be recognised as such.
(c) Row some consequences flow from this. Apart from certain 
friendly approaches to each other, apart from a desire to 
co-operate which will always be conditioned by each party 
deciding on the measure of co-operation and following its own 
policy, there is no obligation. There is hardly any obligation 
in the nature of .commitments that flow. But an attempt has 
been made to produce something which is entirely novel, and
I can very well understand lawyers on the one hand feeling 
somewhat uncomfortable at a thing for which they can find no 
precedent or parallel."
Referring to the question of Indians in South Africa, 
he remarked -
(d) "It was a dangerous thing for us to bring that matter 
within the purview of the Commonwealth. Because then, that 
very thing to which you and I object, might have taken place.
That is, the Commonwealth might have been considered as some 
kind of a superior body which sometimes acts as a tribunal
or judges or in a sense supervise the activities of its member 
nations.Remarking about the continuity, of membership 
he said: (e) "Suppose we had been cut off from England completely 
and we have then desired to join the Commonwealth of Rations, 
it would have been a new move. Suppose a new group of nations
(1) Debates: op.cit. pp.2.
wants us to join them and we join them in this way, that would 
have been a new move from which various consequences would 
have flown. In the present instance what is happening is 
that a certain association has been existing for a considerable 
time past. A very great change came in the way of that
association....... from August 15th, 1947. Row another major
change is contemplated. Gradually the conception is changing 
yet that certain link remains in a different form."
He further said: (f) obviously a Declaration of 
this type, or the resolution I have placed before the house
is not capable of amendment Any treaty with any foreign
power can be accepted or rejected. It is a joint Declaration
( 2 )of eight countries - and it can not be amended in this House."^ ' 
Then followed a long and heated debate on the 
resolution ratifying the Declaration. It is unnecessary to 
refer to all points raised in this connection, because more 
or less the debate centered round the points covered by the 
selected passages from Mr. Rehru's speech.
It was in the resolution of the Imperial Conference 
of 1926, when the allegiance as a basis of the relation of the 
"autonomous communities within the British Empire" was asserted. 
This was slightly modified when the same basis was re-asserted 
in the Preamble of the Statute. This was "inasmuch as the 
Grown is the symbol of the free association of the members 
of the British Commonwealth and they are united by a common 
allegiance." It is this basis which has been reiterated in 
the first paragraph of the Declaration. The Crown has two 
aspects. First serves the purpose of being the centre of the 
whole Commonwealth and secondly is regarded as a symbol of 
their free association. The Grown in its first aspect is 
plainly a basis of "common allegiance" on the part of the
(1) Ibidem, p.8.
(2) Ibidem.
members of the Commonwealth. In other words, a sort of union, 
indeed personal only, was established. The King thus became 
the head of every member State. "Symbol" according to the 
Oxford Dictionary, is defined as a "thing regarded by general 
consent as naturally typifying or representing or recalling 
something by possession of analogous qualities or by association 
in fact or thought; mark or character taken as the conventional 
sign of some object or idea or process." The Crown, therefore, 
in its second aspect is a symbol which has been conventionally 
fixed as representing the free association of the member nations, 
This may be put in other words like this: The Crown being the
centre of allegiance has its legal existence and in this aspect 
acts as the head of the member States and by the fact that all 
member States recognise the same Grown renders this as a 
personal union of all of them. And from this legal source 
flows allegiance throughout the Commonwealth. But as regards 
its function it has its distinguishable existence. The Crown 
when acting for the United Kingdom is the Crown of the United 
Kingdom and nothing else, when acting for South Africa it is 
the Grown of South Africa and nothing e l s e . T h u s  it has its 
identical existence for all members. In its relation to each 
member State it is a matter of municipal law; whereas its 
recognition as the common Crown for all member States becomes 
a subject of international law.
As a symbol of free association it has no legal 
significance except that all member States treat it as a 
recognisable sign of their free association. The source of 
such a recognition is neither a subject of Constitutional law 
nor that of international law but merely connotes a sort of 
Convention in its very loose sense. This symbol becomes real
(1) The Attorney General of Quebec v. the
Attorney General of Canada, (infra)
(2) As regards inter se doctrine see subsequent
discussion on this aspect.
when the legal function of the headship is assigned to it.
It may be argued that a "Grom" is Grown in every 
sense of the word whether used as a symbol of free association 
or basis of common allegiance. It was probably in view of 
^his particular sense that the term "the Grown" connotes, that 
India thought it necessary to replace the Crown with the King 
so that all attributes of prerogatives or governance may be 
eliminated.
Are these two aspects separable from one another?
Was this separation ever effected before India established
her telation on the latter basis? As seen already, allegiance
was not done away with even when the Irish Free State abolished
the oath of allegiance to the Crown and excluded it entirely
(I)from internal affairs. In this sense, it may be stated, it
is doubtful whether any separation was ever maintained. When 
viewpoint of the 
considered from the/Irish Free State, it may be remembered
that provision was made to utilize the King's signature for 
external purposes; but there was either no recognition of the 
King or was as recognised by the other Dominions. The Irish 
spokesman said: "We are associates of the states of the 
Commonwealth; but if they regard the existence of the King 
as a necessary link; if they consider as the bond they have,
then we have not got that bond we are externally
associated with the States of the British Commonwealth."
But associated by what? What was the basis and source of 
this association? The only thing that can be concluded from 
the arrangements made for the appointment of Foreign represent­
atives under the signature is that the King was recognised 
so far as international law is concerned. Any symbol has 
no legal identity or function assigned to it. Therefore it 
may be submitted till the day the Declaration was made there 
was no separation between reality and symbolism of the Crown.
(1) British view.
It had. these two aspects held together. It was, however,
suggestive of the Crown's separable aspectsw The Declaration
for the first time separated not the Grown as the Grown of
the Dominions and the symbol of the free association but rather
as the Grown of the Dominions and the King as the symbol of
their free association.
The fundamental change that was brought about by
the Declaration was that the basis of membership of the
Gommonwealth assumed two distinct characters. One by accepting
the Grown as the head of the member State as well as accepting
the King as the symbol of free association, and second, merely
by recognising the King as a symbol of free association.
The question arises: Is there any difference between
these two kinds of members? The Declaration rules out such
difference by the very fact that India has not only a member
but a full member. There is, therefore, no difference of 
of
status but/the basis of membership. It has been made rather
more emphatic when it was declared that the basis of the
membership of other members including Pakistan and Geylon
was not thereby changed.' But Pakistan as stated already,
has replaced the oath of allegiance, with the exception of
the Governor-General, for all other officers of the State.
In view of this change it is suggested that allegiance should
be treated as that of the States and not of the nationals,
as the grammatical construction of the phrase suggests.
It is the"members of the Commonwealth of Nations united by
common allegiance" who owe allegiance. Obviously it- refers totbe
autonomous communities within the British Empire as defined
in 1926 or members of the British Gommonwealth as declared
in 1951, or members of the Commonwealth as reiterated in 1947.
But can a State owe allegiance to some external 
a
authority and still be/sovereign? Is the Grown for the
(1) Latham: op. citjp.
purposes of Pakistan a supra national authority? The Grown, 
certainly, is the Grown of a certain Dominion and hence is 
not an external personality. If the King is a head of a State 
then naturally all who act in his name and also the nationals 
should owe allegiance to him. It is possible that for the 
internal purposes Pakistan could alter the oath of allegiance 
as was done by Eire long ago.
There is one more point to be discussed. What does 
the phrase "the King as the symbol of the free association 
of the independent member Nations and as much as the Head of 
the Commonwealth" signify? Is the Gommonwealth an organisation 
like that of the United Nations of which the King has been 
accepted as a head? In order to reply to this question one 
is obliged to assess the character of the Gommonwealth in 
comparison with other such organizations.
The United Nations Organisation is as was its 
predecessor the league of Nations, an association of sovereign 
States which have joined together to pursue#ace and peaceful 
settlement of all disputes. By joining the United Nations 
each member State does not lose or subtract its own sovereign 
character, but certainly undertakes an obligation to abide by 
the rules of the Charter. The acceptance of this obligation 
does not impose any limitations on the sovereign independence 
of States but persuades them to pursue a peaceful and reasonable 
course of conduct in their relations with one and another 
both in co-operation and in settlement of certain matters of 
international concern.
The other important feature of the United Nations, 
as was the case of the League of Nations, is that it has its 
own legal existence; enjoying all the attributes of a Corporation 
sole and thus can sue and be sued, and is given immunities.
But this legal existence is not the result of any subtraction 
from the national sovereignty thereby setting up a supra national
State as a federal government does in the case ff its
constituent parts. The creation is not a result of a
subtraction of national sovereignties but on the contrary
is the result of a free contribution of goodwill and good
are
faith.- The rights and duties/assigned to it in order to have 
a better means of building up a healthy and happy international 
society. To borrow SbhlOsberg’ expression, the United 
Nations Organization is no more a super State than a Company 
in private law, is a super person. A Limited Company is 
brought into existence by pooling shares together which are 
contributed by share holders in good faith, out of good will 
and for a certain object, and in order to give it legal 
personality it is duly registered. This does not subtract 
any significance from the shareholders personality. No iota 
of his personality is lost. This definition is without any 
reservations applicable to the United Nations Organizations,
As its object is to maintain peace it has not only a big 
organization consisting of several branches dealing with 
different aspects but also has the Court of International 
(Justice which adjudicates international law, whatever be its 
limitations.
In recent times, of. considerable interest seems
(o')
to be the Netherlands Indonesian Union which had come into'- ' 
existence as a result of the decisions reached in "The Round 
Table Conference" of the delegates of:
(1) The Kingdom of the Netherlands
(2) The Government of the Republic of Indonesia
(3) The Federal Consultative Assembly.
The Draft Union Statute laid down every detail of organs of
the Union and also rules governing the procedure. It also 
makes provision for the Head of the Union and defines the
(1) Schlosberg op.oit. wherein he compares
the Commonwealth to the League of Nations.
(2) Now this has'l^eclared to be terminated by
Indonesia./'
purpose, powers and procedure of the Court of Arbitration.
As regards the head of the State it is stated:
(1) At the head of the Union shall be Her Majesty,
Queen Juliana, Princess of Orange Nassau, and in case of 
succession Her lawful successors in the Crown of the 
Netherlands.
(2) In case of minority of the head of the Union, or 
in case of the Head of the Union being unable to perform 
his Office, both partners shall make the necessary provision 
in common agreement. Such provision may be made in common 
agreement in advance.  ^^ ^
It is obvious that the Commonwealth as it exists
today has no legal personality of its own as the United
States Organisation has. It can neither sue nor be sued,
nor is there any elaborate organization as the U.N.O.
Lord Bruce in February 1948, moved a resolution in the House
of Lords that a permanent secretariat for the conduct of
Commonwealth affairs, be set up but it was obvious from the 
with
reaction it met/in the Dominions that the Dominions as usual 
were divided in two groups and Canada was on South Africa's 
side, who rejected any such idea, whereas Australia and 
New Zealand seemed to welcome the plan which in fact was 
originated in Australia.
The well known Colonial Conference changed into 
the Imperial Conference and made an attempt to lay down some 
rules and conventions both in respect of removing inequalities 
between the Dominions and the United Kingdom as well as in 
respect of those concerned with co-operation among the members 
of the Commonwealth but very soon it became evident that even 
this machinery had served its purpose by removing inequalities;
(1) Official Report entitled "Round Table Conference"
published by the'Secretary-General of the 
Round Table Conference, p.11, Article 5 (1,2).
(2) See|,H.L. Vol. 153, 17th Feb. 1948.
Cols. 1102-1163.
and was replaced by the Prime Minister's Conference. Canada 
does not seem to agree with any formal machinery like the 
Imperial Conference having broader representation. There 
are no rules of procedure governing these Conferences except 
that some ceremonial traditions have been adhered to without 
any objection from any quarter. There will be occasion to 
discuss the more formal conventions laid down by the Imperial 
Conference for the purposes of guiding co-operation and 
consultation within the Commonwealth; but suffice it here 
to state that elaboration of any formal machinery seems to 
be out of date.
The question, therefore, arises: What is meant by 
assigning the headshi.p of the Commonwealth in which tendencies 
against formalism seem to be growing stronger? It has neither 
rules of procedure nor organisations, except whatever inform­
ation passes between the Commonwealth office in London and 
its counterparts in the Dominions. It is, Indeed, very 
difficult to state how and in what respect the head of the 
Commonwealth will perform his functions. For the present it 
appears to be entirely ceremonial and symbolic than real.
The fact becomes obvious when compared with the head of the 
Netherlands-Indonesian Union who has some real existence 
with rules laid down governing its future. The British 
institutions have never been defined and it is against the 
spirit of these ever-growing and living institutions to be 
confined within the frame of definition. The head of the 
Commonwealth is real in the sense that round him revolves 
the whole free association as, besides this, there is no other 
recognisable basis of the unity.
It may as well be suggested that. India by accppting 
the King as the symbol of free association and as such the 
head of the Commonwealth of which she has retained membership, 
has recognised the King as its head for the Gommonvfealth
purposes. In other words India has two kinds of heads.
The President presides over matters concerned with municipal 
and international laws, while the King presides over matters 
concerned with the Gommonwealth. There is indeed some logical 
force in this argument, hut there are twofold difficulties. 
First, the Indian Government, as is evident from Nehru's 
speech, does not recognise it, and secondly the conventions 
of the Commonwealth do not lay down such rules as to give 
them the character of a coherent system of law. There is, 
at least at the present time, no coherent system of rules.
It is not denied, however, that the membership of the 
Commonwealth must imply some sort of obligation. The nature 
and scope of such obligations will be discussed presently.
V.
Closely allied with allegiance is the question 
of the British nationality. Every person born within His 
Majesty's Dominions and allegiance was knoiwi as a British 
subject. The protected persons did not come within this 
definition; though they were treated for purposes of diplomatic 
protection as such. ; The importance of the British nationality 
lay in the fact that it provided a common status throughout 
the Commonwealth and the Empire. It may, however, be borne 
in mind that this formed "an indelible but important" common 
status in fundamental law and was not, despite the reference 
in the Balfour Memorandum to Common Allegiance as the basis 
of Commonwealth unity, a common basis running throughout the 
Commonwealth. Latham, commenting on this fact as it existed 
in 1935 wrote; '.'....there was in 1920 no common allegiance, 
in the strict sense,, of the citizens of all member nations
of the Commonwealth because even at that time the incidents 
attached to Commonwealth in the Dominions were widely different, 
and the classes of persons regarded by various Dominions as 
within the allegiance did not exactly coincide."
In 1946 Canada defined the Conditions determining 
the acquisition and loss of Canadian citizenship but at the 
same time continued to recognise the British subjects thereby 
retaining the common status. This departure from the Common 
Code by Canada made it necessary to study the question of 
common status at an expert level. The question was studied 
in the Conference of experts in London in February 1947 which 
was attended by representatives of all the members of the 
Commdnwealth including Eire and also Burma and Geylon. The 
role of Indian representatives was that of observers.
The question was whether or not the Dominions could 
legislate separately like Canada on the subject of nationality. 
In the view of the Government of the United Kingdom, "common
status", if abolished, would amount to bringing about an end
(2 )of the common allegiance. But the Report^ ' recommended that 
there was nothing incompatible for a Dominion to enact 
separately for its own nationality and also make provisions 
for certain purposes for "common status". It declared 
"that the adoption of a scheme of legislation which combined 
citizenship with the maintenance of the common status of 
British subjects throughout.- the Gommonwealth would be desirable. 
Such a system would give clear recognition to the separate 
identity of particular countries of the Commonwealth, 
clarifies position with regard to diplomatic protection, 
and enables a Government when making treaties with other 
countries, to define with precision who are the persons 
belonging to its country and on whose behalf it is negotiated.
It would also enable each country to malce alterations in
(1) Latham:
(2) G.M.D. 7326.
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its nationality laws without having first, as under the 
common system, to consult the other countries of the 
Commonwealth and to assertâin whether the alterations 
contemplated would impair the common status. The esentialg 
features of such a system are that each of the countries shall 
by its legislation determine who are its citizens, shall 
declarethose citizens to be British subjects and shall recognise 
as British subjects the citizens of the other countries.
For this last purpose there is need of a "common clause" of 
which the substantial effect should be the same in each 
country, to ensure that all persons recognised as British 
subjects in any part of the Commonwealth shall be so recognised 
throughout the Common wealth^^^." It was the acceptance of 
this suggestion which resulted in the abandonment of common 
status by the Act of 1948. It is obvious that this Act 
in a sense met the changed situation caused by including the 
Eastern Dominions in the Commonwealth. Any legislation with 
common consultation and agreement would have been almost 
impossible in view of the fact that South Africa maintains 
racial discrimination and Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
are not prepared to allow Indians or other coloured races 
to immigrate as they do the Europeans. What is most important 
from the standpoint of the Commonwealth law, is the fact that 
the common status owing its existence to the common allegiance, 
was replaced by the common status, with mutual undertaking.
The source of common status also disappeared as soon as it was 
abandoned. There is nothing against any foreign country 
joining such an arrangement. Eire, for example, a foreign 
country since the repeal of External Relations Act of 1949, 
has been accepted on this basis. Compare India's position in 
the Commonwealth in this respect, with Eire which is not a 
member, There was another A c t, namely India (Consequential
(1) Ibidem.
(2) The British Nationality Act, I948.
provision) Act 1949 necessary in view of the fact that India 
became a Republic and recognised the King only as a symbol 
of free association. There is in substance no difference 
between India and Eire except that the latter recognises the 
King as a symbol. In other words a separate enactment was 
necessary to make provision for India. There is no difference 
of substance, in this respect, between Eire and India.
The Nationality Act, further, made distinction 
possible for the purposes of international law. In inter­
national law nationals of the Dominions are known by the 
name of their own State.
The term "British subject" is synonymous with 
Commonwealth citizen. This was obviously needed because 
sentimentally the Dominions were divided on this question 
and after dropping the adjective "British" from the Title 
of the Commonwealth, failure to make provision to this effect 
in the Commonwealth would have been grave. It was further 
needed because that common allegiance is no longer the legal 
tie as it existed in the Empire as distinct from the 
Commonwealth.
This enactment has undoubtedly removed a dangerous 
point of immediate friction which would have undermined the 
very basis of partnership in the Gommonwealth, but the fact 
remains; the future of the Commonwealth entirely depends, 
not on any existing legal basis or system of law but entirely 
on mutual understanding and reciprocal benefits as is evident 
from this Act. Any discrimination, if allowed, would make 
the partners feel strange, nay antagonistic, and as a result 
of that the very basis of partnership will be at stake.
"The time has come for old ways of thought to be discarded 
and the partner States in the(British) Commonwealth should 
take a new attitude to the Commonwealth. Until 1947, the
British Gommonwealth consisted of self-governing na.tions of 
the white races, hut now the partnership includes self-governing 
nations of coloured races. Moreover the day is not far off 
when other Colonial possessions, the inhabitants of which are 
coloured, will rightly be admitted to the partnership. Race 
or colour should not, so far as British subjects are concerned, 
in themselves be barriers to complete freedom for British 
subjects to settle in other parts of the Commonwealth in their 
attainment of equal political status with other communities 
in the territories where they settle. If there is discrimination 
how can there be equality of status."^' *'
VI.
The Commonwealth as defined through the resolutions 
of the Imperial Conferences and as manifested by the machinery 
of consultation and co-operation, was based not only on the 
conventions concerned with iequalities but those of co-operation. 
It is indeed interesting to note that the emphasis has slowly 
been shifting from the former to the latter. The historical 
study of the evolution of Dominion status will reveal that 
greater emphasis was laid by the United Kingdom on the 
Conventions of co-operation while the Dominions, especially 
the radical one, attached greater importance to those concerned 
with inequalities. It is evident from the study of the 
Conventions of first category that they have become comparatively 
less important and for Gountaies like South Africa they are of 
less importance, whereas no importance is attached to them by 
India and Pakistan. Thus they are no more rules defining 
the common basis of the Commonwealth relations,
(l) Fitzgerald 0. Richard: "The Twilight Of Dominion 
Status."
Current Legal ^Problems. Ed.George W.Keeton 
and George Schwarzenberg. London. 1949. 
p. 202-225.
It was declared that the Commonwealth co-operation 
was governed by the "inter se" doctrine. The essence of this 
doctrine was that relations between members of the Oomrnonvfealth 
were "sni generis" and more intimate than relations between 
other nations and for the preservation of this uniqueness and
( 1)intimacy they should be separated from international relations,
and hence the applicability of international law to the
Commonwealth relations was ruled out. In view of this, the
Imperial Conference, 1930, had recommended that an "ad hoc"
Tribunal, the personnel of iMiich were to be entirely drawn
from the Commonwealth should be set up to settle differences
between the members of the Commonwealth whenever such a need
arose. As regards the different reactions to the "inter se"
doctrine Latham observed: "the inter se doctrine.....  is
dominant in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand,
and strong in Canada, on the other hand radicals in Ireland,
South Africa and Canada feel that their national independence
against the encroachment of Great Britain or a co-operative
Commonwealth conspiracy, must not lack whatever prestige or
protection the recognition of their full and perfect
(o')
sovereignty in international law can bring. " ^
It is worth noting that the imperial relations
began to shift slowly from the level of constitutional law
towards that of international law, as the Colonies emerged
this change
as international persons, but to arrest/or at least maintain 
the intimate character of the relations, the inter se doctrine 
under the protection of "sûi generis" definition was propounded 
but the struggle continued. The relations of the British 
Government with Indian States, on the other hand, were caused 
to shift slowly from the basis of international law towards 
that of constitutional law but stopped short of merging into
(1) Latham : op.cit.
(2) Latham : op.oit. p. 602.
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it because of the reluctance on the part of the Indian rulers 
and to create a via media, the theory of personal relationship 
was propounded. The struggle between the Dominions and the 
United Kingdom continued but the inter se doctrine could not 
gain recognition. The struggle between the Indian States and 
the United Kingdom too continued but as the British Government 
in India was succeeded by the Govemmentaof the new Dominions, 
the conflict was ultimately solved by their incorporation into 
the Dominions, thereby merging into the system of municipal 
law completely. In both cases, it is evident that the underlying 
force pressing for change has been entirely political.
It is notorious that the Irish Free State treated the 
relations
intra.0ommonwealth/as international. South Africa, in General 
Hertzog's Government's view, held that its relations with other 
Commonwealth countries were essentially international, albeit 
the "inter se" doctrine is applied to them of free will. The 
Liberals in Canada also held similar v i e w s T h e  first 
occasion to use the machinery of "ad hoc" Tribunal arose when 
in 1932-33 proposals were made to settle the dispute between 
the United Kingdom and the Irish Free State as to the payment 
of land annuities but this prpposal was turned down by the Irish 
Free State on the ground that the arbitrator should be a 
•foreigner, that is from any foreign country outside the British 
Commonwealth.
In recent times as already referred to, India has 
taken the cases in respect of South African Indians and Kashmir 
to the Security Council. Mr. Nehru has categorically asserted 
that this was done because any reference to any Commonwealth 
Tribunal would have made the Commonv?ealth "a kind of superior 
body. Reserving the comment as to how far this contention has 
any validity, it is desirable to sum up the above discussion 
to see whether the membership of the Commonwealth has in fact,
(l) Ibidem.
entirely from the Indian National standpoint "Independence plus".
As discussed in the above paragraphs that there is 
neither any legal basis, nor the basis of Conventions that 
make conditions of membership very strict. There is no organ­
isation and no elaborate rules for procedure. Those laid down 
have never been accepted by all members. Almost every rule 
whether legal or conventional, has been broken by Eire and 
subsequently conceded . by the members of the Commonwealth.
The Indian Independence Act being a document of transfer of 
sovereignty, unreservedly handed over to India and Pakistan, 
makes the membership of the new Dominions dependent on the 
meaning and definition they give to it. There is no room left 
for the continuity of such rules or conventions which appear 
to be objectionable to any member of the Gommonwealth. The 
Commonwealth has ^ become a sort of loose association; in Nehrp's 
words, with no obligations or commitments except friendly 
gestures and approaches. The Commonwealth as such Is certainly 
of advantage to any country and India positively has assumed
b
Independence plus these advantages when she became a sovereign 
Republic and still arranged to continue her membership. The 
plus sign signifies all the advantages that India or Pakistan 
would gain by remaining within the Commonwealth and there will 
be nothing on the minus side to lose in return.
VII.
Some writers suggest that the British Commonwealth 
of Nations grew and developed without any cut and fast rules 
because the British genius suited it and the people constituting 
it were predominantly British. Now that the three Eastern 
nations have been included in the Commonwealth, it is highly
imperative that the unwritten rules of the Commonwealth he 
replaced by some sort of formal conventions or agreements.
They put forward this argument to justify the formal declaration 
of these rules and conventions in the shape of an agreement 
with Ceylon.
It is already asserted, that the rules governing the 
intrà-Commonwealth relationship are such as are not unanimously 
agreed to. The result of the lack of agreement is that they 
are not fundamental rules making it necessary for the member 
States to abide by them. There is no sanction behind to 
enforce them. They have so far entirely depended on good faith 
and goodwill of the members. The rules having no sanction 
behind them are equally worthless when put in some formal way; 
and no such binding force is possible to give them unless a 
unanimous agreement is reached on them. The fact that Ceylon 
has agreed to give its consent in the shape of a formal agreement 
is not attractive enough for other Eastern Dominions to follow 
the example. :
The Commonwealth, indeed, to make it an enduring 
institution, needs some sort of conventions, rules, customs 
or traditions as are agreed upon by all members of the 
Commonwealth. The conventions concerned with co-operation, 
efen after eliminating some of those that have been objected 
to by one or other members, will still consist of such rules 
about which there will be no disagreement. Certainly such 
rules can form the corpus of the conventions of the intra- 
Commonwealth co-operation. The basis must consist of only 
those rules which are, without a single exception, agreed upon 
by all. If there are other Dominions vfao find some other rules 
toq be retained advantageously, they must be at liberty to 
continue them but they should be excluded from the essentials 
of the intra-Gommonwealth relations. They are, in fact.
practiced at present, and there would be no difficulty in 
reiterating them at some future conference.
This, once again, asserts the point made while
discussing the legal basis of the Commonwealth. It may be
recalled that at present there is no legal basis fundamental
or essential to the Commonwealth except the fact that the King
the
has been recognised as a symbol of/free association and as such 
the Head of the Commonwealth. This is the minimum qualification 
that is essential for any member to continue its membership 
or a new one to join this association with consent of the 
members; but it is not incompatible for other members who 
desire so, to make the bond more intimate and strong by 
acknowledging not only the allegiance to the King but in a 
sense the theory of the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament. 
The extra-factors do not come into the category of essentials 
of the intra-Coramonwealth relations. In the same way, the 
conventions concerned with co-operation agreed upon by all 
should form the conventional basis of the intra-Commonwealth 
relationship and the extra-factors of this category too 
should be reserved for those who find it advantageous.
It is, at this stage, desirable to examine whether 
or not there is a need of an impartial Tribunal^to 
adjudicate these rules and also whether or not these rules 
should be codified in a coherent system. But the answer to 
these questions depends on two facts. First, what is the 
reaction to such a Tribunal from the nationalid:standpoint 
and secondly, whether the residuum of the rules thus entirely 
agreed on by all members is such as to need an impartial body 
of adjudication.
Mr. Nehru took the view that such a body would 
imply a kind of supra-national supervisory jurisdiction.
(1) See for general discussion: The British Empire.
Chap. XVII. The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 2nd ed. 1939.
It is not clear on what ground this implication is drawn.
If the authority of such a body is defined to be derived from 
the King or his symbolic headship of the Commonwealth, then 
undoübttedly this implication has some grain of truth; but 
this argument withers away when the authority assigned to
such body is derived from the source of the common consent 
of the members of the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth was dismembered between December 
10th and 12th, as far as South Africa and the Irish Free State 
were concerned. If the Commonwealth after this dismemberment 
came together once again on December 12th 1936, naturally the 
authority of reuniting the Commonwealth was derived not from 
the King but from his peoples or their representatives - the 
parliaments. The formula evolved by India to retain her 
membership of the Commonwealth snapped the legal basis of 
this relationship. The other argument s on the question of 
the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament in respect of India, 
and Pakistan have already been advanced and the King was, 
before adopting the Republican Constitution of India and 
Pakistan, an external link of personal union. The sovereignty 
which was assigned by the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
fo the Crown for the purposes of the Government of India 
in its executive aspect, was unreservedly transferred to India 
and Pakistan by the Indian Independence Act. India and 
Pakistan could either continue the personal union in inter­
national law or could abolish it all together without any 
reference to the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The consent 
of other member States to the formula evolved by India was 
necessary because that was likely to affect the Commonwealth 
but this did hot amount to a limitation on the sovereignty 
of India or Pakistan.
The sanction, therefore, lying behind the . :v.
residue of the Commonwealth Conventions is derived from the
sovereignty of the member States and not that of the King 
as was the case in the Empire. This is the fundamental 
difference which exists between the Commonwealth on the one 
side and the British Empire on the other.
Any tribunal, "ad hoc" or permanent, does not imply 
■ subordination on the part of the member States because 
it would be a creation of their authority.As is the case of 
the Court of Intemational Justice or of the Tribunal set up 
by the Statute of the Union of the Nether lands-Indonesia.
Is it desirable or necessary at all to have a
separate tribunal side by side with the Court of International
Justice? The residue of the conventions, certainly, is
confined to co-operation or to friendly suggestions only,
but this does not exclude the possibility of friction or
conflict between member States as is in fact existing between
India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir. The Court of
International Justice has its own limitations and further
its existence is not a bar against other "ad hoc" or permanent
tribunals because disputes are of various kinds and of varying
implications. It is possible that certain issues may be
settled more conveniently by some tribunal other than the
Court of International Justice. The Commonwealth of free
association for certain issues may provide a more friendly
atmosphere than the Court of International Justice. There
may be some issue which could be better settled on political
level coupled with impartial juristic dealing than a purely
legal handling. A Tribunal of the Commonwealth may be as well 
not
able to depend/only on the traditions of the Commonwealth 
relationship and the intimacy existing between the parties, 
but also on the fact that the ground would have been prepared 
by ^ : discussions on the issue, among the members to iron
out differences at some other level.
Any tribunal set up for the Commonwealth will not 
be governed by the inter se doctrine, because that is no more 
an essential basis of the Commonwealth. There could be a 
President from some foreign country and this might remove 
limitations of the selection being confined to the Commonwealth 
and thus might become acceptable to all. The difference between 
the Boundary Commissions and the Bagge Commission (indo-Pakistan 
disputes concerning boundaries) manifests that India and 
Pakistan have in fact acted and such a tribunal has been of 
great benefit to both countries. Why not a second for other 
remaining disputes?
What principles will such a tribunal apply to the
disputes? "The Commonwealth law and Convention" Latham wrote
in 1936, "have undergone several changes which bring them
nearer In character to international law and further from
it was
municipal law." The case today is stronger than/in 1936.
The Intra^.Commonwealth relations are entirely international 
but more effective because they are based on good faith and 
good will of its members. There was nothing against the 
Commonvæalth judges applying the principles of international 
law, or even international law, in 1936. If the force of its 
application to a particular group under some particular 
conditions and circumstances makes it more effective and 
satisfactory, this should be credited to the good faith of 
the members; but these facts of its being effective under 
favourable conditions and ineffective under divergent circum­
stances, do not change its character. The international 
society as it exists at present, is yet in its primacy and 
societies, groups and associations among the member nations 
is a positive sign of its growth and progress. The,Commonwealth 
of Nations too is such a group contributing to the making 
of a more stable and larger society.
VII.
Sometimes it has been argued that there being no 
binding force of systematic laws or some centre of supreme 
authority and loyalty, there would be nothing to stop the 
member States to plunge into war against each other. The 
case in point is that of India and Pakistan. In 1948, a 
controversy arose on the question whether or not India and 
Pakistan being members of the Commonwealth and owing allegiance 
to the same Crown., could declare war against each other. The 
controversy originated from the gesture to this effect by 
the author of an article entitled "Conflict Problems" published 
in the Indian law R e v i e w . I t  was acutely criticised by 
the "Amrit Bazaar Patrika"; the newspaper of Calcutta in its 
editorial of 5th April 1948 to which two correspondents replied. 
Mr. B.C. Mitter in his letter posed some questions and deduced 
that "If the Indian Union or Pakistan can make peace or war 
with other independent States or with themselves, what is 
there to be said against what has been said in the "Conflict 
Problems" in the Indian law Review? The deduction was based 
on the premises that "the British Crown has the common link, 
but does not impose any fetter on their sovereign States." (sic) 
Dr. Banerjee in c3.earer terms opined that "the doctrine of 
the unity of the Crown, is one of the fundamental concepts
of the Constitutional system of the British Empire. It was
I in 
,(3)
(o')
judicially accepted in William v. Howarth^ ' and used
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide S.S. Co,
It may be argued that the former case was decided at a time 
when the present concept of Dominion status had not emerged 
and even the latter case preceded the Imperial Conference of 
1926. Whether a competent judicial tribunal will emphasise 
the doctrine of the unity of the Crown in 1948 is doubtful. 
Moreover if the doctrine were applied too strictly strange
(1) 1948. (Probably April).
(2) 1905 (A.G. 550.)
(3) 1920, 28 C.L.R. 129.
results might follow. For instance, there could never be a . 
legal dispute between two or more of the Governments of the
British Empire  In several cases the Courts have tried
to solve this problem by distinguishing between the King 
qcting through one Dominion or Colonial Government and the 
King acting through another Dominion or Colonial Government.
Now if the King acting through the Province of Quebec can sue 
the King acting through,the Dominion of Canada it is difficult 
to see why, from the point of view of law, the King acting 
through the Dominion of India can not declare war against the 
King acting through the Dominion of Pakistan. The neutrality 
of Eire in the second world war seems to be a decisive
( o)
repudiation of the doctrine of the unity of the Grown. " ^ ' 
Declaration of war and conclusion of peace are 
certainly attributes of sovereignty of an independent State; 
and there can be no international person in the strict sense 
of the term without such attributes; but the question has to 
be studied from other angles as well. There is nothing in 
the way of stopping a member . : ' State of the Commonwealth from 
declaring war against another member State. The theory of 
the unity of the Crown also has already been rejected for the 
reasons set out  ^ , But the Commonwealth association is
a sort of alliance, indeed not resting on the unity of the 
Crown but on the solemn undertaking of maintaining peaceful 
relations with one and another, by all of its members. Alliance 
and remaining neutral in the conflict when the rest of the 
members of the Commonwealth were at war with the Axis powers, 
was possible because, in the first place, it does not affect 
this undertaking and in the second place it is not an "all or 
none" affair, but is determined by the terras defined by the
(1) Attorney-General for Quebec v. Attorney-General
for Canada. Exparte Silver Bros. 1932 (A.C.514).
(2) Anil Chandra Banerjee's letter to The Amrit
Bazaar Patriea, Calcutta, dated 20th
April, 1948.
terras of the ■undertaking. In the case of the Commonwealth 
there are no formal treaties but as has been observed, 
Conventions that provide basis for partnership are of the 
same effect. The Conventions, the sanction of which lies 
with the member States, are indeed vague. For example, on 
the question of War, South Africa by joining it included war 
within the purview of the alliance, whereas Eire excluded it 
by remaining neu’fcral; but Eire's neutrality did not prevent 
it from co-operating with the Commonwealth in other fields.
Now consider the question of w#r being declared by 
a member State on another member State. Alliance and 
neutrality, as seen in Eire's case, was not an impossibility, 
but contrary to this, alliance and war can not go hand in hand 
for the obvious reason that war suspends or destroys all 
friendly relations; there are certain exceptions to it. The 
treaties to regulate the conduct of war, for instance, continue 
and do not require revival after it s termination. But 
Treaties of Alliance certainly -will be "ipso facto" ^^^  
abrogated by the declaration of war. The Dominion iMiich
declares war or attacks another Dominion, it is submitted,
automatically in view of war will break off its relations 
from the rest of the Dominions. What is the position of
Kashmir? It certainly does not form part of any Dominion,
or at least is not so far recognised as such. Therefore the 
conflict between two Dominions should not be treated as war 
between the new Dominions.
The obligation not to declare war against other 
member States is a necessary condition for the association, 
but should not be treated as a limitation on the sovereignty 
of the Dominion. They can declare war any time if they are
(1) See for a detailed account of Eire's co-operation
with the United Kingdom during war. Mansergh.p.SlO
(2) Macnair: Treaties. Chap.XLIV. For the General
Discussion on the effect of war on Treaties.
prepared to bear the loss of membership. The position is 
exactly the same when two countries come into alliance in 
virtue of some treaty. Such countries can not take any action 
inconsistent with the treaty of Alliance without impairing 
the treaty itself. This is a self-imposed limitation which 
every country does fqr some or other purpose.
VIII.
In the light of the foregoing discussion one is 
inclined to conclude that there exists some difference in the 
bases of membership of the Oommomvealth but does it not also 
imply any difference of status? India's membership being of 
a different nature than' that of Australia, India should have 
been able to exert less weight than Australia. This is not 
true. There is absolutely no difference of status whatsoever. 
Such was the case with Eire too.
TheiijOue may query why did Eire leave the Commonwealth? 
Was it not possible for her, in spite of repealing the.External 
Relations Act in 1949, to retain her membership? and was the 
acknowledgment of the King either as the Head of a State or 
as the Head of the Commonwealth, an essential condition for 
membership? The answer to this question certainly seems to 
be what Fitzgerald wrote - "Eire has preferred the Harp to 
the Crom, and has legally become a foreign State. If any 
partner State should feel that she can not accept the King 
as the symbol of the Commonwealth relationship, it is better
for that State to renounce its membership. The membership 
is a privilege, not a p u n i s h m e n t I t  seems now that the 
Commonwealth has reached its final phase of evolution. There
(1) Fitzgerald: op.cit.
3^
is no further development or change likely, India is sitting 
on the fence and may go the way Eire did. For the present, 
qs is apparent from her policy, it is advantageous for her 
to condone the symbolic reference to the King but tomorrow 
she may find some other source, say America, Russia or even 
she may become herself strong enough, and this symbolic 
reference too may trouble her. She may decide to leave the 
Ooramonwealth. This may prompt others to follow suit.
The wisdom of such rigidity is doubtful. It is 
equally doubtful to predict that the secession of Eire 
necessarily Implies rigidity. What opinion was expressed 
by Fitzgerald, though supported by the secession of Eire, 
is not a safe ground to say that no change is likely to come in 
to change the basis of the entra-Commonwealth relationship.
The future of the Commonwealth should serve the 
purpose of preparing the ground for greater international 
undei'stending and not the object of delaying the disintegration 
of the Empire. The nature of the Commonwealth as seen alz'eady 
has been fundamentally flexible, and at this stage it does 
not appear advisable to make it rigid and rely on an effete 
source of strength. The world is changing fast and the new 
world powers are already rallying small States round them; 
the hope for peace is growing slender. The Commonwealth may 
yet play a great role in the maintenance of international peace, 
This is possible not in virtue of its sources and strength 
as a third power, but in view of its peculiar character which 
gives it strength and vision to act when a situation demands it
The Commonwealth is the product of the aspirations 
of the Communities of the British Empire to attain nationhood, 
now it must live and grow upon the aspirations of establishing 
a world society.
